

This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:


- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + Refrain from automated querying Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at http://books.google.com/

The law of inheritance as in the Viramitrodaya of Mitra Misra

Golápchandra Sarkár (Sástri.)



Herbert L. Hahn Book Fund

6.15/

THE

LAW OF INHERITANCE

AS IN

THE VIRAMITRODAYA

o**y**

MITRA MISRA.

TRANSLATED

ΒY

GOLÁPCHANDRA SARKÁR, SÁSTRÍ, M.A., B.L.,



MESSRS. THACKER, SPINK AND CO.

BOMBAY: THACKER AND CO., MADRAS: HIGGINBOTHAM AND CO.,

LONDON: W. THACKER AND CO.

1879.

CALCUTIA:

PRINTED BY G. H. ROUSE, BAPTIST MISSION PRESS.

1879.

The Ponorable Sir Richard Garth, At., Q. C.,

CHIEF JUSTICE OF BENGAL,

THIS TRANSLATION

OF

THE VIRAMITRODAYA

18,

WITH HIS LORDSHIP'S PERMISSION,

RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED

BY HIS HUMBLE SERVANT,

THE AUTHOR.

PREFACE.

The Institutes of the various sages, which form the primary source of the Hindu law, treat of Law in the widest sense of the term. The rules embracing the religious rites and ceremonies and the moral duties of the different classes of the community, for the enforcement of which mere religious sanctions are prescribed, and the rules of positive law are laid down without any distinction. These rules are believed to be of divine origin;—a belief, not peculiar to the Hindus, but common to all nations who believe in the creation of man by God. In forming an adequate conception of the creation, one would naturally be impressed with the idea that some knowledge must have been originally revealed to man; for without it, the condition of those first created, would be utterly helpless.

The comprehensive name of 'Dharma Sástra' is applied by the Hindus to the records which embody the knowledge, believed by them to have been communicated by God to man. The Dharma Sástras are divided into two classes,—the Sruti and the Smriti. The former comprises the four Vedas consisting of Mantras and Bráhmanas, and the Upanishads, and is believed to record the very words revealed by the Deity. The Smriti comprehends the precepts of divine origin, not embodied in the words of the Deity himself, and includes the Institutes of the sages and certain works on medicine, music, the

grammar of the Sanskrit language and certain other subjects.

The Hiadu writers appear to be divided in opinion as to the origin of the Smritis. According to one view the knowledge embodied in them had been originally communicated to Manu who taught it to his disciples, and from them it was handed down traditionally from preceptor to disciple until its purport as remembered was recorded, but not in the language in which it had been originally delivered. Another theory is, that at the periodical destructions of the world, the Sruti alone is preserved, and everything else is lost, and that Manu who is immortal, comes forward on each occasion to teach the laws remembered by him But it will be observed that neither of these theories offers a satisfactory explanation of the existence of the Institutes of law promulgated by the different sages, inasmuch as all these sages are not supposed to have derived their knowledge from Manu himself. a third theory is put forward, that the rules set to the first-created by God were strictly observed by them and their descendants in the Satya Yuga or the age of Truth, and that the customs and usages which were observed by them in obedience to the remembered commands of God, formed the primary source from which laws were deduced by the sages and consolidated and embodied in the Institutes. This view is consistent with the doctrine that an immemorial custom is presumed to be founded on Sruti or revelation, and as such has the force of law, provided it is not expressly disapproved in any of the Sástras.

Although, according to modern notions, the method pursued by the sages, in laying down their laws without drawing any distinction between moral and legal obligations, may appear unphilosophical, still it is to be observed that so long as a divine origin of the laws is believed

ther

n as

the

ıni•

om

to

not

d.

of

ıg

·d

in, the legal, moral and religious sanctions would all act with equal force upon the minds of men, and so there would be no real difference between them. •It is only when the faith in the efficacy of religious ceremonies loses its grasp on the mind of the community, and the non-observance of the rules of morality and religion begins to be excused as a venial offence, not even meriting the punishment of excommunication, that the distinction between legal and religious rules becomes wide and apparent.

The precepts laid down in the Sástras are divided by the commentators into several classes. The proper object of the Sastras according to them, is to teach of things that lie beyond the scope of reason. What men would do or refrain from doing of their own accord from purely human motives, need not be laid down by the Sástras. Where a precept enjoins men to do a certain thing, when no reason could be suggested for doing it, it is called an utpatti vidhi or injunction. When a precept forbids men to do what they may do under the natural impulses, it is called a nishedha or prohibition. But a precept regarding what men may do, of their own accord, may come within the scope of the Sástras if it enjoins that act at a particular time or place. Such a precept is called a niyama vidhi or restrictive injunction. There is a third kind of precept called parisankhyá vidhi, which is an injunction in form, but a prohibition in purport. As for instance, "Man shall eat the flesh of the five clawed animals." This cannot be an utpatti vidhi, for men may do the same of their own accord; nor can it be a niyama, as no time or place is specified for compliance with the precept. The meaning therefore is • taken to be, that man shall not eat the flesh of any other clawed animal than the five specified ones. Sástras lay down a precept which is neither an utpatti vidhi nor a nishedha nor a niyama nor a parisankhya, or a precept which embodies what has been declared in another

precept or what may be deduced from another precept, it is called an *anuváda* or a superfluous precept that need not have been taid down.

Some of the later commentators hold that the Sástras in so far as they deal with positive law, are generally superfluous, inasmuch as the rules of positive law are deducible from reason, or in other words, from a consideration of what best conduces to the welfare of the community and suits the feelings of the people. The reason why positive laws have been laid down in the Institutes is then explained by saying, that they were intended to guard the unthinking from falling into error.

It has already been said that in the Institutes of Hindu law no distinction is drawn between positive law on the one hand and laws of morality and religion on the other. But it is to be observed that one of the principles on which that distinction is based at the present day, is wanting in the Hindu idea of Law. According to the modern view, positive laws are rules of conduct set by political superiors to political inferiors, whereas according to the Hindus, laws of every description emanated from the Supreme Being himself. The idea of a political superior amongst the Hindus did not carry with it the power of making laws for the guidance of the community. The function of the king, according to the Hindu notion, is to protect the country from foreign invasion, and to see that the laws are observed, but he is, equally with his subjects, bound to obey the self-same laws. It would have been humiliating to the pride of the intellectual aristocracy of • the Brahmans to concede to a king the power of making laws for their guidance.

But notwithstanding the want of the above feature in the Hindu notion of Law, it came to be noticed that obedience to laws of all descriptions could not be enforced by the king. A distinction therefore developed itself in

the body of the Hindu laws. In the earlier Institutes, we find no sort of method or arrangement: all kinds of rules are mixed up together. In the Institutes of Yájnavalkya, however, which is admittedly a later work, some trace of a distinction begins to be perceived. It adopts an improved arrangement, devoting a separate chapter to what may well correspond with positive law. This code is divided into three chapters. The first is the A'chára or ritual, which treats of the initiatory ceremonies, the duties of the different castes, the domestic and social usages and the rites of purification and sacrifice. The second chapter is called Vyavahára or litigation, which embraces adjective and substantive law. The third is termed Práyaschitta or expiation. which treats of the religious sanctions, and the mode in which sin incurred by the violation of rules is purged off. The Institutes of Yajnavalkya have, besides, improved the Hindu law on many points, of which one may be noticed here. that the cognates who are not recognized as heirs by Manu and other sages, are for the first time introduced by Yájnavalkya in the category of heirs.

Although Manu is theoretically said to be entitled to the greatest respect, still practically speaking, Yájnavalkya appears to have been held in the highest estimation by the Hindu lawyers. The Mitákshará which gives a systematic exposition of the Hindu law, and is held to be of the greatest authority in almost all the schools, professes to be but a commentary on the Institutes of Yájnavalkya, though it cites texts of other sages to support the doctrines propounded in it. It appears that there were other digests compiled previously, but all of them were replaced by the Mitákshará. This treatise however being, as its name indicates, a very concise one, the law enunciated in it, came to be differently understood by different persons. Thus arose various other commentaries which have concurrently with the Mitákshará

considerable weight in the schools of last by which they have respectively been adopted. Of all the later digests, the Dáyabhága alone, which is recognised by the Bengal School as of the highest authority, is, on many important points, opposed in doctrine to the Mitákshará. But nevertheless this treatise, excepting in so far as it has been modified by the Dáyabhága, may still be regarded as an authority for the Bengal School as well.

Some of the doctrines of the Mitakshara which are laid down in clear and unmistakeable language were attacked by the Dáyabhága and other treatises, and the reasoning by which they were arrived at, was criticised and impugned. A vindication therefore, of the doctrines of the Mitákshará would naturally be undertaken by the admirers of that treatise. This appears to be one of the objects for which the Víramitrodaya came into existence. It examines copiously the arguments by which the doctrines of the Mitákshará were assailed, exposes their fallacy and, when necessary, puts forward reasons to support the principles laid down in the Mitakshara. hibits a strong feeling of antagonism to the Dayabhága, and omits no opportunity of exposing its errors of reasoning. The Viramitrodaya has, however, on several points dissented from the Mitákshará, and although it serves as the ablest vindication of the doctrines laid down in that treatise, it is in itself an independent work giving a complete and accurate digest of the Hindu law.

The various commentaries or digests of the Hindu law which maintain conflicting doctrines, all profess to interpret the laws that are laid down in the Institutes of the sages. They do not however, appear to have been intended to have merely local authority, such as generally speaking, they now possess. The reason for the adoption, in different parts of India, of particular treatises as containing authoritative expositions of the law, appears to be, not that

the arguments by which their peculiar doctrines are maintained were thought very cogent, but that the doctrines themselves were suited to the feelings of those who adopted them. The process of development seems to have been that a change in a particular point of law being considered desirable, by reason of a change of feelings occasioned by altered social conditions, some learned pundit attached, it may be, to the court of a king, undertook to establish the foregone conclusion by the authority of the texts of the sages.

The Hindu law was systematized at a time when society was composed of joint families, the constitution of which, though resting on a natural basis, was to a great A joint family, very naturally conextent artificial. sisted of individuals connected by blood, but at the same time it excluded the cognates, however nearly related, and included strangers by marriage and adoption. An individual, as such, was not originally recognised as a member of society, but as belonging to a certain gotra or family. And though the family divided and subdivided itself into smaller groups, such as samánodakas, sakulyas and sapindas, still all these were connected by a great many ties, above all, by the tie of a local union. It was only when the smaller groups or individuals left the original seat of the family, and migrated to distant places, that the strong family feeling or clan feeling began to abate, and the natural tie of consanguinity became stronger, and importance began to be attached to the cognates.

The gradual development of the Hindu law which was originally moulded by the institution of families may thus concisely be stated to consist in the recognition of individual rights and in the introduction of cognates as heirs, and of nearer cognates as heirs in preference to more distant agnates.

The principle underlying the Hindu law of inheritance would appear to be the same as in every other system of Inheritance, namely, the common principle of natural love and affection, varied, of course, by the peculiar circum-It has, however, been asserted stances of each case. by the highest authorities that the doctrine of spiritual benefit is the key to the Hindu law of inheritance. with the greatest deference to them, it may be observed in the first place that no trace whatever can be found of such a doctrine in the Mitákshará. The author of the Dávabhága does, no doubt, for the first time, introduce that doctrine, which is more or less made use of by the later writers according as it suited their purpose; but the doctrine itself is used in the Dayabhaga not for the purpose of determining the right of inheritance, but for the purpose of ascertaining priority, as regards the order of succession, of those who are recognized as heirs in the three fundamental texts of Manu, of Vishnu and of Yájnavalkya respectively. The principle enunciated in the Mitákshará is, that succession is determined by propinquity; whereas the author of the Dáyabhága maintains, that propinguity is not alone the criterion of succession, but in addition to it the capacity for conferring a comparatively greater amount of spiritual benefit is to be taken into consideration; and the order of succession laid down by him, which is at variance with the Mitakshara in many points, especially in the preference given to certain cognates, is justified by him on the principle of spiritual benefit. But it should be observed that a clear and consistent principle of succession cannot be deduced from the various references to the doctrine of spiritual benefit, in the Dáyabhága, so as to enable us to decide a question of disputed succession that has not been especially dealt with by the author himself; in such cases the difficulty of determining which of two persons confers the greater

amount of spiritual benefit, remains unsolved. The Hindu idea of honouring the deceased by offering oblations of food and libations of water appears to be a very catholic one. The Hindus present these offerings to some of their ancestors by name, and to others generally, as well as to the spirits of all that ever inhabited this globe. It is a debt of gratitude paid by a Hindu to all from whom he inherits the world as it is, and especially to those from whom he derives the greatest amount of secular benefit. This will be clear to those who are conversant with the ceremony of *Párvana Sráddha*.

· It would appear that the theory of spiritual benefit $^{\mathcal{K}}$ and the law of succession are both of them based on one and the same principle of natural love and affection. sapinda relationship, as explained by the author of the Dáyabhága and other commentators, shows forth in a glaring light the strength of the joint family union, which forms the principle of the Mitákshará law of survivorship. Those who may live together in this world as members of a joint family, become united in the next as sapindas or as it were members of a celestial joint family. It is by a strained construction of the term sapinda, that the author of the Dayabhaga attempts to include some of the cognates under it, with a view to support their preferable position as maintained by him. And the critical reader will find that his exposition of the doctrine of spiritual benefit in tracing out the order of succession is far from satisfactory. Some of the inconsistencies of the Dayabhaga on this point are noticed in the Víramitrodaya, although the author of that treatise himself sometimes invokes the principle of spiritual benefit in establishing some of his positions.

The Viramitrodaya was, as the author himself says, composed by Mitra Misra under the direction of Vira Sinha, a king. The name of the work indicates the history of its origin. It may also mean either "the rise of the

friend of Víra" or "the rise of the heroic sun" of law to dispel the darkness which gathered round many points of law. Fellowing the arrangement of the Institutes of Yájnavalkya, the author divides his work into three books, namely, A'chara, Vyavahara, and Prayaschitta. The book on Vyavahára or litigation again is subdivided into The first, treats of the constitution of courts and the law of procedure; the second, deals with the law of evidence and ordeals; the third, comprises the eighteen topics of litigation; and the fourth, which is a very short one, deals with cases in which the king is the plaintiff, and to a certain extent corresponds with the present criminal The portion translated in the following pages deals. with the law of succession and inheritance, and is called partition of heritage, -one of the eighteen topics of litigation, occupying more than a fourth of the book of Vyava-Like the Mitákshará it shows great respect for the authority of Yájnavalkya, whom he always quotes under the title of Yogisvara or 'the lord of sages'.

The Viramitrodaya has always been regarded as an authority of considerable importance. In Gridhari Lall Roy versus The Bengal Government, the Lords of the Judicial Committee observe,—"That question, however, is not to be governed by the Mitákshará alone. Adhering to the principles which this Board lately laid down in the case of The Collector of Madura versus Moottoo Ramalinga Sathupathy, their Lordships have no doubt that the Viramitrodaya, which by Mr. Colebrooke and others is stated to be a Treatise of high authority at Benares, is properly receivable as an exposition of what may have been left doubtful by the Mitákshará, and declaratory of the law of the Benares school."

In the arrangement of the present work, I have followed the suggestions kindly made by the Honorable Justice Rameschandra Mitra. The division into chapters, parts, sections &c., not found in original Sanskrit works, has been frequently introduced by translators for convenience of reference; though this has sometimes led to the mistake that there are verses in the original corresponding to the number of paragraphs. These works are all written in prose, and there is nothing in them which may be taken to resemble the sections of a statutory enactment. The division into small paragraphs again is very misleading, since one might fancy them to be complete in themselves, whereas in the generality of instances they may often be only isolated links in a long chain of argument. I was therefore advised to divide the work in such a way as to prevent any mistake of that kind.

I have adopted the language of Colebrooke in translating many of the texts of the sages, and compared West and Bühler's translation of the Chapter on *Stridhana* with mine.

For the convenience of those who may wish to make occasional references to the original, that portion of the original Sanskrit, of which the following is a translation, is printed at the beginning of the book.

I am grateful to the Syndicate of the Calcutta University for having offered to contribute one thousand rupees from the Tagore Law Fund towards the expenses of the publication of this work; and to the Honorable Justice Louis S. Jackson, C. I. E., the Honorable Justice William Markby and the Honorable Justice Rameschandra Mitra, who have evinced a kind interest in the preparation of this work.

My best thanks are also due to some of my friends, especially to Babu Sríschandra Chaudhuri, M. A. and Babu Indranáth Bandyopádhyáy, Vakils of the High Court, from whom I have derived considerable assistance.

G. S.

HIGH COURT, The 5th September, 1879.

वीरमित्रादये

व्यवचाराध्याये

विभागास्थव्यवद्वारपदम्।

सरकारश्रीगालापचन्द्रशास्त्रिणा

संख्ञतम् ।

कलिकाताराजधान्याम्

बप्टिस् मिग्रनास्थे यम्त्रालये मुद्रितम्।

र्दे॰ १८७८।

वीरमिनोदये

व्यवद्वाराध्याये

विभागाख्यवद्वारपदम्।

CHAPTER I.

- . 1. यत्र मन्यादिवचनव्याख्यासु बज्जधा बुधाः। विवदन्ते दायभागः स प्रबन्धेन वर्ण्यते॥

2. तक्कत्त्रवामाच्च नारदः। विभागोऽर्घस्य पित्रस्य पुत्रैर्वत्र प्रकत्स्यते। दायभाग इति प्रोक्षं तदिवादपदं नुधैरिति॥

पित्रोर्यं पित्र इति क्षतेकश्चेषात्पित्रशब्दादात्। असे मात्रधनस्थापि विभाग-कथनात्।

पियस्य पुत्रीरिति च द्वयमपि सम्बन्धिमात्रीपषचार्यम्। प्रत्नीत्यादिनान्येषामपि भर्त्रादिधने तक्षिरूपवात्।

खतरबीपक्रमें मनुना पित्रादिषदं नीपात्तम्। रष स्त्रीपुंसयोगक्ती धर्मी वे। रितसंहितः। खापदापत्यप्राप्तिख दायधर्मा निवेषिति॥

दायधर्मीऽप्यत्र विभागरूपोऽभिप्रेतक्तस्वैवाये बच्चणक्यनपूर्वकं निरूपणात्। उद्गावसरेऽपि स्त्रीपंधर्मी विभागस्रेति तस्वैव विवादपदलेने।द्गात्। स्नतस्व वाये यावत्सम्बन्धिधनविभागमेव प्रदर्शितवात्मनुः।

3. दायग्रब्दस्थायं सामिसम्बन्धमात्रद्रचे सत्वन्तद्रूपे। वदित । तथा च निष्ठयदुकारः । विभक्तत्रं पित्रदृष्टं दायमार्ड्डमेनीयिस इत्याष्ट् । स्वत्रापि पित्रपदं सम्बन्धिमात्रोपलत्त्वसमन्धत्रापि दायग्रब्दप्रयोगात् । विभक्तत्यं विभागार्ष्ट्रमित्यर्थः । सन्ययेकपत्रादिसामिके विभागाभावाद्द्यग्रब्दवाच्यता न स्यात् ।

यत्तु जीमृतवाद्दनेन दीयत इति खुत्पत्त्वा दायग्रब्दो ददातिप्रयोगस्व गौर्याः स्तप्रविज्ञतादिस्तत्विवद्त्तिपूर्वेकपरस्वतेत्वतिपत्तिपत्तिमान्यात् । न तु स्टतादीनां तच्च व्यागोऽस्ति । तच पूर्वेद्रखसामिसम्बन्धाधीनं तत्त्वाम्योपरमे यच द्रखेऽन्यस्तवं तच निरूठो दायग्रब्द इत्युक्तं ।

तत्र सुन्दरम्। निरूष्टलाङ्गीकारे दायददातिश्रब्दयोगीयालोपन्यासामर्थकात्। सर्वेषाऽत्रयवार्धराष्ट्रिको चि निरूष्टलं। न च योगरूष्टलम् खवयवार्थवाधस्य स्वयमे- वे।पन्धासात्। गौग्रामवंथवार्थं परिकल्य तदक्तीकारस्य निष्पृयोजनत्वमन्धोन्धाः स्रथत-मनुभवविरोधो ब्याधातस्य। तत्त्वान्योपरम इति च जन्मनापि खलस्योपपादियध-माग्रात्वादस्यापकम्।

- 4. विभागप्रन्द स्वनेकसान्यानां त्रयससुदायविषयामां तत्त्रदेशे यवस्थापने प्रक्षः। स्वत्यवैकपुत्रादीनां पित्रादिधनसान्ये विभागप्रन्दाप्रयोगो दायोऽनेन सन्य द्रयोव च प्रयोगः। यत्रापि चैकं दासीगवादि बद्धसाधारमं तत्रापि तत्तत्सासविष्रेष- नियतदास्यदेशकादिना तस्य तस्य स्वत्यञ्चनादस्योकदेशसान्यय्यवस्थापनरूपो विभागप्रन्दार्थः। स्वत्यव। स्वां स्त्रीं कारयेत् कर्म यथां भ्रोन ग्रष्टे ग्रष्टे इति। उद्घत्य क्रूपवाप्यम्भस्तनुसारेण ग्रष्ट्यते इति। युक्त्या विभजनीयं तदन्यथानर्थकम्भवेदिति। च वहस्यत्यादिवचनेषु वन्धमाणरीत्या तदुपपादियस्यते।
- 5. स च दाया दिविधोऽप्रतिबन्धः सप्रतिबन्धः । पुत्रादीनां पित्रादिधने पुत्रलादिनैव सत्यपि खामिनि पित्रादौ जन्मनैव खलोत्पत्तेः स तेषामप्रतिबन्धो ल्याः खामिसद्भावस्याप्रतिबन्धकत्वात् । यन्तु विभक्तस्यासंदृष्टिनोऽपुत्रस्य स्टतस्य पिट-धात्रादीनां तद्भनरूपो दायः स सप्रतिबन्धः । खामिसद्भावस्य प्रतिबन्धकस्यापग्रमस्य तत्र खलोत्पत्तेः ।
- 6. ननु सर्वे। प्रिमातिबन्धस्य दायः। खामिसङ्कावे पुत्रादीनामपि जन्म-मात्रेय खलस्य वक्तमधन्यत्वात्।

तथा हि। यदि जन्मनैव पुत्रादीनां पित्रादिधने खत्वं स्थात् तद्युत्पद्ममात्रस्य पुत्रादेक्तत् साधारणमिति तदनुमितं विना त्रथसाध्येष्वाधानादिषु पित्रादीनामनिध-कारापत्तौ जातपुत्रः क्रव्याकेशोऽभोनादधीतेति स्रुतिविरोधः।

- 7. विश्व । विभागात् प्राक् पित्रादिप्रसादक अखाविभाज्य त्वचनं व्यथं खात्। ति प्रता पुत्रान्तरानुमत्वा यदि दत्तं सर्वेरेव दत्तिमिति विभागपात्यभावादेव प्रतिविधोऽनर्घकः । खननुमत्वा तु साधार याद्रव्यख्य दानमेव न सम्भवतीति पित्रादिप्रीतिदत्तत्वादिवाची युक्तिर युक्ता।
- 8. यवं पुत्राचनुमितमन्तरेश स्थादीनामि भर्त्रादिभिः प्रीतिदानस्यासम्भवात् तदनुमतौ त तैरिप दत्तलात्। भर्त्रा प्रीतेन यदत्तं स्त्रिये तस्मिन् म्तेऽपि तत्। सा यथाकाममत्रीयादद्यादा स्थावरादते इति॥ वचने यथाकाममत्रीयादद्यादेश्वने-नाविभाज्यलं भर्व्यपितिकव्यस्य यदभिष्ठितं तदिप व्यर्थम्। न चेदमिवभागावस्थायां प्रीतिदानं तस्य चाविभाज्यलं न प्रतिपादयित किन्तु स्थावरादते यदत्तमित्यन्या-दिभागोत्तरमिप भर्त्रा स्थिये स्थावरं न प्रीत्या देयमचानादत्तमिप तेन पुत्रादिभि-रपद्यत्व विभजनीयमस्थावरन्तु न प्रत्याद्वर्त्तव्यमित्वनुवादमात्रम्। स्थावरस्य स्थिये प्रीतिदानप्रतिविधमात्रं तात्पर्येश्व वेधयतीति प्रक्षनीयम्। तथान्वयस्य स्वविद्याजना प्रसङ्गेनायुक्तलात्। स्थावरपीतिदानप्रतिविधमात्रतात्पर्यक्तेश्वर्णायस्थानुवादमात्रं स्थर्थ-, लापरपर्यायद्यायद्यायद्वापदते।

- 9. खर्ष। मिसमुक्ताप्रवालागं सर्वस्थेव पिता प्रभुः। स्थावरस्य तु सर्वस्य न पिता न पितामन्दः॥ तथा। पित्वप्रसादाङ्गुच्यन्ते वस्त्रास्थामरसाति च। स्थावरन्तु न भुच्येत प्रसादे सित पेत्वक इति॥ वचनमवस्यं विभागप्राक्तालीनस्थावरप्रसाद-दानप्रतिषेधपरं वाच्यं मिसमुक्तादिप्रसाददानानुमितपुरःसरं तत्रतिषेधाभिधानात्। स्वन्यथा तस्यानुवादमाचत्वेन वैयर्थ्यापत्तेः। तथा च जन्मना पुत्रादीनां स्वतान्मित्तिमुक्तादिषु तदनुमित्ववेति विभ्रेष इति वचनद्यार्थस्य वाच्यताच्चन्मना स्वत्मायातीति। मैवम्। तस्य पितामन्दो-पात्तस्थावरिविष्यत्यात्। स्वतीते पितामन्दे तस्वान्यनाम्यात्यतापुत्रयोः साधार्यो तदी-यम्बस्विष्यत्यात्। स्वतीते पितामन्दे तस्वान्यनामात्यत्वापुत्रयोः साधार्यो तदी-यम्बस्विष्यत्यात्। स्वतीते पितामन्दे तस्वान्यनामात्यत्वापुत्रयोः साधार्यो तदी-
- 10. यत्तु गौतमवचनं उत्पच्चैवार्धसामिलं सभते इत्याचार्था इति । जन्मनः सलच्छेतुले मिताचाराक्यता प्रमासलेनोपन्यसं तद्दायभागतत्त्वक्यता व्याख्यातमेव । पित्रसंलोपरमे तच्जन्यत्वस्य इतुभूतेनोत्पत्तिमाचसम्बन्धेनान्यसम्बन्धाधिकेन जनक्षमे पुत्राकां स्वामित्वात्तद्वमं पुत्रो सभते नान्यः सम्बन्धीत्याचार्यः मन्यन्त इति । न तु पित्रस्वले विद्यमानेऽपि तच पुत्रस्वतिमित तद्धः । नारददेवसवचनविरोधात् । पितर्यूद्धं गते पुत्रा विभजेयुर्धनिमतुरिति नारदः पितुर्धनिमत्याद्व स्वन्यया धनं विभजेयुरित्येवावक्यत् । पितर्युपरते पुत्रा विभजेयुर्धनिमतुः । स्वसान्यं हि भवेदेषां निर्देषि पितरि स्थिते, इति ॥ देवसोऽपि पितुर्धनिमत्यक्षोत्तरार्द्धं नासान्यं हीति स्वस्मेव तेषामस्यतं तत्र हेतुलेनोक्षवान् । निर्देषि पातित्यादिस्वलापगमकदोष-रहिते । मनुरिप । ऊद्धं पितुस्व मातुस्व समेत्य भातरः समम् । भजेरन् पेत्रकं रिक्य-मनीग्राक्ते हि जीवतेरिति ॥ जीवतेर्मातापित्रोक्तद्वने पुत्रावामस्वान्यं स्वक्तमेवाह ।
- 11. यत्तु प्रस्तुलिखितावाहतुः। न जीवित पितिर पुत्रा रिक्थम्भजेरन्। यद्यपि खान्यम्पद्मादिधगतन्तर्रन् एव पुत्रा खर्षधम्भयोरखातन्त्रगदिति ॥ सृति-चित्रकालारेण च व्याख्यातम्। यद्यपि तैः पुत्रेः खकीयज्ञम्मनः पद्मादमन्तरमेव पिद्धधने खान्यमधिगतं प्राप्तं तथापि जीवित पितिर तद्धनं तिरच्छां विना न विभजे-रज्ञर्थधभैयोरखातन्त्रगत् पिद्धपारतन्त्रगदिभागकरणे अन्हाः पुत्रा इति । तेनानेन वचनेन जन्मना पुत्रादीनां पित्रादिखामिकधने खलिमित तदपि न। मन्वादि-वचनानां बङ्गनामखान्यप्रतिपादकानामनुरोधेनाखान्यथावर्णनीयलात् । वर्णितस्व कच्यतरौ । यद्यपि पद्मादिधगतं पिद्धधनव्यापारिनरपेचैः पुत्रीर्वद्यादिभित्रपात्ते धने खार्थं तथापि तत्राध्यखान्यद्वीवित पितिर किमृत पिद्धधने खर्थधर्मयोक्तियां पितिर जीवत्यखातन्त्रगदिति ।
- 12. किस्र । स्वतं श्रास्त्रेकसमिधान्यं तत्र च रिक्यकयादिवक्तमनः स्वत-इतुत्वेनानुक्तेर्जनां स्वत्मप्रमायकमेव । स्वत्यव यथा भार्थादिवचनम् । भार्था एत्रस्य दासस्य प्रययवाधनाः स्नृताः । यश्चे समिधान्क्वित यस्य ते तस्य तद्वनिमिति ॥ पारतन्त्रद्वमात्रप्रतिपादनपरं तथाऽस्वान्यवचनान्यपीत्यपास्तम् । भार्थादिस्वध्वप्रप्रादिव-

चनैः कर्त्तनादिनाचार्यकलेन खामिले सिद्धे युक्तमखातन्त्रामात्रपरत्वमन्त्रणा पुत्रादिषु धनसाध्येषु पुराक्षादिश्रुतं तेषामधिकारित्वमपि विबद्धेत । अत्र तु प्रत्युत जन्मनः खलक्रेतुत्वे प्रमायाभावाद्यर्थमेवान्यथानेकवचनवर्यनम्।

13. किञ्च यदि खत्वं जीकिकं स्यात्तिकिं तदुपायानामपि जीकिकत्वात् सामी रिक्शक्रयसम्बिभागपरिग्रहाधिगमेषु ब्राह्मग्रस्थाधिकं जब्धं च्याचियस्य विजितं निर्विष्टं वैश्वग्रद्रयोरिति गौतमवचनं व्यर्धमेव स्थादनुवादमाचलात्र हि पाकादोदनो भवतीत्यादिग्रास्त्रं निष्पुयोजनमनुवादमाचमुच्यते।

तस्य हि वचनस्यायमर्थः। रिक्यं दायः। क्रयः प्रसिद्धः। सिन्धानाे दायस्वैनदेशनिष्ठसामित्वयञ्चने विभागः। परिग्रहः पूर्वमपरेशासीक्षतस्यारस्यादिसाधारसप्रदेशसम्बन्धिनस्तृयजननास्यादेः सीकारः। स्विधामोऽज्ञातसामिकस्य
निध्यादेः प्राप्तिः। रतेषु स्वलहेतुषु सत्यु सामी भवति। जातेषु च जायते।
ब्राह्मसस्य नव्यं प्रतिग्रहादिप्राप्तमधिकमसाधारसं रिक्थादयसु सर्वसाधारसाः।
स्विकतित्युत्तरत्र सर्वत्र सम्बध्यते। चान्वस्य विजितं युद्धविजयदस्यादिप्राप्तमसाधारस्तम्। वैद्यस्य निर्वष्टं क्षिमोरचासादिस्रतिन्वस्यम्। श्रद्भस्य दिजनुश्रुवादिस्रतिनवस्यम्। निर्पूर्वस्य विश्वमेतिवाचकत्वम्। निर्वेश्रो स्रतिभोगयोरिति त्रिकार्याभिधानात्। वैद्यस्य न्यस्यस्यस्याद्याप्तन्तात्वात्वादन्येषामप्यमुने। नर्वेश्रम् स्वर्यस्याद्याप्रनित्वाचानात्वात्वादन्येषामप्यमुने। सर्वेस्य स्वर्यस्याद्याग्रनसादिप्रतिपादितं स्वत्वातं निर्वेष्ठग्रन्देन संग्रह्यते। सर्वस्य स्वर्वस्यतात्।

14. किस् योऽदत्तादायिना इस्तास्त्रिप्तेत ब्राह्मणो धनम्। याजनाध्यापनेनापि यथा स्तेनस्त्रथेव सः ॥ इत्यदत्तादायिनस्त्रीरस्य इस्ताद्याजनादिखदृत्थापि धनमर्ज्ययता दखविधानमनुपपमं खत्वस्य जौकिकत्वे। खुदृत्त्यार्ज्यतो निरपराधत्वात्।

मन्मते तु प्रास्त्रिकसमिधान्यलात् खलस्य चौरदाष्टकयाजनादावेतद्वचनादेव खलानुत्पादकलात्तदिधानमुपपन्नतरम्।

15. चिप च मम सममनेनापहतिमित खपदेशो न स्थात् सत्यस्य सौति-काले। चपहर्सुरेव तच सत्यात्।

मन्मते लपहारस्य निषिद्धत्वेन सत्तानुत्पादकत्वादुपपद्मीऽयं व्यपदेशः।

16. यदि च सुवर्धालादिकमिव तच सलमिष प्रत्यच्यमायाकं ति सुवर्धालादी यथा न सन्देशक्तथास्य समिदमस्य वेत्यपि सन्देशे न स्थानिर्यातिलात्। इदमेवोक्तं संग्रहकारे या। वर्त्तते यस्य यद्धक्ते तस्य सामी स एव न। अन्यसमन्यद्धक्तेषु चौर्याद्येः किं न दश्यते। तस्माच्छात्मत्यव स्थात् साम्यं नानुभवादिष। अस्यापष्टत-मेतेन न युक्तं वक्तुमन्यथा। विदित्ते प्रधीगमः श्रास्त्रे तथा प्रवर्षि एथक् एथि गिति॥ श्रास्त्रे साधारयासाधारया स्थाप्तामः सलोपायः एथक् एथि गिति स्थानिर्याति साधारया साधारया स्थापित्यः। अन्यत् स्पर्म् एथि गितिकाले तच्छा स्वानिर्यं सादित्यर्थः। अन्यत् स्पर्म् । यथावर्यानिति स्वृतिचन्त्रिकायां पाठः। पूर्व्याउक्तु मदनरम्निष्ठितः।

17. ख्रथ यदास्य यथेष्टं विनियोक्तं तत्तस्य समिति लेकिप्रसिद्धेयेषेष्ट-विनियोक्यलं सत्विमिति चौर्थादार्क्तिते नातिप्रसङ्गत्तत्र चौरादेर्येषेष्टविनियोक्यला-भावादिनियोगकाले ज्ञासादिदर्भनात्। स्रतस्व सन्देश्वीऽप्यूपपद्मः सुवर्भालादितुच्य-ताभावात् सत्वस्य। मैवम्।

खसम्भवात्। शास्त्रेय सर्वस्य कुटुम्बभरवादौ विनियोगिविश्रेषिनियमादैिक्किनियोगिविश्रेषिनियमादैिक्किनियोगिविश्रेषिनियमादैिक्किनियोगिविश्रेषिनियमादेशिक्किनियोगिविश्रेष्य कुत्राप्यप्रसिद्धः। तदप्याद्य संग्रहकारः शङ्कोपन्यासपुरःसरम्। न च समुचते तद्यत् सेक्क्या विनियुज्यते। विनियोगोऽस्य सर्वस्य शास्त्रेणेव नियम्यते इति॥ स्त्र पूर्वार्द्धे शङ्कोपन्यास उत्तरार्द्धे तत्परिद्यारः।

- 18. न च रिक्थादिवदुत्पचिवार्यसामित्वमिति गौतमवचन उत्पत्तेरिप जन्मापरपर्यायायाः सत्तवहेत्वोक्षेः सत्यि सत्वस्य तदुपायानास श्रास्त्रैकसमिधगन्यत्वे जन्मना पुत्रादेः पित्रादिधने सत्वमच्चतमेवेति वरचम्।
- तस्यानेकदूषसैरन्थणाव्यात्वानस्य पागेवेाक्तत्वात् । इदमेवाभिसन्धाय धारे-त्रवेसापि प्रास्त्रेकसमिधगन्यमेव स्वतिमिति सिद्धान्तितम् ।
- 19. चिष च। जीवत्यपि पित्रादी पुत्रादेख्य जे जन्मना खत्ने तदिन्छायामि पुत्रादी छ्येव विभागः खात्। चालान्ना वचना प्रेविमिति चेत् न। तथा
 सति दृश्यदृश्विदेश्यमात्रं भवेद्यवद्याद्यतु। चाला पित्रादिभिः सद्य पुत्रादिभिन्नतुष्पाद्यवद्यारे प्रवर्ष्यमाने तथां दृश्यदृश्योः श्रेयोविधातमात्रं गुरोः प्रिष्ये
 पितुः पुत्र इत्यादिवचनार्थं इति प्राक्षप्रपित्तं तथात्रापि खात्। चित्रिः चेत्र
 सक्तिनन्धविदेश्यत्।
- 20. क्वचिज्जन्मनेवेति प्राचीनग्रश्चिष्णवनमपि जन्मनिबन्धनलात्यितापुत्रादि-सम्बन्धस्य पिद्धमरशस्य च तत्स्वलापगमच्चेतुत्वेन परम्परया वर्षानीयम्।
- 21. किस । ऊद्धें पितुस्विवादि मनुवचनं जन्मना पुत्रावां खलपन्ने जीवति पितिर सव्यपि पुत्रावां खान्ये तिदक्त्या विना तिह्माग ऊर्द्धन्त खेक्क्येति विभाग- निषेधार्थं प्राणिति वाणं तत्रान्यायां खलार्थपरत्वापत्तेः । न च पितुरपरमकालविधानार्थं चेति युक्तम् । दृष्टार्थत्वाहिभागस्थोभयस्याप्यनुपपत्तेः । नापि नियमविधिविभागस्य एवं सद्द वसेयुवी एचग् वा धर्मकान्यया इति मनुना विकल्पा- भिधानात् । कालविधौ च पित्रुपरमानन्तरकाल एव विभागो नैमित्तिकस्य निमित्तानन्तर्यवाधोऽयं स्थात् । जातिस्थिन्जातप्रावियोगापित्तस्वरूपविश्वेषविरोधस्यात्राम्भावात् ।
- 22. खता जीवताः पिचोक्तद्धने खाम्यं नाक्ति किन्तूपरतयोक्तयोदिति तत्का-कीनखत्वचापनायं मन्दादिवचनं विभागक्त खातन्त्रात्तत्वाकीन द्रच्छाप्राप्तार्रार्जन्यते। तथा चैतदचनविरोधादिष न जन्मना खत्वं वक्तुं प्रकाम्। उपरमवत्पतितत्वादिक-मिष पिचादिखत्ननाप्रकारणं वच्चते।

तस्मात् पित्रादिखलनाग्रस्य तद्धने पुत्रादीनां खाम्यं न तत्व्वत्यसमकाकीनमिति

खान्यादिसद्भावस्य सर्वत्र प्रतिबन्धकत्वात् सर्वे। अपि सप्रतिबन्धस्य दाय इति हैविध्य-मनुपपद्ममिति।

- ख्याचित। यदि पित्रादिख्लापमम एव पुत्रादीनां तद्धने खलं तर्षि निर्देषि पित्रादौ जीवति तेषां धनसाध्यवैदिककर्मखनिधकारप्रसङ्गे जातपुत्रः क्रमा-नेशोऽमीनाद्धीतेत्यादिश्रुतिविरेश्यसुख्यः। न तु खन्योजनस्थित हत्वाभाससमर्थित-सावर्थानुरोधेन श्रुतिसङ्गोची युक्तः। खाडितामाविरुप्रयमयज्ञे पित्रादौ जीवत्यपि पुँचादीन् प्रति तत्प्रवृत्त्विभिषात् । सक्लयाज्ञिक्षिष्टानां तदनुष्ठानदर्भनाच । जात-पुत्रक्षायाके प्रपदान्यां वयो रुद्धानित क्रमस्थेव विवच्या न तु तयार स्थास्य स्थार साम्प्री गोति विरोधाधिकरणे भाष्यवार्त्तिकादी स्थितलात्। न च यथा पुत्रानुमत्या पितु-भैवन्मते तदधिकारकाया मन्मतेऽपि पुत्रादीनामपि पित्राद्यनुमत्येति वाचम्। यतो दयोरिप मते पितुः खलस्य धने विद्यमानलात् खलत्यामरूपप्रधाननिष्यत्तिरविद्यता भवन्मते तु पुत्रादीतां खलखैवाभावादनुमते ख खलाजनकलाद्यागादिप्रधानिष्टपिकः रेव कथम्। वज्ञुतज्ञु पितुः पुत्रानुमतिरपि नापेच्चिता खातन्त्रात्। पित्राखनुमतिज्ञु पुत्रादेरपेक्तिता पारतन्त्रगादिखेतावान्त्रिभेषा यथा स्त्रियाः स्वधनेनापीछापुत्तीदि-वतादी भर्तादेरनुमितक्तत्पारतन्त्रावचनात्। चननुमतौ तु खतन्त्रः प्रव्यवाया वैगुखं वा कर्मिक न तु प्रधानखरूपानिष्यक्तिः। पित्राद्यनुमतेः खलात्पादकलस्वेतदंगुरीधात् कन्यमानमनौकिकमग्रास्त्रीयस्। तसास्क्रास्त्रीकसमिधाम्येऽपि खले कथि ज्ञास नाऽपि रिक्थादिवचनादिधगमादिपदेन संग्रच चावध्यकः श्रुतिस्मृतिपुराणिष्रछाचार-सिद्धस्य निर्देषि जीवत्यपि पित्रादौ पुत्रादियज्ञांद्यनुष्ठानाधिकारस्यानुरोधात्। वक्ततक्त लौकिकमेव खत्वं लोके च जातमात्रायामेव प्रतादीनां पित्रादिधने खाम्य-व्यवचारे। उन्येषामपीति साधियवामः।
- 24. यच पित्रादीनामनुमत्वयोग्यपुत्रादिसाधारमाखत्वे कचमनुमितमन्तरे-माधानादिकं स्यादित्युक्तं तदनुमितियोग्येष्विपि पुत्रादिषु स्वातन्त्रात् पित्रादीनां व तदनुमत्वपेत्वा किमुतानुमत्वयोग्येष्विति परिश्वतप्रायमेव। तदिधिवलादेवाधिकारी-ऽवगम्यत इति तु विज्ञानेश्वराचार्यः।
- 25. खतस्रोत्यस्थेवार्थसामित्वमिति गौतमवचनस्य यच्जीमूतवास्त्रनरपुनन्द-नाभ्यां पारम्परिकोत्पत्तिस्त्रसम्भेतुलेन स्थास्थानं स्ततं तदिष स्टर्थमेव ।
- 26. यमु प्रसुवचनं तस्यापि स्नितचित्रकोक्तात्यास्त्रैव साधीयसी। कस्यतस्क्त-यास्थायान्तु विद्याद्युपात्ताध्याचारेऽनुपस्थितभ्रयःपदाध्याचारः प्रसन्देत। जन्मपदा-ध्याचारन्तु पुत्रवाद्याच्चेपोपस्थितेरस्याध्याचाराच नायुक्तः।
- 27. तेन श्रुखप्रस्वसमुखनुरोधान्मनुनारददेवेषादिवचनानामेवास्वातन्त्रप्रयस्व वर्धनमुचिततरम्।
- 28. यदप्युक्तं प्रीतिदत्तस्याविभाज्यत्ववचनानि जन्मना खत्वाश्वपग्रमेऽनुपपद्मा-नीति । तदपि न । खनुमत्यभिप्रायेख स्थावरप्रीतिदानाभावस्थिरीकरकार्धद्योपपत्तेः ।

खातन्त्रप्रादा पितुरनुमितमन्तरेणापि तेन दत्ते स्थावरव्यतिरिक्ते पुत्राणामित्रभाज्य-त्वमुचते।

- 29. खतरव स्थावरे विशेषवचनम्। स्थावरं दिपदच्चैव यद्यपि खयमजितम्। खसम्भूय सुतान् सर्वान् न दानं न च विषय रित ॥ मिश्रमुक्ताप्रवालानामित्यादिवचनन्तु जन्मना खत्यपद्यरवोषपद्मतरम्। न च पितामहोषात्तस्थावरमाचविषयत्वमिति युक्तम्। न पिता न पितामह रित दयग्रह्यात्। पितामहस्य हि
 सार्जितमिष पुत्रे पौत्रे च सत्यपि न देयमिति वचनं जन्मना खत्यद्मयति। यथा
 परमते मिश्रमुक्ताप्रवालादीनां पैतामहानामिष पितुरेव सत्यं तत् स्मर्यात् तथास्मिन्
 मतेऽपि पुत्रदिनां तत्र जन्मना सत्ये साधारयोऽपि पितुर्दानाधिकार रत्यविश्वेषः।
- 30. तस्मात् प्रेटको पैतामचे च इशे पुत्रादीनां यद्यपि जन्मनेव खलं। तथापि पितृरांवध्यकेषु धर्मक्षत्येषु वाचिनकोषु च प्रसाददानकुटुम्बभरसापिदमोचादिषु च स्थावरथितिरक्षद्रश्यविनियोगें खातन्त्रामिति ध्येयम्। स्थावरादौ तु खार्च्चिते पित्रा-दिपरम्पराप्राप्ते च पुत्रादिपारतन्त्रं तु त्यमेव। स्थावरं दिपरस्वैव यद्यपि खयम् चित्नम्। खसम्मूय सुतान् सर्वान् न दानं न च विक्रयः॥ ये जाता येऽप्यजातास्त्र ये च गर्भे व्यवस्थिताः। दित्तस्य तेऽभिकाङ्गिन्त न दानं न च विक्रयः॥ इत्यादिवचनात्। स्थाप्यप्यवादो वच्यते।
- 31. यच खतस्य प्रास्त्रेकसमधिगम्यतास्त्रास्त्रे च जन्मनः कापि खत्यहेतुता-नाभिधानात्। क्यं जन्मना पुन्नादीनां पित्रादिधने खत्यखीकार इत्यक्तम्। तत्तु प्रास्त्रेकसमधिगम्यत्मभ्यपेत्यापि गौतमादिवचन उत्पत्तरपि खत्नोपायत्नोक्तेः परि-इतमेव प्राक्
- 32. वस्तुतन्तु न खलस्य प्रास्त्रिकसमिध्राम्यलं युक्तियुक्तम्। सर्वथा प्रास्त्र-द्यानगम्यरिह्तानां प्रत्यन्तवासिनां स्त्रेम्हादीनामिष समस्तिमदमन्यस्य सिमित व्यवप-देप्रस्तत्क्वतस्य क्रयविक्रयादिव्यवद्यारो दृश्यते। तेनान्ययव्यतिरेकाभ्यां क्रयाद्युपायकं सामिलिनिरूपितस्वलमिष तैर्ययेष्टिविनियोगाईलरूपं पदार्थान्तररूपं वा प्रत्यचादि-प्रमासादेवावगतिमत्त्रवद्यं वाचम्।
- 33. रतत्तर्ने परुखोऽनुमानवाक्यप्रयोगोऽपि विज्ञानयोगिनोक्तः। खतं लीकिंतं लीक्तिपर्धित्रयासाधनताद् त्रीस्त्रादिविद्यव्ययस्यानः। जाइवनीयादीनां
 हि श्रास्त्रेकसमधिग्रम्यानां न लीक्किपर्धित्रयासाधनत्वमस्तीति यतिरेकद्यान्तः।
 तेनान्यययतिरेको हेतुः। यद्यप्याइवनीयादीनामिष यागादिलोकिकित्रयासाधनत्वमप्यस्ति। तथापि तङ्कोकप्रमाखकाग्रगदिरूपेख नालौकिकाइवनीयादिरूपेखेति न
 व्यभिचारः। इइ तु सुवंशादिरूपेख न क्रयादिसाधनत्वमपि तु खत्वनेवित। सुवर्धत्वादिनाऽअरखाद्यर्थिक्रयासाधनत्वात् तद्यथा लोकिकं रूपमेवं खत्वमिष सर्वानुगतं
 लोक्किनेव न सुखेन क्रयादिक्रियानिर्वाहो लोके।

⁹34. न चैवं खामी रिक्येयादिस्मृतीनां लेकिसिद्धार्थानुवादकत्वेनानर्थक्या-

पत्तिरिति वाच्यम्। धर्माधर्मापयोगितया व्याकरमस्तावनादिवाचकत्वतदभावरूप-साधुत्वासाधुत्वविवेकस्येव तस्योपपत्तेः। साधुम्रब्दाधिकरमे च्रोतदवस्थितं यस्प्रीर्थ-व्यवचारियां क्षोकानामविविक्तं कौकिकमेव साधुत्वं ग्रास्त्रेम विविच्यते न त्वकौकिकं साधुत्वं। साधुभिभीषेत इत्यादिविधावन्थोन्यात्र्ययप्रसङ्गादित्यादि। यवमचापि।

- 35. तथा च नयिववेके अवनाथः। कोकसिद्धश्वार्ज्जनं जन्मादि खतरवा-निन्दं प्रथमकोकधीविषययवस्थितं तिन्नवस्मार्था स्मृतिर्याकरणादिस्मृतिविदिति। जन्मादीत्यादिपदेन क्रयादिग्रहणम्। त्याकरणादीत्यादिपदेन सङ्गीतरत्नपरीचासाम्-दिकाणां ग्रहणम्। रागादीनामि हि कोकसिद्धानामेवानिभयुक्तान् प्रति विवेकार्थ-मेव तक्कच्यक्षयनित्युक्तं स्मृत्यधिकरणे खाचार्थ्यचर्योः।
- 36. खामी रिक्येर्यादिवचनन्तु प्रागेव व्याख्यातम्। रिक्यक्रब्दस्तु निष्पृतिबन्धदायपरः संविभागभ्रव्दस्य सप्रतिबन्धदायपर इति मिताचारायां विज्ञानंत्रप्रेत्वः
 व्याख्यातम्। स्मृतिचन्द्रिकाञ्चता तु रिक्यं पित्रादिधने पुत्रादीनां खामिलापादकः
 जन्मैवेति व्याख्याय संविभागः पित्रादिधने विभ्रोधनिष्ठखामिलसम्पादको विभाग
 इति संविभागभ्रव्दो व्याख्यातः। तम्न खस्य सतो विभागात् खल्चेतुत्वेन तस्रतिपादनानौचित्यात्। एकदेभ्रव्यवस्थापनमात्रं चि खलस्य विभागेन क्रियते। मुख्यामुख्यचेतुलग्रच्यो खामिपदे वैरूप्यापक्तेः। खतरवाच मिताच्यरायां विज्ञानेश्वराचार्यः।
 विभागभ्रव्यक्षानेकखामिकधनविषयः प्रसिद्धो नान्यदीयविषयो न प्रचीयविषय इति।
 कोके पुत्रादीनां जन्मनेव खलं प्रसिद्धतरिमितं च।
- 37. यदि पत्नी दुष्टितरखेत्यादिवचनं तदिप खामिसम्बन्धनिबन्धनानेकदाय-इरप्राप्ती कोकप्रसिद्धेऽपि खले व्यामोद्दनिरासार्थम्। प्रायेख व्यवहारस्मृतीनां कोक-सिद्धार्थानुवादकलिमिति सक्कनिबन्धभिरिभधानात्।
- 38. नियतौपायिनं खत्वं जीकसिद्धमेवेति भगवता गुरेरिप सम्मतम्। जिम्नानये हि हतीये वर्धके द्रयार्ज्जनियमानां क्रल्यं खलमेव न स्यात् खल-स्याजीकिकलादिति पूर्वपच्चासम्भवमाम्बद्धा द्रयार्ज्जनप्रतिग्रहादीनां खलसाधनत्वं जीक-सिद्धमेवेति पूर्वपच्चः समर्थितस्तेन। न च द्रयार्जनस्य क्रल्यं खमेव न भवतीति थाग एव न संवर्त्तेत। प्रजिपतिमदं केनापि। चर्जनं खलं नापादयतीति विप्रति- विद्यम् इति ग्रायेन।

चरार्षचीकाछता विद्य रवम्। यदा द्रवार्जनिवयमानां क्रत्वर्धतं तदानियमानां खत्वेषायतामिदं प्रास्तं न नेष्यवित। क्रत्वर्धतानेष्यने व्याद्यततात्। तथा सित प्रतिग्रहादिप्राप्तस्य खत्मित्यत्र प्रमावाभावाद्खेन च खत्यागात्मक्यागासम्भवात् केस्येदम् द्रवार्जनिवयमा भवेयुरिति पूर्वपच्यासम्भव इति प्रश्नार्थः। प्रजिपतिनित्याद्युत्तरस्यस्यार्थः। चर्जनप्रतिग्रहादेः खत्वहेतुताया कोकसिद्धत्वेन प्रास्त्रस्य तचाव्यापाराद्रियमानां क्रत्वर्थतेव तेन ग्रम्यत इति न यागासम्भवे। नियमानर्थ- चर्चित।

सिद्धान्तेऽपि तेन खलस्य जौकिकलाभ्यपगमेनैव विचारप्रयोजनमृक्षम्। छतो नियमातिक्रमः पुरुषस्य न क्रतारिति। खस्याप्यर्थं रवं विद्यतः। यदा द्रव्याजननियमानां क्रल्यंत्वं तदा नियमाजितेनैव क्रतुनं नियमातिक्रमार्जितेन द्रव्या। न तु पुरुषस्य नियमातिक्रमदोषः पूर्वपन्ते। सिद्धान्ते लर्जननियमस्य क्रल्यंलाभावात् केवल-पुरुषार्थलादिक्रमाजितेनापि द्रव्येण क्रतुसिद्धरप्रत्यूष्टा। पुरुषस्येन तु नियमातिक्रमदोष्ठा द्रति। खनेन नियमातिक्रमार्जितस्यापि खलमभ्यपगतमन्यथा क्रतुसिद्धभिधान-विरोधात्।

- 39. तत्रैवाधिकरको कुमारिकखामिनोऽप्यत्रभवतः खलं कौकिकमिल्वेवाभि-मतमिति। तत्रत्ववार्त्तिकं तन्त्ररत्नाभियोगभाजां सक्षभमेव।
- 40. खतरवाच प्रास्त्रदीपिकायां पार्धसारिषः रागप्राप्तेस्तावदर्जनं न प्रा-स्त्रीयम् । रागतस्य पुरुषार्धतया प्राप्तिः प्रत्यस्त्रे वार्जितं द्रव्यं पुरुषं प्रीययत् पुरुषार्थं विद्यास्ते न तदनुमानेन कालेकग्रेषतया प्रकां विद्यातुम् । तस्तात् पुरुषार्थं द्रव्यं क्रतुरिष पुरुषकार्थासामन्यतम इति कार्यान्तरवत् कतावण्णपयुच्यतः इत्येतावान् विग्रेषः । न तु तस्त्रेवाष्ट्रं तथा सति जीवनकापात् क्रतुरेव न संवर्ततिति प्रघट्टकेन । खत्रा- जनस्य प्रास्त्रीयसं निरस्तता सत्तस्य तदुपायानास्य काकसिद्धत्वं स्पष्टतरमेवाक्तम् । सन्तर्यायां द्रवार्थं द्रवार्थं भवति । नियमस्त स्वारावात् काममदस्यार्थः स्यात् । खदर्यमपि पुरुषार्थार्जनविषयत्वात् नियमस्य पुरुषगतसेव कत्यते । तेनासावृपायान्तरेकार्ज्यन् प्रत्यवेतीति ग्रम्यत इति ।
- 41. ततस्व स्वामी रिक्थेवादिवचसां सौिककामेव रिक्थादीनां स्रत्वोपायत्व-मनूद्य तदितिरिक्तोपायिनिष्टत्तौ तात्यव्यं नियमविधयेति नानर्थकाश्वशापि। द्वप्तिसा-धनभोजनात्रितिरङ्गियमवत्। द्रव्यार्जनमेव कात्वर्थपुरुषार्थत्वविचारोदाइर्यां निय-मस्त पूर्वप्रच्यपृक्तितयोपन्यस्तः। स यव तत्रोदाइर्यामिव्येव भट्टगुरुमतयो भेंदः। स्रत्वस्य सौिककात्वं तूभयसम्मतिमिति निष्कार्षः। तत्तदूषमाभूषमादि तु तन्नाभियो-गवतामाकारे यव यक्तं प्रस्तृतानुपयोगादिङ् नोच्यते।
- 42. रतेन चौर्यादिपाप्तस्यापि खलं स्यादिति यत् संग्रहकारधारेश्वराभ्यां खलस्य जौकिकत्वे दूधग्रमिन्दितं तदिप पराक्तम्। चौर्यादिषु खल्वापायत्वस्य जोक्यवाप्रसिद्धेरन्यस्य खिमदं नास्येव्येवं व्यवहारात्। क्रयाद्यपायसन्देश्वादेव खल्व-सन्देश्वाप्रपायसन्देश्वादेव खल्व-सन्देश्वाप्रपायसन्देश्वादेव खल्व-सन्देश्वाप्रपायसन्देश्वादेव खल्व-सन्देश्वाप्तपायस्य वित्याकारको नानुपपद्मः। मम खमनेनापश्वतमिति न ब्र्या-द्यश्चित्रं खल्वादिति च यत् खलस्य जौकिकत्वे दूधग्रमिनिहतं तदप्येतेनाजून-विश्रीश्वम्।
- 43. यचीक्तं संग्रहस्रता। ग्रास्त्रेय सर्वस्य तत्र विनियोगिनयन्त्रयाद्ययेष्ट-विनियोज्यत्वरूपस्रतासम्भवः। इच्छ्या क्वापि नियोगासम्भवादिति। तदप्यापाततः। निष्ट वयमेच्छिकविनियोगोपष्टितत्वं त्रूमोऽपि तु तदर्श्वमात्रम्। चन्यथा राजादि-भयादिक्याप्रतीचातेऽपि तम्न स्यादिनियोगेच्छानिच्छादश्ययोच्य स्वत्वतदभावौ विवदौ

प्रसच्येयाताम्। राजादिनियन्त्रणादिव प्रास्त्रनियन्त्रणादन्य चिन्क्तिविनयोगाभावेऽपि तदर्श्वत्यानपायात् । चतरव दुर्वत्तेनाप्रास्त्रीयविनियोगोऽप्यस्वयवद्वारो नास्ति। प्रयवायमाचपरं प्रास्त्रातिक्रमात् । तदर्श्वता च तदर्जितत्वप्रयुक्तास्येव । तथा च नयविवेकेऽप्युक्तम् । तच तस्य तद्श्वं यद्येनार्जितमिति । तद्श्वं यथेष्टविनियोगार्श्व-मित्यर्थः। प्रतिबन्धादशुरमजनयतोऽपि कुस्त्रलस्य वीजस्य वीजत्वप्रयुक्तमञ्जूरोत्पादनार्ष्ट्विमव । वस्तुतस्तु वीजत्वाशुरार्श्वत्योरिव स्वत्वयथेष्टविनियोगार्श्वत्योरिय भेद
यव । स्वन्यथार्श्वतावस्त्रेदिकापरिचयेऽर्ष्ट्वताया दुर्निरूपत्वात् । तेन ब्रास्त्रस्यस्य स्वत्मपि तदुपायचानयस्यं पदार्थान्तरमेवोत्पत्तिवनाप्रप्रात्व । ब्रास्त्रस्यन्तु जातिरूपं नित्यमित्येतावान् परमोदः । इदश्वाकरे यक्तं लीलावत्यादौ च ।

- 44. अत्र मिताचारायां खललोकिकालोकिकलिवचारप्रयोजनमुक्तं। प्रास्त्रेंकसमिधान्ये खले। मनुः। यद्गर्ष्ट्रितेनार्ज्यन्ति कर्मणा ब्राह्मणा धनम्। तस्योत्तर्म्नांण युद्धन्ति जपेन तपसेन च ॥ इत्यादिस्मरणादसत्यितप्रद्वादि यस्य यद्ज्रेनोप्तः यत्वेन निषिद्धं तद्जिते तस्य खलाभावाचौर्य्याद्यर्जितनत्तत्पुत्राणामिष तद्विभाज्यमेव। कौकिकले तु खलस्य तद्जितेऽपि पितुः खलात् तत्पुत्राणां पित्रधनलेन तद्विभाज्यम्। स्वर्गयतुरेन प्रतिषेधातिक्रमिनिष्तप्रत्यवायात् प्रायस्त्रित्तम्। तत्पुत्रादीनान्तु दायरूपधर्मापायतस्त्रत्विमित न प्रायस्त्रित्तमिष्। सप्तवित्ताग्रमा धन्धा दाया काभः क्रयो जयः। प्रयोगः कर्मयोगस्त्र सत्यतिग्रह स्व वा ॥ इति मनुस्मरणात्। प्रयोगो सद्धार्थं द्वयप्रयोगः। कर्मयोग चार्त्विज्यादिकरणम्। तत्र दायादीनां त्रयाणां नर्णचतुरुयसाधारस्येन जयस्य चित्रयं प्रति प्रयोगस्य खयंद्यतस्य नेप्र्यं प्रदृष्ठ प्रति धर्मत्तम्। च्यस्यंद्वतस्यापदि च खयंद्यतस्यापि सर्वान् प्रति। कर्मयोगस्य तु विप्रं प्रत्येनिति विग्रेष इति।
- 45. खत्र मदनरत्नकरो दूषग्रमाद्य। खत्रस्य प्रास्तिकसमध्राम्यत्युप्य-सम्प्रतिग्रहादिनिष्ठेशे न खत्रानुत्यादकतां तेषां वदन्ति। किन्तु प्रत्यवायमात्रहेतु-ताम्। इतरथा। खापद्रतः सम्प्रग्रह्णन् भुञ्जानो वा यतस्ततः। न लिप्येतेनसा विप्रो ज्वलनार्कसमो द्वि सः॥ कुसीदं क्रिषवाणिज्यं प्रकुर्वीताखयङ्गतम्। खापत्काले खयं कुर्याद्वेनसा युज्यते दिजः॥ इति वचनैरेनसा न युज्यत इत्यभिधानेनापदि प्रत्यवाया-भावावग्रमेनापदि प्रत्यवायस्यवावग्रमात्। प्रतिष्ठेधप्रतिप्रसवयोः समानविषयत्यौचित्यात्। खत्यवागापदि तद्वव्यपरित्वागपूर्वनं जपतपोक्तपं प्रायस्थित्तमेव विद्धाति। न चौर्यादिवनाजदण्डमपि किस्विदचनमसत्यतिग्रहादौ। तेनासत्यतिग्रहादेः पूर्वपत्त-सिद्धान्त्योदयोरिप तेषां खत्वात्यादकत्वाविष्यवात्तर्द्यात्य पुत्रादिविभाज्यत्वभिष तुत्थमिति नेतत्वयोजनं विचारस्यास्य युक्तमिति।
- 46. खत्र वदामः। प्रास्त्रेनसमिधाम्यस्वत्ववादिने मते यथा चौर्यादि-निषेधस्य स्वतानुत्पादनत्वद्यस्प्रयोजनत्वपायिक्तार्धताप्रयोजनत्वपरता तथाऽसत्वित-यद्यदिनिषेधस्याप्यस्तु। यथा चापदुपाधिना। तथैव सप्तमे भन्नो भन्नो निष्ठानित्रता।

अञ्चलनविधानेन इर्में छीनकर्मबाः ॥ आख्यातस्य तत्तसी एच्छते यदि एच्छती-त्यादिप्रतिप्रसवननाचौर्ये तिस्रतयाभावन्तयाऽसत्प्रतिग्रहादेरणन् । चन्यशोभयनापि ततः पश्चमद्दायज्ञाद्यनिष्यत्तिप्रसङ्गः। ग्रास्त्रीयत्वे खलर्याप्रसक्तचौर्य्योपायकलनिषेधः कथमिति चेत्। चित्रमान्तभावेन कथित्रसासे स्तेनावश्यवस्यात्। चपर्था प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तेः । प्रास्त्रपाप्तप्रिषेधे च विकल्पापत्तिभिया दीचितो न जुद्दोती त्यादिवद्वाय्यकारमतेन पर्युदासत्वं सामान्यविभ्रोषभावेन विभ्रोषनिषेधसामान्यविध्यो-र्वाध्यवाधकभावाऽपि वा मतान्तरेखेळपि खीकार्यमेवागळा। प्रतिग्रहादेन् प्रसित्त-क्रीसाबादेरस्थेवेत्यापत्तदभावोपाधिकौ प्रतिप्रसवप्रतिषेधावप्यपद्मतरौ। तर्द्धसत्रति-यच्खयंक्रतवासिन्यादावनापि ब्राह्मसस्य राजदर्गेऽपि स्यादिति चेन्न इष्टापत्तेः। न हि खधर्म्मतागिनो राजदराहाभावः कस्यापि सम्मतः। स च क्वचित् सामान्य-रूपेबोर्क्तरव ग्रञ्चते क्वचिदिश्रेषामात इत्यन्यदेव तत्। चतरवालौकिकस्रत-अदिन इदमप्यपरद्रवगम् । चौर्थादिनिषेधस्य चितयप्रयोजनतागौरवम् । पर्यंदास-लादिसीकारगौरवस लौकिकस्वववादिनम् दाख्प्रव्यवायमात्रपरतम्। तेषां सत्वा-पर्युदासादिखीकारानापत्ति खेति नुपायलस्य जोकसिद्धलादिति रागप्राप्तनिषेधे जाघविमति । तसाच्छास्त्रैकसमधिगम्ये सत्त्वेतसातिग्रहादेत्तदन्पायतात्तदर्जिते पितुः खलाभावः स्यादेवेत्यापागवचौर्यादार्जितपित्यधनाविभागवदसत्रतियहादार्जितस्याप्यवि-भाज्यत्वम् । लौकिके तु तस्मिन् लोके तेषामपि तदुपायत्वात् सिद्धं तद्दिभाज्यत्वभिति मिताचारीक्षं साध्वेव प्रयोजनम्। इदच्चीपलचासम्। पूर्वपची चौर्य्यादार्जितपिष्टधन-सीकारे यथा पुत्रादीनामिप दर्ग्डप्रायस्थितं भवत्येव तथाऽसत्प्रतिग्रहादार्जिततद्-यस्बेऽपीविष प्रयोजनमनसेयं चर्जियतुरेव पायस्वित्तमिविधानेनेतिततात्।

- 47. इदिन्वह विचार्थम्। खलस्य लौकिकले चौर्थस्य लोके तद्नुपायले सिद्धे यह्मक्तानग्रनाद्यापि यचौर्थमनुमतं तेन चोरिते खलमुत्पद्यते न वा। नाद्यः लोकेऽनुपायलेनावधारितात्तद्वत्पत्तेरम्युपगन्तुमग्रक्यलात्। न हि प्रत्यच्चिकद्धं ग्राख्यस्वस्त्रेषापं जलादेदेधिजनकलादि बोध्यते। न हितीयः चलेन पद्ममहायचादिप्रधानानित्यत्तेः। न च चत्र्यतिघातमाचमेन तेन कियतां नान्यदलौक्तिकिति वाच्यम्। श्रिष्टाचारविरोधात् न हि ग्रिष्टाः पद्म महायचाद्यक्तला तदुपयुच्यते। यदद्रः पुरुषो लोके तदद्यास्त्रस्य देवता इति सार्याच। चत्रस्य विश्वामित्रच्य। श्रामानी श्रीपच्यस्त्रात्ते हित्ते हिश्चेन त्यक्ता भोच्यामीति मनसिक्तत्य यदा यचादेवतां तद्भागांच्यक्तं प्रवत्तस्त्रत्ते तुर्यत्वे स्थाप्ते स्थाप्ते स्थाप्ते स्थाप्ते त्यक्तां प्रत्यस्त्रत्ते प्रद्यस्ति । श्राष्ट्रिकस्ति प्रत्यस्त्रत्ते विश्वद्धौ । जौकिकस्त्रस्त्रत्त्रत्यायवादिनक्त्रभ्यतः प्राग्रारच्यु-रियमिति।
- 48. सम प्रतिविद्धाः। यद्यपि चौर्यस्य सत्ते।त्यादकत्वं न कोकसिद्धं तथा-प्यनेनैव ,तप्तमभक्षाप्रनकाले षड्भक्षानिप्रने।त्य विधानाद् गन्यते। सत्तमात्रस्य हि

शास्त्रीयलं विरुद्धमतज्ञानानां क्रयादिखलसाध्ययवद्वारानुपपत्तेः। स्रतस्त्रीर्य्यनिषेधो दखपापमात्रवेश्वकरन । चौर्यस्य खलोत्पादकलाप्रसक्ते न तदभावपरः । यथा ब्राह्मत्थस्य सर्वत्र प्रत्यचालेऽपि जात्युत्वर्षस्थाचे प्रास्त्रीयतमेव । पुरुषेयत्तानियमस्य शास्त्रिकाम्यलात्। यथाङराचार्याः। रतावन्मात्रन्विचागिनकं प्रयेतयम्। न द्ययं पुरुषेयत्तानियमा लोकप्रमागाम्य इति । तत्रापि तावत् पुरुषपरम्पराजन्यवातौ ब्राह्मस्यमभियन्यत इति यज्ज्ययञ्चनभावस्य परं ग्रास्त्रीयः ग्रास्त्रीययञ्चनज्ञानवतस्ता-द्रम्यक्तौ त्रास्यस्य प्रत्यचमेव । यक्तिप्रत्यचप्रमुखजातिप्रत्यचसामग्रीसम्भारादित्यपि वदन्ति । इइ तु चौर्थमाचस्वेव खलानुत्पादकलयज्ञात्तादग्रस्य तस्य खलात्पादकतेव शास्त्रेय बेाधते। न च प्रवन्त्विरोधः न हि प्रवन्न्विवडं शास्त्रसङ्खेयापि बाधिवतं प्रकामिति वाचम्। न चानुत्पादकलमपि जोकात्। ताद्दप्रेन व्यवद्वाराभावादन्वयव्यति-रेकाम्या खलस्य चौर्यापायकता नावमस्यत इत्येतावत्। तथा च पुत्रेद्यादीनां लोकानवगतपुत्रादिजनकता यथा प्रास्त्रादवगम्यते तेषां दृष्टोपायान्तरजन्यतायामप्र तथे इाप्यस्त । सर्गाइवनीयादीनामसौ िकसमात्ररूपामां दछोपायाभावोऽप्यधिक इत्र-न्यदेतत्। प्रतिबन्धकप्रतिबद्धदाद्दादिजनकता यथोत्तेजकमन्त्राखामथर्वादिग्रास्त्रगन्या-<u>र्लाकप्रमाग्राम्यत्वात्</u> उत्तेजनतायास प्रतिबन्धनप्रतिबद्धनार्थ्यजननतातिरिक्ताया चनिर्वाचलात्। प्रक्तिनाप्रतदुत्पत्तिकत्यनायामितगौरवात्।

- यत् जन्मना खत्वं निराकुर्वता जीमृतवाहनेन । क्वचिष्णन्मनेवेति जन्म-निवन्धनलात् पितापु चस्य सम्बन्धस्य पिढमरणस्य च कारणलात्परम्परया वर्णनिभिति प्राचीनिष्यनाभिप्रायमुक्ता कथमुत्पादनरूपेख पिद्रगतव्यापारेख पुत्रखलीत्पत्तिर-व्याप्रद्भीतं अन्यवापारे गाप्यन्यस्य सलमविषदं प्रास्त्रमूलकलादस्य। दरुच लोकेऽपि दाने हि चेतनोद्देश्यकत्यागादेव दाद्वयापारात् सम्प्रदानस्य द्रवी स्त्रामित्वम्। न च सीकरणात् खत्वं स्वीकर्तुरेव दाव्यतापत्तेः। परस्वयापत्तिपत्तेन हि दानरूपता तच पालं सम्पदानाधीनम्। यथा हि देवते।देश्रेन त्यागं कुर्वम्रपि यजमाना न होता किन्त तस्येव यागस्य होमाभिधाननिमित्तभूतं प्रच्लेपं कुर्वन् ऋत्विग्रेव होते खुचते तद्वद्वापि स्थात्। किस। मनसा पात्रमृद्धिस्थाविद्यास्त्रे सीकारात् प्रागेव दानपदं दृष्टम्। ननु ग्रन्थां खीकारः। चभूततद्भावे चिप्रयोगादखं खं कुर्वन् वापारः खीकारा भवति क्यन्ततः प्रागेव खलम्। उच्यते। उत्पद्ममपि खलं सम्प्रदानवापारेग ममेदिमिति ज्ञानेन यथेख्यवद्वाराईं कियते इति खीकारणब्दार्थः। याजनाध्यापनसाहचर्याच प्रतिग्रहस्य सलमजनयतोऽप्यर्जनरूपता न विरुद्धा। याजनादौ दिचाणादानादेव खलात्। पिट्टनिधनकालीनं जीवनमेव वा पुत्रस्यार्जनं भविष्यति। किञ्च। भाषादि-धने तन्मरखात्तन्मरखातानीनजीवनादा भाजन्तराहेः खलमकामेनापि वाच्यं तद्दि-द्याप्यस्विति।
- 50. तदेतदुत्तानमितिविवसितम् । तथा चि प्रास्त्रमूजलादस्येति तावत् खालस्य जौतिकालसाधनादेव निराक्ततम्। यदिष दृष्टस जोक्रेपीत्यादि तृहर्यापात-

सुन्दरम्। न हि प्रतिग्रहीतर्थेखीकुर्वविषि तस्य खलमुत्यवते। पात्रविभेषोदेभेन त्यागे तेनाखीक्रतेऽपि तत् खलात्यत्तौ परसी तस्य प्रतिपादनासम्भवप्रसङ्गात्। यदपि खीकर्तुरेव दाह्रवापत्तरिति तदप्ययुक्तम्। परखलापत्तिपानकथापारस्य दानत्वात् सम्प्रदानसीकारानुकू जानुमानादिखापारस्य दानपदार्थलात् तत्पाजापि हतता तु तस्य सम्प्रदानखीकारमन्तरेश न सम्भवतीति सम्प्रदानखापारस्तद्गटकः। न तु सरव दानप्रब्दार्थः। यदि यथा शिखादि तदि न। यजमानकर्वकामिक्रोत्रक्षामादी तद्विरोधात्। यत्रापि दर्भपूर्णमासादौ त्यागमात्रं यजमानेन क्रियते। चर्राष्ट्वत्तस्य प्रचेपेाऽध्वर्यादिभिक्तत्रापि विविक्तकर्दकलाद्यथासं तद्यवद्याराविरेधात्। स्रवक्तस्य प्रचिपे परं होमग्रब्दवाच्यता नास्ति। स तु त्यागः खकर्टकोऽन्यकर्टको वाऽवच्छेदको-इक्त न तावता किस्होधः। खतरव यागस्य न प्रक्रेपापेचा खात्मलाभा होमस्य त् तद्येक्तरंव । दानस्य तु प्रतिग्रहीव्व्यापारसायेक्ततेव । तदभावे दानपदार्थानिव्यक्तेः । .यच किचे व्यादि । तदिप यत्किचित् । उत्पर्भस्येव तत्र विधानात् न तु दानस्य । श्रतस्व दाता तत्माजमात्रीतीयक्तमन्यथा तस्यानुवादलापत्तेः। दानविश्वितस्य तत्माजा-भावाप्रसामेल तत्मलमाप्रोतीति व्यर्थमेव स्थात्। खतस्तत्र जलप्रस्रोपरूपः पात्रोद्दे-ध्यकमृत्यर्गस्व ददातिना विविच्चितो दानलिनिष्यत्तिक्त तस्य सम्प्रदानकर्द्धकसीकारे सत्येवेति परमार्थः। खतर्यवात्स्जे इत्येव तत्र सङ्ख्यवाकां प्रिन्दानां न तु दास्ये इति सम्पदरे इति वा। खतः प्रतिग्रहादेव दानस्य फलेऽपि सम्प्रदानस्य खलिनित प्रतिग्रहस्यार्जनरूपत्मविदद्धम् । स्वतंजनको हि व्यापारे। जनग्रव्यार्थः । स्वतस्वाह प्रभाकरः। प्रकपितिमदं केनापि। खर्जनं खत्वं नापाद्यतीति विप्रतिसिद्धमिति। चयास्य ग्रमः प्रामेव विद्यतः। किञ्च। प्रतिग्रहस्य ममेदिमितिज्ञानरूपस्य दाह्यापारमाचात्पन्नस्ववयवद्वारार्घतामाचसम्पादकतायामर्जनग्रस्य तच गौगता स्यात्। अन्यसी तत्रातिपादनानुपपत्तिस पूर्वमुक्का। तदसीकारे प्रामुत्पन्नतत्त्वलनाग्रस कच्यः स्यात्। न च दाव्रयापारात् तत्वलनाग्रात् साधारकसम्पदानस्वात्पत्तिरव-ध्याभ्यपेया त्वयापि। खपरचैतत्त्वत्वनाग्रीं अन्यस्य च स्त्रतानुत्यत्तेर्भध्यकस्य तस्य परि-यहादिनाऽन्यस्य यस्य कस्यापि वनगतासामिकहणकार्खादाविव तत्र स्वयं स्यात् परिपालनाप्रसिक्ति । तथा मन्मतेऽपि पात्रविभ्रेषोद्देश्यकत्यागे पात्रविभ्रेषस्थात्पद्मभपि खलं तदखीकारे नायत्वन्यस्य खीकारात्तस्थात्पद्यत इति न कीऽपि विरोधः साधा-रबखलविनाशासाधारगखलोत्पत्तिरिवेति वाचम्। यतस्तत्र साधारबखलव्यवद्वारा-भावेन तद्वत्यत्तिरप्रमाणिका नैव खीक्रियते गौरवाच। किन्तु दातुरेव यथेछविनि-योगाईसलापगमेऽपि परस्रलापत्तिपालाभावे दानग्रव्दाचीनियात्तेविधिग्रिरस्कपाला-र्धिनः प्रतिपादनावधि परिपालनीयलरूपं सलमस्येव। यथाज्ञते इविधि भस्मसा-द्भावाविध खस्पुथ्यस्पर्धादिनिषेधात्र्यवनिमित्तदोषत्रवनानुरोधेन । तथा चान्यस्रला-नुतात्ताविष न मध्यकत्वपरियञ्चाचिनिवारसादिदोषः। श्रिस्टाचाराऽप्युभयव्यपरिपाकन-रुपक्तन्तुकारव। न चोत्सर्गमात्रस्य तत्र तया विध्यशुपगमात्परस्रतापादगादरस्व

न स्मादिति वाच्यम्। तादृश्रोत्धर्भस्थैव विधितात्पर्यविषयत्वात्। श्वामस्यनेऽप्यन्यचा भस्मसाद्भावानाद्रापत्तेः।

यच याजनाध्यापनसाइचर्यात्रित्यइस्यापि खलाजनकलेऽपि गौग्रमेवार्जनलमिति। तद्यवेधात्। तच हि ये ये दिजप्रस्तीनां भागात्तेषां तेषां तेभ्यो स्तिरूपेणेव दिच्चणाकाले प्रतिपादनम्। परिक्रयव्यवद्यारेऽप्यतस्य खामिकर्म्मपरिक्रय
इति जैमिनिस्चादौ विक्तरेण निर्णातस्य विक्तरन्तु तचैव द्रस्टव्यम्। कर्मकरानतिजनिका स्तिरेव हि परिक्रयः। स्वमध्यापनेऽपि भ्रिष्योऽध्यापकायाध्यापनस्तिमेव
तत्मन्तोषजननीमध्ययनान्तेऽपयन्ति। नियतस्तिकरणे तु स्तकाध्यापनमुपपातकम्।
खतस्व याजनाध्यापनयोः प्रतिग्रहाद स्तिश्रब्दवाच्यनिर्वेशाच एचग्रभिधानमुभयमित्रितत्वात्। तेन तयोरपि मुख्यमेवार्जनत्वम्। दिच्चणात्वयवद्यारोऽप्यतस्व
ऋत्वग्रध्यापकरेथे।

यदिष भात्रादिधने भात्रनारादिखलोत्पादकत्वं ति प्रधनस्य तत्कालीनभात्रनाराद्वि दिजीवनस्य वा क्षुप्तमिति पुत्रादाविष पित्रादिनिधनं तत्कालीनं जीवनं वा खलो-त्पादकमन्तु न त्वक्षुप्तं पुत्रादिजन्मेवे युक्तम्। तदिष जन्मनोऽिष खलोत्पादकत्वस्थाव-श्यकत्वोपपादनादेव परिष्कृतम्।

- 51. यचीक्तमूर्द्धिमातुचित्रादि मनुवचनमपि जन्मनः खलापादकले न घटते। प्राम्बिभागिनिवेधार्थले तस्याखार्थपरलापत्तेः विभागदृष्टार्थलेन तदिधानकालविधानयोरसम्भवात्। विभागस्य पद्मप्राप्तस्य नियमार्थले सञ्चवासविधिविरोधाद्यापत्तेः। तस्मात् पितरि स्ति मातरि च सत्यां तद्धनखान्याभाव उपरतयोरिव तयोः पुचादे- चाद्यनखान्यमिति प्रतिपादनार्थमेव तद्दाच्यमिति।
- 52. तदत्युत्तानाभिधानम्। अखार्घविधानापत्तेनुस्यत्वात्। प्रागस्वातन्त्रेग्रेग्रं कालविधिपरत्वे बाधकाभावात्। इच्छापाप्तकालानुवादेऽपि व्यवद्वारणास्त्रत्वेनाविरो-धात्।

रतेन जातेष्ठिवज्ञातप्राग्यविधागपत्तिस्वरूपविद्योष्ठविदेशिदिनिमित्तानन्तर्थन्वधिकाभावात् पित्रुपरमानन्तरच्यायव विभागः प्रसन्धेतेष्ठप्यपास्तम्। कालविधानेन पित्रुपरमस्य निमित्तलाबेश्वनाच। अन्धया निमित्ते सति नैमित्तिकस्यावस्थक-लात्पित्रोरुद्धं विभागकर्यो प्रसन्यविश्वापि प्रसन्धेत । पतितल्वपारिष्राज्ययोः पित्रस्वलनाप्रोऽपि प्रसन्धेत । पतितल्वपारिष्राज्ययोः पित्रस्वलनाप्रोऽपिधकः जन्मना स्वलं तुन्यमेव । पातित्ये तु प्रायस्वित्तानाचरग्रयव सलनाप्रो विभागानर्थता च । अन्यथा द्रयसाध्यप्रायस्वित्तमिषि पित्रोः सद्वयेश न स्थात् ।

खतरव मातुर्निरुत्तरेजसीत्याद्यपि कार्जविधिपरमेव। न तु पातित्यादिवत्तत्र खलाभावः। स तु जोकतरव विभागनिषेधाच भात्रादाविवेत्यादि वच्यते।

53. किस्। तदेवं पिटस्तामारकः कालः खपरस्वानपगतस्य पिटस्तामो पितुरिस्हियेति कालदयिमायुक्ता मध्ये मिताचारीक्षं विभागकालत्रयं दूषिया। तस्मात् पितितस्विनस्पृह्रलोपरमेः पिटस्तलापगम एकः कालः खपरस्य सर्ति सले

तिद्धात रित कालदयमेव युक्तिमिख्यसंहरता जीमूतवाहनेनेव पिद्धस्तानपगमेऽपि पुत्राकां विभागो हीनक्तः। तत्र पुत्राकामिद्धमे स्रतात्पादः कथम्। कथस् जीवतोः पित्रोरसाम्प्रपिपादकवचनेः सह न विरोधः। चस्य विभागासम्भवात् कथं तेषां विभागः। पिद्धस्त्वापगमरवेद्धं पितुस्रियनेन विविच्चते।ऽतरव स्तपदं परित्यच्यो- द्धिमिख्कम् पिद्धस्त्वापगमोर्द्धमित्यर्थः पिद्धस्त्वापगमस्य तिव्वधनादिवत्तस्य पतितत्व- निस्पृहत्वाभ्यामपीत्यादि स्वग्रस्त्रे पूर्वापरविरोधस्य न कथम्।

चायुपरतस्पृहलादिना पुत्राणां खलम्पित्धने भवतीति चापनादयमेकः काक इति उक्तम्। तत्रायुपरतस्पहलादिनेत्वनेन पित्रखलापगमरव यदि विविच्चितस्तर्धः नपगते पित्रखले तदिच्छाऽपरः काल इत्यभिधानविष्यसम्।

पिटखलापग्रमकाजीनपुत्रादिजीवनस्थैवार्जनस्य तदीयस्य खीकारात् पिटखले सित पुत्रांबां तद्धने खलखीकारः कथम्। न भ्रानाश्रमित्रमाद्धरज्ञोनिटित्तमात्रेखः जिल्लापग्रमः पूर्वद्रख्यामिसम्बन्धाधीनं तत्खाम्थोपरमे यत्र द्रखे खलं तत्र निक्षि दायभ्रव्द इति खोक्षदायभ्रव्दार्थाभावात् पिटखलानपग्रमे यत्र विभागस्तत्र दायभ्रव्द प्रयोगोऽपि दुःस्य हत्यादिवज्जव्याकुजी स्थात्।

54. जन्मना खलखीकारे तु सर्वमनाकुलिमिखादि सुधीभिक्त्रेयम्। खतरव मिताचारादौ पूर्वखामिसम्बन्धाधीनं यद्धनं तत्र खलमन्यस्य तदेव दायप्रस्दवाचिमित्युक्तं न तु पूर्वखान्योपरमोऽपि तत्र प्रवेशितः। तिसुद्धं दिविधो दाय रति।

मिताचारोक्तविभागकाषाचयसमर्थनन्तु तत्प्रस्तावे प्रपद्मयिष्याम इत्यष्यसक्तानुप्रसक्तविचारेग्रेति।

55. यच जीमृतवाइनेनेव। मिताचारोक्तम् विभागो नाम द्रथसमुदायविषयामामनेकखान्यानां तदेकदेश्रेषु व्यवखापनमिति विभागश्रव्दार्थः। न च सम्नन्धाविश्रेषात् सर्वेषां सर्वधनोत्पद्मस्य खलस्य द्रव्यविश्रेषे व्यवखापनं विभाग इति वाद्यमित्याश्रद्धा सम्बन्धनारसद्भावप्रतिपच्चस्य सम्बन्धस्यावयवेष्येव विभागख्रश्चखलापादकलात्। क्रत्विपिटधनगतखलात्पादिवनाश्रक्तस्यागिरवात्। यथेटविनियागश्रकाभावेनानुपयोगाचिति दूषियता उच्यते। रकदेश्रोपात्तस्येव भ्रुष्टिरस्थादावृत्यद्मस्य खलस्य
विनिग्नमनाप्रमाखाभावेन वैश्रिषकत्यवद्यारान्धत्या च्यवस्थातस्य गुटिकापातादिना खञ्चनं विभागः। विश्रेषेख भजनं खलचापनं वा विभाग इति व्यत्यचेस्वक्तम्।

56. तद्दायतत्त्वकृतोपन्थस्य दूषितम्। यत्रास्य खत्वं तत्रेव गुटिकापात इति क्यं वचनाभावाज्ञिस्रेतयम्।

यत्र हि पितुर्निधनानन्तरं तदीयात्रयोरिकमादाय आत्रा यदिर्जितं तत्रार्जिकस्य हो भागावपरस्थेकः सर्वसम्मतः। तत्र यदि प्राचीनधनविभागकाले गुटिकापातादर्जिकेन सरवात्रः पश्चाक्षव्यक्तदा प्रादेशिकस्वत्ववादिमते प्रागण्जिकस्यैव सीऽत्रहति तेनार्जित-धने कर्षे भात्रन्तरस्य विभागः। तत्रवास्वत्वेन तदुत्ववे सुतरां स्वत्वाभावादत्रस्य

चाविभाज्यत्वात्। यदि वार्जकोतरेख सेाऽश्वो जन्मस्तदा तेनार्जितधनस्य समभागरव युक्तः। रकस्य सायासेनापरस्याश्वायासेनार्जकत्वादिति दूषिते।

वन्तत्त्व सम्बन्धाविश्रेषात् सर्वसम्बन्धिनां सर्वधनोत्पन्नस्य सत्वस्य गुटिकापाता-दिना पार्देशिकत्यवस्थापनं विभागः।

्र स्वं सत्त्वधनगतखलात्पादिवनाश्चावप्यगत्या कस्पेते। संस्टरतायां पादेशिक-खलात्पादस्वत्वधनखलोत्पादिवनाश्चाविव।

तस्त विभक्तो यः पुनः पित्रा भात्राविकत्र संस्थितः। पिष्ट्येषायवा प्रीया स तु संस्ट उच्यते ॥ इति रुइस्पतिवचने येषामेव हि पिष्टभाष्टपिष्ट्यादीनां पिष्टपिता-महोपार्जितद्येषाविभक्तं खत्ममुपत्तितः सम्भवति। तस्व विभक्ताः सन्तः पुनः पर-स्परप्रीया पूर्वद्यतिवभागार्थ्यसे। यत्तव धनं तन्ममापि यन्मम धनं तत्त्वापीय्येकसिन् कार्य स्कार्यहरूपतया स्थितास्ते संस्ट्याः। न त्वनेकरूपायां धनसंसर्गमात्रेष सम्भूय कारियां विण्डामपि संसर्गितम्। नापि विभक्तानां द्यसंसर्गमात्रेष । प्रीतिपूर्वकः ताद्यभिसन्धं विनेयभिद्धता दायभागक्रतापि सहस्तितम्।

साधारणस्तादेव हि बन्धूनामिक्षमानां भोगं नैव प्रदापयेत्। इति कात्या-यनवचनं यथा श्रुतमेव सङ्गच्छते। यावद्शुक्तधनमाचे स्वस्तत्यापि सत्तात्। चत-रवाच परस्परस्य चौर्यमपि नापदान्ते।

रवद्य। सान्तित्वस्मातिभावाद्य दानं यद्यसमेव च। विभक्ता भातरः कुर्युर्नावि-भक्ताः परस्परम् ॥ इति नारदवचने परस्परनिरूपितदानादिनिष्ठेघोऽपि न्यायमूलक-रव। दानादेः पूर्वमपि देयादौ प्रतियद्यीचादेः स्वत्यस्वाद्दानप्रतियद्वादेरसम्भवात्।

खिभक्तात्वेव चाविभक्तद्रश्या यत्क्वतं दृद्धादृष्टां कर्म तत्र सर्वेघां प्रक्षभा-जिलम्। तथा च नारदः। भाष्टृणामविभक्तानामेको धर्मः प्रवर्तते। विभागे सित धर्मे। प्रभेतेषां एथक् एथक्॥

या बेरिप । स्थावरस्य समस्तस्य गोत्रसाधारणस्य च । नैकः कुर्य्थात् कयं दानं परस्परमतं विना ॥ स्वत्र समस्तस्येति विश्वेषयोपादानात् कृत्स्वधनगतमेव प्रत्येकस्तरं कीयते ।

तसात् तुच्यधनसम्बन्धन्तरसत्वेन सम्बन्धिसकाणात् संक्रान्तं धनं तस्यापि ममा-पीति सम्बन्धिना प्रतीयते तदिमतौ दानादिकं प्रतिधिद्धं खार्धम् ।

खता नैकदेशगतं खत्वमिति।

57. इरच द्रव्यसमुदायविषयाणामनेक खान्धानामेकदेशे ध्रवस्थापनं विभाग इति वदतो मिताचाराक्रते।

इदिन्यह विचार्यम्। इत्यसमुदायिनक्षितं खामिगतं खाम्यम्। खामिनिक्ष् पितच इत्यसमुदाये खत्वं व्यासन्यव्यत्ति प्रत्येकवृत्ति वा। नादः। रक्षेकखामित-खत्माश्रयमाभ्रो तज्ञाभ्रस्याविभ्रष्टसमुदायगततदुत्यत्तेच कल्पनायामितगौरवापृत्तेः प्रत्ये-कस्य प्रत्येकद्रव्ये दानक्रयादिययेव्यविनियोगानर्ज्ञतापत्तौ व्यवद्वारिवस्म्यादापत्तेच। न दितोयः विभागे सति तावताबाधोत्पादकस्पनापत्तेः। सस्य सते विभागे न तु विभागात् सलमिति यञ्चविरोधास।

स्व ब्रूमः। प्रत्येकरत्तीनि सम्बन्धाविश्वेषात् खाम्यानि च सन्त्येव। परस्पर-विभागागते परस्परस्थान्यान्यदीयद्वये तानि नश्चित्ता परमरणपारिष्ठच्यादिनेविति न काप्यनुपपत्तिः। स्ववस्थापनमपीदमेव स्वन्ययेकदेश उत्पादनिमत्वेव वदेत्। स्वतस्व विनाशमात्रकाल्या न तु खालान्तरात्पादकाल्या। जीमृतवाद्यनमते च कुत्र वास्तवं मम खालमिति विभागात् प्रागनिरूपणात्तदधीनश्चौतस्मार्त्तकौ किककर्मो स्टिदः। सनु-मत्या विभागोत्तरक्षतया परस्परद्वये परस्परखालान्तरोत्पत्तिखीकारे तदुत्पादविनाश-कल्यनागौरवं यत् त्या मिताद्यराक्षते प्रत्यापादितं तत्ते। प्रित्याधिकमापद्यम्। स्वच्यारानुपयोगेनु समुदायखालस्य निष्युयोजनता स्वयोपन्यस्ता साप्येकदेश्वगतखान्यः भूपगमे तुन्दैवेति क्षतमितदूरं गत्या।

CHAPTER II.

PART I.

1. स्रथ विभागकालकर्दिनिरूपसम्। तत्र मनुः। ऊद्धें पितुस्व मातुस्व समेत्व स्वातरः समम्। अजेरन् पेद्धकं रिक्यमनीश्वास्ते हि जीवतोः ॥ पेद्धकं पित्रोः सम्बन्धि प्रागुभयोपादानात्। स्वतरव पितुरूर्द्धमिति पिद्धधनविभागकालाः। मातुरूर्द्धमिति माद्धधनविभागकालोऽभिहितः। चश्रव्यस्तु कालान्तरसमुस्रयार्थः न तु द्वेशरूर्द्धमिति नियमार्थः। पिद्धधनविभागे माद्धजीवनस्याप्रतिबन्धकलात्। माद्धधनविभागे पिद्ध-जोवनस्य।

तथा चाइ संग्रहकारः। पिल्डम्थिविभागः स्याच्जीवन्यामि मातरि। न खतन्त्रतथा खाम्यं यसान्मातुः पतिं विना॥ माल्डम्थिविभागोऽपि तथा पितरि जी-वित। सल्वपत्येषु यसान्न स्त्रीधनस्य पतिः पतिरिति॥ पत्युरभावेऽपि पुत्रेषु सल्यु यतो मातुस्तद्धने खातन्त्रेग्य खाम्यं नास्त्यतस्तस्यां जीवन्यामि पिल्रधनिवभागो युक्तः। यतस्यापत्येषु सल्यु भार्याधने पत्युः खाम्याभावस्ततस्त्रस्मिन् जीवत्यपि पुत्रायां माल्र्यनस्यामायिकार इति भावः।

खतस्वानी प्रास्ते सि जीवते। रित्यपि तत्तद्धने खवस्यया खसातन्त्रप्रतिपादनं न सस्तत्वप्रतिपादनं जन्मना सत्तस्य पुत्रायां पिष्टधने खवस्थापनात्।

याच्चवक्ताः। विभागचेत् पिता कुर्यात् सेष्ट्या विभनेत् सतान्। च्हेरं वा श्रेष्ठभागेन सर्वे वा खः समांधिनः॥ खनेष्ट्या पिता सतान् विभनेदिति वदन जीवत्यि पुतरि पितुरिष्टा यदा साऽपि विभागकात इति स्चयति। तदा च पितेव विभागकर्ता। काखाम् इ भवेदेषां निर्देषे पितिर स्थिते इत्यनेन पुत्रामाम् काखातन्त्रप्रतिपादनात्। निर्देषे इति विश्वेषमात्पातित्यादिदेषवित सत्यपि पितिर पुत्रामां तत्पारतन्त्रप्रभावात्तिदिक्शा यदा सेऽपि विभागकाकः पुत्रामास्र तदा विभागकर्तिमास्रक्तं भवति।

खन्येऽिष पुत्रेक्था विभागकालः पितिर इष्टिनिस्पृष्टे निरुत्तरमखे मातिर च निरुत्तरज्ञकायाम्। यथाच नारदः। खत ऊद्धें पितुः पुत्रा विभजेयुर्द्धनं समिति। पित्रोरूद्धें विभागमुक्ता। मातुर्निरुत्ते रजिस प्रकास भगिनीषु च। निरुत्ते वापि रमयात् पितर्युपरतस्पृष्टे, इति॥

जीमूतवाइनेन तु विनन्धे वाप्यश्ररण इति पाठो लिखितः विनन्धे पतिते चश्ररणे यहस्थात्रमर्गहत इति व्यास्थात्य। निरुत्ते वापि रमणादिति पाठान्तरमनाकर-मित्यपुक्तं तदयुक्तं मिताच्चरादिवज्जनिवन्धलिखितत्वात्। पुत्रा धनं विभजेयुरिखनुषद्रः।

गौतमोऽप्यू दें पितः पुत्रा रिक्यं विभजेरिज्ञ खाँ निख्ते चापि रजिस मात्-जीवित चेच्छतीत्वाच ।

व्हरप्रतिरिष । पित्रोरभावे बादृषां विभागः सम्परिष्तः । मातुर्विवत्ते रजिस जीवतारिष हास्यत इति ॥ तथा सरजस्तायामिष मातर्थिनिस्कृत्यिष पितिर दीर्घ-रोगयन्तेऽधर्मवर्त्तिन पुत्रेस्क्या विभागः । यथाह प्रसुः । खनामे पितिर ऋक्य-विभागो वद्धे विपरीतचेतिस रोगिण चेति । नारदाऽपि । व्याधितः कुपितस्वेव विषयासक्तमानसः । खयथाप्रास्वकारी च न विभागे पिता प्रभुरिति ॥

2. चन पियुपरम एकः काली निक्ते चापि रजसीति हितीया जीवति चेक्तिति हतीय इति मिताचारायां जीमृतवाइनीक्षं दूष्णम्। माहरजो निक्तेः पिनुपरतस्पृष्टलविश्रेषणले। चिंश्रहेषा वहेल्यन्यां इद्यां हादश्रवार्षिकीम्। यक्वें उठवर्षां वा धर्मे सीदित सलरः ॥ इति मनुना विवाइकालविधानात्। वनं पञ्चारतो वजेदित्यात्रमान्तरममकालविधानात्। तदा रज्ञोनिक्तेभीतुरसम्भवे पितिर वोपरतस्पृष्टे वानप्रस्थे तत्पृत्राणामिक्त्या विभागाभावप्रसङ्गात्। निर्विश्रेषण-मुपरतस्पृष्टे वानप्रस्थे तत्पृत्राणामिक्या विभागाभावप्रसङ्गात्। निर्विश्रेषण-मुपरतस्पृष्टे पितिर पतिने उप्यविभागप्रसङ्गात्। खयमप्यपरः काल इत्यभिधाने कालचतुष्ट्यापत्तिः पितुषपरमः पतितस्तं निःस्पृष्टलमिक्का चेति। तस्नात् पतितस्तिनःस्पृष्टलोपरमेः पितुः खलापगम एकः कालोऽपरस्य सति तत्वस्त्रे तिस्कात इति कालदयमेव युक्तमिति।

तिमताच्चराष्ट्रदाग्रयापरिचानात् । न हि तेन कार्षचयिनयमेऽभिहितः । तथेवादिग्रस्नेन कार्षान्तरसानुपदमेन प्रतिपादनात् । नियमस्य निर्वाजलात् । पिद्ध-स्वलापग्रम एकः कार्षोऽपरसानपग्रतरन पिद्धसान्ये तिद्धातः इति कार्षद्वयमित्य-प्रयुद्धम् । निर्दत्तरजस्कायां मातरि लनन्वयापत्तेः न हि माद्धनिर्दत्तरजस्कातामाचे स्विद्धस्वलापग्रमः । जन्मना स्वलावस्थापनात् पिद्धस्वलापग्रमस्य कार्षोपषच्चस्वा-सम्भवास । एवं दीर्घराग्रसस्वेऽपि न स्वलापग्रम इति काषद्वयनियमस्त्वः पि दुःसम्मवास । स्वापत्ती तद्वचनिरोधः ।

3. यचे तं तेने व । मातुर्नि छत्ते र जसीति पिताम हा दिधन भिप्रायम् । नि छत्ते र जिस पुत्रान्तरसम्भवाभावात्तरानीमपि पितुरि क्येव पुत्रायां विभागः । क्षिनि छत्ते र जिस क्षमागतधनविभागे प्रकाष्णातानां छत्ति लोपापत्तेः । न चासौ युक्तः । ये जाता येऽप्यजातास्य ये च गर्भे व्यविद्यताः । छत्तिस्य तेऽभिकाङ्गिन्त छत्तिलोपो न विद्यते ॥ इति वचनात् । यतस्य पिद्धधने काल इयमतस्य मनुगौतमादिभिर्म्दतपदं परित्यक्यो- इति वचनात् । यतस्य पिद्धधने काल इयमतस्य मनुगौतमादिभिर्म्दतपदं परित्यक्यो- इति वक्षात् । जिङ्के पितुः खलापगम इत्यक्षः । यदि चास्य पिद्धधनविषयता स्थात् तर्द्युद्धे विभागाक्षातस्त पित्यमेव हरे इनिमत्यस्य निर्विषयता भवेत् । निष्टत्ते र जिस पुत्रोत्तरस्यसम्भवात् । माद्धधनगो चरत्वसास्य नाम्न इनिविषयता भवेत् । निष्टत्ते र जिस पुत्रात्तरस्य विभागामावात् करे क्ष्यत्यपे चायामुद्धे पितुः पुत्रा विभागानिमित्तं सम्भवत्यनिक्या विभागामावात् करे क्ष्यत्यपे चायामुद्धे पितुः पुत्रा रिक्यं विभज्ये विद्यत्ते र जिस मातुर्जीवित चेक्कतीति गौतमवचनात् पितुरे वेक्कात इति निर्वायत इति पितामहादिधनविभागस्यापि पित्रोरभाव इत्येकः कालः । मातुर्निवत्ते र जिस पितुरिक्कात इति काल इयमेवित ।

तदप्यनिभयुक्तप्रमोदनम्। दृत्तिकोपापत्तेः पिद्धभेऽपि तुस्यतात्। ऊर्द्धे वि-भागादित्यस्य निर्विषयतापत्तेरपि पितामद्दादिधनेऽपि तुस्यतात्। सस्पृष्टे पितरि पातित्यादिदुर्छे पितामद्दधनेऽपि पुत्रेष्ट्या विभागस्य सक्क्षसम्मतत्वादवस्थवाष्यताच। वस्ततस्तु पितामद्दादिधने भूया पितामद्दोपात्तेत्यादिना सदद्यस्य पितापुत्रसाम्यस्य वस्त्रमाक्रतात् पृत्रेष्ट्यापि तस्य विभाग उत्तित एव। यत्त्वत्र स्याख्यानान्तरमनीम-तस्य तद्वनगोत्त्रस्तादिकस्यनं तस्त्रवे तद्वचनविवेचने निराकरिखामः।

4. वयन्तु खातन्त्रार्षे पितरि जीवित तिरक्षेत्र विभागितिमित्तम्। पातित्य-पारित्रच्यादिभिक्तदनर्षे पुत्रेक्कापि। तदुपरमे तु खेक्काया निमित्तत्वमर्थसिद्धमिति कालत्रयमेवानेन प्रकारेख। खन्यथा बङ्गनामुपरतस्पृष्ठत्वादीनां विकस्पसमुख्यादि-कस्पनानुपपत्ती विभ्रोषखविभ्रोष्यभावाद्यव्यस्थापत्ती बङ्गकाक्षभभावः। खतरव कचिदचने केषास्विदेवीपादानमनुपादानस्व केषास्तित् सङ्गक्कते।

यकमूलकत्वनालाघवेनीपरतस्पृष्टलादिभिः पितुः खातन्त्रग्रभावस्थेकस्य सर्वे वप-लच्चग्रात्। खनीग्रात्ते हि जीवतोः निर्देषि पितरि स्थिते। जीवतेरिप प्रस्रते इत्यादिवचनखरसेऽप्येवमेव।

खतरव पित्रोजीवतोक्नीदृशां सहवासा मुख्यस्तरनुमवादिना च्येष्ठस्य कार्ये ज्ञमस्यान्यस्य वा पुत्रस्य खातन्त्रमन्योवां तदनुरोधरुत्तित्विमिति च पच्चदयमुक्तवन्तो व्यासादयः। ब्राह्यां जीवतोः पित्रोः सहवासा विधीयते इति व्यासः। जीवति पितरि पुत्रात्वामर्थादानविसर्भाच्येषेषु न खातन्त्रम्। कामन्दीने भोषिते खात्तिं कृते च्येष्ठो वार्थाखिन्तयेदिति हारीतः। प्रखुलिखितौ तु स्पष्टतममाहतुः। पितर्थमक्ते कुटुम्बखवहारान् च्येष्ठः प्रतिकुर्यादनन्तरो वा कार्यच्चत्तन्त्रतो न त्वकामे पितरि रिक्विविभागो दक्षे विपरीतचेतिस दीर्घरोगिखि वा च्येष्ठस्व पिद्यवदर्थान् पाषये-दितरेषान्त्वस्वमून्तं हि कुटुम्बमखतन्त्राः पिद्यमन्तो मातुरप्रेवनवस्थिताया इति।

तसादाचातारीता विभागस्य कालत्रयमेवेति ब्रमः।

- 5. खत्र मनुवचने समेखेखनेन पाचितं साहित्यमनूचते बङ्कत्ववत्। खन्य-चैनोक्क्या दयोख भात्रीर्विभागो न स्मात्। सममिति तु नियम्यते। तच विवक्तामः।
- 6. यत्तु पित्रोरिति दिवचननिर्देशात् सेादरमादृगां पित्रधनविभागोऽपि मातुरभावरव कार्यः। न तु मात्रधनविभागार्धं मातुरभावापादानम्। जीवतेरपीत्रस्य मात्रधनगोचरत्वानुपपत्तेरन्यधनगोचरत्वमवद्यं वाचमते यत्रैव पित्रोरभावो निमित्तं तत्रैव जीवतेरपीत्रपिष्रब्देन जीवनस्यापि प्रश्चत्वत्वीर्त्तनात्र मातुरभावो मात्रधने व्याख्येद्यति जीमृतवाद्यन व्यादः।

तदसम्बद्धम्। पितुष मातुषेति मनुवचने एचड्निर्देशादन्यधापि दिवचनस्य विभागसम्बन्धविवचामात्रेण खाल्यानं युक्तम्। इतरधैकतरधनेऽन्यतद्वाभावस्यादछा-र्थालापत्तेः।

यचेति जीवतिरित्यादेभीत्यधनगोत्त्राचरत्वानुपपत्तेरित्यादि । तस्यापि केऽभि-प्रायः। मातुः पितरि जीवत्यसातन्त्राच्च तद्धनगोत्त्राचरत्वमिति यदि तिर्द्ध सत्वपत्येषु भार्याधनेऽपि पितुः सार्यं तदभावस्यापि तचानुपयोगादन्यविषयत्वापत्तिः।

श्वभिप्रायान्तरन्वसम्भवदुक्तिकमेवेति वृद्धामः। तस्मादृष्टार्थत्वात्तत्तद्धनविषय-रव तदभावः संग्रहकारायुक्ती युक्तः।

7. यथा च पित्रोजीवर्ताभादृतां सहवासी मुख्यस्तया तदृद्धमपि। तथा च म्यूडिलिखिती। नामं सहवसेयुरेनतः संहता दृद्धिमापद्येदिति। संहताः सह-वसन्तो द्रव्योपचयसाहाय्यादिना परस्परक्षतेन दृद्धिमापुर्यत्वर्थः। नारदीऽपि। विभ्यादिनतः सर्वान् च्येको भाता यथा पिता। भाताम्रसः न्निको वा भ्रात्यपेत्वा कुलिखितिः॥

मन्दिष । च्येष्ठरव तु ग्रङ्गीयात्प्रसं धनमग्रोधतः । श्रोधात्तम्पजीवेयुर्ययेव पितरं तथा ॥ च्येष्ठेन जातमात्रस्य पृत्री भवति मानवः । पिष्टुसामन्दस्य देव स तस्मात् सर्व्यमर्हित ॥ यस्मिन्नुसं संनयति येन चानन्यमत्रते । सरव धम्मेजः पृत्रः कामजान्तिरान् विदः ॥ पितेव पालयेत् पृत्रान् च्येष्ठोभादृन् यवीयसः । पुत्रवचापि वर्त्तेरन् च्येष्ठे भातिर धम्मेतः ॥ च्येष्ठः कुलं वर्द्वयति विनाश्यति वा पृनः । च्येष्ठः पूज्यतमो लेवि च्येष्ठः सिद्धिरहार्हितः ॥ यो च्येष्ठो च्येष्ठस्तिः स्थान्मातेव स पितेव सः । खञ्येष्ठस्तिर्यन् स्थात् स सम्प्रच्यन् बन्धवत् ॥ यो क्येभादिनिकुर्व्यति च्येष्ठो भादृन् यवीयसः । सोऽच्येष्ठः स्थादभागस्य नियन्तस्यस्य राजिभः ॥

इत्यादिवचननिचयाद् गुमान्धेखनम्बर्क्ततया सर्वेषां सहवासः प्रमुक्तः।

धर्मर दिवासनया तु विभागः कार्य इत्या इतुर्मन प्रजापती। एवं सहवसे युवा एचगवा धर्मका त्या। एचितवर्द्धते धर्मकास्त्राद्धमा एचक् क्रिया। धर्मच देवादा चेन-रूपकार्येव सहवासे एचक्र अवव्यात्। तथा च रुहस्पतिः। एकपाकेन वसतां पिटरेव-दिजार्चनम्। एकं भवेदिभक्तानां तदेव स्थाइ ग्रहे ग्रहे॥ इति। यत्तु संग्रहकारिका-

पिशेषादिधमंदिद्वरिष धमंदिद्विष्यव्देन ग्रञ्चत इत्युक्तम्। यदा । वियते खं विभागेन पुषायां पेट्टनं धनम्। खले सति प्रवर्षन्ते तस्माद्धम्थाः एथक् विया इति ॥ प्रवर्षन्ते साध्यन्ते खिपशोषादिक्षिया इति विषये इति। तत्तु जन्मनेव पुषायां पिट्टधनखत्वादिभागात् प्रागपि स्रोतस्मार्त्तकर्माधिकारं प्रतिपादयद्भिरसाभिः प्राग्वेव प्रत्यासि। तस्मात् पश्चमञ्चायद्वादिधमंद्यव धर्मशब्देनाच ग्राञ्चः।

- 8. दत्तासु भगिनीयु चेति तु न नानाधं निन्तु तासामवध्यं दानार्धम्। यथा, विष्ट्रं पिट्टरायेभ्ये दत्त्रश्चे पेट्टनं ततः। भाटभिक्तदिभक्तव्यन्त्रश्ची न स्याद्यथा पिता इति॥ नारदवचनन्त्रशादानावध्यनत्वार्थं न विभागनानार्थम्।
- 9. पिता च यदि खेळ्या पुत्रान् विभन्नति तदापि निर्द्रुप्रेक्श ने।पादेया किन्तु। क्येष्ठं वा श्रेष्ठभागेन सर्वे वा खुः समांश्चिन इति। पच्चयोर्मध्ये यः पच्च इष्टः स ग्रांच्य इति योगीश्वरवचनार्थः।

. . च्येखं श्रेष्ठभागेन मध्यमं मध्यमभागेन । कनिखं कनिष्ठभागेन । सर्वे वा च्येष्ठा-ंदयः समांग्रभाजः कार्य्या इति विज्ञानेश्वराचार्याः ।

प्राचात्त सेच्हयेति एचक्पचान्तरं च्येष्ठादिभागसमभागौ च दौ पचाविति पच्चयमतस्य च्येष्ठं वेति प्रथमो वाष्यस्य सेच्हयेति पचापेच्या समञ्जसे वच्च-मासपचापेच्यते क्रिष्टः स्यादित्याङः।

उपपत्तिस्व तत्र वदिना। पितेष वा स्वयं गुत्रान् विभजेस्यसि स्थितः। च्येष्ठं वा स्रोठमागेन यथा वास्य मितभवेदिति ॥ नारदवचने। च्येष्ठं वेत्यादिनेकं विषम-विभागप्रकारमुपन्यस्य यथा वास्येत्युक्तरेन्थे।ऽपि न्यूनाधिकभागः पितृरिच्छ्यास्तीति ग्रन्यते। हारीताऽपि। जीवन्नेव वा विभच्य वनमात्र्यदे र द्वात्रमं वा गच्छेत् खल्यं वा संविभच्य भूयिस्त्मादाय वसेद् यद्यपद्रस्थेत् पुनक्तेभ्यो स्ट्रष्टीयादिति। रद्धात्रमः पारित्रच्यम्। उपद्रस्थेद् द्व्याभावेन चीत्रो भवेत्। चत्रापि सक्यं वेत्यादिपचान्तरम्क्तम्। तस्मात्तदेकमूककतानुरेधिन योगीत्रयवचनेऽपि तत्संस्रहायेच्छ्येति एथक्-पच्छस्य युक्त इति।

तदसत्। वाग्रव्दक्तावद्देधापि खुत्यत्तेर्नासमञ्ज्ञसः। या चोषपत्तिरुक्ता साप्ययुक्ता। यदि वचनान्तरोपात्तपचान्तरसंग्रहार्थिमच्च्येत्वस्य भवेदुत्तराद्धं व्यर्थमेव
स्यादुक्तपच्चदयस्यापि वचनान्तरोपात्तलादिच्च्येत्वनेन तयोरिप संग्रहरुभवात्।
तदितरपच्चसंग्रहार्थले मन्दप्रयोजनता स्यादेव। इच्छाया निरङ्गालेनानियमवारकाय
वचनान्तराकोचनं विना तद्धीनिवीहात्। स्वोपात्तपच्चदये व्यवस्थानिरासार्थतयेच्च्येति व्याख्यायमाने वचनान्तराकोचनानावास्थकत्वात्। न च विकच्योक्तयेवेच्छालाभे
इच्छ्येति निर्धकमिति वाच्यम्। उत्तराद्धवैयर्धायेच्यया व्यवस्थितविक्रस्यनिरासाय
स्वाक्योपात्तपच्चदयविषयतया तदनुवादस्थैवोप्रपद्मतरस्वात्।

नारदार्शकमूषकता तु विकानेश्वरव्यास्थानेऽपि नापैति । तद्वसपक्षदयस्य वच-नानौरेख्यपुपादांनात् । न च निर्दर्शकेष्टामाचमेव पद्यान्तरं योगीश्वरवचनार्थाः- ऽिष्वित वाच्यम्। खयथाश्राख्यकारी च न विभागे पिता प्रभुरित्यस्य निर्विषयता-पत्तः। इच्छामाचस्य श्रास्त्रीयत्वेऽयथाश्रास्त्रकारित्वाप्रसक्तेः। जीविद्यभागे तु पिता नेकं पुचं विश्रेषयेत्। निर्भाजयेत्र चैवैकमकस्मात् कार्यां विनेति ॥ कात्यायनवचसी-ऽपि निर्विषयता स्यात् इच्छ्या स्ककारयात्वात्। न विश्रेषयेच्छास्त्रीयच्येष्ठभागाद्यति-रिक्तेच्छिकविश्रोषवन्तं न कुर्य्यात्। कारयाच्च श्रास्त्रोक्षां पातित्यादिकं विनाऽकस्मात् कोधात् सभगापुचकोद्दादिना वा न निर्भाजयेद्वागर्राह्यं न कुर्य्यादित्यर्थः।

यत्त् । न्यूनाधिकविभक्तानां धर्मः पिष्टक्ततः स्मृतः । इति योगीश्वरवचनं तदिषे धर्मोधर्मादनपेतस्रेत् पित्रा क्रतः क्रतस्य स्मृतो न निवर्त्तते । स्वधर्मस्वयधामास्त्रक्रतो निवर्त्ततस्वेत्वभिमायहति विद्यानयोगिभिरेव स्थास्थातम् ।

थाधितः कुपितस्वेवेत्यादिवचनान्रे।धात्। एवम्। समन्यूनाधिकाः भागाः पित्रा येषां प्रकल्पिताः। तथेव ते पाकनीया विनेयाक्ते सुरन्यथा॥ पित्रेव तु विभक्ता ये समन्यूनाधिकैर्डनेः। तेषां सरव धर्मः स्यात् सर्वस्य हि पिता प्रभृदिति॥ रहस्यति -नारदवचने अपि खात्व्ये। श्रेष्ठादिविभागोऽपि पित्रा न्येष्ठादिभ्या दत्तेऽन्येरमुप्रयो न कार्यः। समांप्रविभागे वा न्येष्ठादिभिरिति तात्पर्यार्थः खतरव नारदक्तेषां स रव धर्मः स्यादित्याह।

स्रेष्ठादिभागस्य मनुनेक्तः। च्येष्ठस्य विंग्र उद्घारः सर्वद्रयास्य यहरम्। ततोऽद्धं मध्यमस्य स्यात् तुरीयन्तु यवीयस इति ॥ समांग्रपत्तं बौधायन साहः। मनुः पुत्रेश्यो दायं स्थभजदिति समें।ऽग्रः सर्वेषामविग्रेषादिति। मनुः पुत्रेश्यो दायं स्थभजदिति स्रुतौ विग्रेषास्रवसात् सर्वेषां पुत्रासां समोऽंग्र इत्यर्थः।

10 यदि पिता खेळ्या समाग्रेन पुत्रान्यभन्नते तदा खपत्रीभ्यः पत्रसममग्रं द्यादित्याच्च याज्ञवल्कः। यदि कुर्य्यात् समानंग्रान् पत्नः कार्य्याः समाग्रिकाः। न दत्तं स्त्रीधनं यासां भन्ता वा ऋगुरेश वा॥ यासां भन्ता ऋगुरेश वा स्त्रीधनं प्रीत्यादिना न दत्तम्। भन्तिदिग्रहश्चपुपत्रज्ञाच्च वच्चमाश्वस्त्रीधनग्र्न्या इत्यर्थः। तासां पत्नीनां पृत्रसमाग्रभागमानं नियम्यते। तथा च यदा ऋष्ठभागादिनापि पिता पुत्रान् विभन्नति तदापि ऋष्ठभागादुङ्ग्योङ्ग्रोङ्गरोङ्गरदृश्यसमुदायात् पुत्रसमानेवांग्रान् पत्नग्रो न सन्तेन खन्यस्रभागादिकमित्यर्थः पर्यवस्यति।

यत्तु प्रद्धाः खोडारः परीभाखादित्तमि प्रती त्रभते। तथा चापत्तमः। परीभाख्य प्रदेशत्रश्वारो भाष्याय इति। परीभाख्यभोजनपाचादि यदसाधार्यं यसा खनशारीऽप्यसाधार्यक्तिवेचिययते।

न च पत्तदयेऽप्येतावता पुत्रसमांशित्वं पत्नीनां विज्ञानेश्वरेशोक्तन्तर्षि यदि कुर्यात् समानंशानिति समांशानुवादो व्यर्थः पत्नारो च्येष्ठांशादि न कमन्ते द्रवेताव-मात्रमेव वाच्यमिति युक्तम्। यतः एवं समुद्रुतोद्धारे समानंशान् प्रकल्पयेत्। उद्धा-रेऽनुद्रुते त्रेषामियं स्थादंश्वक्त्यना॥ एकाधिकं इरेच्चेत्रष्ठः पुत्रोऽध्यर्धन्ततोऽनुत्रः। चंश्रमश्चं यवोयांस द्रति धर्मीत्यवस्थित द्रति मनुना। द्यंशी वा पूर्वत्रः स्युद्धिकम्

इतरेषामिति। गौतमेन खय भावृषां दायभागो द्यंशौ इरेज्येको गवाश्वस्य चात्र दश्ममजावयो ग्रह्स कनिष्ठस्य कार्यायसं ग्रहोपकरणानि च मध्यमस्त्रेति। विश्व-केन व्येष्ठस्यांश्रीऽधिको देयः कनिष्ठस्य वरः स्रतः। समांश्रभाजः श्रेषाः स्यूरप्रचा भगिनी तथेति॥ नारदेन चाजारम्ते विषमभागमात्रमुक्तं तद्यदादियते तदा पत्नी-नामंश्राभावप्रतिपादनाशं यदि कुर्यात् समानंश्रानित्रक्तमिति न देखः।

खतरव भादृणामिवभक्तानां यद्यत्यानम्भवेत् सङ् । न तत्र विषमं भागं पिता दद्यात् कथस्वेति मनुना सर्वेषां भादृणां द्रव्याज्ञेने यदि सङ् समानमेवात्यानमुद्यागो भवेत् तदा पितुर्विषमिवभागदानप्रतिषेधकमनुवचनव्यात्वाने जीमूतवाङ्गेने तिसु-द्वारक्तु पित्रा दातव्यस्व । तस्य विभागरूपतामावात् ।

न्यूनाधिकविभागस्थैव निषेधादिति । तसाञ्चेरं वा श्रेष्ठभागेनेति याज्ञ-वक्कार्युक्त उद्घारेऽपि समांग्रमागिता पुत्रामामस्येवेति तत्रापीदं वचनं प्रवर्त्ततस्व इंग्रादिपचे परं न प्रवर्त्तत इति विज्ञानयागिनामाग्रयः।

दत्ते तु स्त्रीधने दत्ते त्वर्धं प्रकल्पयेदित्यत्रार्द्धदानं वच्चते। यद्यपि तदाधिवेद-निके भर्त्रा दीयमाने वच्चते तथाप्याकाङ्गायां समानन्यायत्वादत्रापि योज्यम्। बौधायनः। बद्धनामेकधर्म्भाग्यामेकस्यापि यदुच्यते। सर्वेषामेव तत् कुर्यादेकरूपा हि ते स्तता इति॥

भाद्रुवामिविमक्तानामित्यादिमनुवाको सहात्यानं सर्वेषां विभागप्रार्थना यदि मवतीति जीमृतवाहनेन तदनुयायिना दायतत्त्वक्तता च व्याख्यातम्। यदि पुनः पितिरि जीवति पुचा यव विभागमर्थयन्ते तदा विषमविभागः पिचा न दातव्य इति वदता। तच सहग्रब्दवैयथ्यं उत्थानग्रब्दस्य चोद्योगवाचिनोऽपि भागप्रार्थनापरत्वमन्यायिमत्य-सद्याख्यानमेवादर्त्तव्यम्। तथा च। सामान्यार्थसमुत्याने विभागत्तु समः स्मृतः। इति योगीश्वरवचःसम्बादीऽपि लभ्यते। तस्यास्मदिभमतार्थतयेवापपत्तेः।

दत्ते तर्डिमित्यचाप्यर्डेशब्दः समप्रविभागवचने। न भवति खतस्य यावता पूर्वेदस-मिदानीं दीयमानस्य समस्भवति तावद्देयमिति मिताच्चरायामुक्तं। तचायमाश्रयः यद्यपि नपुंसक्तस्यार्डशब्दस्य पुंस्यर्डेऽडं समेऽशाक इति काषात्ममाश्रवाचित्वमित्तः। तथापि कदाचित् तासां पुचाधिकधनत्वं कदाचित्तद्रनधनत्वमय्यवस्थितमर्डिनियमस्य चादृस्टार्थत्वं मा प्रसाङ्गीदिति पुचसमांश्रितायामेव तात्यर्थमिति।

खन मदनरत्नाकर खाइ। पत्नग्रहित बक्तवचनात् प्रतिपत्नि समानंशान् पिता प्रहीयात्र तु ताभ्यः एचक्त्रत्वांश्रो दातवः। जायापत्वोर्विमाग्गो न विद्यत इति इतिवचनविरोधापत्तेरित।

तज्ञ। नाच जायापत्योर्विमाग उच्यते येन हारीतवचनविरेधः स्थात् किन्तु पत्नेव पुचित्मागसमये ताभ्यस्तत्समां प्रदानं प्रीतिदानवत्। खत्यव स्त्रीधने दत्ते लर्ड-मित्युक्त्मिति न केऽपि देखः।

113 यस्तु जीवति पितरि पुत्रेष्क्या विभागः स वैषम्यात्रवसात्मानुर्निष्टत्ते रजसीति मनुवचने समग्रब्दानुषक्षात्र समयव।

ये। पितुरू द्वें विभागः से। पि समस्व । पूर्वे (राष्ट्रतमनुवचने समित्यभिधानात् । हारीते। पि समाने। स्ते पितिर रिक्थविभागः । पेठीनसिरिप । पेढने विभज्यमाने दायाचे भादृषां समे। विभागः । याच्चवल्लागेऽपि । विभजेरन् स्ताः पित्रोरू ईस्वस्थस्य समम् । पित्रोरू ईमिति कालः स्ता रित कर्त्तारः समिति प्रकारनियम रित मितान्तरा ।

नन् मन्नेव पितुरू धें विभागसुपक्षम्य च्येष्ठरव तु ग्रङ्कीयात् पित्रं धनमग्रेषतः। श्रेषात्तसुपजीवेयुर्येषेव पितरं तथेति सहवासपत्तं सुख्यसुक्षा च्येष्ठस्य विंग्र उद्धार इत्यादिना विषमविभागोऽप्युक्तस्तल्यं समिनयम इति चेत्। उच्यते। यद्यप्यं विषमभागो जीवत्यजीवति च पितरि शास्त्रदृष्टस्त्यापि वचनान्तरान्रेधात्सली सम् रवेति नियमः। स्वस्यां लेकविदिष्टं धर्म्यमप्याचरेत्र त्यिति योगीश्वरवचनात्।

चन लेक्यदेन युगमुचते। युगान्तरे धर्मिष युगान्तरे यदिदिछं प्रतिधिदं तम्राचरेदिव्यर्थः। चन्यया धर्म्यलाखग्र्यत्वयार्थाघातः। प्रास्त्वविद्विते तदिभन्नविद्वेषोः वाधितयव। तदनभिन्नया मरजनविद्वेषम् नाखग्र्यत्वापादकाऽप्रीचेगमदिहिंसादा-वित्रसङ्गादिव्यादिद्व्षयं स्यात्। चतयव मितान्तरायां मधुपर्कप्रजनधग्रवालम्भादि-क्लिवर्च्यमेव लेक्वविद्वरुवनेश्राह्मतम्।

किवर्ज्येषु च पुनरदाद्वादिकमच्चतादीनां यत्रोक्षं तत्र ज्येष्ठांश्रायुद्धारादिक-मिष्। यथा चादिपुराखे। ऊढायाः पुनरदाद्वा ज्येष्ठांश्रो गोवधक्तथा। कलौ पच न कुर्वीत खाळजाया कमग्रहलुः ॥ स्मृतिसंग्रहेऽपि। यथा नियागधर्मो ना नानु-बभ्गा बधोऽपि वा। तथोद्धारिवनागोऽपि नेव संप्रति वर्त्तते ॥ नियागधर्मो खाळ-भाषायां वाग्दत्तायां स्तपितकायां गुर्वादिनियागेन विधिना गमनम्। मैत्रावर्त्तां गामन्वस्थां वग्रामालभेतेति विद्विता गोवधः। सम्मित कलौ।

खतरवापक्तम्बो जीवन् पुचेश्यो दायं विभजेत् समिति खमतमुक्ता च्येशे दायादहरोकहित क्रत्खधनग्रहणं च्येश्रस्थेकित्रीयमतमुपन्यस्य देशविशेषे सवर्णं गावः क्रायामभौमं च्येशस्य रथः परीभाग्धं पितुर्ग्रहेऽजङ्गारा भार्याया ज्ञातिधनश्चेयोकमत-त्वेनेवाडारिवभागं दर्शयिता तच्छास्त्रविप्रतिषिद्धमिति निराक्ततवान्। शास्त्रविप्रतिषिश्च खयमेव विद्यतवान्। मनुः पुचेश्यो दायं व्यभजदित्यविशेषेण स्त्र्यत हित। तस्तान्न विद्यविनागः शास्त्रदृश्कोऽपि कलावन्रश्चेयः।

यत्त मिताचाराक्यता श्रुतिविरोधे युक्तं तिहचार्यम्। श्रुतिविरोधे हि सित युगान्तरेऽपि तस्यानमुखाने तद्घोधकवचनानां सर्वधाऽप्रामाख्यमेव स्यादिति किन्व-वर्व्यतयापन्यासा विरद्धः। न वात्यन्तं श्रुतिविरोधोऽपि। खिवश्येषश्रवको सित समं स्यादश्रुतलादिति न्यायलभ्यलात् समलस्य।

स्मृतिचिन्त्रकायान्तु बौधायनेदाद्यतं विषमविभागप्रतिपादकमपि श्रुत्यन्तरं विषिवतम्। न्येखलादाधिकोऽपि श्रुत्यन्तरमित्याद्य स यव। धनमेकमेकमुद्धरे ज्येखः तस्मात् न्येखं पुत्रं धनेन निरवसाययतीति श्रुतेरिति। धनमेकमेकमिति वहन् श्रुति-

वाक्यातं धनेनेत्येकवचनं विविच्चितिमिति सूचयति। निरवसाययति तेषयतीत्यर्थे इति सञ्चेन।

जीमूतवाद्यनादयस्तु यदा भक्त्यतिश्रयादिना भावृत्यामनुमितस्तदेाद्वारादिविषम-भागे द्वित्यवाद्यतनानां भक्त्याद्यभावादुद्वाराद्यक्ष्वेन्येष्ठाभावाद्य समभागयव नेतने दृश्यते इत्यादिना ग्रस्नोननुमत्यननुमितभ्यां विषमसमभागयार्द्ववस्थामाद्धः तत्तु तथा सित पुत्रेच्छायायव प्रयोजनात्वापत्तेः पूर्वाद्वविरोधादनादेयम्। पित्रिच्छायाः स्वतन्त्रपत्ता-नारपरतन्तु प्रागेव निरासि।

12. पित्रा पुत्रेभ्यः खार्जितधनविभागं ददता खयमंग्रद्धयं याद्यमित्याद्यं नारदः। दावंग्री प्रतिपद्येत विभजद्गात्मनः पितेति। स्वस्पतिरिप। जीविदभागे तु पिता स्वक्रीतांश्रद्धयं खयमिति।

पितुरं ग्रह्मयम्बानेकपुत्रविषयमित्याहतुः ग्रञ्जलिखितौ । स यदोकपुत्रः स्थाद् ह्रौ भागावात्मनः कुर्यात् । व्यवहारपारिजातकार इदं वचनमेवं व्याचर्छे । यक्मव्दो उत्र श्रेष्ठवाची । तथा च यदि पुत्रो गुग्रवचाया धनार्च्जनग्रह्मस्तदा तेन सह विभागे पित्रांग्रह्मयं ग्राह्ममिति ।

जीमृतवाइनस्त रकस्य पुत्रः रकपुत्र रकपिद्धक सौरस इति यावत्। न पुनः रकः पुत्रो यस्येति बज्जीहिस्तस्यान्यपदार्थप्राधान्येन षष्ठीतत्युक्षाद् दुर्बक्षत्वात्। तथा च चेत्रजस्य खादित्तस्य दिपिद्धकत्वात्। तथा चौरसपुत्रक्षः पिता खिपद्धिने भागदयं ग्रङ्गीयात्र तु चेत्रज इति खाचखौ।

तदसत्। तथा सति पितामच्धनगोचरतास्य स्टात् तत्र च सदशं खाम्यं पिता-पुत्रवारित्योरसस्यापि पितुः पुत्रसमांश्रताया व्यवस्थापिष्यमायात्वात्। तथा चागत्या बज्जबीचिरेवास्थेयः।

मिताचाराक्तता लिदं वचनमनादतमेव।

कात्यायनः। द्यंश्वरोऽर्ष्वरो वा पुत्रवित्तार्व्जनात् पिता। मातापि पितरि प्रेते पुत्रत्यांश्वभागिनीति॥ स्व जीमूतवाइनः। पुत्रस्य वित्तार्जनात् पुत्राजितेऽपि वित्ते सार्जितदव पितुरंश्वदयिमत्यस्यार्था न तु पुत्रस्य वित्तस्य तथार्र्जनादिति। स्वनिजंतपुत्रस्यापि भात्यभिर्विभागे वित्तार्जकतयांश्वदयसेख्यात्। स्रेता विभागाई-सम्बन्धिनि विद्यमानेऽर्जकस्य द्यंशादिइरत्वमसति तु सर्व्वहरत्वमिति वास्यं तथा सति पित्रपुत्रपरथाः प्रमत्तागितता स्थात्। किञ्चार्जनं सत्वहरुत्रभूतो स्थापारः। स्वर्जनं स्वत्वं नापादयतीति विप्रतिविद्यमित्यभिधानात्। न च पुत्रमु स्वत्वमस्तिति सर्वस्वराने दिश्चतमत्त्वत्तः गौग्रमर्व्जनपदं वित्ते च मुख्यमिति सक्षदुत्रिते वेरूप्यमयुक्तम्। न च पुत्रस्यार्व्जकत्वादेवांश्वदयप्राप्तेः पितुस्वास्भादचनादतेऽपि वचनान्तरादेव भागदय-सिद्धवचनमिदमनर्थकमिति वास्यम्। सत्वस्वनमन्तरेशापि पुत्रभने पितुर्भागदया-प्राप्तेर्स्य सार्थक्यात् द्वाइ।

तज्ञ। दन्द्विच्चया षद्यर्थलच्च्यावते। भवदुक्तसमासस्यायुक्तलात्। दश्वानर्जित-

पुत्रसेत्यादिदन्ददृष्यां तदत्यसम्बद्धम्। भाद्यभागाद्यविषयकत्वादस्य। पिद्धधनप्रसान्वात्। न चैवं पुत्रपदं यथं विकार्जनस्व द्यंग्रहरत्वे हेतुत्वापपत्तेरिति वाष्यम् खातन्त्रार्थतात्। यतः पुत्रोऽपि विक्तवत् तेनैवार्जितस्तेन परतन्तः सार्जितधने पितुरंग्रदययस्यावयहा न भवतीत्यत्र तात्पर्यम्। यसार्जनपदवेरूपं तदप्यसत्। पुत्रे-ऽपि पिद्धस्रसेरुत्वत्। न च सर्वसदाननयविरोधः पित्राद्यस्वे तस्य तात्पर्यात्। पुत्राद्यदानस्य तम्रयसिद्धान्तस्य भाष्यप्रदर्भितचोदकविरोधयृक्तिसिद्धत्वात्। स्वतयव पुत्रकन्यादानादिविधया सुखार्थास्य न पुत्रादिपरतन्त्रीकर्यारूपगौयदानादार्थः।

13. इदस पितुरंग्रद्दयापादानं खार्जितिवययं न पित्रार्जितिवययम्। भूया पितामहापात्ता निवन्धा द्रव्यमेव वा। तत्र खात् सद्द्र्यं खाम्यं पितुः पुत्रख चीभयो-रिति याच्चवल्कोन तत्र पितापुत्रयोः समखाम्याभिधानात् समांग्रभागित्वमेव।

तस्य द्यायमर्थः। भूः शालिचोत्रादिका। निवन्धे राज्ञामसुकस्थैकसिन् पर्या-मरकक्षसुक्तमरकादावियन्ति पर्यादीनि देशानीति शासनारू एतया यद् छत्तित्वन् दीयते तदुच्यते। तथा द्रश्चं सुवर्यादि तत्र पितुः पुत्रस्य च खान्यं द्वि शब्देन प्रसिद्ध-मित्युच्यते। जन्मनेव खलात्। तदपि सद्दशं तुस्यमताऽत्र पुत्रायां न पित्रजितद्दव पिष्टपारतन्त्रामिति तदनिच्छ्यापि विभागोऽश्वदयनियमस्व पितुन्।क्तीति।

रहस्पतिः। द्रश्चे पितामहीपात्ते स्थावरे जङ्गमे तथा। सममंश्रितंमास्थातं पितुः पुत्रस्य चैव हि॥ पित्रा समरवांश्रो याह्यो न तु स्वार्जितवरंश्रदयं विषम-विभागपत्तात्रयमां विश्वर्थ इति मदनरक्षकारः।

जीमृतवाइनस्त यत्र दयोक्षेत्रोजित्वेव पितर्थेकः पुत्रमुत्याद्य नर्शेऽन्यस्य जीवित । पस्यात् पितापि स्टतस्त्र पित्रधार्यं सहग्रं सान्यसिति वचनम् । यथा पिताम् स्थने पितुः सान्यं तथा तत्पुत्रस्यापि । न तु सिन्नकंविप्रकर्षयुक्तो विश्रोषः । पार्वयविधिना पिख्डदाल्लेन दयोरिविश्रेषादित्यभिप्रायः । स्वत्यत्र स्टतपिल्लकः प्रपौनाऽपि प्रपितामद्यने पुत्रयोत्रास्यां सह तु स्टत्वदेव स्वामी । पिख्दानाद्यविश्रेषात् । जीवित तु पितरि पुत्रायां तद्धनस्यां सप्तृत्रस्वयिष्ठमाग्रे तत्पुत्रायामपि विभागः स्थात् सामित्वसान्यात् । तस्मान्मृतपिल्लपौत्रविषयक्षमिदं न पौत्रमात्रविषयकं न चाप्रकान्ततात् तदर्थकलं प्रागनेकपिल्लपौत्रविषयक्षमिदं न पौत्रमात्रविषयकं न चाप्रकान्ततात् तदर्थकलं प्रागनेकपिल्लपायानेव प्रक्रमात् । सादर्धवचनन्तु सार्जित-वर्ते पित्रस्थ्या विभागामावार्थम् । यथाद्र विष्णुः । पिता चेत् पुत्रान् विभजेत् तस्य खेन्द्या विभागामावार्थम् । यथाद्र विष्णुः । पिता चेत् पुत्रान् विभजेत् तस्य खेन्द्या विभागामावार्थम् । यथाद्र विष्णुः । पिता चेत् पुत्रान् विभजेत् तस्य खेन्द्रा स्वयमुपात्तेऽर्थे । पैतामहे तु पिता पुत्रयोक्तुः साम्यक्षित् । स्वतः स्वापात्ते विषयते । जीवित्यलक्षपौत्रविषयतापि वा धारेश्वरानुमतास्यान्तां तथापीन्द्राव्यन्त्रयान्यस्य पितुरनेन वेष्यते । किस् जन्मविद्यागुष्ठक्येक्षो द्वां द्वायद्वाप्रुयत् । समांग्रमागिनस्वन्ये तेषां

पिष्टसमस्तु स इति रहस्पितवचनात् पितापि खिपत्नरकिनवर्त्ते गुग्राच्येष्ठः खमाद्रमिः सह विभागे पित्रवांग्राद्रयमाक् तत्र पुत्रः सह विभागे पित्रवांग्राद्रयमाक् तत्र पुत्रः सह विभागे पित्रवांग्रः दयं पेतामहधनेनाप्नोति खदारकरव पुत्राणां तद्धनसम्बन्धेति भवता सुनीनाच्च वचनमनुचितम्। तस्मादिच्च्या विभजेत्यतानिति पित्रिच्च्या विभागकाकलं दावंग्रो प्रतिपद्येतेत्यादि वचनेत्तं पितुर्भागदयचाविभ्रिष्टं पितामहधनेऽिष । न्यूनाधिकभागमात्रन्तु पुत्रेषु खाच्छन्द्येन न भवति । द्रव्ये पितामहिषात्ते स्थावरे जङ्गमे तथा । सममंश्रित्वमात्यातिम्पतुः पुत्रस्य चैवहीति रहस्यितिना पितापुत्रयोरंग्रसाम्यस्येत्वाह्य विधानात् कथं पितुरत्राप्यंग्रदयिमिति चेत्र । खंग्रित्वमंग्रकर्द्वलं समं न तु खेच्या खार्जितवद्युनधिकांग्रकर्द्वलमिति तदर्थात् । न लंग्रवन्तं सममिति । स यद्येकपुत्रः स्थादिन्धेकपुत्रपदस्थौरसपरत्वस्थोक्कत्वाद् दिपित्वकच्चेत्रजादिरूपपित्रभिप्रायं वा समांश्रित्वाभिधानमित्याह ।

तदनादेयम्। सन्दर्भविदेशित्। तथा हि। खनेकपित्रकार्णा पित्रदारकभाग-कल्पनामिश्वायानन्तरं भूर्या पितामहि।पात्तेव्यक्तं तत्राखान्यमेव पौत्राणां पेतामहि धने पितरि जीवित विभागाभावा वा। तिदक्त्येव वा खार्जितविद्वभाग इति शक्तात्रयमेवात्तिष्ठति। यन्मितान्चरायामुक्तं तिव्रराकरणार्थमेवेदं वचनं तद्याख्यान-रीत्या सङ्गक्ते। प्रमीतपित्रकपौत्रविषयक्तेव सङ्गोचोऽस्य कुतः। न च धारेश्वरा-कथारितरीत्या पौत्रमात्रविषयक्तायामि न्यूनाधिकभागमात्रस्य पित्रिक्काकृतिरा-सायेदं न पित्रिक्काकातदीयभागद्वयस्याविश्वेषप्रस्तर्यति वाच्यम् विनिगमनाविर-हात्। किद्य। पित्रक्कावातदीयभागद्वयस्याविश्वेषप्रस्तर्यति वत्त्रीयानिर्देशाक्काव्यमार्थिनकन्त्र तस्याविभागकात्रीपणच्यात्वम्। तत्र शाब्दं हेतुत्वम्बाधमानेनानेनार्थिकं कालो-पणच्यात्वं न वाध्यत इति चित्रम्। सति च खान्यसान्ये पुत्रेक्काया निमित्तत्वं तत्त्रुतस्य तस्याः कालोपणच्यात्वस्त्रक्षेपातिकयापि तद्वीरम्।

नन् पितुरं प्रदयं पिद्धल्पयुक्तं न खां न्याधिक्यप्रयुक्तं नाप्य जेन तस्य येन चेषां खयमुपार्जितं स्थात् स द्यं प्रमित्र कामेतित वाप्रिस्ताधार मन्य नादेष सिद्धे द्वावं प्रो प्रतिपद्येतित विश्वेषय चनान प्रमित्र क्षात्। तस्मात् पित्र जितेऽपि च्येष्ठपुत्र लप्रयुक्तं यथा तस्यां प्रदयं विश्वेषय चनाक्त्य प्रताम हे पितुरिषः। खतर वास्त न्य प्रमाजितेऽपि पितुरं प्रदयमिति चेत्। सत्यम्। परन्तु निः सङ्घोष्प्रय च वचनेन तद्वाध्यते। पुत्राजिते तु पितुरं प्रदयमावा भवदु दा हत् पुत्र विक्तार्जनादिति वचनस्य भवदुक्तार्थे दृष्यात् प्रागेव व्यवस्थापितः। न च तद्वचनादं प्रदयमाविऽपि सामान्य च चार्चित्र प्रमाजितेऽपि पितुरं प्रदयमायात्विति वाष्यम्। विक्तार्जनस्य तत्र हेतुलोपन्य सिवेयर्थे प्रसङ्गात्। न च तद्येवाद मात्र मन्य प्रक्ति सामाग्र दयस्य विप्रस्व च च विद्यावार सिद्धि विश्वेषय च च नाम् प्रस्व सामान स्व प्रक्र प्रमाण द्वार प्रमाण द्वार प्रमाण विक्त प्रमाण विक्त प्रमाण विक्र प्रमाण विक्र

यच किन्ने व्यादिनानौ चित्यमुक्तं तम्र किन्नित्। वाचनिकसाम्धे जो चित्याप्रसक्तेः। च्येष्ठस्य च्येष्ठत्यपृक्तमं प्रदयं पित्रत्वप्रयुक्तच्य पितुरिति च्येष्ठपुत्रसान्यापत्ते स्वयाप्यनौ - चित्यस्य दुर्वारत्वात्।

- 14. मदनरत्नष्टतकात्वायनवर्चनात्तु सर्वेषां भाद्रुणां पितापुत्राणाञ्च समाग्र-यहणमेव मुख्यमिति प्रतीयते । सक्तं त्रख्यजातं यद्वाग्रेग्टं इन्ति तत्समेः । पितरौ भातरखेव विभागो धर्म्य उच्यत इति ॥ खतरव यागीश्वरीऽपि सर्वे वा स्यः समाणिन इति सर्वपदं प्रायुङ्क खन्यणा समाणिनो वा कुर्वोत सुतानिति वदेत्।
- 15. यस्तु विभागिनां मध्ये खब्यवसायेन जीवनसमर्थः पित्रधनादिविभागं न जिष्टचित तम्मवाह मनुः। भातृयां यस्तु नेहेत धनं ग्राप्तः खक्रमेणा। स निर्वास्यः खकादंशात् किस्चिद्स्तोपजीवनम्॥ याज्ञवल्क्योऽपि। श्रष्तस्थानीहमानस्य किस्चिद्स्ता एथक् क्रिया। निर्वास्थे निःसम्बन्धीकरणीयः। एथक् क्रिये व्यस्पाप्ययमेवार्थः। किस्चिद्स्तिति विभागिचिङ्गलेन किस्चिद्सारमि दस्त्वेत्वर्थः। तत्पुत्राणां दार्यजिष्टचानिष्टस्व र्थम्बेदम्।

हलायुधन्त । बुद्रमार्थेषु चोद्युत्तस्तात्यं बुदते तु यः । स भारत्मिर्द्धस्वीया यासाच्छादनवाहनैदिति नारदवचनेकवाक्यतालाभेन मनुवचने स निर्वात इति गाठं प्रकल्य स भारत्मिर्र्यहीतभागैः खखभागाद्धनमाहाय्य पूर्यीय इत्यर्थ इति याख्यातवान् । तन्तु नेहेतेत्यादिपदवैयर्थापत्तेहपेच्यम् । मेधातिधिप्रमुखाचार्थानादत-तया पाठकल्पनानौचित्याव । एथक्कियेति स्पष्टवचनसम्बादाव ।

प्रकाशकारकः । ये। भागिषु धनार्षं व्याप्तिषु प्रमादालखादिना नेष्ठेत न व्याप्रियेत साष्ट्रायं न कुर्यात् । खकर्मवा खव्यापारेव श्रक्तः साष्ट्रायकचिनेऽपि सन् स खकादंशात् खव्यापारजनिताद्धनाद विष्टःकार्यः किश्चिदुप्जीवनं दत्त्वा मूलधन-माज्ञभागीकरवीय इतीदं मनुवचनं निर्वाखेवाकरपाठमङ्गीकृत्येव व्याचके । तदिप न युक्तम् । चिपिश्च्दादाध्याष्ट्रारप्रसङ्गात् । योगीश्वरवचनसम्बादिनोऽर्षस्य स्पष्टतर-प्रतीतिकत्वाच । भवदुक्तार्थस्य वचनान्तरवश्चत्वाच ।

16. कात्यायनः। खित्मिक्ते निजे प्रेते तत्सुतं रिक्थमागिनम्। कुर्वात जीवनं येन लब्धं नैव पितामद्दात्॥ लभेतांशं सिपयन्तु पित्ववादापि तत्सुतात्। सरवांश्रास्तु सर्वेषां भादृणां न्यायता भवेत्॥ लभते तत्सुता वापि निरुक्तिः परता भवेत्। निजे भातरि तत्सुतं भाद्यपुत्रम्। जीवनमागः। स कीट्रश्मागं लभत इत्यपित्तिते खाद्य पित्रमंश्रमिति। तत्सुता यस्य धनं विभन्यते तस्य प्रपौतः। पौत्रस्य प्रस्तुत्वत्तात् । परतस्तत्सुताद्विरुक्तिभागिनरुक्तिभवेत् प्रपौत्रपत्रो भागं न लभेतेत्वर्थः।

चतरव देवलाऽपि। चिविभक्तविभक्तानां कुल्यानां वसतां सङ्। भूया दाय-विभागः स्यादाचतुर्थादिति स्थितिरिति॥ वीजिचतुर्थमभिव्याप्य दायभाग इत्यर्थः। विभक्तानामपि संसर्गादिना सङ्घासे सतीयं व्यवस्था। वसतां सङ्गित वचगत्।

पियभंग्रिति कात्यायनोक्तेः पित्रदारने । भाग इति स्वितम्। स्वर्षयनाह

याज्ञवरकाः। प्रमीतिपित्वकाणान्तु पित्रतो भागकत्यनेति। पैतामहे धने जन्मना सत्य पौचाणां पुष्णेः सहाविधित्यसेव यद्यपि तेन पुचवत् पौचाणामिप पुचसमय भाग उचितः। तथापि तेषां पित्रदारेण भागं प्रकल्य सस्विपत्रभागाधिकारो न तु पैतामहे धने स्वतो भागित्विमित्यर्थः। रतदुक्तं भवति खित्रभक्ता भातरो यदा पुचानृत्याद्य दिख्कुताक्तचेकस्य दौ पुचावन्येषां चिचतुराद्या इति पौचाणां वैषम्यं तदा दावेकं सिपत्रभागं देधा विभज्य ग्रङ्कीतिस्त्रचतुराद्या खिप सस्विपत्रभागमेकिकं चेधादिक्ष्णेण विभज्य ग्रङ्कित न तु पौचसङ्क्ष्या पैतामइधनभागाः। स्वन्येव रीत्या केष्ठचिद्य भात्रस्तु जीवत्य केष्ठचित्र प्रचानृत्याद्य विनय्येषु श्रियमाणाः सस्वांप्रभागिनोऽत्येषां पुचाः सस्विप्रभागिन इति वाचिनकोऽयं भेदः। स्वत्यव वचनिद्यनन्यवक्तान्वादकाम् उद्घारिदिविषमिवभागेऽपि वाचिनकः। समांप्रत्यं तु साम्यात् प्राप्तमेवानृद्यते।

17. यच पैतामक्षमपक्षारादिना नस्टं पित्रोद्भियते तत्र पितिच्छ्येव पित्रजितहव पौत्रा विभागभाज हत्याक मनुः। पेत्रकन्त पिता हत्यमनवाप्तं यदाप्तयात्।
न तत्पुत्रभेजित्यार्द्धमकामः खयमजितम्॥ खयमजितमिवेतीवश्रव्दाध्याक्षारेख योज्यम्।
यदा तत्पितामक्षाद्भतमनेनैवे।द्भतमतः खार्जितमेव जातं यत हति हेतुतया योज्यम्।
खकाम हति वंचनात् पितिच्छ्येव तादश्ये पैतामहेऽपि विभागो न पुत्रेच्छ्येति
गन्यते।

तथा स्मृत्यन्तरमि। पैतामचं इतिम्पचा खग्रत्या यदुपार्जितम्। विद्या-ग्रीर्थादिना प्राप्तं तच खाम्यिम्पतुः स्मृतम्॥ प्रदानं खेच्छ्या कुर्याद् भागच्चिन तता धनात्। तदमावे तु तनयाः समांग्राः परिकीर्त्तिता इति॥ इतमपरेरपद्धतं पिता-महेन न प्रत्याद्धतिम्पचा तु प्रत्याद्धतिमत्यर्थः। खग्रत्येत्युक्तेः पितामद्धद्यानुपद्धेवे-बेत्यर्थः। तदुपद्मेवेग तूड्विऽर्जकत्विनित्तमंग्रद्धयं येन चैवां खयमुपार्जितं स्यात् स द्यंग्रमेव कमेतेति विग्रस्वचनात् पिता मजते। इदस् विद्यादिस्विप योज्यं तस्र विकारेग विवेच्यते।

खयमत्र निर्मालताऽर्थः। यद्यपि जन्मनेव पेढने पेतामहे च धने पुत्रपौत्रामां खाम्यं तथापि पूर्वे त्त्रवचनेः पेढने पुत्रामां पिढपरतन्त्रतया पितुस्वार्जनतया प्राधान्यात् पित्रा खाजिते विनियुज्यमाने स्थावरं दिपदस्वे वेत्यादिप्राक्पदिर्भातवचनात् तद्यति-रिक्ते पुत्रेरनुमतिरवध्यं कार्या। पेतामहे तु निषेधाधिकारोऽप्यस्ति। तदनुद्धृते पित्रोद्धृते तु तदिस्हावभवर्त्तितेव पेतामहेऽपीति। मिणमुक्तादौ तु पेतामहेऽपि पितुरेव स्वातन्त्रं मिणमुक्तापवालानामित्यादिप्राग्नितिवत्वचनेभ्यः।

18. सम पित्रेपरमानन्तरं या भादृगां विभागः स पित्रोरिति दिवचना-दुभयोपरमय् पित्रधनेऽपि न तु मातुषपरमा मात्रधनगोत्तर इति संग्रहकारायुक्त-मादर्श्तयम् । पेढकमित्यत्र पित्रोरिदिमिलेक्ग्रोधकल्पनायां प्रभागामावात् । जनन्यां संस्थित्यात्रपन्त समं सर्वे सहादरा इत्यादिना मात्रधनविभागस्याये वन्धमाग्रसामा माढधनविभागतियौ पौनषक्ष्यपत्तेस्य । याज्ञवल्कोनापि मातुर्द्रहितर इत्यादिना

माल्धनिविभागस्य विभजेरन् सुताः पित्री रिक्यमिति सम्बन्धा नाभिमतः किन्तु पित्रोरूर्द्धिमत्येव । पितुर्श्वस्यस्यमिति तु सम्बन्धेऽयोन्माल्श्वस्यश्रस्यविभागस्योत्त-रार्द्धेनाक्तेः । स्वतस्य प्रागुक्तप्रश्चलिखितवचने रिक्यमूर्लं हि कुटुम्बिमत्यादौ मातु-रिक्यमविस्थिताया इत्यनेन मातुरपेद्यायाप्यसातम्त्रं विभागानिधकारः सेदराणां तस्यामिष जीवन्यामित्येतद्यमेवोक्तम् । स्वतस्य । सालुणां जीवतोः पित्रोः सञ्चवासे । विधीयते । तदभावे विभक्तानां धर्मस्त्रेषां विवर्द्धत इति यासवचने सञ्चवासविधान-सुखेन एयग्भावनिष्धेषात् पिल्भालजीवनवतस्य विभागनिष्धेषाच्जीवतोरिति साहित्य-मिवविद्धितम् । स्वतस्य रकस्मिद्धपि जीवति विभागो न धर्मः किन्तभयोपरमे ।

पित्रोरभाव इत्यादिरहस्पितवचनेऽपि निरुत्तरज्ञसायां मातिर जीवन्यां विभागस्य मात्रधनगोचरत्वानुपपत्तेरभयाभावास्तिविभागस्येव जीवनारपीत्विपिश्रब्देन निर्दिष्टस्य शक्तत्वकोत्त्वादुभयारभावे भावविभागः पित्रधनगोचर्यवेत्ववधार्यते।

खतरव यासे मातरि जीवन्यां ये विभागस्तस्य माहप्रधानकसं दर्भयति। यथाइ। समानजातिसङ्घाये जातास्त्रेकेन स्नवः। विभिन्नमाहकास्त्रेषां माहभागः प्रश्नस्ति॥ रहस्पतिरिष्। ययोकजाता बह्वः समाना जातिसङ्घ्या। सापलास्त्रे-विभक्तस्यं माहभागेन धर्मत इति॥ खत्र जातिसङ्घ्या साम्ये सापलांनामिष माग-विश्वेषः खरूपक्रता नास्त्रीति माहभागत्वविधानं माहप्रधान्यपरमेवेति नायं पुत्रामां विभागः किन्तु तन्माहुमामिसुद्श्य विभागः कर्त्त्य इत्यत्र तात्पर्यम्। तेनैतन्माहधन-इवात्रापि माहजीवने पुत्रामां न परस्परं विभागे धर्मः। यता गौतमाद्यक्ता विभागे धर्मद्रिद्रिप्य मानुपरमस्व वेदित्योति जीमृतवाहन खाइ।

तित्पृष्टधने मात्रभावापेच्यया खहरुार्धलायनेः प्रागेव निरस्तम्।

यच प्रत्निकाशेषस्थापमामानातात् पौनन्त्रत्थापत्तेच नास्य मात्रधनपरत-मित्रुक्तं तदप्यदृष्टार्थतापत्तिभयादेनश्रोषस्य खोनर्त्त्यत्वादयुक्तम्। पौनन्तत्व्यन्त्वयुक्तम्। पूर्वोक्तास्थापि मात्रधनविभागस्य विश्रोषविधानायानुवादीपपत्तेः।

याज्ञवल्कावाको तु भिताचाराक्तता च भातापित्रोर्डनं सता विभन्नरिज्ञत्तम्।
तत्र मात्रधनेऽपवादमाहेत्युत्तरार्डमवतारयता पौनवत्त्यम्परिह्नतम्। ताभ्य ऋतेऽन्वय
इति च दुहित्रभावेऽन्वयः पुत्रादिमीत्रधनस्याविष्यस्य ग्रङ्कीयादिति व्याख्याय इद्ध।
विभन्नरन् सताः पित्रोरूर्डम्ब्यस्यां समभिति। खनेनेव सिद्धमपि स्प्रस्रार्थमुक्तमित्रुक्तम्।

न चात्र पित्रोरूद्धीम्येवास्तु सम्बन्धः माय्यभविभागस्थोत्तरार्द्धेऽभिधानात् पितुर्श्यस्यम्यामिति पर्य्यवस्यति । तथा च ताभ्य इत्यादेनिर्र्श्यकानुवादत्वमि न प्रसम्भवतीति वाच्यम् । ऋष्यऋषपदयोः ससम्बन्धिकार्थत्वात्तराकाङ्घायां स्ववाक्यो-पात्तंपित्रोरिति पदानुषद्भस्येव परिश्रेषावगतार्थिकपितुःपदान्वयापेच्याभ्यर्षितत्वात् । तदंश्रेन तु ताभ्य इत्यस्यानुवादत्वस्याप्यभ्यपगमौ चित्यात् । ये त्वन्वयपदं दुष्ट्वित्रन्य-दौद्धित्रादिपरत्वेन व्याच्यते तन्मते तु वयर्थाश्रद्भव नास्ति । तद्विदिक्षरेष स्त्रोधनविभागप्रसावे प्रपश्चियव्यामः। प्रश्नुनिखितातां मातरि जीवन्यामसातन्त्रान्तु मानवर्द्धनं तद्धनगोत्त्रसमि सङ्गच्छतस्व।

चाद्वर्णामित्यादिव्यासवचनमपि सच्चासप्राग्रस्थमात्रमुभयजीवन चान्निति जी-वद्गोरिति साद्वित्यविवचायामपि न देावः। वन्तृतस्तु पित्रोरूर्द्धमपि च्येष्ठरव तु राष्ट्रीयादिति सच्चासत्य सुख्यतादिभागस्य च धर्मराद्वीवान्मातिरि जीवन्यामपि धर्मस्य पद्ममन्याद्यादेरावश्यकत्वात्तद्रस्द्वार्थं विभाग उचितरव।

यत्त पित्रोरभाव इति ब्रह्स्पतिवचने निवसरज्ञकायां मातिर जीवन्यामिन्यायुक्तं तत्रोचिते। उभयजीवने सहवासः प्रश्नकत्त्वसावे विभाग इति पूर्वार्डेना-भिह्निते। मातर्य्यनिवत्तरज्ञकायां सन्तानसम्भवात् तद्ववत्तिनेपस्य च ये जाता येऽप्यजातास्रोव्यादिवचनेन ग्रह्तित्वाक्षिवत्तरज्ञकायान्तु तस्यां तदप्रसक्तेष्परतस्पृष्टे पितरीव विभागः प्रशक्त इति तस्यार्थः। तथा सति निवत्तरज्ञकायां तस्यां तदीय-स्वव्याधिकारिकन्यासन्तानस्यासम्भवात्मृतरान्तिरक्या तद्वनविभागोऽपि पुत्रामासु-चित्त इति माद्यधनगोत्ररताप्यस्य वचसः सम्भवतीति न किश्चिरेतत्।

यदिष व्यासवृद्धस्यितवच्या मीलप्राधान्यं सापत्नविभागस्योक्तन्तन्ममाणविष-द्धम्। यथा दि। जोवतारस्ततन्त्रः स्यादारयामिसमन्त्रितः। इत्यादि वचनवप्रादि-माग्रोत्तरपित्नमात्रपारतन्त्रं तथेतदचनवप्रान्मात्रभागस्यायमिति बुद्धा तदाचावप्रम्व-दत्या तच्चीवनाविध स्थेयमित्येतावता पित्रधनविभागेऽपि तस्याञ्जीवन्त्यामनिधकारः कृतस्त्व इत्यसमिथकेन।

19. जीवत्यिष्टकविभागे पित्रा यथा खपुत्रांधसमांधभागिन्यः खपत्नाः कार्यास्तथा तदुपरमविभागेऽपि पुत्रेस्ताः खसमांधभागिन्यः कार्या इत्याद्य याज्ञवस्काः।
पितुक्द्वं विभजतां माताप्यंधं समं इरेत्। यदि स्त्रीधनन्दत्तन्न भवति। दत्ते त्यंधार्डहारियी कार्येति वचनादप्यत्रार्डधस्त्रो न समविभागवचनः। किन्तु यावता पुत्रसमांधिता भवति ताबदेव विविच्तितम्।

खत्र मात्यदस्य जननीवाचकालाद्वापुत्रसपत्नमात्वपरत्वमपि। सञ्चल्कुतस्य मात्र-पदस्य मुख्यगौषोभयार्घत्वानुपपत्तेः।

यत् । ससुतान्त पितुः पत्नाः समानां भाः प्रक्षिताः । पितामस्यस्य सर्व्वान्ता माहतुत्व्याः प्रकीत्तिता इति सासवचनात् यागीश्वरवचने पत्नीयद्वसां जीवत्यिद्वकवि-मागे पत्नीमात्रस्य पुत्रसमां भावम् । पुत्रपत्नीपदयाः पिद्वपतियोगिकसम्बन्धार्थकतया गौर्यासुव्यार्थकत्वातात् पित्रोर्ह्यः विभागे तु पुत्रकर्षकतया तत्सम्बन्धमाद्वप्रतीते-विष्टप्यादुभयपरत्वासम्भवात् पुत्रवतीनामेव सपुत्रसमां भित्वं सपुत्राखान्तु यासाक्ष्याद्वनमात्रमात् सम्बन्धमाद्वपत्नीनामित । युक्तस्वतच्चीविद्यागे पितुः खातन्त्वात् सजीविद्यमागे पुत्राखां खातन्त्वात् माह्यपद्यत्नीपद्खरसात्र । युक्तस्वापुत्राखां यासाक्ष्यद्वमात्रभाजनत्विति वज्जतर्गिवस्थस्यस्य।

मिदाचाराक्ततत्तु जीवदिभागे पुत्रसमांश्रिलं पत्नीनामुक्तमिदानीं पितुरूद्धे

विभजतामिष पुत्रसमभागितं पत्नीनामाचेत्ववतारिकां पितुरूद्धं विभजतािमत्वस्य योगीश्वरवचसः प्रयक्तिऽत्रापि सपुत्रापुत्रसक्तिपित्वपत्नीनां पुत्रसमांश्चित्वमिष्प्रेत-मिति प्रतोयते।

मदनरत्नक्तताप्यत रवेाक्तम् । जननीयस्यामपुषायामपि मात्रसपत्नीनासुप-जन्त्रयां पितामस्नीनास् । स्रासुतास्य पितुः पन्त्य स्वादिखासवचनादिति ।

युक्तश्चेतित्यतुः पत्न्यइति पुत्रप्रतियोगिकपिद्धयद्यास्थान्थया वैयर्थात्। पुत्र-समांशित्वस्य पिद्धक्तविभागविषये पत्न्यः कार्याः समांशिका इति वदन्नपि मातर इत्येव वदेत्। तस्मात्पिद्धपत्नीत्वप्रयुक्तमेव जीविद्यभागसाधार्यां पुत्रसमांश्रभाक्रमिति मिताचारामद्वरत्नकारक्रतोरभिप्रायः।

पितुरिति कर्त्तरि षष्ठी। तेन पित्रकर्त्तृ के विभागे पत्न्यः समानां भा इत्यक्तेप्रधात्तत्प्रतियोगिकस्येन पत्नीत्वस्य लाभाच्जीविद्यमागिवष्यतेवास्रोचिता। तंत्र मादपरे मुख्यामुख्यमाद्यपरत्वानौचित्यात्प्रतिसम्बन्धितया च पुत्रावासेन खनचनेपात्ताः
नामुपस्थितेर्जननीपरत्वमेन माद्यपदस्य मुख्यार्थलाभायाचितम्। भिष्ठाचारोऽप्येनम्।
तदन युक्तन्तद्यास्त्रमित्यलमधिकेन।

रहस्पतिः। तदभावे तु जननी तनया वा समांश्रिनी। खन प्रक्रमात्तक्क्वेन

20. पितरि प्रेते यदि केऽपि भातराऽसंख्नुताः सन्ति तदा तत्संखारं समु-दायद्रवेश विधायाविष्रस्रं यथां प्रेन विभजनीयिमत्याच्च याच्चवष्काः। असंख्नुतास्तु संख्तार्था भाविभः पूर्वसंख्नुतेः। भावृभिरित्यभिधानादसंख्नुता भातर इति प्रतीयते॥

संस्वार्थ्यतमात्रविधानस्य दावभागपत्तावासम्बन्धात्मपुदायद्रव्यादिति विविचिः तम्। तथाच व्यासः। खसंस्कृतात्तु ये तच पैद्यकादेव तद्रनात्। संस्वार्थ्या भाद्यभि चैर्थेकः कन्यकास्य यथाविधि॥

खिवद्यमाने पित्रधनेऽसंखातसंखारावध्यकतामाच नारदः। खिवद्यमाने पित्रचें खांधादुज्ञृत्व वा पुनः। खवध्यकार्याः संखारा भाव्यभः पूर्वसंखातेः॥

21. चसंकृतभगिनीसंकारोऽप्यावस्थकः। सित पिळर्वचे ताभोऽ प्रदानमधीत्याच्च याच्चवक्कः। भगिन्यच्च निजादंश्राद्त्त्वांश्रन्तु तुरीयकमिति। चसंकृताः
संक्षार्य्या इत्यनुषद्रः। मनुः। खेभ्योऽ भ्रेभ्यक्तु कन्याभ्यः प्रदद्युर्भातरः एचक्। खात्खादंशाचतुर्भागं पितताः खुरदित्सवः॥

खनोभयत्र प्रत्येकपरिकाल्पिताविज्ञादंशादुङ्ग्य सर्व्वेक्षीत्रिभिर्भागिनीभ्यः प्रत्येकं चतुर्थे। शो देय इत्यर्थे। न भवति । तथा सति बद्धभाद्यकाया बद्धधनलं बद्धभगिनी-कत्य भातुर्विर्द्धनतापत्तेः। तस्मात्मं खारे। पयुक्तद्रव्यदानमात्रं विविच्चितिमिति रत्नाकर-चिन्तामण्यादौ व्याल्यातम्। खनूष्णानन्तु कन्यानाम्बित्तानुरूपेय संख्वारं कुर्यादिति विद्यावचनस्व तत्रोपोद्यक्षम् प्रम्यस्तम्।

तदयुक्तम् अंग्रदानाविवचायाः सृतिदयेऽप्यन्यायालात्। संस्ताराकरणप्रवान

यात् प्रथमदानप्रत्ववायत्रवणाच चन्यया पतिताः स्युरितस्व इत्यदानप्रत्ववायवचनम-प्यसंस्कारप्रत्यवायपरं स्यात्।

चतो मेधाति चिमिताचाराकारादिभि चीखातमेवम्। निजादं प्रात् खात् खादं-शादिति नापादाने पश्चन्यपि तु ल्यन्नोपे। तथांच तमपेच्येति यावत्। एवश्व यच्चा-तीया कन्या तच्चातीयपुत्रभागचतुर्थांग्रभागिनी सा कार्था। तथा चायमर्थी ब्राह्मग-जातीया या बन्या वच्चमायो ब्रास्मयोपुत्रभागो यावांक्तचतुर्थांप्रक्तस्याः। रवं चित्र-यादिजातीयकन्यापि। तच यथा। यदि कस्यचिद्वाद्वार्ययेवेका पत्नी तस्यास्वेकः पुत्रः कन्यकाचैका। तत्र पियन्त्रयं सर्व्वमेव दिधा विभन्य तत्रैकम्भागचतुर्डा क्रत्येको भागो भगिन्ये तेन देये। दिशिष्टं स बयङ्गृङ्गीयात्। एवं पुत्रदये कन्येक्येच त्रेक्षा विभागं सर्वेदयस्य विधायेकस्य चतुर्द्धाक्तत्स्य भागस्य चतुर्घभागमागिन्ये दत्ता ग्रोघं दाभां यथां प्रम्थिभन्य ग्राह्मम्। पुत्रेको बन्धादिले त्रेधा हतस्य द्रवस्येवस्मागस्त्रद्वा क्रत्वा द्वावंग्री दाभ्यां कन्याभ्यां दक्ताऽविश्विष्टनीन याद्यम्। एवं समानजातीयेषु असाम्बेर्डिप सर्व्वेषा भगिनीनां भादजाव्युचितभागतुरीयांग्रभागिता यथा भवति तथा-द्यम्। यदा तु ब्राह्मग्रीपुत्र एकः चित्रियकन्या चैका । तत्र पित्रधनं सप्तधा विभन्य चित्रवागुचभागांस्त्रीं खतुर्दी विभन्य तुरीयमंत्रं चित्रवानवाये दत्ता प्रेषं ब्राह्मणी-मुत्री मंद्रीयात्। यदा तु दी ब्राह्मसापुत्री चित्रयाकन्या चैका तदा पिल्धनमेकाद-ग्रंधा कला चित्रयापुत्रभागांस्त्रींखतुर्द्धा विभन्येकमंग्रं चित्रयाकन्याये दत्त्वा ब्राह्मणी-पुत्रावन्यत् सब्नैं विभन्य ग्रङ्गीयाताम्। एवं सब्बेत्र जातिवयम्ये भावभगिनीसंख्या-साम्यविषमं याज्यम्।

विष्णुरिष। मातरः पुत्रभागानुसारभागद्दारिखोऽनू हास दुहितरः पुत्रभागानु-सारेख यथा वर्षक्रमेख पुत्रावासतु स्विद्येकभागभागिता तथा तत्त्रच्वातीयपत्नीनामि । सनू हास दुहितरः पुत्रभागानुसारभागद्दारिखा इत्यनेन यद्यपि चतुराद्यंशानां सर्वेषां दुहित्रभोदानं प्रतीयते तथापि स्रेभ्योऽंश्रेभ्यः सात् सादंशादिति मनुयागीश्वराभ्यासतु-थांश्वरानस्योक्तेस्त्रचैव पुत्रभागानुसारा न सजातीयभातृसमभागद्दारितिमत्विवरोधः ।

स्पष्टमाच्च रुप्त्यतिः। समाग्रा मातरक्वेषाच्चतुर्धांग्राच्च कन्यका इति ॥ कन्य-कानाक्वदत्तानाच्चतुर्धा भाग इष्यते। पुत्राखाच्च त्रयोभागाः साम्यं त्वल्यधने स्मृत-मिति ॥ वदतः कात्यायनस्याप्येतदेवाभिमतम्। साम्यमित्यादेक्वयमर्थः। यदि संस्का-रपर्याप्तमपि पिद्यधनं नाक्ति तदा पुत्रसमभाग्तिवे दुव्दिकृषामिति।

चनू ज्ञानां त्वित्यादिविष्णुवचनमिप मेधातिष्यादीनां न प्रतिकूलम्। वित्तानुसारेख संस्कारमनू ज्ञानाम्यतुः कन्यानां स्वभिग्नीनां कुर्यादित्यनेन संस्कारावध्यकतामात्रम-त्रोच्यते न तु भागदानादाने।

स्मृतिचिन्त्रिकाकारक्त । कन्याभ्यस्य पितृत्रखन्देयं वैवाहिकं वस्तिति देवलवचनानुसारेश्व संस्कारमाचोपयागित्रखदानमेव मन्यते । वैवाहिकं वसु देयमिति वेवाहिकविश्रोधसस्यान्यथा वैयर्थापक्तेरिति तदाग्रयः ।

खन वदामः । कन्याभ्यः पितृत्रखन्देयिमिति एचिग्विधः । तच मन्वाखनुरोधाचतुर्थां ग्ररूपमेव । वैवाहिकंवसु च देयिमत्यपि एचग्रेव विधिः । विभन्यमाने दायाचे
कन्याऽलङ्कारं वैवाहिकच्च स्त्रीधनं कभेतेति ग्रङ्कवचनसमानार्थतया। व्याख्यातच्चेदं ग्रङ्कवचनं विद्यारखन्नीचर्योः पराग्ररसृतिटीकायाम् । पेळकत्रखविभागकाले खधतालङ्कारादिकमिष कन्या प्राप्नोतीत्याच ग्रङ्क इति । यदि तु वैवाहिकं विवाहेषयोगि पिळत्रखं कन्याभ्योदेयिमत्यर्थः स्यादसुपदम्यनक्कं स्यादिति एचिग्विधदयमेवान युक्तम् ।

दायतत्वस्ता तु कन्याभ्यस्य पिल्टम्याद्येवैवाहिकं बस्तित पठितन्तचापि प्रस्केत समामार्थकतालाभायासमदुक्तमेव स्थाल्यानमादर्त्तुं मर्हं न तु विवाहि।पयुक्तम्यपरतेत्व-वसेयम्।

स्वत्र च मन्यादिवस्रनेषु भगिनीपदं कचित् कस्ति कन्यादियदं यद्यपि स्रूयते तथापि भाटकर्त्तृ कविभागाधिकारात् पिटप्रतियागिकं कन्यात्वन्दु स्टिल्लं भाटप्रतिया-गिक्स भगिनीत्वमादायेकार्थकतावसेया।

तसादजीवित्यदक्विभागे भगिनीनामि पिष्टद्रश्यांश्रभागित्वत्र तु संस्कार्थता-मात्रम्। पूर्वम्तु यत्किसित्यिता ददाति तदेव लभते विश्रेषवचनाभावादिति।

जीमृतवाहनेन तूत्तम्। प्रद्युक्षातरः दत्त्वांप्रनिवति मनुयागीश्वराभ्यामिधानाज्ञ भगिनीभिरधिकारबुद्धा चतुर्थाऽं प्रोग्राह्यः। न ह्यधिकारिय एकस्मे भाजेऽन्धो भाता खांप्राइद्यादिखुच्यते। तथा चतुर्थांप्रदानमपीति। तददाने भाष्ट्रवामेव देाघो न तु तासाम्प्रसह्यकारिति।

तदप्ययुक्तम्। उक्तिवैचिद्यमात्रस्यास्याप्रयोजनलात्। इच्छ्या विभन्नेस्युताम् उद्धारं ज्यायसे दत्त्वेत्यादिवत्।

यदिष तेनेवाक्तम्। येषान्तं न कृताः पित्रा संस्तारिवधयः क्रमात्। कर्ज्तव्या भाविभिक्तेषां पेटकादेव तद्धनादिति॥ नारदवाक्ये येषामिति पुंकिक्तिनिर्देशासदमन्तर-मेव चाविद्यमान इति वचनारम्भाद्भादसंस्तारार्धमेवेदं वचनमिति सति पितृहस्ये मन्तादिवचनेभ्योभिगिनीसंस्तारावध्यकत्वप्रतीतेः संस्तारापयागिहस्यदानमेव विविक्तित-मिति।

त द्वेयम्। वचनान्तरेषु भगिनीसंकारस्यावस्थकत्वप्रतितः। पिता पितामचा भाता सकुत्वो जननी तथा। कन्याप्रदः पूर्वनास्र प्रकृतिस्यः परः परः। अप्रयक्तन् समाप्राति भूणच्यास्तास्ताविति॥ भातुर्पि योगीत्र्यरेण भगिनीविवाइसंकारा-कर्यो भूणच्यारेषस्रूतेक्तरेकमूलकतया येषान्तेषाभित्यस्य सामान्यिक्षन्नपुंसकमिति वचनात्सासान्यविवचान्यायाच नपुंसकषद्यन्तत्वं विक्पेक्षस्रेषोऽपि वान्युपगन्तुसुचित-रवित।

यबीयस इति नुम्दीर्घयारभावन्दान्दसमभिप्रेत्य। असंखुता भातरक्त ये सुक्तत्र यबीयसः। संस्कार्थाः पूर्व्वजेक्ते वे पैतृकान्मध्यकाद्धनादिति। रहस्प्रतिवचनं पठित्वा भातृग्रह्यं भगिनीनामप्रपानच्यानिति मदनरत्नकता व्याख्यातम्। अम च संस्कारसाइचर्यादनूजानां दुव्तिवृत्वाम्। वन्यकानान्त्वदत्तानामित्वनूज्व-लिविश्वेषक्षोपादानाचापरिकीताएव चतुर्याश्चभागिन्योभगिन्योऽन्यान्तु यत्किच्चिदौचि-त्वाद्धभन्त इति बेध्यम्। मातुधने चेदम्यपद्यनीयम्।

22. खावरस्य खार्जितस्य पैतामइस्य वा पुत्रानुमत्येव पिता दानादि कुर्यात्। खावरं विपदश्चेवित प्रागुदाइतवचनात्। यद्यपि खयमर्जितमित्यनेन पेता- भन्ने केमुतिकन्यायेन पुत्रानुमत्यावध्यकता प्रदर्भिता। कुटुम्बद्यापिन्यामापदि तु यः किखदन्याननुमताविप कुटुम्बभरसस्यावध्यकतात् ख्यावरदानिकयादाविधकारी। स्काऽपि खावरे कुर्याद्दानाधमनविक्रयम्। खापत्काले कुटुम्बार्थे धर्मार्थे च विद्येषतः इति वचनात्। धर्मार्थे इत्यनेनावध्यकः पित्वस्थादादिक्पोधर्मी स्टच्चते।

यत्त सारवम् । विभक्ता चविभक्ता वा सपिग्डाः स्थावरे समाः । रके। द्यानीयः सर्वेच दानाधमनविक्रय इति ॥ तचाविभक्तानां मध्यक्रवये खान्यसान्यादनीग्रत्यमन्या-नुमतिं विना सिद्धमपि स्थावरे विश्वेषतक्तदादरार्थमुखते। विभक्तानान्त यवहारसौ-कर्यार्थम्। काकान्तरे हि विभक्ताविभक्तसंग्रये विभागभावनावर्णं साच्यादिप्रमाखेन तथा सति कार्या खादन्यथा साधारबदयदानायसम्भवात्। चनुमतौ तु सत्यां तदनपेक्तरव व्यवहारः सिद्धति । ननु यथाश्रुतं स्थावरे विभक्तानामपि समं खाम्यम्। विभागस्यादृष्टार्घताप्रसङ्गात्। खत्रबान्धानुमतिमन्तरेवापि दानादिखरूपं सिद्धावेव विभागभावनायां खवचारोऽपि। यथा खग्रामचातिसामन्तदायादानमतेन वा। हिरस्योदकदानेन षड्भिर्मच्छति मेदिनीति वचने ग्रामानुमतिः सामन्तानुमतिस्य। सामनानुमतिस्तु सीमाविप्रतिपत्तिनिरासायापि। चातिरायादानुमतेस्तु पूर्व्ववदेव थवस्या। जनस्व स्मृत्यन्तरम्। प्रतिग्रष्टः प्रकाशः स्थात् स्थावरस्य विश्वेषते इति ॥ अन्ययात्रापि ग्रामसामन्तानुमतिमन्तरेख दानाद्यसिद्धिः प्रसच्येत । हिरस्योदकदा-नेनेति स्थावरे विक्रया नास्ति कुर्यादाधिमनुचयित स्थावरस्य विक्रयप्रतिविधात्तु। भूमिं यत्प्रतिस्ट्रज्ञाति भूमिं यस प्रयच्छति । तातुभौ पुर्व्यक्रमासौ नियतं सर्गग्रामि-नाविति। दानप्रशंसनाच कुटुम्मरणाद्यर्थमवश्यक्तर्चेऽपि विक्रये सिहरएसमुदकं क्रेचे दत्ता दानांग्रीऽपि किखराया तत्र भवति तथा दानरूपेय स्थावरविकयं कुर्या-दिति स्वितम्।

जोमूतवाइनस् । स्थावरस्य समस्तस्य गोषसाधारमस्य च । नैकः कुर्यात्कायन्दानं परस्परमतं विना ॥ विभक्ता वाऽविभक्ता वेत्यादि व्यासीयवचनद्वयमुपन्यस्य
नेदमेकस्य क्रयदानाद्यनिधकारप्रतिपादनार्थम् । यथेरुविनियागार्धत्वस्त्वस्य स्वतस्य
द्रव्यान्तरद्व स्थावरेऽप्यविभ्रेषात् स्वत्वस्यागाद्यनिष्यत्तेवचनभ्रतेनापि वस्त्रनेऽन्यधाकरसाभ्रक्तेवे धियितुमभ्रकात्वात् । किन्तु दुर्वत्तपुरुषम्पति कुटुम्बार्च्यादिनिमित्ताभावे
कुटुम्बविरोधादधर्मभागिताच्चापनार्थं निषेधरूपम् । चत्रस्व नारदः । यद्येकजाता
बच्चः एथम्बर्माः एथक्कियाः । एथक्कम्मग्रसोपेता नचेत्वार्थेषु संयुताः ॥ स्वभागान्
यदि दस्त्वे विक्रीसीयुरसापि वा । कुर्य्ययेष्टं तस्ववंभीभाक्ते स्वधनस्य द्वीति ॥

सामान्यतं रव विक्रयादानुमन्थते । ईशास्ते स्वधनस्य हीति हेलभिधानात् स्थावरगोच-रमपीदं वचनम् । स्वपरथा तदानर्थन्वापत्तेरित्याह ।

तत्मस्यमेव परं त्यधर्मभागिताचापनार्थमित्युक्तम्। द्या स्थावरिवक्रयस्य बङ्गन् प्रत्यपि निषेधादेक्तग्रह्मापार्थस्यापक्तेः। स्थवहारश्चास्त्रस्य स्थवहारसौकर्यादिहरु-प्रयोजनसम्भवेऽहरूकस्यनानुपपक्तेः। स्थन्धद्याऽनुमताविष तदापक्तेः कुटुम्बविरोधजन्य-वचनान्तरप्रतिपादिताधर्भप्रयोजकतापरमस्तु।

- 23 खन च पुनेक्च्या या जीविद्यभागी यखाजीविद्यभागः स रकेक्च्यापि भवव्यविद्योषात् । खतरव विभागं प्रक्रम्य यत्कात्यायनेनोक्तम् । खप्राप्तव्यवद्दाराखां धनं व्ययविवर्जितम् । न्यसेयुर्वन्धुमित्रेषु प्रोधितानां तथैव चेति ॥ तदपि सम्मतम् । खन्यचा तदनुमतिमन्तरेख विभागाभावे तद्धनस्य बन्धुमित्रेषु न्यासविधानमनुपपन्नं स्यात् । तथा विष्युर्पि । तथा रक्षं बालधनमाव्यवद्दारपाप्तरिति ।
- 23a. खयस पुत्रामां विभागः पुत्रपौत्रपर्यं नः समानात्रीत्पत्तिः प्रवासत्तिकमेणाधिकारक्रमः । पुत्रदीनान्वयाणामेव पार्व्यो पिग्छदानाधिकारात्। खतरव देवलः। पिता पितामक्र्येव तथेव प्रपितामक्षः। उपासते सतं जातं शकुन्ता इव पिष्णलम्। मधुमांसेख शाकेख पयसा पायसेन च। एव नोदास्यति श्राद्धं वर्षास च मघास चेति ॥ तथा च स्थोकाः शक्क्षिलिखतगौतमानां। पिता पितामक्र्येव तथेव प्रपितामक्षः। जातम्पुत्रं प्रश्नंसन्ति पिष्णलं शकुनाइव ॥ मधुमांसेन खक्केन पयसा पायसेन वा। एव दास्यित नक्तृप्तिं वर्षास च मघास चेति ॥ एवं तुल्याधिकारात् जन्मना खलस्यापि तुल्यालासुल्यभागभागिता प्रसक्षाप्यनेकपिष्टकाणान्वित वचनेन निवक्ते।

जीवत्पिटकयेए पौजपपौजयाः पार्वणानधिकारेख पिण्डदाटलाभावात्पिताम इ-प्रपिताम इधने नाधिकारः । यदा चैकस्य पुत्राः सन्येकस्य पुत्र रवास्ति । तदा पुत्रस्थे-कोभागोऽपरस्थेकः सर्वेषां पौजाणाम् । स्विपत्रधीनजन्ममूलकलात् पिताम इधनसम्ब-म्यस्य यावत्येव धने तस्य स्वामित्वाईलन्तावत्येव तेषामपीति जीमृतवा इनेने । सम्

खनादेयम्। जन्मना पौचाबामिप पितामद्यमे खत्वख्यवस्थापनात्। तस्नात् पौचाबां पितामद्यमे वाचनिकमेव भागवैषम्यं न त्वौपपत्तिकम्।

यत्त तेनेवाक्तम्। यत्रैकस्य भातुरनेकसङ्घाः पुत्रा खन्यस्य च तते।ऽस्पसङ्घा-स्तत्रेदमनेकपिटकायामिति वचनं पौत्रत्वेन सर्वेषां समभागनिरुत्त्यर्थञ्चीर्वाततु पितरि पौत्रायाम्पितामद्वधनस्यो सपुत्रापुत्रभाटद्वयविभागे तत्पुत्रायामपि विभागः स्यात् स्वान्याविश्रोषादिति।

तत्प्रागिव निरस्तम्। उक्तोऽतिप्रसङ्गोऽप्यनेनेव परास्तः। स्वतरव पित्रसमात्र-पुत्रसमवाये पित्रस्यपित्रधनन्तदिति भात्रपुत्राखान्तत्र साम्याभावादिभागरव न स्था-दित्रप्यपास्तम्।

यच जीवित्यत्वनेयारित्यादि तदिष मन्दम्। न चि पिग्छदानाधिकारस्व दाय-यच्ये प्रयोजकः ज्येष्ठे सित कनीयसामनधिकारेऽपि दायग्रच्यात्। तदर्चतायाचा- त्राप्यनपायात्। गोत्रजादीनां दायद्वराखामनेकेषां समवाये पिखदानाद्युपकारित्वं धनखामिने। यत्तदनुपकारित्यावर्त्तकम्परम्नतु तदत्र प्रयोजकम्।

24. जीविद्यभागेऽजीविद्यभागे वा क्षस्याश्चित्पितृपत्न्यां भातृपत्न्यां वा स्पष्टग्रभायामाप्रसवस्मतीच्य विभागः कार्य्यः। चय भादृणान्दायविभागो याखानपत्याः
स्मियस्तासामापुत्रकाभादिति विश्वस्वस्यात्। आपुत्रकाभादिति वचनात् स्पष्टग्रभासु
प्रतीच्चाऽस्प्रस्मर्भासु तु नेत्यवगन्यते।

खतरव तत्र पखादुत्पन्नस्य विभागप्रकारमाद्द यागीत्र्यरः। विभक्तेषु स्रोताजातः सवर्णायां विभागभाक्। पित्रिक्स्या पुत्रेक्स्या वा जीवतोः पित्रोर्वभक्तेषु पखात्मवर्षायां भार्य्यायासुत्पन्ना विभागभाक्। विभाज्यत इति विभागः पित्रोर्भागक्तभजत इति विभागभाग्भवति। पित्रोर्क्ष्यं स स्व तयारं ग्रं क्षभत इत्यर्थः। खसत्यां दुद्दित्ति मातृभागमिति विश्रोषः। सवर्षायामिति विश्रोष्ट जात्वांशमेव क्षभते दुद्दित्रभावे मातृभागं सर्व्यमेव। खनेनेव, न्यायेन जीवदिभागे- ऽपि विभक्तेजाऽसवर्षापुत्रः खजात्युचितभागेव। न सक्कपियभागित्वमवसेयम्।

रतदेवाभिप्रेत्व मनुः। ऊद्धं विभागाच्चातस्तु पियमेव इरेद्धनिति। पित्री-रिदिम्मयन्थनं यथोक्तव्यवस्थया इरेत्। स्वकारेण भात्नभः सांग्रादाक्कथ सभागसम-भागभाकं स न कार्यः। गौतमाऽपि। विभक्तजः पियमेवेति।

जोवति तु पितिर मातिर तस्परन्याचाऽविस्परग्रभायां विभक्तेविभागानन्तरा-त्यन्नोऽयं खभागादाद्वय्य खभागसमभागभाक् स कार्यः। तथा च विष्णः। पिटविभक्ता विभागानन्तरात्पन्नाय विभागन्दयुरिति। तच भाटदत्तं तिद्वभागं पितेव ग्रचीत्वा तम्परिपालयेत्। तस्येव तत्राधिकारात्। खप्राप्तथ्यवद्वाराणामित्यादिप्रागुक्तवचनाच।

यस वचनम्। स्रनीशः पूर्वजः पित्रोक्षीतुर्भागे विभक्तज इति। तस्याप्ययमेव विषयः। पूर्वजे विभागात्पूर्वमुत्पन्नः प्राप्तिपित्रधनविभागः पित्रोविभागेऽनीश्रो न स्वामी। विभक्तजस्य पूर्वविभक्तस्य भातुर्भागेऽनीश्र इत्यर्थः।

विभागोत्तरस यत्पित्रजितं तरिप विभक्तजस्येव। पुन्नः सद्द विभक्तेन पित्रा यत्व्यमिर्जितम्। विभक्तजस्य तत्सर्व्यमगिमास्तत्र पूर्वजाः यथा धने तथाँ च दानाधानक्रयेषु च। परस्परमनीमास्ते मुक्ता भौचोदनिक्रयामिति सद्दस्पतिस्तर-सात्। स स्व पित्रा सद्द विभक्ता ये सापत्ना वा संद्वीदराः। जघन्यजास्तु ये तेषा-मित्रभागद्दरास्तु ते॥ स्वत्र हेतुरनीमः पूर्वजः इत्यादितद्वचेनाक्तर्यः।

ये तु विभक्ताः पित्रा संख्छाः पुत्रास्तैः सह तु तस्य विभागो न सक्कपिय-धनग्रह्यमित्याह मनुः। संख्छास्तेन वा ये स्यु विभन्नेत स तैः सह। तेन पित्रा।

पितुरूर्द्धिमित्रधने साहिभिर्विभन्य राष्ट्रीते विभागसमयेऽसारगर्भायाः पित्र-पत्न्याः पश्चात्पुत्रे जाते खखभागादायययविद्योधितात् तैः खखभागसमभागभाक् कर-बीय इत्याष्ट्र याज्ञवक्कः। दृश्यादा तदिभागः स्यादायययविद्योधितात्। दृश्याद्श्याद्ध-भिर्म्यद्वीतस्त्। खायः प्रतिमासं प्रतिदिनं प्रत्यन्दं यत्तदुपरिस्टब्रम्। खयः पित्रकृत- र्षापाकरणं भादभगिनीसंखारकरण्य। तस्य सर्वेशधारकोन कर्त्तवालात्। न तु भादकर्त्तवाययस्य विभागित्रात्म न्यापात्। ताभामायवायभ्यां विभाधितात्मिद्धभात्तस्य विभागः पूर्वेविभक्तसमः स्यादित्यर्थः। स्तदुक्तस्मवति। प्राति-स्विकेषु खसभागेषु तदुत्यमायम्यवेश्यावश्यकष्य साधारकं व्यविक्रकाश्याविश्वरखस्य भागोभ्यः किषित्विष्वदुद्ध्य विभक्तजः सभागसमभाक् कार्ये इति। वाश्रव्दक्तु विभक्तेषु स्रते।जात इति पूर्वोर्द्धेन सङ्ख्यवस्थितविक्रस्पार्थः व्यवस्था चोक्तेव।

इलायुधस्त । दश्यात् प्रत्यचात्र तु गुप्तात्पित्रधनादित्वर्धसुक्ता । विभक्तभाचपे-चया ये।ऽल्पगुत्वो विभक्तजस्तविषये।ऽयम्पच इत्याइ ।

तिव्रविज्ञितात् गुप्तस्यापि विभागानकारे ज्ञातस्य समभागेन विभजनीयत्वादज्ञ तदप्रस्तौ प्रमागाभावावियमकास्पनेऽदृद्धार्थतापत्तेविज्ञानेश्वराक्तार्थकातयाच वचन-सामञ्जस्यादुपे स्थम्।

25. चसवर्षानां स्नाहृगां विभागप्रकारमाच्च यागीश्वरः। चतुस्त्रिद्येक-भागाः स्पृवेगमो ब्राह्मग्रातमञाः। चात्रजास्त्रिद्योकभागा विड्जान्तु द्योकभागिन इति ॥

तिं वर्षानुपूर्वे हे तथेका यथाक्रमम्। ब्राष्ट्रमच्चियविष्राम्भार्था खा सूद्रजन्मन इति ॥ योगीस्ररेग ब्राष्ट्रामस्यासर्वमास्तिषः चानियस्य हे विष्र एका भार्था इति सवर्णामादाय तेषां मध्ये ब्राष्ट्रामस्य चतवः चानियस्य तिस्रो वैष्यस्य हे इत्यक्तम्। सवर्णासवर्णसर्वभार्थाभिप्रायेग चादिसंखाने वैष्यस्यापि हे सूद्रापरि-हारे च खैवेति खा सूद्रजन्मन इति वैष्यादैषच्चात्रास्त्रतेरेवासवर्णाभिप्रायेवेयं संखेति विचानयोगिभिर्थाखातम्।

तथा च ब्राह्मसाद ब्राह्मस्यादिष्ठ स्त्रीष्ठ जाताः पुत्रा यथाक्रमं वर्मशो माहव-कांनुसारेख। संस्थिकवचनाक्त्स वीश्वायामित्यधिकरस्वार से ग्रस् प्रत्ययः वर्मे वर्मे हत्यर्थः। ब्राह्मसादिभ्यः चित्रयादिषु जातानां मूर्डः भिविक्तादिजातिसं च्रत्वेव तहर्क्ष-ग्रस्थासम्भवान्मात्वर्वाश्च हत्यर्थः। चतुस्त्रिद्धोक्षभागाः स्यः। स्तदुक्तम्भवति ब्राह्मसावेन ब्राह्मस्यासुत्पद्मा स्वेक्षक्षश्चतुरस्वतुरेभागान् क्षभन्ते। तेनेव च्यत्रियायासुत्प-ब्राह्मस्वीन्। तेनेव वेश्वयायासुत्पद्मा हो हो। तेनेव श्वद्रायासुत्पद्मा स्वभिक्ति। वर्माश्च हित सर्व्वचेत्रसेव सम्बध्यते। तथा च च्यत्रात् च्यत्रियादिष्ठ जाता यथाक्रम-न्तिस्तिन् हो दावेकक्षस्य क्षभन्ते। विद्वेश्वादिष्ठ जाता यथाक्रमं हो दावेकमेकं क्षभन्त हित। श्वद्रस्यासवर्ष्याभावां भावां सजातीयपुत्रभागः पूर्व्वोक्त स्व।

यद्यपि स्रुद्रापरिखयने दिजातेर्भूक्षां छोषः पुत्रार्थितवाञ्चलं सर्व्वधा स्रुद्रायां निषिद्ध यव। तथा च मन्विष्णू। श्रीनजाति स्त्रियं मेश्वादुद्दश्तो दिजातयः। कुलान्थेन नयन्यास् ससन्तानानि स्रुद्रताम्। स्रुद्रावेदी पतत्यचेत्रत्व्यातनयस्य च। श्रीनकस्य स्रोत्याच्या तद्यत्यतया भ्राोः॥ तद्यत्यतया स्रुद्रामाचजनितापत्यवत्तया न्यान्त्रास्त्रस्य तु ज्ञाचिद्यपेश्चयाप्यधिकदेषितामाञ्चतुत्तत्परिखये तावेव। स्रुद्रां श्रयन-भारोप्य आस्रुखो यात्यधोगतिम्। जनियत्वा स्रुतन्तस्यां आस्रुख्यादेव श्रीयतं इति॥

योगीश्वरीऽिष । यदुच्यते दिजातीनां श्रूदादारोपसंग्रहः । नैतन्मम मतं यसात्त-चात्मा जायते स्वयमिति ॥ तेन विपादिजातश्रूदापुचाभावात्वचन्तस्यांश्राभिधानमिति प्रतिभाति ।

तथापि रितधर्माथिविवाह्येरनुकल्पलेन परिग्रीतायां स्रदायामनुषक्षाच्यातस्य विभागाभिधानमुपपद्ममेव । स्रदाञ्चाता निषादे यः पारम्रवित जातिकथनिव । खाचारिमताच्यायामेवं ध्वयस्यापितं । खतरव मनुना । कामतस्त प्रदत्तानामिमाः स्युः कमग्रोऽवरा इति । कामत इत्यवरा इति च वदता सवर्षापरिग्रायनमेव मुख्यिन्त्यक्षम् । प्रद्वाविखताभ्यामि । भार्याः कार्याः सजातीयाः सर्वेषां स्रेयस्यः स्विति पूर्वः कल्पस्ततेऽनुकल्पस्तत्वो ब्राह्मग्रस्थान्पूर्वेश तिखोराजन्यस्य दे वैद्यस्य रका स्रुक्ति । खानुमूर्वेश्वेशक्तिरत्तरञ्ज्ञप्रकात स्रविता।

यत्तं मनुना चातुर्वर्णपुत्रविभागे प्रकारदयसुक्तम्। शंग्रन्दायाद्धरेदिपो दावंग्री चित्रयासुतः। वैग्र्याजाऽध्यद्देमेकांग्रमंग्रं स्वदासुता हरेत्। सर्वं वा रिक्यजातन्तु दश्रधा परिकच्य तत्। धम्यं विभागं कुर्वीत विधिनानेन धर्मावित्। चतुराऽंग्रान् हरेदिपस्तीनंग्रान् च्रियासुतः। वैग्र्यापुत्रो हरेद्द्धंग्रमंग्रं स्वदासता हरेदिति ॥ तत्रोत्तरकारो योगीश्वरसंवादी। तद्ग्यवदगुग्यवत्च्तियादिपुत्रविषयतया यव-स्थापनीयम्। खतरव ब्राह्मण्यातीराजन्यापुत्रस्व यदि जन्मज्येष्ठो गुग्यवांख तदा ब्राह्मणीपुत्रसमांग्रमाक् ब्राह्मण्याने च्रियेण चित्रयाजाते। जन्मज्येष्ठो गुग्यान्वतः। प्रवस्तमांग्रमागित्याह रहस्पतिः। विप्रेण चित्रयाजाते। जन्मज्येष्ठो गुग्यान्वतः। भवेत् समाग्रो विप्रेण वेग्र्याजातक्त्यवच ॥ तथा बौधायनः। सवर्णपुत्रानन्तरापुत्र-योरनन्तरापुत्रचेदुग्यवान् स ज्येष्ठांग्रं हरेत्। गुग्यवान् हि ग्रेषाग्यान्यत्तां भवतीति ॥ सतदचनेऽनन्तरात्यमात्रस्य गुग्यवत्त्वज्येष्ठताप्रयक्तोत्वरुप्यसमांग्रमाक्तोक्तः वैग्यजन्त्रसप्यच्याप्यवंविधस्य वैग्र्यापुत्रसमांग्रिता दर्या रहस्यत्वनुक्तापि। ज्येष्ठाग्रं हरेदित्वस्योत्कृष्ठसमांग्रहर्णनेवार्था रहस्यतिसंवादादुत्तमजातीयापेच्याधिकांग्रानौ-चित्याख।

यदा तु श्रूहा रेवेकः पुत्रो ब्राह्मणस्य । तदा स तद्धनत्वतीयांश्रहारी भागहयं सिपाडानां तदभावे सकुल्यानान्तेषामप्यभावे श्राद्धकर्त्तुः । यदाह देवलः । निषाद-रक्षपुत्रस्तु विप्रस्य स त्वतीयभाक् । दो सिपाडः सकुल्यो वा खधादाताथवा हरेत् । ब्राह्मणाच्छूहायां जाता निषादः स रकुष्यासौ पृत्रस्रेत्यं । च्राह्मियवेश्ययोस्तु श्रूहरवेकः पुत्रः स धनार्द्धहराऽपरमर्द्धमपुत्रधनग्रहणाधिका-

च नियवैश्वयोत्त श्रू नर्येकः पुत्रः स धनार्डहरोऽपरमर्डमपुत्रधनग्रहणधिका-रिखलदत्क्रमेण ग्रङ्कीयुः। तथा च विष्णुः। दिजातीनां श्रू न्त्वेकपुत्रोऽर्डहरोऽपुत्र-क्षिस या गतिः साऽर्डस्य दितीयस्थेति। दिजातिपदेनात्र चत्रियवैश्वमात्रग्रहणम्। देवकेन श्राद्धार्थे विश्वेषाभिधानात्। स्कपुत्र इति कम्मधारयः।

इदुमपि सद्वृत्तातिगुणवच्कूद्रापुत्रविषयम्। चन्यया। यद्यपि खात्तु सत्युत्र इत्यादिना ऋस्यायद्यत्रियविद्यामित्यादिना च वच्चमाणमनुवचनेन विरोधापतेः। यद्यपि सामान्यत इयम्भागकृतिरुक्ता तथापि प्रतिग्रहपाप्तभूमिखितिरक्तविषया चित्रयदिस्तानान्तत्र भागप्रतिषेधात्। तथा च रहस्पतिः। न प्रतिग्रहभूदेया चित्रयदिस्ताय वै। यद्यप्येषां पिता दद्यान्मृते विप्रास्ते। हरेत्॥ अत्र प्रतिग्रहीपादानात्क्रयादिप्राप्तायाम्भवत्येव तेषामिष भागः खजात्यर्ष्ट् इति स्वचितम्।
चतर्व भूमिमात्रविषये श्रुद्रापुत्रस्य एथङ्निषये धे देवलेने क्षः। श्रुद्रगां दिजातिभि
र्जाता न भूमेर्भागमर्हति। सजाता वाप्तुयास्विमिति धर्मो खवस्थित इति।

यत्त । त्रास्मणचित्रियं त्र्यापुत्रों न रिक्यभाक् । यदेवास्य पिता दद्यात्त-देवास्यं धनं स्मृतिमिति मनुवचनम् । तित्राव्यप्तितिदत्तधनसङ्गाविषयमिति दाच्चि-बात्याः । निर्भुं व्यापरिक्षीतस्त्रद्रापुत्रविषयमिति तु पौरस्यास्त्रनमन्दम् । यदेवास्येत्यादि-वाक्यप्रेषे।पात्तव्यवस्थामपद्यागुपात्तसगुक्षनिर्भुं व्यवस्थायाः कस्यितुमनद्यतात् । स्परिक्षीतस्त्रद्रापुत्रभागस्य च दासप्रस्तावेऽभिधास्यमानत्वात्याचेव व्यवस्था संस्था ।

PART II.

- 1. मुख्यामुख्यपुत्राणां विभागस्थवस्थां वर्तुं तत्त्वरूपं निरूपते। तत्र यात्र-वल्काः। सैरिसे धर्मपत्नीजलत्त्यमः पुत्रिकासुतः। चोत्रजः चोत्रजातल् सगोत्रेशेतरेश्च वा। ग्रहे प्रच्छत्र उत्पन्नो गूष्टजल् सुतः स्मृतः। कानीगः कन्यकाजाता मातामहस्ता मतः। खन्तत्यां चतायां वा जातः पौनर्भवः सुतः। दद्यान्माता पिता वा यं स पुत्रो दत्तकः स्मृतः। कीतस्व ताभ्यां विक्रीतः स्वित्रमः स्थात् खयं स्तः। दत्तात्मा तु खयन्दत्तो गर्भे विक्रः सहैष्ठाः। उत्पृष्ठो ग्रह्यते यस्तु सेर्पविद्योभवेत् सुतः॥
- 2. सवर्षा धर्मविवाष्टीा धर्मपत्नी तस्यां जांतः श्रीरसः पुत्र इति मिताचारा। वस्तुतस्तु नेदमेव बेाड्यम्। खनुत्तामजानासमूर्ड्डामिषिक्तादीनामौरसेव्यन्तभावादिति खवचनविरोधात्। न ष्टि ते सवर्षायासुत्पन्ना। ब्राष्ट्रामादिषु येषां ये
 न धर्मविवाष्ट्रासदू होत्पन्नानामनारसत्यप्रसङ्गे तेषु सत्स्वप्यन्येषान्दायग्रस्याप्रसङ्गात्र।
 तस्मादुत्वधीभिप्रायं सवर्षाग्रस्यां धर्मपत्नीजलमात्रं वाक्योपात्तं च्लेत्रजादित्यावर्त्तवं
 चच्चम्।

खतरव मनः। संख्रुतायां खमार्थायां खयमुत्पादयेत् यम्। बीरसन्तं विजानियात्पृत्रं प्रथमकित्पक्तम्॥ विभिष्ठोऽपि। दादुश्येव पृत्राः प्रराणदृष्ठाः खयमुत्पादितः खन्ने संख्रुतायामारसः प्रथम इति॥ विष्णुर्दीप। अथ दादश्र पृत्रा भवन्ति खन्ने संख्रुतायामुत्पादितः खयमारसः प्रथम इति॥ अत्र वचनद्वेऽपि खन्ने संख्रुतायाभिति व्याख्यानव्याख्येयभावाऽन्यथा पानक्त्यापत्तेः। देवनः। संख्रुतायां खमार्थ्यायां खयमुत्पादितो हि यः। खारसा नाम पृत्रः स प्रधानः पिष्टवंश्रष्टक्॥ खापक्तम्यः। सवर्षां श्रास्त्रविद्वितां यथर्तु मच्छतः पृत्राक्तिषां धर्मामिसम्बन्धः दायेनाव्यत्विक्रमस्वाः भयार्मातापित्रोः॥ बीधायनः। सवर्षायां संख्रुतायां खयमुत्पादित्रभीरसं पृत्रं

विद्यात्। खराण्यराहरन्ति। खङ्गादङ्गात्मभवित हृदयादभिजायसे। खात्मा वै पुत्रनामासि स जीव शरदः शतम्। खाधत्त पितरा गर्भे कुमार पृथ्वरस्जम्। यथेइ प्रवासात्मा तथा लिमिइ जायसे। खात्मा पुत्र इति प्रोक्तः पितुर्भातुरन-यद्यत्। पुन्नामस्त्रायसे यसात्पुत्रस्तेनासि संज्ञित इति ॥

. चापत्तम्बीयवेषधायनीययोः सवर्णाग्रहसामुलार्घाभिप्रायक्रमेव । बीस्रत्यद्वानामध्यौरसपुत्रप्रस्तावस्य विभागप्रकार उक्तः सङ्ग्यक्ते । स्वापस्तम्बवचने सवर्बामपूर्विमिति रत्नाकरे छतः पाठोऽपूर्वे न पूर्वः पतिर्थ्यस्याः सा वाग्हत्तापि या न भवतीत्वर्ध इति प्रकाशकारहति व्याख्यातस् । पारिजातेऽप्यक्तम् । सवर्शात्र दिजस्य दिजा श्रृदस्य श्रृदा।

- न तु ब्राच्यबस्य ब्राह्मबी चित्रयस्य चित्रया वैग्रयस्य वैग्रया। चन्यचा ब्राह्म-बादिपरिकोतच्चित्रयादिपुत्राकां दादश्रपुत्रान्तभीवा न स्यादिति।
- 3. पत्रिकायाः सुतः पुत्रिकासुतः स तत्समः। यथाइ स्त्रीकं विश्विष्ठः। अध्याद्यकां प्रदास्थामि तुभ्यक्कन्यामलक्कृताम्। अस्थां या जायते पुत्रः स मे पुत्रो मवेदिति । मनुरपि । अपुत्रीरनेन विधिना सुतां कुर्व्वीत पुत्रिकाम् । यदपत्यं भवेद-स्यान्तन्त्रम स्यात् खधाकरम्। खनेन तु विधानेन पुरा चक्रेऽय पुनिकाम्। विरुद्धार्थं खवंग्रस्य खयं दत्तः प्रजापतिः। ददौ स दग्न धर्माय कम्यपाय त्रयादग्र। सामाय राचे सत्क्षत्व भीतात्मा सप्तविंगतिम् । अत्र परिभाष्य दत्तायामुत्यद्गः पुत्रिकापुत्री माताम इस्ये ब्रुक्तम्। अपरिभाषितदत्तायामिष सम्भवतीति भारमतीमिति विश्वेषा-म्युचिकाकर बाग्रज्ञानिक चार्योम् चानेन चापरिभाषितापि पुचिका भवती वाचारिन-ताचरायां निरूपितम्। चतरव मौतमाऽपि। पितात्मृजेत्पु जिनामनपत्यो मदर्थमप-त्यमिति सम्बाद्य। अभिसन्धिमात्रात्पुत्रिके खेकेषामिति । ब्रह्मपुराखेऽपि। अपुत्रेख तु या कन्या मनसा पुत्रवत्कृता। राजामिबान्धवेभ्यस्य समद्यं वाच कुत्रचित्। प्रामार्भमधवा मुख्कयुक्ता पित्रा वराय वा। स्टेत पितरि वा दत्ता सा विज्ञेया तु षुत्रिका। पित्राहक्यात्समन्भागं कभेत ताहची सुतेति ॥ मनुः। मातुः प्रथमतः पिर्व्हं

निर्वयेत्युचिकास्तः। दितीयन्तु पितुक्तस्याक्तृतीयन्तु पितुः पितुरिति ॥
अथवा पुचिका चासौ सतस्य पुचिकास्त इति पुचिकवे पुचस्यानीयेत्यर्थः। तस्याचीरचेा जात्ते अपि बन्धालात्युत्रसमलिमिति वयम्। पित्रवयवानामन्यत्वानानव-यवानां वाज्जल्याचौरससमलिमिति मिताचारा। यथाच विश्वकः। दितीयः पत्रः पत्रि-केवेति।

द्यामुख्यायबन्तु। खपुत्रेव परक्तेत्रे नियागोत्पादितः सुतः। उभयारप्यसौ रिक्शी पिखदाता च धर्मत इति याच्चवस्कारोऽपि। स वीजिना यदायौरसक्तयाणन्य-चोचोत्पद्मवादीरसादपक्तरूरव । खतरवीरसे धर्मापत्नीज इत्यौरसमच्चां तेनेवाभि-हितम्। व्यक्ताभिरपि चोत्रजलानपायात्चोत्रजपुत्रमध्यस्य व्याख्यास्यते। मैनुदूपि। क्रियाभ्यपगमात् चोत्रं वीजाधं यस्त्रदीयते। तस्रेह भागिनौ दस्तौ

वीजी चेचिकरव च ॥ यथा लेकि कियाकर्षणाखातादभ्यपामात्। रकस्य वापाधं वीजं बीचादि नास्ति. चेचमस्ति खपरस्य चोचं नास्ति वीजमस्ति। तच तो मदीयं वीजन्वदीयं चेचं तच तदावापेन कृषिं कुवंस्तचीत्यद्गं प्रमावयारस्विष्यभ्यपामं सम्बदं यदि कुरतस्त्रथा सित दाविष तत् प्रमागिनौ दस्ते। तथा द्यामुख्यायय-स्थलेऽप्यचीत्पद्ममावयारस्विति संविदा यद्येकस्य चेचेऽपरः सवीजमावपित तदुत्पद्ममप्यप्रसम्भयोभवतीति तस्य चेचजस्य दिपिहकत्वन द्यामुख्याययसंज्ञा।

स्त्र याज्ञवल्कोन नियागोत्पादित इत्युक्तेर्गुक्तस्यैव देवरसिपखादेकीत्रा-दिभार्थ्यायां छताभ्यक्रादिविधितः पुत्रोत्पादनिमतरथा प्रत्यवाय उभयोरित्युक्तं भवति। तथा च मनुः। स्वपुत्राक्तुर्वनुज्ञाता देवरः पुत्रकाम्यया। स्विपढो वा सगोत्रो वा छताभ्यक्त ऋतावियात्। स्वनेन विधिना जातः स्त्रेत्रजाऽस्य भवेत्युतः॥

यदा लनिमसाय देयारपत्यं परचेत्रे देवरादिना वीजमुण्यते तदा चेत्रियास्व तदपत्यम्। तदणाद्य मनुः। पलन्वनिमससाय वीजिनां चेत्रियान्तथा। प्रत्यचं चेत्रियामर्थी वीजाद्योनिर्वलायसीति॥ पलमपत्यरूपमनिमससाय यत्र परचेत्रे यदपत्यमुत्पाद्यते तत्चेत्रसामिनस्व भवति। यथा लेको परचेत्रे त्रीह्यादिवीजं चेत्रसामिना सद्य सम्बद्धमद्यत्वेष पत्रादौ परकीयेऽन्यदीया नगात्रपादिवीर्यमावपति तत्रोभयत्रापि चेत्रसामिनस्व तदुत्पन्ने पत्रे साम्यं दृश्यत इति प्रत्यच्यािष्यं। तत्र चेतृवीजाद्योनिर्वलीयसीति। गवात्र्यादौ तथा दर्भनादिति भावः। तथा चामिसस्यौ सत्येव चेत्रजस्य वीजिसाम्येन द्यामुख्याययात्रं चेत्रसामिसाम्यन्तु चेत्रज उभयत्रापीति प्रतितिऽर्थः। खतस्व यद्यपि याच्चवक्कोनापुत्रेयोत्यादिवचने वीज्यभिसिन्यापत्तिस्त्यापि मन्वाद्येत्रमूलकत्यानुसन्धेयः। खतस्व। चेत्रजः चेत्रजातस्तु सगोत्रयोतरेय वा। इत्यनभिसन्धिसाधार्यं चोत्रजन्तव्यम्नक्तमन्यथा पौनवत्यापत्तेः। सगोत्रयेय देवरसपियद्यदिना। इतरेयासगोत्रयेयत्वनुक्तस्यः। मनुना सपियद्यो वा सगोत्रये वा इत्यभिधानात्।

नियागस्य वाग्दत्ताविषय एवेत्याचार्याः। यस्या स्वियेत कन्याया वाचा सत्ये क्वते पतिः। तामनेन विधानेन निजा विन्देत देवर इति मनुना तज्ञैव नियागिविधिना पुजात्पादनस्य नियमितत्वात्। विधवानियागस्य प्रत्युत प्रतिषिद्धत्वाच। तथाचि। देवराद्वा सिपखाद्वा स्विया सम्यङ्नियुक्तया। प्रजेसिताधिगन्तव्या सन्तानस्य परिच्यये। विधवायां नियुक्तस्तु एताक्तां वाग्यता निश्चि। एकसृत्यादयेत् पुजं न द्वितीयं कथस्वेति॥ इत्यादिविधवानियागसुपन्यस्य नियधयति स्वयमेव मनुः। नान्यस्मिन् विधवा नारी नियाक्तव्या दिजातिभिः। सन्यस्मिन् दि नियुक्ताना धमं चन्यः सनातनम्। नोदादिक्षेषु मन्त्रषु नियागः कीर्च्यते कचित्। न विवाद्यविधानुक्तं विधवावेदनं पुनः। स्वयं दिजेदिं विद्विद्वः प्रसुधर्मा विग्राच्वितः। मनुष्याग्वामिप प्रोक्तो वेग्वौ राज्यं प्रशासित। स मदीमखिलाम्मुझन् राजर्षिप्रवरः पुरा। वर्णानां सङ्गरस्क्रो कामेपच्यतेनः। ततः प्रस्ति या मोद्दात्वभीतपितकां स्वयम्। नियाजयुत्वपैत्वार्थनां विग्रर्द्धन्तं साधव इति॥

अत्र वाग्दसाम्बद्देन तुश्यमत्तं सम्मदद इत्यादि सङ्गल्यवाक्येन सन्यादाचा विधवाग्रब्देन तु सप्तपदीपर्यन्तविवाहीाढा पञ्चान्स्तपतिका। न तु विवाहात्मागनियतकालप्रतित्रवग्रारूपवाग्दानदत्तायाः। खर्यकुरुपतितेरुक्तीवे दश्रदाषविवर्जिते। इमां जन्यां प्रदास्यामि देवाधिग्रवसिव्धविति वाक्येन प्रति-चायते। चतरव पतिरिति मनने। प्रामार्वपतिश्रवणस्य विवाहप्रयोग-विदर्भावेन प्रतिश्राव्यस्य पतित्वानृत्यत्तेः पतिश्रब्देन निर्देशानुपपत्तेः। सङ्घाल्यताया चिप न स पतिर्ज्ञातः। भार्यात्वनत्पतित्वस्याप्यलौकिकसंस्कारात्म-कालेन विवाहभावनाभाव्यस्य सततं प्रागनुत्यत्तेः। तथापि प्रयोगोपक्रमे तत्पाली-भूततद्यवद्यारसम्भवः। यजमानेस्थितः प्रागणाद्यवनीयव्यवद्यारवत्। प्रतिश्रवग्रामात्रे तु न तदुपक्रमेरऽपीति सर्व्यथा पतिल्यपदेश्रोऽन्पपन्नः। खतर्व प्रतीचौदीचादीनां विवाहिदिदवीयःप्राक्काले वाग्दत्तायात्तदुद्धेये स्तेऽपि प्नरविगीतिशिक्टरचेन सह विवादः क्रियते। अन्यथा कली नियागिवधेरिप निधिद्धतया पुनरच्चताविवाद्यस्य दूरापास्ततया स दुराचार एव स्थात्। तथा चायमर्थः। वाचा सर्वे क्रते सङ्गल्य-वाच्येन दाने कते सति यस्याः पतिः पतित्वभाव्यक्तविवाचभावनाविषयीभूतः पक्षो मियेतेति। न च विच्चितप्रतिषिद्धालादिकः व्ययव विधवानियागस्या चित्रति वाच्यम्। वस्तुनि विकल्पासम्भवात्। निष्ट विधवायां नियागात्रवृत्तस्य प्रत्यवाया भवति न भवति वेति सम्भवति। नियागिवधेर्यस्या नियेतेत्वादिवचनेन वागुदत्ताविषयत्वे नियन्त्रिते विधवाविषये प्रवस्यभावाच नियाजियहृगाज्ञिन्दाश्रवगात् स्त्रोधर्मेषु यभि-चारस्य बद्धदेषजनकत्वश्रवणात् संयमस्यातिप्रश्रंसनाच तुल्यवलत्वस्यापि विधि-प्रतिषेधयारभावात्। तथा च मनुरेव। कामन्तु च्वपयेद्दे पुष्पमूलपालैः श्रुभैः। न तु नामापि स्टक्कीयात्पत्यौ प्रेते परस्य त्विति जीवनार्थं पुरुषान्तराश्रयसे निषिद्धे। चासीतामर बात् चान्ता नियता ब्रह्मचारिखी। या धर्म र कपलीनां काङ्गन्ती तमन्-त्तमम्। अनेकानि सद्द्वाणि कुमारब्रह्मचारिणाम्। दिवं गतानि विप्राणामञ्जला कुलसन्तिम्। स्ते भर्त्तरि साध्वी स्त्री ब्रह्मचर्ये व्यवस्थिता। सर्गकुक्वयपत्रापि यथा ते ब्रह्मचारियाः। अपत्यले।भाद्या तु स्त्री भत्तीरमितवर्त्तते। सेइ निन्दामवा-न्नोति पतिले।काच चीयत इति पुत्रार्थमपि पुरुषान्तरात्रययां निन्दातिग्रयपुरःसर-स्रतिषिद्धवान्। प्रचात् खयमेव यस्या स्त्रियतेत्वनेन वाग्दत्ताविषयनियास्य च धर्म्यत्ममुक्तवान्। खनेन विधानेनेत्युक्ताऽन्यथा। यथा विध्यधिग्रन्थेनां श्रुक्तवस्त्रां श्रुचि-व्रताम्। मिथो भजेताप्रसवात्मकत्त्वस्तावताविति विधानमपि दर्शितवान्। ष्टताभ्यक्रगुर्वनुद्यादिः पूर्वीक्षः स्मृत्यनारीक्षस्य या विधिः साऽप्यनेनेति सर्वनासा पराम्डायते । देवरसञ्चयं सिप्यहादेरपणच्याम्। वचनान्तरानुसारात्। पतिपदं वाचा सत्य इति च व्याख्यातमेव।

यसी वाग्दत्ता स प्रतिग्रहमन्तरेखेव तस्याः प्रतिरित्यसादेवावागस्यत इति मितास्त्रद्वायस्योऽप्यसदुक्तार्थाभिप्रायसतयेव नेयः। यथा श्रुते देावस्योक्तत्वात्। स्रत- स्वाग्रेतनोग्रायः। स्रयस्य विवाष्टेः यस्रस्वताभ्यक्तादिनियमवात्रियृक्ताममनाक्तमेवेति न देवरस्य तस्यास्मार्थात्मापादयति । स्वतस्तदुत्पन्नमपर्यं स्रोत्रस्वामिन स्वासत्वां सम्बिदि । सम्बिदि सम्बिदेव तूभवारपीति ।

नारदः। चीत्रकानुमते वीजं यस्य चित्रे प्रसिच्यते। तदपत्यं द्वयोरेव वीजिची-त्रिकयोर्मतम्॥ प्रश्कृतिखितौ। मन्त्रसंस्कारकर्त्तुरपत्यमित्याष्ट्रिरसेवीजिचीत्रिक-योरनुमते यदीजम्मकीर्यते तत्दिधा प्रस्यमित्युष्टनाः॥ कात्यायनः। चीत्रिकस्य मते-नापि पालसुत्यादयेत्तु यः। तस्येष्ट्र भागिनौ तौ तु न पालं ष्ट्रि विनेकतः॥

हारीतः। जीवति चोत्रजमाङ्गरखातस्त्रान्तृते द्यासुष्यायख्यमनुप्तवीजत्वात् । नावीजं चोत्रं फलति। नाचोत्रं वीजं रोह्युभयदर्भनादुभयारपत्यमित्यपरे। तेषासुत्पा-द्यितुः प्रथमः प्रवरे भवति। दौ पिखौ निर्वापे द्युरेकपिखं वा द्वावनुकी चेयेत्। दितीये पुत्रस्तुतीये पौत्रो लेपिनस्व त्रीन्वाचचात्व स्वासप्तमादिखेके॥

जीवित चोत्रपती तस्यैव चोत्रजं पुत्रमाजः। स्वत्र हेतुरसातन्यात् स्विया हत्यर्थः। स्तते तु चोत्रपती। सपुत्राग्रयनं भर्त्तरिक्षादिवच्यमाग्रमन्वचनादसा-तन्यमिविण्रिष्टं यद्यपि तथापि न चोत्रिग्रयत तत्र हेतुरनुप्रवीजलात् चोत्रिग्रो वीजिनस्मत्यनुमत्यवग्रंभावादित्यर्थः। तचोपपादकता वीजिमित्यादि निर्वापे निरूप्तते प्रसिन्निति निर्वापः पिग्रद्धियाच्याच्याः पित्रद्वयाय दौ पिग्रहो एधग्दद्यः। एकिपिग्रहे वा दौ पितरावनुकीर्त्तयेत्। एकिप्तस्मन् दौ दाविति वीभ्रा बेध्या। यदि दिपितास्यादेकिकस्मन् पिग्रहे दौ दावुपलच्चयेदित्यापस्त्रस्मरमात्। त्रयाग्रामिष्टित्यादिति भावः। दितीय हत्यादि। दितीयं हतीयं चारस्थेत्वर्थः। लेपिनस्य त्रीग्रिन्त्यादि। तत्वीर्त्तनेऽपिद्वदौ दावनुकीर्त्तयेदित्यर्थः।

नारदेऽपि। द्यां सुष्ट्रायकता दद्युर्दाभ्यां पिखोदके एथक्। ऋक्यादक्षीं ग्रमादद्य-वीजिन्ते विकये स्त्राया ॥ कार्डी ग्रमिति यथो चितभागोपलन्त्रायम्।

बैधायनः। खाषाप्युदाइरिन्तः। दिपितुः पिखदानं स्यात् पिखे पिखे च नामनी। त्रयस पिखाः यसां स्युरेनं कुर्वन्न दुष्यतीति ॥ यसां पिटपितामचप्रियता-मचानाम्। स रव। म्टतस्य प्रस्तेत यस्र क्लीवस्य व्याधितस्य वा। तेनानुमतस्य च्लेत्रे स च्लेत्रजः स् च दिपिता दिगोत्रस्य दयेरिप स्वधात्रम्थभाग्भवति ॥

मनुः। यस्त्रस्यजः प्रमीतस्य स्नीवस्य व्याधितस्य वा। स्वधर्मेखः नियुक्तायां स पुत्रः चोत्रजः स्मृतः॥

खत्र सर्वेत्र जीवित चेत्रिण व्याध्यादिप्रतिरद्धपुत्रीत्यादने यथायागं गुरुखा-स्मर्तुरपि नियोगः सम्बद्ध । स्ते तु गुरुखानेव ।

तथा च दोत्रजा दिविधो दिपिटकः दोत्रिकपिटकस्य।

5. ग्रेड प्रस्कृत उत्पन्नो जारात्यसात्मवर्षाजातित्वेन निर्मितः चोचसामिनो गूढिको नाम पुत्रः। मनुः। उत्पद्यते ग्रेड यस्य न च चायेत नस्य सः। स ग्रेड गूढ उत्पन्नस्य स्वायस्य तस्पत्रः॥ नचेत्वादि। पुरुषविश्रेषजन्यत्वेनाचातोऽपि सुवर्वीजार-

अन्यत्वेन चातः। सजातीयेष्वयन्योक्तत्तनयेषु मया विधिरिति यागीत्र्यरोक्तेत्तच याख्यास्यते।

6. कानीनः वन्यवायामपरिबीतायां सवर्षाच्चातः स मातामइस्रते। यस्य सा वन्या तस्यैव पुत्रः इत्यर्थः । परिगीतायान्तु जातो बेाढुरेव तु गूढ्जः । यथाइ मनुः । पिढवेमानि वन्या तु यम्पुत्रञ्जनयेष्टः । तं वानीनं वदेवासा वाढुः वन्यासमुद्भव-मिति ॥ स्तैवीक्यरपरिबीतायां पिढ्रग्रद्धावस्थितायां सवर्षजारजः वानीनः स च मातामइस्रत इत्युक्तं ।

तिहर्त्यं ब्रह्मपुरासीयं कल्पतर्काखितं वाक्यम्। खदत्तायान्तु या जातः सवर्केन पितुर्रे है। स कानीनः सतकास्य यसी सा दीयते पुनः । नारदवाक्यमपि तत्रेव। कानीबस्व सद्देाज्य गृजायां यस जायते। तेषां वाजा पिता च्रेयसे च भागर्हराः स्मृता इति ॥ खनादत्तायां सवकात् पितुर्यः हे जातस्य कानीमलमविबद्धम्। यसी सा पुनर्शियते तस्यासी सत इति विबद्धं। नारदवचनेऽपि गृहोत्पन्नसङ्घाहकानीन-स्थापि वाढेव पितेति प्रतिपादितम्। मनुनापि वाढ्रिस्युत्तं न माताम इस्थेति। या तु मिताचाराष्ट्रता यद्यनू ज्ञायासुत्यंत्रस्ति माताम इसते। उप्यू ज्ञायान्तदा वे जिर्देविति यवस्या क्रता । सापि मनसि न चमत्वारमादधाति । तथा सिति हि नन्याग्रन्दवा-चायामपरिकीतायामजातत्वात् तस्य कानीनतन्दुर्वचम्। न च कन्याभ्रस्टः चपत्वमा-त्रपरीविश्वेषववैयर्थात्। गृष्कादीनामि तत्रीत्यद्वलेनांचावर्त्तकलात्। सर्वाचि कस्य-चित्वाचीव । त्रद्मपुरायावचनविरोधस दुष्परिष्टरक्तत्रादत्तायामित्युक्कत्वात् । स्वतरव मानविद्रोधोऽपि दुःसमाध रव । जल्पतरकारेखापि परस्परविरुद्धवचनानि लिखि-तवता इत्यम् न्यवद्यवस्थानिभधानादिरोध एव न प्रतिसंहितः। तेन हि मातामइ-सुतलक्कानीनस्य बेाधयन्ति बङ्कान वचनान्युपन्यस्य तदिराखे ब्रह्मपुराखनारदवचने तदन्पदमेव जिखिते। तत्र विश्वरुख वचः। कानीनः पश्चमः या पिट्टारहेऽसंस्कृता कामादुत्पादयेत्स कानीना मातामहस्य पुत्री भवतीत्वाह । खथाप्यदाहरिना । खपुत्रा दुविता यस्य पुत्रं विन्देत तल्पजः। पौत्री मातामक्तिन दद्यात्पिखं करेजनिनित । नारदरीवम्। चचातिप्रदेवा यस्त कानीनीमूढमाद्यकः। मातामचस्य दद्यात्स पिर्स्ट रिक्यं इरेत्ततः ॥ वैाधायनस्यापि । असंब्कृतामनतिस्ट यासुपमक्तितस्यां या जातः स कानीन इति ॥

खन प्रतिविद्धाः। मातामइस्तत्वं कानीनस्य प्रतिपादयतां वचनानां सर्वधा या न दत्ता तस्यां सवर्षानातिवयत्वम्। वेष्ठः स्तत्वं प्रतिपादयतान्तु सङ्गल्यितायां सप्तपदीपर्यन्तं विवादभावनाभाय्यभार्यात्वमप्राप्तायां यः सवर्षादुत्पन्नस्तिद्वयत्वम्। खदत्तायामिति नारदवचने वेधायनवचने चानतिस्रस्टामिति पदाभ्यामसमाप्त-विवादभावने।चते न तु सर्व्ययादत्ता। युक्तचेतत्। सङ्गल्येन पित्रस्त्वत्यपरामपरियो-द्रस्त्वोत्यत्तेवपन्नमात्। पितुः सर्व्यया स्त्वापग्रमाभावाच कानीनत्वयपदेश्वस्य परियो-द्रस्त्वोपन्नमेय तदीयत्वस्य च सम्भवात्। पूर्वपित्रस्त्वे तु तदुत्वनस्य मातामइस्त- लोपपत्तेः । मनुवचनस्याप्ययमर्थः । या सङ्गल्यिताऽसमाप्तविवाहभावना स्वतस्व कन्या परिग्रेटसार्थालस्यानिस्यत्तेः । तादृश्यकन्यासमुद्भवं कानीननामानं वे द्विर्धेन विवास्त्राते तस्य वदेदिति । स्वतस्व पिढवेद्मानीव्यपि सङ्गतमनुवादतया । विवाहानन्तरमेव भर्त्तृ ग्रह्मवेश्वात् । मिताच्चराग्रत्रास्याप्ययमर्थः । स्वनूष्वायं वे द्विमनुपकान्तायाम् । कष्वायां वे द्विमनुपकान्तायाम् । कष्वायां वे द्विमनुपकान्तायामिति । स्वादिकमीति क्षः । न तु भूते । समाप्तविवाह्यस्वायान्तु सवर्षात्रारज्ञाते। गूष्ट्यः । स्वतस्व ग्रहे प्रस्तव्य उत्पन्नो भर्त्तृ ग्रहे तेनाः चाते। जात इत्यक्तम् ।

- 7. पुनर्भृदिविधा। विवाहमात्रेणात्रतायन्थेन परिणीयमानेका। अन्या तु विवाहात्यागेव पुरुषसम्भोगदृषिता। तस्याञ्चातः पौनर्भवः। अतरवात्त्वतायां त्वतायां वा जात इत्युक्तम्। मनुः। या तु पत्या परित्यक्ता विधवा वा खयेच्छ्या। उत्पादयेन्तुनर्भूत्वा स पौनर्भव उच्यते॥ कात्यायनः। क्रीवं विहाय प्रतितं या पुनर्क्षभते प्रतिम्। तस्याम्पौनर्भवा जाता व्यक्तसुत्पादकस्य सः॥ विश्वस्रविष्णू। पौनर्भवस्वतुर्थं इति। चतुर्थत्वन्तदनुक्रमापेत्राया।
- 8. माता भर्त्राज्ञया पिता वा यमन्थसी दश्चात्म तस्य दत्तकः पुत्रः। तथा च मनुः। माता पिता वा दश्चातां यमङ्किः पुत्रमापित्। सदृशं प्रीतिसंयुक्तं स ज्ञेया दित्रमः सुतः॥ च्यापदीत्युक्तोरनापित् दातुः प्रत्यवायः। मातापितरौ प्रत्येकं मिलितौ वा। च्यद्भिरिति दानप्रतियच्चप्रकारोपज्ञ्चायम्। सदृशं सवर्षः। प्रीतिसंयुक्तमिति क्रियाविश्रवेषयम्।

रकः पुत्रस्व न देया न प्रतिग्राह्मः। तथा च विश्वरुः। सुक्रशोखितसम्भवः पुरुषो माता पित्रनिमित्तकत्तस्य प्रदानिविक्रयपरित्यागेषु मातापितरौ प्रभवतः। नत्वेकं पुत्रन्दद्यात्प्रतिग्रङ्गीयादा। स हि सन्तानाय पूर्वेषात्र तु स्त्री पुत्रं दद्यात्प्रतिग्रङ्गीयादान्यत्रानाद्भत्तेति॥

चन भर्जनुचां विना स्त्रियाः पुत्रप्रतिग्रहिनिषेधाददत्तानुच्चे भर्त्ति स्ति विध-वया कृतः पुत्रोदत्तको न भवतीत्याज्ञस्त्र स्वपुत्रस्य ग्रत्थभावात्पुत्रकर ग्रस्थावस्य कर्त्व-श्रवशाच्छास्त्रमूलकतदनु चायास्त्रत्राप्यच्रतेः। न चेवमनु चानादन्य नेति व्यर्थम् व्याव-च्याभावाच्छास्त्रीयानुमतेः सर्व्वनावस्रकातादिति वाच्यम्। सुमुच्चोः पत्न्यन्तरे पुत्र-वतोवानुच्याया च्यसम्भवाद्वार्थ्या यदि स्वपुत्रार्थमेव तं प्रतिग्रहीतु मिच्छिति तदा तां प्रतिषेधित। सर्व्वासां रुक्तपत्ति गानेका चेत्रपत्तिश्ची भवेत्। सर्व्वास्तास्त्रेन पुत्रेश्च प्राह पुत्रवतीर्मनु दिति पुत्रकार्यश्चाद्वादेः सपत्नीपुत्रेश्च सिद्धे भर्त्वनुच्चां विना तादस्या पुत्रो न कार्यः। उभये दिपि तत्र कार्यस्य तेन निष्यत्तेः। भर्ते हिं स चौरस रव सुख्यः तस्या च्यपि दत्तवद्गौश्च इति तादस्या भर्त्वनुमितमन्तरेश्वेतरेः न प्रतिग्राष्ट्य इति तात्पर्यार्थः। वस्तुतस्तु। स्वादृश्वामिकजातानामेकच्चेत् पुत्रवान् भवेत्। सर्व्वे ते तेन पुत्रेश्च पुत्रिश्चो मनुद्रविदिति वचनवदेतस्यापि स्वाद्यपस्त्रास्त्रास्त्रकादौन्थास्था-सम्भवेदन्यः पुत्रप्रतिनिधिर्व कार्यः इत्यर्थकतया मिताच्चरास्तृतिचिन्नकादौन्थास्था- तत्वाद्वर्त्तरि जीवति भार्य्यया खातम्युक तदननुमतौ न पुत्रीकरवीय इति भर्तुरन्-ज्ञानादन्यचेत्वस्थार्थः।

स्ते तु तसिन् यत्पारन्युन्तदनुमितरेवापे सिता। यवं सित दृश्येता भवति प्रतिमेधस्य। तस्माददत्तानु से स्तेऽपि भक्ति भाष्याया दक्तकादिकरसमिवद्वम्। मनुवचनद्वयस्य पूर्वेक्तिः विद्याचित्रस्य मितास्त्ररादावेविक्ता। यदपुत्ररिक्य- यद्याधिकारिकामपरे पत्नी दुष्टितर दृश्यत्राप्रजःस्त्रीधनमित्रम् च भाष्टपुत्रसपत्नी- पुत्रयोः पत्नादिभन्नीद्यभावेऽधिकारप्रतिपादनिवरोधापत्तेरिति। तच तन्व प्रपद्विष्यते।

खनेकपुत्रसङ्गावेऽपि ज्येष्ठः पुत्री न देयः। ज्येष्ठेन जातमात्रेख पुत्री भवित मानव इति । पुत्रकार्य्यकर्वे तस्येव मुख्यत्वाभिधानात्।

कीतंखयंदत्तक्विमेखिप समानन्यायलादेकपुत्रच्येरुपुत्रयाद्विष्ठेषः । स्वतरव बङ्ग्वनाद्वावे इरिसन्त्रोपात्वाने कीतेऽपि च्येरुपुत्रमितिषेधिकपुत्रप्रनं स च्येरुपुत्रं निम्नङ्गान उवाचेति ।

पुत्रप्रतिग्रहप्रकारसः । पुत्रस्यतिग्रहीस्यन् बन्धुनाङ्कय राजिन चावेद्य निवेद्यनस्य मध्ये व्याङ्गतिभिर्ज्ञलाऽदूरमान्धवं बन्धुसिङ्गाङ्गये प्रतिग्रङ्कीयादिति विद्यस्रोक्तः । सदूरमान्धविभित्वत्र देश्रभाषाविप्रहारुस्य प्रतिष्ठेधः । सवं क्रीतादिव्यपि ।
समानन्धायलात् । सन्धते लदूरमान्धवमसिङ्गाङ्गमेवित पाठं लिखिलाऽदूरमान्धवं
सिङ्गास्यात्वादिकम् स्रमङ्गिङ्गास्यक्षेत्रस्य स्रमिन्द्रस्यात्वात्वादिकम् स्रमुक्तिः स्रमिन्द्रस्यात्वात्वादिकम् । सन्देष्ठे चोत्पन्ने दूरमान्धवं ग्रुडमिन स्थापयेदिकायते च्लोकेन
च बङ्गास्यातामितीति च विद्यस्यनमधिकं लिखिलवं विद्यतम् । सन्देष्ठे
बान्धवानामसिङ्गधानाङ्गातिसन्देष्ट उत्पन्ने ग्रुडमिन संस्वारप्रीनमेव स्थापयेत् ।
ग्रुडोऽपि दि क्रतपुत्रो भवतीत्यभिप्राय इति ।

- 9. क्रोतसु प्रचलामां विक्रीत इति। ताथां मातापिद्धभां मात्रा अर्जन्ज्या पित्रा वा मृद्ध्यस्त्रे नापरस्य दत्तः। रक्तपुत्रं क्येष्ठपुत्रं वर्कियता खापदीत्ये । सवातीयेष्वित्रुपसंद्वारात्सवर्षयः। यत्तु मनुनेत्रिम्। क्रीक्रीयाद्यस्त्रपत्थां मातापिन्त्रार्थमन्त्रकात्। स क्रीतकः सतस्त्रस्य सहग्रोऽसहग्रोऽपिवेति ॥ तद्गुक्तैः सहग्रोऽसहग्रो वेति व्यास्त्रयं न तु जात्याऽसहग्र इति सजातीयेष्वित्रवनेन विरोधापत्तेः। बौधायने।ऽपि। मातापित्रोद्दं स्तात्क्रीते।ऽन्यतरस्य वा याऽपत्रार्थे स्ट्याते स क्रीतक इति।
- 10. क्रविमस्तु पुत्रार्थिना खयं धनचेत्रादिप्रदर्भनादिना प्रसेश्य तं मे पुत्री भवेति यः सवर्थः पुत्रीक्षतः स उच्यते । मातापिष्टविद्योनचेत् । तत्सद्भावे तत्पर-तन्त्रतया तेन पुत्रीभवितुमग्रकातात् । मनुविष्णु चिप । सद्यं यस्पनुर्धातां गृब-देविचक्रायम् । पुत्रं पुत्रग्रार्थेक्षं स विच्चेयस्त क्रविम इति ॥ सद्यं सवर्थम् । प्रकुर्यातां मस्तापितरौ मिलितौ प्रत्येकं वा ।

- 11. दत्तात्मा तु खयन्दत्तः खयमेव खात्मानमग्रक्षे दत्तवांक्तवाद्यमुत्रो भवानिति खयमुपगता मातापिष्टविद्यीनक्ताभ्यां त्वक्षो वा सर्वेषांऽपतितः स उच्यते । तथा च मनः । मातापिष्टविद्यीने यस्त्वक्षो वा स्थादकारणात् । खात्मानं स्पर्भयेयसी खयन्दत्तक्त स स्मृत इति ॥ खकारणात्यातित्वादिकारसमन्तरेवेव दुर्भिद्यादौ पेष- बाद्यसामर्थ्योदिना मातापिष्टभ्यान्यक्षः खतन्त्व इत्वर्थः ।
- 12. यस्तु गर्भे स्थिते। प्रियति विद्याला सर्वेषा स्वर्धा स्वर्धा स्वर्धा स्वर्धा स्वर्धा स्वर्धा स्वर्धा स्वर्ध स्वर्य स्वर्ध स्वर्य स्वर्ध स्वर्य स्वर्ध स्वर्ध स्वर्य स
- 13. उत्पृष्टो मातापिद्धभ्यान्यक्तो या ग्रन्थते पुत्रार्थिना सेाऽपविद्धो नाम ग्रन्थीतुः पुत्रः। रताविप सवर्षावेव। तथा विष्णुरिप। स्वपविद्धस्वेकादमः पित्रा मात्रा च परित्वक्तः स येन ग्रन्थीतः। विष्यसः। स्वपविद्धः पश्चमेाऽयं मातापिद्धभ्याम-पासं ग्रन्थीयात्। रकादम्यसं पश्चमसं तत्तत्पाठकमापेन्यया।
- 14. यस्तु मनुना गौखपुत्रमध्ये पारश्वाखाः श्रूझापुत्रः परिगिखाः स येगी-त्रारेख सजातीयेव्वयं प्रोक्तस्तनयेषु मया विधिरिखुक्तीपसंश्वरव्याजेन नियमकरखाः त्रस्य च कथिश्वरिप सजातीयलासम्भवाद्योक्तः। चतरव जातोऽपीत्यादिना यत्र्येन स उक्तः। दिजातस्य श्रूझापुत्रस्यान्याभावेऽपि पित्यत्रस्थश्वरत्वाभावाच। तच वस्यते। तथा च मनुः। यं ब्राह्मखन्तु श्रूझायां कामादुत्पादयेत्युतम्। स पारयद्वेव श्ववस्त्यात् पारश्वरः स्नृतः इति ॥ वौधायनाऽपि। दिजातिप्रवराक्ष्यूझायां जातः कामात्पारश्वर इति।
- 15. तत्रीरसादया गौबाः पुत्रा मुख्यस्वीरसरव। तथा च मनुः। चीत्रजादीन् सुतानेतानेकादश यथोदितान्। पुत्रप्रतिनिधीनाङः जियाकापान्मनीविकः।
 जियाकापात् परिवायादिजियाकापादिति प्रतिनिधित्वं हेतुः। स्मृतिचित्रकायान्तु।
 बीरसाभावे तत्कर्द्धकश्राद्धादिजियाकापादिविश्यते मनीविक्व ऋषय रकादश्र पुत्रप्रतिनिधीन् कर्त्तव्यत्वेगाङ्करिति व्याख्यातम्। रुहस्पतिः। पुत्राख्येपदश्र प्रोक्ता
 मनुना येऽनुपूर्व्वशः। सन्तानकारवान्तेषामौरसः पुत्रिकादयः॥ पुत्रप्रतिनिधी कर्त्तव्यत्वेगाङ्करिति व्याख्यातम्। रुहस्पतिः। खाव्यं विना यथा तेषं सद्भिः प्रतिनिधिः
 स्मतः। तथेकादश्र पुत्राल् पुत्रिकौरसयोर्विना॥ अद्यापुराक्वे। दत्तकस्व खयन्दत्तः
 क्विमः क्रीतयव च। चपविद्धास्त्र ये पुत्रा भरक्वीयाः सदिव हि। भिक्रगोत्राः एथक्
 पिखाः एथावंश्रकराक्तथा। स्नुतके स्तके वापि श्रहाश्रीचस्य भागिनः। चिप
 वस्ताद्भवां चेत्रवीजवतान्तथा। ग्रुदो दासः पारश्रवे। विप्राक्षां विद्यद्वे क्वित्।
 राज्ञां तु श्रापदग्धानां नित्वं द्वायवतान्तथा। ख्रथ संग्रामश्रीकानां कादाचिद् वा

- भवन्ति ते। बीरसे यदि वा पुत्रस्वयवा पुत्रिकासुतः। न विद्यते तत्र तेषां विश्वयाः खोत्रजादयः। रकादग्र एयग्भावा वंग्रमात्रकरास्तु ते। श्राद्धादि दासवत्ववें तेषां कुर्वन्ति नित्यग्रः। गूढोत्पद्मस्य कानीनः सष्टोढः खोत्रजस्त्या। पौनर्भवस्य वैश्वानां राजदस्क्षभयादिष । वर्जिताः पद्म धनिनां ग्रेषाः सर्व्वे भवन्यिष। श्रूदायां दासरक्तीनां पर्यापक्षोपजीविनाम् । परायक्तग्ररीरायाद्म क्वचित् पुत्र इत्यपि। तस्नाद्सस्य दास्यस्य जायते दास रव द्योति ॥
- 16. रवनेतेषां पुषाकां खरूपित्ररूप्य तेषान्दायग्रहकां निरूप्यते। तत्र वेगित्राक्ष्यः। पिक्डदेाऽंश्रहरखेषां पूर्व्वाभावे परः परः। परःपर इति वीप्रादर्शनात् पूर्व्वपूर्व्वाभाव इत्यपि वीप्रावसेया।
- 17. बीरसपी त्रिक्षेयसमवाये प्रयोवमीर से सित पुत्रिकास तस्य दायग्रहणाभावे प्रसंक्षे मन्रपवदित । पुत्रिकायां क्रतायान्तु यदि पुत्रो प्रनुजायते । समस्तत्र
 विभागः स्थाज्ञ्येस्ठता नास्ति हि स्तिया इति ॥ स्हस्पिति पि । एक स्वीरसः
 पिन्ये धने सामी प्रकीर्त्तितः । तत्तुस्था पुत्रिका प्रोक्षा भर्तत्या स्वपरे सताः ॥ न च
 पुत्रिकाया स्व प्रथमं पुत्रे जाते पस्तादीरसे त्यत्तौ पुत्रिकापुत्रस्थ न्येस्ठत्वादस्त्रीत्यास्व
 स्वर्धां प्रभागिता भवेदिति यक्षम् । तस्य पौत्रात्वात् । तदाह मनुः । स्वत्तता वाक्षता
 वापि यं विन्देत्सद्यात्युतम् । पौत्री मातामहस्तेन दद्यात् पिग्छं हरे द्वनिति ।
 पुत्रिका हि पुत्रस्तपुत्रो दौहित्रोऽपि पौत्रस्तदान् पौत्री भवित । पौत्रस्य च न्देस्ठस्वनां प्रातिरेका नेव स्रतः । न च स्रसां यो जायते पुत्रः स मे पुत्रो भवेदिति पुत्रिकापुत्रसापि पुत्रताभिधानात्तिदोध इति वाच्यम् । मनुविरोधेन तस्य गौत्यः
 पिस्डदात्यत्विनित्तपुत्रताभिधानात्तिदोध इति वाच्यम् । मनुविरोधेन तस्य गौत्यः
 पुत्रपद्यस्त्वामानावाद्या गौर्याः
 पुत्रपद्यस्त्वास्य तथा स्वजन्यपुत्रकाजन्यपुत्रस्थापि । पुंच्वे सत्वपि जन्यत्वाभावात् ।
 क्रन्यपुंक्तस्ति पुत्रपद्यस्य स्वात्।
- 18. तथान्येषामि पुत्राक्षां पूर्व्वपूर्वसत्वे सर्व्वमागान हत्वमनेन प्रसक्तमपवदित विश्वरः। तिसंखेलितिग्रहीत चीरस उत्पद्येत चतुर्थमागमागी स्टाह्तक
 हति दत्तकग्रहक्षं क्रीतादीनामुपलच्यां पुत्रीकरकाविश्वेषात्। उत्पन्ने त्वौरसे पुत्रे
 चतुर्थाश्वराः स्वताः। सवर्या खसवर्याः ग्रासाच्हादनमाजना हित कात्यायनवचनाच। सवर्याः चोत्रजदत्तकादयक्षे सत्यौरसे चतुर्थाश्वराः। खसवर्याः कानीनगूढोत्पन्नसहिाढगोनर्भवाक्षे तु सत्यौरसे न चतुर्थाश्वराखि किन्तु ग्रासाच्हादनमात्रभागिन हत्यर्थः कात्यायनवचनस्य। खतस्व विष्याः। खप्रश्वक्ताक्ष कानीनगूढोत्पन्नसहिाढजाः। पौनर्भवच नेवेते पिखरिक्यांश्वभागिन हित ॥ बीरसे सित
 कानीनादीनां चतुर्थाश्वमागित्वं प्रतिवेधति। कानीनादीनामप्यौरसाद्यमावेऽस्त्येव पियसक्तधनग्रहक्षम्। पूर्वाभावे परःपर हित वचनात्। यच मनुवचनम्॥ एक

 एवौरसः, पुत्रः पित्रस्य वसुनः प्रभुः। श्रेषाकामान्दश्वराधं प्रदद्यानु प्रजीवनमिति।

 तदिप दत्तभादीनामौरसप्रतिकूक्तलेऽत्वन्तिनगुँगाले च चतुर्थाश्वादिनिषेधपरश्वानीना-

दिपरस्। तेषां सत्योरसे बासाच्हादनमात्रमागित्वस्थाक्तातात् तदेकम्लकत्वकत्यगत्। कात्रजस्य तु सत्योरसे पद्ममघरुष्यो मनुनेवाक्तो। घरुन्त क्षेत्रजस्यां प्रद्यात् पिटकाद्धगत्। सारसे विभजन् दायं पिटां पद्मममेव वेति॥ प्रतिकूलत्वनिर्भुखत्य समवाये घरुमेकतरसङ्गावे पद्मममिति खवस्या। यन्तु समग्रधनमोक्ता स्थादौरसी-ऽपि जघन्यजः। निभागं कोजजोसङ्को चतुर्थं पुनिकास्तः॥ इत्यादि ब्रह्मपुराखादि-वचनः समभागार्ह्वतया मन्वादिमिरक्तस्य पुनिकापुत्रस्य चतुर्थां प्रजक्षा पद्ममघरुष्या-र्ह्तत्योक्तस्य क्षेत्रयास्त्रस्य क्षेत्रस्य स्य क्षेत्रस्य क्षेत्रस

चौरसाभावे दस्तकस्याखिकधनयहकार्थं एचगारत्यं मन् ना उपपन्नो गुक्यैः सर्वैः पुत्रो यस्य तु दिनमः। स हरेतेव तित्रक्यं संप्राप्तोऽप्यन्यगोत्रतः ॥ स्वगोत्रसंप्राप्तः किसुतेति किसुत्पत्त्वर्थोऽपि एव्दः। जनकधनयहक्षश्च तस्य प्रतिषिद्धन्तेनवं। गोत्र-रिक्ये जनिवतुर्व भजेदित्रमः सुतः। गोत्ररिक्यानुगः पिखो व्यपित ददतः सधित ॥ ददतः सम्बन्धी पिखस्तते।व्यपित । स्वधा पिद्धदिप्तिहेतुरिति पिखविश्रोधक्षम्। गोत्र-रिक्यानुग इति हेतुगर्भम्।

दत्तनमात्रविषयनमि सत्यौरसे चतुर्थाश्चरत्वप्रतिपादनं एथगारव्यं विश्व-छेन। तिसंखेलितिग्रहीत चीरसउत्पद्येत चतुर्थभागभागो स्थाइत्तन इति। क्रीतादि-साधारयन्तु नात्यायनीयं प्रागेव पठितम्। तत्र इतीयांश्चहरा इति नच्यतद्यतिखत-पाठो यदि सान्तरक्षि दत्तनादीनामौरसापेच्यया सगुवले इतीयांश्चहरत्विति व्याख्येयः।

मनुनैव ज्ञेत्रज्ञखौरससमभागमागित्वमण्क्षम्। यवीयान् च्येरुभार्थायां पृत्रमुत्पादयेद्यदि। समस्तत्र विभागः स्यादितिधर्मी व्यवस्थितः। उपसर्च्यनं प्रधानस्य
धर्मतो नेपपद्यते। पिता प्रधानं प्रजने तस्माद्धर्मेण तम्भजेत्। धनं यो विस्थाद्भातुर्मतस्य स्त्रियमेव वा। सेऽपत्यं भातुत्त्याद्य दद्यात्तस्यैव तद्वनम्। यद्येत्वरिविद्यनौ
स्थातामौरसन्तेत्रज्ञौ सतौ। यस्य यत्येद्धतं रिक्यं स तद्वक्षित नेतरः॥ यद्यप्यौरसप्रक्रमात्मभागमागित्वं च्येत्रजस्य तिन्वर्षितमेवोक्तिमित्याभाति। तद्यापि वाक्यविरोधे
प्रक्रमस्य वाध्यत्वादीजिसमभागित्वपरन्तदिति बोध्यम्। चतर्यवात्तरवचने पितुवीजिनः प्राधान्यसुपन्यस्यति। सेऽपत्यं भातुत्त्याद्येत्यनेनापि यस्य च्येत्रज्ञस्तदीयन्यननास्मै दद्यादिति भाद्यस्थानीयत्वात्तस्य स्वसमभागितां प्रतिपादयति।

रवसम्यान्यणुचावचभागान् चेत्रजादीनां प्रतिपादयन्ति रहस्पत्वादिवचनानि क्यचिद्यवस्थापनीयानि । तत्र रहस्पतिः । चेत्रजाद्याः स्तास्वान्ये पच वट् समभागिनः । हारीतः । विभिज्ञिष्यमात्र रक्तविंग्रञ्जानीनाय दद्यात् । विंग्रम्पौनर्भवाय ।
रक्तानविंग्रं द्यामुष्यायवाय । चरादग्रं चेत्रजाय । सप्तदग्रं पुत्रकापुत्राय । इतरानौरसाय पुत्राय दद्यः ॥ ब्रह्मपुरावो । समग्रधनमोक्ता स्यादौरचे।ऽपि जघन्यज्ञः । जिभागं चेत्रजो सङ्गे चतुषं पुत्रकास्तः । क्रित्रमः पद्यमम्भागं वर्गामङ्गुष्यसम्भवः ।

सप्तांश्रचापविद्यत् कानीनचारुमांश्रकं। नवभागं सहाज्य कीता दशममस्तते। पौनर्भवस्त परता दादमं खयमागतः। चयादममभागन्त भौदो सङ्के पितुर्जनात्। तद्गोचना वा धर्मिको मसाचार्यप्यथवा पुनः॥ सत्रौरसे सतीति सर्वत च्रेयः। पूर्वीभावे परःपर इति वचनात्। ब्रह्मपुराखीयस्य समग्रेखादिप्रथमञ्चाकस्य पूर्वमेव विषयस्ववस्थोक्ता। स्रन्येवामिप गुसतारतम्येन देशाचारानुसारेस वा यथाययं व्यवस्था इन्द्रवा । घट्भागं घरुमागम् । नवभागं नवमं भागमित्वर्थः । चन्ययार्थासङ्गतेः प्रज्ञम-मङ्गप्रसङ्गाच । परतादश्रमात्परमेकादश्रम् । चयादश्रमेत्वार्धम् । श्रीदः श्रुद्रागुचः ।

यदिप मनुना पुत्राबा घट्कदयसुका पूर्व्यघट्कस्य दायादबान्धवत्वम् उत्तरषट्कस्य चादायादवान्धवत्वमुक्तम्। बीरसः चोत्रजसीव दत्तः क्षत्रिम एव च। मूछोत्पन्नोऽपविद्वस्य दायादा बान्धवास्य घट्। कानीनस्य सहाज्य कीतः पौनर्भवस्तया। ख्यंद्र संख ग्रोहस्य घड्दायादनान्धवा इति ॥ तदिष स्विष्टसिष्यसमाने।दकानां सिंबिह्तरिक्ष्यहरान्तराभावे पूर्विषट्कस्य तिनक्ष्यहरत्वसुत्तर्घट्कस्य तु तज्ञास्ति। पिटक्यक्यहरत्वन्तु सर्वेधामिप पूर्वपूर्वाभावे समानमेवेति तहायादादायादत्विभागो नीपपद्यते। पूर्व्वाभावे परःपर इति वचनात्। रक्तरवीरसः पुत्रः पित्रस्य वसुनः प्रभुशिखुका न स्नातरा न पितरः पुत्राशिक्यद्दराः पितुरिति वचनस्य गौय-पुचार्यामेव सर्वेषाम्पिटरिक्यचारित्पप्रतिपादनपरताच । दायादभ्रव्यस्य दायादा-निप दापयेदित्यादौ पुचर्यातिरिक्तरिक्यहारिस्वेव प्रचुरप्रयागाच । बान्धवत्वं सपिग्छ-समानगी चलान्यामुदकदानादिकार्य्यकरलं घट्कद्वयस्यापि समानमेवे खेतदर्थकम्।

यत्तु द्वारीतवचनं। षड्बन्धुदायादाः साध्वां खयमुत्पादितः द्वोचनः पौनर्भवः काभीनः। पुचिकापुची गूढीत्पन्नी स्टह इति बन्धुदायादाः। दत्तः क्रीताऽप्विद्धः सहाढः स्वयंसुपगतः सहसाट्ट खेव्यवन्धुदायादा इति । साध्वाां स्वयसुत्पादित चीरस इत्वर्थः । सहसा दृष्टो या मातापित्रादिविहीनाऽनसादृष्टः नेनिषत् परिताया मम लं पुत्रोभवेत्युक्तस्त्रचेति प्रतिपद्यते । क्वचिम इति यावत् ।

तच मनुविरोधः स्पष्टः। तेन कानीनपौनर्भवयारबन्धुदायादमध्ये परिग्रबनात्। चारीतेन बन्धुदायादमध्ये दत्तक्रिमापविज्ञेषु च खत्ययात्। तस्मादेवं सवर्षादिभेदेन

देशाचारभेदेन वा विरोधः परिचरकीयः।

बौधायनस्तु मन्यनुसारेगीवादः। बीरसं पुचिकापुत्रं स्तेत्रजन्द्रसङ्खानिमौ। गूढजं वापविद्यस् ऋक्सभाजः प्रचन्तते॥ कामीमस सङ्घाटस कीतम्यौनर्भवन्तथा। स्यन्दत्तिषाद्य गोत्रभाजः प्रचन्तत इति ॥

बीरसपुत्रिकापुत्रस्तेत्रजकानीनगूढोत्पद्गापविद्यसहोढपौनर्भवदत्तकखयसुपगत-क्षतकक्रीतानिभधायास् देवलः। एते द्वादम् पुत्रास्तु समास्यरंभुदास्ताः। स्रात्मजाः परजास्वेव लब्धा याद्यक्तिकात्तथा। तेषां घड् बन्धुदायादाः पूर्वेऽन्ये पितुरेव षट्। विभ्रम्बापि पुत्रासामानुपूर्वंग विभ्रिष्यते। सर्वे ह्यानीरसस्यते पुत्रा दायहराः स्नृताः। चौरसे॰पुनरत्यन्ने तेषु न्येषद्म विद्यते । तेषां सवर्षा ये पुत्रास्ते द्वतीयांग्रभागिनः। ष्टीनात्तसुपजीवेषु यासाञ्चादनसंस्ताः । जात्मजलादिकं परिगश्चितेषु यथायथं स्पष्टमेव । जनौरसस्य न विद्यते चैारसे यस्य तस्येति वज्जनीहिः ।

नारदे। दिया चीरसः चीयअधिव पुत्रिकापुत्रस्वच। कानीनस्व सङ्गेष्टस्य मूहोत्पद्मस्वयेव च। पौनभेवाद्भपिवद्भस्य दत्तः क्रीतः क्षतस्त्रस्य। खयस्रोपगतः पुत्रा द्वादश्चीते प्रकीर्त्तिताः। एषां षड्वन्धुदायादाः षड्दायादवान्धवाः। पूर्वः पूर्वः स्तृतः खेको ज्ञान्यो योद्धानूत्तरः। क्रमाद्विते प्रवर्त्तन्ते स्तते पितिर तद्धने। ज्यायसे। ज्यायसे। ज्ञान्यस्तदवाप्त्रयात्॥

मनुः। श्रेयसः श्रेयसे (जामे पापीयान् रिक्यमर्हति। बह्वस्वेत्तु सदधाः सर्वे रिक्यस्य भागिनः॥

रुष्यतिः। दत्तोऽपविद्धः क्रीतस्य कृतः श्रीतस्ययेवच । जातिसुद्धामध्यमास्ते सर्व्वे रिक्वसुताः स्मृताः। च्रेचजा गर्षितः सङ्क्रिस्तया पौनर्भवः सुतः। कांनीनस्य सङ्घाज्य गूढोत्पक्तस्येव च ॥

हारीतः। श्रुद्रापुचाः खयंदत्ता ये चैते क्रीतकाः स्ताः। सर्वे ते गोचिसः भोक्ताः कार्यप्रश्चान संभ्रयः। खकुलं एछतः कृत्वा येवि पर्कुलं ब्रजेत्। तेन दुच्चरि-तेनासी कार्यप्रश्चीन संभ्रयः॥

यमः। खापहत्तो द्युपातो यस खाँदेवावीस्तः। सर्वे ते मनुना प्रोक्ताः काग्छएसा स्वयक्तया। कुलं काग्छमिति खातं यसात् पूर्व्वावा ते जङः। तत्र ज्येस्तरो यः खात्तं वे काग्छ विनिर्द्धिते। खुकुलं एस्तः क्रांता योवे परकुलं व्रजेत्। तेन दुर्खारतेनासौ काग्छएस् इति स्मृतः॥ वैद्यावी श्रुद्रेति कल्पतरौ।

- 20. उक्तोपसंहारमुखेन नियममाहात्र यागित्रारः। सजातीयेष्वयस्पोक्तस्तनयेषु मया विधिः। अयं पूर्वाभावे परःपरोधनभागित्राक्तो या मया विधिः स सजातीयेषूत्रपदिकसजातीयेष्वेव क्लेत्रजादिषु क्लेया न विजातीयेषु तत्र कानीनगूढोत्य- इसक्लेष्टपोनर्भवानां सवर्णत्वञ्चनकहारेख न खरूपेण तेषु वर्णजातिकक्षवात् वर्णजातिविक्तमभिधाय विद्वाखेवविधिः स्मृत इति योगीत्र्वरेखेवाभिधानात्। अनुवेतमजानां मूर्ज्ञाभिषिक्तादीनामौरसेष्वेवान्तर्भावाषतुस्त्रिद्योकभागा इत्यादिना भागकृप्तिवक्ता। तेन तेषामप्रभावे क्लेत्रजाद्यः पित्रत्रक्षक्षक्षारिखः।
- 21. श्रूहापुत्रस्य लौरसलेऽपि न क्रत्खिपयधनभागित्वमन्याभावेऽप्यक्ति । यथाइ मनुः । यद्यपि स्वान्त् सत्पुत्रो यद्यपुत्रोऽपि वा भवेत् । नाधिकं दश्यमाद्द्यास्कृहा-पुत्राय धम्मतः ॥ यदि सत्पुत्रो विद्यमानः सवर्षापुत्रो यदि वाऽपुत्रोऽविद्यमानः सवर्षा-पुत्रो भवेत्तस्मिन्तृते स्वेत्रज्ञादिः पुत्रोऽन्योवा रिक्यइारी श्रूहापुत्राय तद्धनाद्श्यमाशा-दिधकं न दद्यात् । स्वसादिव वचनात्मवर्षापुत्राभावे स्वित्रविद्यादिमा श्रूहापुत्रस्वेत स्वत्रात् प्रह्मापुत्रस्व विद्यादिमा श्रूहापुत्रस्व समाग्र-भागितं यागिश्वरादिमिवक्तन्तदितसद्वृत्तश्रहापुत्रविषयं वेदितस्यमन्यथा मानवृति-रेशात् । श्राह्यस्वस्वित्रयविद्यामिति मनुवचनन्तु प्रागेव स्वात्वात्मान् ।

- 22. श्रू इधनविभागे विशेषमाइ याज्ञष्यः। जाताऽपि दास्यां श्रू देख कामताऽ ग्रू इरो भवत्। स्ते पितरि कुर्युक्तं स्नातरक्त ईभागिनम्। क्षमाहको इरेस्वं दुष्टिह्यां स्ताहतेति । श्रू देख दास्यामुत्यद्वः पुत्रः कामतः पितृरिक्त्याः भागं कभते। पितृरू ईन्तु स्नातरः परिक्षीताश्रू द्वाप्याक्तन्दासीपुत्रं खभागाईभागिनं कुर्युः। क्षत्र वज्जवनात्सर्वे खल्लभागादईन्दस्युरिति न स्नितस्यम्। तथा सति वज्जनाहकस्य तताऽप्यतिवज्जधनलापक्तरस्यवस्या स्यात्। किन्त्वेकपुत्रस्य यावान् मामकाक्तदर्वमागं श्रू द्वापुत्रा कभन्ते स्वत्यमिश्रायेख जात्यभिग्रायेख च वज्जवक्रवन्तयन्त्रमे । परिक्षीतश्रू द्वापुत्रमत्यमावे तु दासीपुत्रोऽपि कृत्सं श्रू दस्य पितुर्द्धनं कमत दृश्यर्थे दुन्यते।
- 23. श्रूत्रयच्चाद् दिजातिम्थे दास्यामुत्पन्नः पिचिच्ह्यापंग्रमर्ज्ञभागं वा तद्र्रक्षेत्रं लभते क्रत्यतद्भवयद्भं दूरापाक्तमेव किन्त्यप्रतिवूचयेच्जीवनभाचिभिति प्रतीयते।

CHAPTER III.

PART I.

1. मुख्यतौबपुचाभावे स्तपिततपरित्राजकादिधनग्रह्याधिकारिक उचानी।
तच योगीश्वरः। पत्नी दुहितरखेन पितरौ भातरक्षणः। तत्नुता गोचजा
बन्धः शिखः सत्रद्वाचारिकः। रवामभावे पूर्वस्य धनभागृत्तरोत्तरः। खर्यातस्य
श्वपुचस्य सर्ववर्धे व्वयं विधिरिति ॥ खपुचस्य पुर्वेशिक्तदादश्रविधपुचरितस्य
खर्यातस्य स्तस्य पत्नग्रदयः पूर्वपूर्वाभावे पाठकमेकोत्तरोत्तरस्य ग्रङ्गोयुरित्वर्थः।
खर्यं विधिः सर्वेषु मूर्ज्ञाभिविक्ताविक्ताद्यगुर्वे। मजप्रतिवामजादिषु वर्षेषु च त्राद्वाबादिषु वेदितव्यमित्वर्थः।

2. तत्र प्रथमं पत्नी धनहारिसी। पत्नीग्रन्देनेन निवाहसंस्कृता। पत्नुनेति यत्त्रसंयोगे इति पासिनिस्त्रतात्। जात्वभिप्रायेख चैकवचनं तेन बङ्गासिरात्रा रकस्य तदा सर्वाः सजातीया निजातीयाः क्रमेख यथाययं भक्तं धनं निभन्य प्रक्रीयः।

पत्नीश्रन्दादास्रदादिविवाहे। हाया यह बंधमीववाहे। हायत्रान्तरसद्भावे नास्तीति गम्यते। तथा स स्कृतिः। अयभीता तु या नारी न सा पत्नी विधीयते। न सा देवे न सा प्रिन्ने दासीन्ताश्वयो विदुर्शित ॥ अत्र च दासीत्वभणनमहरू र्थं-कम्मेस सहाधिकाराभावाभिप्रायेख न तु दासीवदगन्यताभिप्रायेख । विवाहितात्वेन परद्युरत्ववाधात् चत्रयव मनुर्धन्दीधर्मविवाहाननुक्रम्य सन्तानगतावेव गुखदे। वाह। • जिन्दिते स्त्रीविवाहेरिनन्दा भवति प्रजा। निन्दिते निन्दिता मुखानन

साम्निन्दान्विवर्जयेदिति ॥ प्रजाया निन्दितत्वमिय सहुत्तस्वभावत्वाभावे। न तु वर्काजा-त्यभावः। परियोतुः परियोतायासुत्पन्नत्वमात्रस्य वर्काजातित्यञ्चनत्वात्। विद्यास्वेष विधिः स्मृत इत्युक्तेः। स्वतस्व न सा देवे न सा पित्र इति सञ्चाधिकारस्य प्रतिषिद्यः।

तथा च पियादिकर्मार्छतापि पितदायहरत्वप्रयोजिकेति पत्नीपदेन चापितम्। चतरव त्रौतसार्त्तसहाधिकारियो पितवतेव भर्ट्धमभागिनीयाह प्रजापितः। पूर्वे स्ता त्विष्ठीत्रं स्ते भर्त्तरि तडनम्। जभेत् पितवता नारी धर्म्मर्ष
सनातनः॥ रुडममुरिप। चपुत्राग्रयनम्भर्तः पाजयन्ती व्रते स्थिता। पत्न्येव दद्यात्तिप्रां क्वत्वमंग्रं जभेत चेति॥ चत्रोत्तरार्द्धोक्तपाठकमस्यार्थक्रमेया वाधात् प्रथमं
क्वत्वमंग्रं जमते पद्यात् पिग्रं दद्यादिति स्मृतिचिन्द्रिकाकारेयोक्तं। न्तद्रियम्। क्रमे
तात्पर्याभःवात्। उभयधिकारप्रविपादनमात्रपरत्वादचनस्य। चन्यथा यावदंग्रजाभं
भर्त्रन्येखिविजन्वोऽपि प्रसन्येत । सचानेकस्मृतिनिधिद्धः। च्यद्यकत्त्वपात्तिच।
पत्नेग्रवेखेवकारियापुत्रस्यान्यकर्मास्यप्रपुत्रपुत्रवत् पत्नीत्यादिवचनाद्भात्रादिसत्विऽपि
सेवाधिकारियोति दिर्धितम्।

खयमेवार्थः प्रपिद्धाः प्रजापितना । जक्षमं स्थावरं हेम कुप्यन्थान्यं रसाम्बरम् । खादाय दापयेक्षाः मासघायमासिकादिकम् । पित्वयगुरुदौष्टिचान् भर्तुः खखीयमातु-जान् । पूजयेत्कयपूर्त्ताभ्यां रद्धांखाप्यितिषीन् स्त्रियः ॥ कुप्यन्त्रपुसीसादि । कथिम्पचर्षं सङ्गाल्यितमङ्गादि । पूर्त्तक्षाति । क्यावरेगापि सङ्गितं सब्वं भर्त्तृधनमधिगत्य धनसाध्यं स्वधिकारिकं पत्युरात्मनस्य श्रेयःसाधनकर्मे प्रतिपच्चीयपुरस्कारेग्र पत्न्या कार्य्यमिति ।

रवं वर्त्तमानाया ये थीड़ाकारिकक्ते राज्ञा चौरवह्यद्वा इत्याच् स स्व। सिपछा बान्धवा ये तु तस्याः स्युः परिपश्चिनः। चिंत्युर्द्धनानि तान् राजा चौरदखेन भासयेत्॥

स्मृतिचिन्त्रकायां वार्षस्यव्यक्षेत पत्न्याः स्थावरयस्यानिष्ठेधकम्। यदिभक्ते धनिद्विद्विद्याधादिविवधं स्थातम्। तच्चाया स्थावरं मुक्ता कमते स्वतम् कृति॥ वचनं किस्तिन्। जङ्गमं स्थावरिमत्यादि प्रजापतिवचनिवरोधपरिसाराय स्तिविच्याविषयाचे वान्योक्तम्। स्त्रस्थायि स्रतेऽप्यंग्रे न स्त्री स्थावरमईतीति। तच्चेषविरोधनापास्य दुष्टिस्रिस्मित्रिक्षविषयाचे व्यवस्थापितस्थ।

तत्र मदनरत्नकारेश मिताचाराकख्यतरहकायुधादिसर्वयस्थान्तरेव्यक्षिखनातिर्भूक्षतमस्य। जङ्गमं स्थावरमिति प्राजापत्यस्य च सर्वत्र किखनासमूक्षतमिति
दूषश्वका तदुक्तव्यवस्थायास्य स्रोत्पेचामात्रकित्यतत्वेनायृक्कात्वमिधाय समूक्षदेपि
स्थावरादिसमस्यधनस्य बाद्यादिविवाद्याधाविषयन्तद्वचनेषु पत्नीशब्दप्रयोगात्।
स्थावरस्यप्रतिवेधकरहस्यतिवचनन्तु जायास्त्रीशब्दमात्रप्रयोगादासुरादिविवाद्योग्धावस्यमिति स्थयं व्यवस्था द्यता।

सास्रादिविवाहोणयाः प्रतीयन्देनायहणान्यादियन्दे पितवचनानामपि तदेकमूनकतया तत्परत्वात् सृतिचिन्द्रकायामेव निरक्ता । यत्त तदुक्तव्यवस्थायामौ-त्पेद्रिकत्वसृक्षं तदिष् न । दुद्धिसत्त्वे तत्सन्तानद्वारेण स्थावरस्थोपभोगधनसाम्थपका-रयाः सम्भवात् स्थावरमिष यास्यं तद्रहितायास्तु तदभावाद्य तद्रयहणमिति तत्रापि वीजसम्भवात् । स्वतस्य पितुरिष स्थावरे सार्जितेऽपि पुत्रानुमितमन्तरेणानिधकारः प्रागुक्तः ।

3. यत्तु ग्रहीतधनायाः पत्न्यास्तद्धनेन जीवनमात्रन्दानाधीकरणविक्रयेषु तु नाधिकार इति । स्ते भत्ति भत्नेष्यं लभेत कुलपालिका । यावच्जीवद्ग हि साय-न्दानाधमनविक्रय इति कात्यायनवचनात्प्रतीयते । तदिप दृष्टार्घनटनत्तेकादिदाना-स्तातम्त्रपरम् । स्रदृष्टार्घदाने तदुपयोगिनोराधीकरणविक्रयास्त्र तेनेवाधिकाराभिधानात् । क्रतापवासनिरता ब्रह्मचर्ये व्यवस्थिता । दमदानरता नित्यमपुत्रापि दिवं व्रजेदिति ॥ दिवं व्रजेदित्यनेन काम्येऽपि दानादौ तस्या स्वधिकारः प्रतीयते किसुत नित्ये मैमित्तिके च । जक्रमं स्थावरं हमेत्यादिपूर्वीदाह्यतप्रजापतिवचनाच । तत्रापि पूर्विग्रह्यात्काम्येव्यप्यधिकार स्वायातीति स्मृतिचिन्द्रकाकारादयः ।

यचापरमपि कात्यायनवचनमेव । चपुचा प्रयनमार्तुः पालयन्ती गुरौ स्थिता । सञ्जीतामरंबात्चान्ता दायादा ऊर्द्धमाप्तृयुरिति ।

तत्र सृतिचित्रिकाकार बाइ। ज्ञान्ता दायादकारितधनविनियागप्रतिबन्धं सङ्माना सत्यामरबाद्वञ्जीतेत्वर्थः। इदघ रज्ञकाभरकाद्यसमर्थेषु कार्यान्तरव्ययेषु श्रश्ररादिषु पत्न्या यत् खयमेव खजीवनार्थमुपात्तमविभक्तं तिह्वयम्। विभक्तद्रव्य-विषयत्वे मन्वादिपरिनिष्ठतार्थवाधापत्तेरिति।

पौरस्वास्तु गुरौ श्रश्चरादिसभीपे स्थिता भर्वधनं सञ्जीतेन। न तु स्तिधनवद्ययेष्क्नन्दानाधाननिक्रवादि कुर्व्योत। तर्या ऊर्ध्वे दायादा दुष्टिभादयस्त्र स्विधिकारिका प्रक्रीयुर्ज तु ज्ञातयः। तेषां दुष्टिभादिभ्यो जधन्यत्वात् तद्वाधकत्वानुपपत्तेः।
पत्नी ष्टि तेषां वाधिका। तद्धिकारपागभावप्रध्वंतयेरिविग्रेषाद्वाधकाभावस्य
तद्वाधानुपपत्तेः। नापि स्तिधनाधिकारियो प्रक्रीयुः। कात्यायनवचनेनेन स्तिधनाधिकारियां वचनान्तरैकक्तत्वात् पौनकक्त्यापत्तेः। स्ततः पत्नी दुष्टितरस्वेत्यादिना ये पूर्वपूर्वस्थाभावे परभूता स्वपुत्रासंस्वरिविभक्तम्यतधनाधिकारियो निर्दिष्टास्ते यथा
पत्न्यधिकारपागभावे प्रक्रीयुस्त्रया पत्न्या जाताधिकारायाः प्रध्वंसेऽपि भोगाविग्रस्वं
प्रक्रीयुः। तदानीं दुष्टिभादीनामेवान्यापेद्यया स्ततेपकारकत्वात् युक्तस्वदिधकारः।
दानधर्मेषु मद्दाभारतवचनमप्येतदुपोद्वलकम्। स्त्रीयां स्पतिदायस्तु उपभोगप्तकः
स्मृतः। नापद्यारं स्त्रियः कुर्युः पतिवित्तात्वध्यनेति॥ उपभोगोऽपि न स्त्यावस्तादिना किन्तु पत्यस्वपकाराय देद्दधारस्थान्ते।ययाग्यपभोगानुज्ञातम्। यवच्च यद्दस्यतिना पित्वयगुरदोष्टिनानित्यादिना पित्वयपदेन भक्तः सपिग्छोपलद्यसादोन्।
देन तद्दिवसन्ताने।यलद्यसान्नातुलस्वसीयपदाभान्तन्तात्वक्ति।यलद्यसात्तेभ्यस्वार्षान्नस्य

रूपं भर्त्तुः त्राडायौद्धदेशिकोपकारकं दसात्। न तु खिपळकुकसम्बन्धिभ्यः। तदनुमत्वा तु तेभ्योऽपि। तथा च नारदः। म्हते भर्त्त्वयंपुचाया पतिपद्धः प्रभुः ख्वियाः। विनि-यागेषु रच्चासु भरबेषु स ईश्वरः। परिचीबे पतिकुले निर्मनुखे निरास्रये। तत्विपिखेषु चासत्वा पिळपचाः प्रभुः ख्वियाः॥ इति सम्मुखमेव वचनार्धमादाय नास्त्येव खियाः ॥ स्टि सम्मुखमेव वचनार्धमादाय नास्त्येव खिया भर्ळरिक्ये दानविक्षयाद्यधिकार हत्याद्धः।

तचेदं वाच्यम्। किन्तस्य तया क्षतेऽपि दानादौ तत्सरूपानिष्यत्तिदेव। ब तावदेवं युक्तम्। मन्वादिवचनैः सक्तम्ब्रह्मनयद्वते तस्या उक्ते सति तस्यास्तन खत्वे दानादिखरूपानियात्तेवीधितत्वात्। खत्यव जीमृतवाद्दनेनैव स्थावरस्य सम-क्तस्य। विभक्ता वाऽविभक्ता वा। स्थावरं दिपदच्चे वेत्यादीनि स्थावरविषयाणि दागदि-निषेधवचनान्युपन्यस्याधर्माभागिताचापनार्धमेतानि दुर्हत्तं पुरुषं प्रति कुटुम्बदुःखदा-मार्धमेव दानिकायादिप्रवत्तं प्रतिष्ठेधकानि न तु दानादिखरूपानिष्यत्तिप्रतिपाद-कानि। यथेरुविनियागाईललच्चमखलस्य द्रव्यान्तरहव स्थावरेऽप्यविद्रोवादचनद्रते-नापि वस्तेने।ऽन्ययाकरबाग्रक्या तत्रतिपादनानुपपत्तेरिति निरूपितम्। तदुक्तरीत्या-चापि दुर्हत्ततया दायाददुःखदानार्घमेव भन्तिस्थदानादिप्रस्ताया खन्तु प्रतिषेधा-धर्मार्धन्दानपृष्टत्तायाः अजीवनाद्यधं विकथाधाने कुर्वन्यास्य तिक्रमादधमीः । नास्येवाधर्मोऽपि। न च सञ्जीतेविति नियमादायादा ऊर्द्धमाप्रयुदित्यभिधानाच दानाद्यनिधकार एव तस्या अविभक्तधनहव तचेति वाचम्। साधारं गस्तवाश्रयावि-भक्तधनेनासाघारबखलाश्रयस्थास्य वैषम्यात्। न च सभागस्य प्राप्तत्वेनाविधेयत्वादाः-नादिप्रतिवेधार्थय विधिक्तया चानधिकारक्तचागत रवेति वाश्वम्। वस्तन्यथा-कर्यामक्तेनियमस्य ख्यादानादिना द्रथानाम्बिक्चर्यतयेवापपत्तरवस्यवास्यतात्। चन्ययाऽनिधकारे दमदानरता पूजयेत्कचपूर्त्ताभ्यामित्यनेन दानविधिना विरोधोऽप-रिचाकी। यद दायादाः पत्न्यनन्तराधिकारिकः पत्नी दुव्तिर इत्यत्र निर्दिछाक्ते म्हीयः प्रामभावप्रधंसयाः प्रतिबन्धकपत्न्यभावत्वस्याविष्येवात्तद्धिकारोद्भवादिख्यक्ष-दायादपदेन स्त्रीधनाधिकारियन्त्र येथा वचनान्तरे।कालात पौनवितः तथा तेषामिप कात्वायनेन वचनान्तरोक्तत्वात्पौनवत्त्यऽविभेषात्।

वस्ततन्तु जातस्ववे सामिनि मते तत्रवासद्वानामेव तद्वनग्रहणसृचितम्। पत्नादिशन्दानां सम्बन्धश्रम्द्वेन द्रयसामित्वे पत्ना उपजाते पूर्वसामिद्दिश्वादीनाङ्गः प्रसङ्गः। तेन यद्यपि पूर्वभावः प्रागभावः प्रध्वंसस्वात्वन्ताभावस्व प्रतिबन्धन्तः संसग्राभाव उभयाभावस्व तुत्व्यस्त्यापि या द्रथसाभी तिसान् स्ते तत्सम्बन्धि पत्नादिक्मपुत्रस्य तस्य धनं कभेतेत्वेव वाक्यार्थः। सन्यथा दुष्टित्रादिभिरपुत्रपिद्धभे कन्धे तन्मरको तत्सन्तवातिष्वक्षनेन तद्धनं पूर्वसामिनः पितु ये पित्रादयस्तर्य कभेर-द्विति मङ्गव्यवस्था प्रसन्योत। तसाद्भन्ति प्रसन्धं पत्न्या कथन्तस्यां स्तायां तद्गीगाव-द्विति मङ्गव्यवस्था प्रसन्योत। तसाद्भन्ति प्रसन्धं पत्नाद्यां स्वयन्तस्यां स्वयन्तादिक्षभन्ते। स्वयन्तादिक्षाद्यां स्वयन्तस्यां स्वयन्तादिक्षभन्ति। स्वयन्तादिक्षाद्यां स्वयन्तादिक्षभन्ति। स्वयन्तादिक्षमान्तिः। द्वायादा द्वात्रत्वे कस्योवपेन्तायां स्वयन्तिन्तभन्तिः। द्वायादा द्वात्रत्वे कस्योवपेन्तायां स्वयन्तिन्तिन्तमन्तिः।

रिखेने। प्रस्तानस्थानस्थान । तथा चैवं वचनव्यक्तिः तस्या ऊर्द्धमार्गुद्दे। यादा व्यवभक्ता-तद्धनाधिकारियो विभक्तमालधनमपि तत्पत्नीभीमाविष्यस्य स्वाधिक्य प्रक्रीयुर्व पत्नीरिक्यस्या दुष्टिचादय इति स्वचापूर्व्वार्थलाचतुर्घचरयास्यार्थवन्तं भवति व्यन्यमते वचनान्तरे।-क्वार्थानुवादमाचमनर्थवं स्यात्।

तसादररार्थे दाने रहारहानध्यकार्थार्थमाधी विकाये चास्येन पत्न्याः सक्ताभर्त्तृ धनविषयाऽधिकारः नियमस्त नटनर्सकादिदानानानध्यकाधिविकयनिष्ठधर्ष इति सिद्धम्। खतरन चान्तेयुक्तम्। वर्षे प्राप्तनती रुधावयययकारियी
न भनेदिवार्थः। दानधर्मेखं महाभारतन्यनन्तु सुतरामस्यदुक्तमेनार्धमुपोद्धलयि।
तथा हि स्त्रोबां स्ववतिदायः स्थार्टरिक्यमुपभोगपकः। उपभोगो धर्मप्रवासको
भोगो नवसद्भोगः पत्तम्ययोजनं यस्य तार्द्धः सृत उक्तो मन्यादिभिः। उत्तरार्द्धं
तदेव सर्नेक्ति। स्त्रियः पतिवित्तादपहार्र रुधाययं न कुर्युः। कथ्यन्तेवनेनापहारस्य
सर्वयवाश्रयस्वरतामाह। स्वपहारो हि चौर्यम्। महनर्सकादी स्थादानम्।
स्वावस्त्रादिपरिधित्यास्ररभस्यादिन्द्वस्त्रेवेवमाद्यपि स्वताया स्वनीचित्वासीर्यनुत्यमित्वपहारश्रस्योगीवः। धर्मीदार्यदानादिकन्तु न तथिति नापहारश्रस्यने बेधियतुं
प्रकाते। तस्नात्यव्ये सुस्यम्।

4. ' पत्ना खपुत्रविभक्षासंखिष्ठपितसापतेयग्रहको प्रथमाधिकारप्रितपादकान्यपराख्यपि भूवांसि स्मृतिवचनानि । तत्र टहस्पितः । खाझाये स्मृतिवन्ने च लेकाचारे च स्तरिभः । धरीराई स्मृता जाया पुख्यापुख्यमले समा । यस्य नेपरता
भाष्या देहाई तस्य जीवित । जीववार्डधरीरेऽधं क्यमन्यः समाप्रयात् । सकुर्स्थिवंदमानेसु पिद्धमाद्धसनाभिभः । चपुत्रस्य प्रमीतस्य प्रमी तद्भागहारिकीति ॥

याजी खरोऽपि पूर्वीभावे पराधिकारं वदन् सर्व्यप्राचकोन पत्न्था स्वाधिकार-मिक्सिको ।

विष्णुरिष । चपुत्रस्य धर्म पत्च्यभिमामि तदभावे दुष्टित्यामि तदभावे पित्रमामि तदभावे मात्रमामि तदभावे चात्रमामि तदभावे मात्रप्रतमामि तदभावे वन्धुमामि तदभावे सञ्जल्यमामि तदभावे प्रिष्यमामि तदभावे सष्टाध्यायिमामि तदभावे
मास्राध्यमवर्च्चे राजमामिति । बन्धुरत्र संपिद्धः सञ्जल्यः समोत्रः । बन्धुपदेन वन्ध्यमास्रापित्रवन्ध्वादिग्रस्थे योगीत्रपरोक्तकमिवरोधापत्तेः ।

कात्वायनोऽपि। पत्नी पत्युर्जनस्री या स्यादव्यभिचारित्यी। तदभावे तु दुस्तिता यद्यमुद्धा भवेत्तदा॥

सृत्यन्तरमपि। सप्त्रस्थाय कुलजा पत्नी दुष्टितरीऽपि वा। तदमावे पिता माता स्नाता पुत्रास्व कीर्त्तिता इति॥

रतेर्वचनैः सर्वतः पूर्वम्यत्नी पतिधनभागिनीति प्रतिपादितम्।

5. रतद्विरद्धान्यपि वचनानि षच्यन्ते। तथा च नारदः। भाष्ट्रगाम-प्रजाः प्रेयात्विविद्यान्त्रेत ना। विभजेरन्यनन्तस्य प्रेवासी स्त्रीधनं विना। भरणदास्य कुर्वीरम् स्त्रीयामाजीवनच्चयात्। रच्चन्ति प्रय्थामार्जुखेदाष्टिन्खुरितरास् तिति ॥ पत्नीसङ्गावेति भाद्यान्धनग्रस्यस्य तत्पत्नीनामाद्यं।

मनुरिष । पिताइरेदपुत्रस्य रिक्यं भातर एव चेति । पिटमात्री विकन्पेना-पुत्रधनग्रहें वाधिकारं वदति न तु पत्न्याः।

खनपत्थस्य पुष्रस्य माता दायमवाप्तृयात्। मातर्थ्येपि च रुत्तायां पितुर्भाताहरे-

जनिति च सृतिमीत्विपितामच्चीरपुचधनाधिकारमिभदधाति । प्रद्वितिखतपैठीनसियमा चिप । चपुचस्य खर्थातस्य साहगामिनव्यन्तदभावे पितरी इरेयातां च्येका वा पत्नीति भातुः पित्रे खाभावे पःचिधकारं कथयन्ति।

देवलाऽपि। तता दायमपुचस्य विभजेयुः सन्दे। तुल्या दुन्तिरो वापि भ्रियमायाः पितापि वा। सवर्षा भातरा माता भार्या चेति यथाक्रममिति। सर्व-पूर्वीभावेन यागीश्वरेवाभिद्यितायाः पत्चा भात्राद्यभावेऽधिकारमाचछे। भारक्राब्दे-नाच भिन्नोदराः। सहादराखां एथगुपादानात्।

कात्वायने। इपि । विभक्ते संस्थिते दर्थ पुत्राभावे पिता हरेत् । आता वा जनगी बाध माता वा तत्पतुः ज्ञमादिति । पित्रादिष ग्राह्मेव पत्न्या निर्देशमणि न करोति।

रतेषामन्येन्यविरद्धानां वचनानान्यारेश्वर इत्यं व्यवस्थामाइ। विमन्ना-संस्टब्भातुरपुत्रस्य पत्नी यदि नियागमङ्गीकुरते तदैव पतिधनं सभते । स्विनयागा-र्घिन्यान्त तस्यामविभक्तसंख्रष्टपत्नीवद्भरवामात्रमेव नियागदारेवापुत्रपत्न्याः पतिखा-पतेयुखामित्यम्। न च वीजम्। खनेक्समृतिव्यपत्यदारैव तस्या धनसम्बन्धवाधनम्। तथा च गौतमः। पिगङ्गोत्रिधिसम्बद्धा रिक्थम्भजेरन् स्त्री वानपत्थस्य वीनं वा लिप्रोतेशि। चनपत्यस्य रिक्यन्पिखगोत्रर्विसम्बद्धा भजेरन्तस्य स्त्री वा रिक्यम्भजेत्। यदि वीजं लिप्रोत। वा ग्रब्दो यदिग्रव्दार्थे। उन्यथा रिक्थयह सवी जलिप्ययो रतु स्वतं विक स्था-र्थालानुपपत्तेः। तथा मनुरपि। धनं या विभ्रयाद्भातुर्म्हतस्य स्त्रियमेव वा। द्वाउपत्वं भातुरत्याच दद्यात्तरीव तज्जनमिति विभक्तधनसम्बन्धमध्ययत्यद्वारेगीव पत्ना दर्श-यति । तथा विभागाभावेऽपि । निगान् च्येष्ठभार्थायां पुत्रमुत्यादयेद्यदि । सम-स्तत्र विभागः स्यादिति धर्मे। व्यवस्थित इति वदम्रपत्यद्वारा धनसम्बन्धोऽस्तीत्वाह । तेनान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामपत्यदारक एव पत्न्या धनसम्बन्धो नान्यचेति सिद्धम्। विश्व हो प्रति । रिक्य लाभा द्वासित वियोग इति रिक्य लाभप्रयुक्तं वियोगं प्रतिवेधन क्रीत-तिनयागाया एव धनसम्बन्धोनेतरस्या इति स्पष्टमेवाचछ । तथा च स्नाद्ध्यामप्रजा इत्यादीनि नारदादिवचनान्यनियागार्थिनीविषयाणि पर्यवस्यन्ति । चपुत्रा याषित-चैवां भत्तेचाः साधुरुत्तयः। निर्व्वास्या चिभचारित्यः प्रतिकूलास्तरीव चेति वेगी-श्वरीऽप्यपुत्रावामन्यादियावितास्मर्यां भाषमायाः पुत्रस्थेव धनसम्बन्धप्रधान्यात्रत्वुत एव तत्स्त्रीयां धनसम्बन्ध इति सूचयञ्चायसान्यात्मव्ये चापत्यमूनकमेव स्त्रीयां रिमय-यहां चापयति। यचार्यं म्यमुत्यमं तचानिधकताल ये। चिरिक्यभाजकी सर्वे

यासाच्छादनभाजना इति सृतिः पुरवासामपि पुत्रादीनां यज्ञानिधक्तानां रिक्यानिधकारं वदन्ती दण्डापूपन्यायेन स्तरामभ्हेकाणान्तदनिधकारिसीनां धनसम्बन्धं निरस्यति। तथा स्नृत्यन्तरमि। यज्ञार्थं विद्वितं विक्तं तसात्तिविवियाजयेत्। स्यानेषु धर्म्मयुक्तेषु न स्त्रीमूर्खविधिर्मिष्विति स्थादिषु धनविनियागमपि प्रतिषेधत्साचात्तस्या एव क्रत्स्वधनग्रह्यं सुदूरं दूषयतीति।

7. तदिदं विज्ञानेश्वरादयानामुमन्यन्ते। प्रक्रीदृष्टितर इत्यादिषु साज्ञाङ्गियोगानुपादानात् प्रस्तावाभावाच । किञ्च नियोग यव पत्न्या रिक्थसम्बन्धप्रयोजकस्तदुत्पद्ममपत्यं वा। प्रथमेऽनृत्पादितपुज्ञाया च्यपि खीक्ततियोगाया धनाधिकारः
स्याद्मियोगोत्पद्मपुज्ञस्य च न स्याद्मियोगमाज्ञेयेव भर्वधमखान्यात्। दितीये वचनान्तदेरेवापत्यस्य धनसम्बन्धसिद्धेः प्रक्रीवचनमनर्थकम्। च्यय स्त्रीयां पितमाज्ञदारकोः
धनसम्बन्धो न प्रकारान्तरेया। जीवित पत्यौ तद्ददारको स्रते त्यपत्यद्वारक इति बेधनार्थं नियोगार्थिनीपत्नीपरं पत्नीवचनमितिमतम्। तदसत्। च्यथगन्यथावचनिकिनत्यादि वद्यमायवचनैरन्यथापि तासान्धनसम्बन्धसेधमात्। भर्ज्यभने देधेव सम्बन्धोः
नियम्यत इति चेत्। तिर्च जीवित पत्यौ तद्यनसमन्धस्य पात्रियच्याद्वि सञ्चलिनत्यादि गौतमवचनैनेव सिद्धेम्रते तु तिस्मिद्वयोगिनिमत्तद्वनसम्बन्ध उच्यमानः स्त्रेजजपुत्रस्थैवाक्षो भविति सेऽपि प्रागुक्त इत्यपुत्रप्रकर्यो पत्नीत्यनारभ्यमेव।

यश्च गौतमवचनं वीजं वा लिप्रोतेति यदि वीजं लिप्रोतेत्वर्धकतया नियागहारक एव धनसम्बन्धाऽपुत्रपत्था इत्यत्र प्रमाणिमृत्युक्तं तद्प्ययक्तम् । वाण्ड्दस्य
पत्तान्तरवाचित्र्वेन यद्यर्थाप्रतीतेः। धनप्रचणवीजलिप्पयोरतुस्यार्थतया विकस्पार्थकालासम्भवे निपातानामनेकार्थत्वात्रकृतान्वयोपयोगी यद्यर्थे एव कस्यत इति
चित् न । वीजं वा लिप्रोत संयता वा भवेदिति प्रासिक्षकधम्मान्तरोद्देशस्प्यतया विकस्पार्थकताया एव सम्भवात् । तथा च गौतमवचसापि नियागितरपेच्चमेव भर्वरिक्यप्रचणसुक्तम्भवति । किस्र विधवानियागस्य निषिद्धत्वादपुत्राश्चयनं
भर्तः पाक्वयन्तीत्वादि मन्वादिवचनेः संयताया एव धनाधिकारप्रतिपादनाद्विविस्या
स्थिन्यारिक्य इत्यादिना भरमात्रस्याप्यसंयतानामभावात्वृत्त्वभर्वरिक्यप्रच्यां दूरापाक्तमेव ।

यचाभिद्धितं धनंया विश्वाद्भातुः। कनीयान् च्येष्ठभाव्यायां। रिक्यलेभाद्मातिः नियाग्र इति मन्दादिवचनिर्वभक्ताविभक्तधनसम्बन्धाद्भवयय्यतिरेकाण्यामपत्यद्वारक यव पत्या खायातीति। तदिष वार्तम्। खिवभक्ते संख्रिति वा मर्तर प्रते पुत्रद्वारक एव तस्याक्तद्वनसम्बन्धित। धनलोभेन नियागो नाष्युपेय इति। तत्तात्ययात्। खत्यव। संख्र्यानान्तु या भागः स तस्या नेव्यते बुधैरिति खिभधाय तत्स्त्रीया-मनपत्यानाम्भरद्यमात्रं नारदेन प्रतिपादितम्। न चैवं भादृष्यामप्रजाः प्रेयदित्यस्यपि संख्र्याविभक्तविषयत्वे संख्र्यानान्त् भाग इत्यनेन पौनद्क्यं स्वादिति वाच्यम्। तदंश-विवर्षस्र्यक्षं स्त्रीधनाविभान्यत्वं तद्भर्ययोरपूर्व्याविधानात्। यन्तपुत्रा योषित-

श्वेषामिति येग्गीश्वरवचनं तत्तु स्त्रीवादीनां प्रकान्तानामेषामिति सर्व्वनासा पराम-र्घात्ततस्त्रीविषयमिति विभागानिधकारिनिरूपगप्रसावे वस्त्रते।

यदि दिजातिधनस्य यचार्थसान्तरमिकारिस्या प्रमीतपितकया तद्ग्रहस्यनर्षमिस्रक्षन्तरप्ययुक्षं।यच्यस्यस्य दानास्युपकचाकस्यात् तच्च च तस्या चप्यधिकारात्।
यथा स्रते यचिभव्रदानहे।मादिव्यप्यविनियामप्रसङ्गः। वन्तुतन्त केवकधर्मार्थसमिष्य
धनस्य नास्ति। धर्ममर्थच कामच यथाप्रक्षि न हापयेत्। तथा पूर्व्याक्षमध्यन्दिनापराक्षानप्रवाद कुर्योद्रम्भार्थकानेभ्य द्रवादिभिर्यक्षामयारिष तस्याध्ययारावस्रकस्वात्। यचार्थतच व्यवस्य यदि स्यादिरस्याध्य कत्वयभिचारिष्टरसम्बन्धेन
क्रव्ययति स्यादिति पुरुषार्थलं यत्तस्य स्यापितन्त्रचेव विषधेत। न स्त्री स्वातन्त्रयम्हकीत्वादि वचनात्पारतन्त्रमात्रमन्त्र स्त्रयाः न तु धनग्रहस्य केत्रप्रि विरोधः। यचार्थक्रव्यमुत्यव्यमिति तु धर्मविनियागप्रभंसार्थम्। च्यतस्य स्यानेषु धर्मायुक्षेषु नं स्त्रीमुस्विधिमिष्टिति वाक्षभ्रयः। मिताच्चराक्षतन्तु। यचार्थं कव्यमददद्वासः काकोप्रिप वा भवेदिति देषस्त्रवसस्य पुत्रादिव्यप्यविभ्रष्ठेया पित्रा यद्यचार्थमिर्जलं तत्युक्तदिभिरपि तचैव विनिये।च्यं नान्यक्रेयेवम्प्रमेतदिखाजः।

8. श्रीकरादयन्त । भार्क्याभरकमात्रपर्व्याप्तं यदि भद्धमन्तदा सर्व्यमेव ग्रङ्गाति। खतिरिक्तचेद् भात्रादय इति विषयव्यवस्थामाङः। इत्ख्यमंश्रं सभेत चेत्वेतद्यि तत्यरमेव। वर्तनदानस्थावश्यकत्वात्। तेन सर्व्ववाक्यानामविरोध इति च तत्रोपपत्तिङ्गस्पर्यन्ति।

वार्तमेतत्। सक्तकृतधनपदस्य पत्नापेच्छीवनपर्याप्तधनपरतं भाचाद्यपेच्छ धनमाचपरत्विति तात्पर्यभेदस्य सित सारूप्यसम्भवेऽन्याय्यतात्। मनुवचने क्रत्य-पदवैयर्थापातात् किछ। सत्वय्यौरसेषु पुत्रेषु तत्समांग्रयच्यां जीवदजीविदभागयाः सक्तां। यदि कुर्यात्समानंग्रान् पत्नाः कार्याः समाधिकाः। पितुरूद्धं विभजतां माता-प्रांग्रं समं इरेत्। इत्याभ्यां वचनाभ्याम्। खसत्सु पुत्रेषु पत्नी भरवामात्रं क्षेत्रेत इति मचान् व्यामाद्यः। तचापि जीवनपर्याप्तमेवांग्रयन्देन विविच्यतिमिति चेत्र । खंग्रयन्द्रसमग्रव्दयारानर्थकप्रसङ्गात्। दत्ते त्यद्धं माक्षक्ययेदित्वज्ञापि जीवनेपयक्तपरत्वाव्यमावे सर्व्यपाद्याप्तपापत्ते छ। खल्पधने पुत्रसमाग्रं वद्धमेने जीवनेपयक्तप्तमान् विविच्यतिमिति तु विधिवेषम्यापत्ते त्ययुक्तम्। तथाचि । तावेव समाग्रयन्द्रसमान्त्रमपेत्व वद्धमेने जीवनमाचपर्याप्तधनपरी कदाचित्। खल्पधने तु यथा मृतार्थकावित्यक्तिसित्यक्षौ वाक्यार्थभेदेन वाक्यभेदापत्ते रयुक्तम्। युग्रपक्तिक्षक्ताव्या-हित्तद्यापात्वः।

यथा चातुर्मास्यप्रकरसे द्वेषः प्रस्थवन्तीति वाक्येन पूर्वंपित्वसा सीमिक्यस्ययन्तातिदेश उत्तरवेदिमुपिक्रिटिन्त न सुनासीरीय इत्युत्तरवेदिप्रतिविधेऽप्राप्तस्य प्रतिवेध्यायास्यात्राद्वेत्तेत्वेति द्वान्तेकदिश्चिना नातिदेशप्राप्तायाः सौमिक्ते।त्तरवेदेरवं प्रतिवेधः किन्तूपाच वपनीति प्राक्रिक्षक्षचनप्राप्तायाः इत्युपन्यस्ते प्राक्रिस्कि वक्षने प्रय-

मेश्तमयोः पर्व्योः प्रतिषेधमपेक्य पाचिकौं प्राप्तिं मध्यमये स् निष्प्रतिपच्चमेवा-पाच्चिकी सुत्तरवेदेः प्राप्तिं करेति ति विधिवेषम्यप्रसङ्गेन पूर्व्वपद्यिया तन्मते दूषिते परमसिद्धान्तिना पूर्व्वपक्षुक्ति विधिवेषम्यभयादेव प्रथमेश्तमयोः पर्व्ययोरप्रप्रप्रप्रतिषेधा-याग्राद्व वैद्यदेव इत्ययं नित्यानुवादः उपाच वपन्तीति तु द्वयोः प्रव्ययन्तीत्याद्यर्थवाद-सङ्क्ततं मध्यमये । रेव वर्ष्यप्रसाससाक मेधपर्व्ययो रत्तरवेदिः विधत्ते न तु वचना-तिरेक्षो प्रथमित प्रतिपादितम्।

9. सन कसिदाइ सादृबामपुत्रधनयाहितं भरमं चास्य कुर्वीरन् स्तीमा-माजीवनच्यादिति भरमोपयुक्तधनदानस्य तत्स्त्रीमामुक्तं। यदा भरमान्त्रीपयुक्तमेवा-पुत्रधनं तताऽपि न्यूनं वा। तदापि किं स्नातर स्व प्रक्रन्ति पत्नी वेतिविरोधे पत्नप्रा स्व धनग्रस्यं पत्नीदुष्टितर् इत्यादिन्। पूर्वपत्नीखलज्ञायनयोत्त्रत इति।

तद्यि मन्दम्। पूर्वेतितिविधिवैधम्यस्यात्रापि तादवस्थात्। धनभागिति पदं वाक्यान्तरमपेच्याच्यधने जीवनमात्रपर्याप्तधनभाक्तं पत्नीविषये वदति पित्रादिषु तु सक्तषधनभाक्तिमिति।

10. कथन्ति विरोधपरिष्ठार इति चेत्। प्रस्य। पिता प्रदेदित्यादिषु क्रमाप्रतीतेरपुष्पधनग्रस्याधिकारमाष्प्रपर्भकानि तानि। वेगित्रश्रवचित त्वेषाम-भावे पूर्वत्य धनभागृत्तरोक्तर इति क्रमपरतात्पक्षग्रादिग्रबस्य निगडक्रमस्याभावेऽपि तेषामर्थाविरोधात्पक्षग्राद्यभावे पित्रादये।ऽपुष्पधनग्राद्यि इति।

प्रशिव्यिभिचारायाल् प्रकाः हारीतेन धनग्रह्यं निविद्धम्। विधवा यौकन्यस्था चेद्वारी भवित कर्क्षमा। चायुवः च्यवार्थं तु दावयञ्चीवनन्तदेति ॥ च्यसादेव वचनादनाम् श्वित्वस्थान्यारायाः सकलभर्यधनग्रह्य क्ष्म्यते। च्यत्य प्रद्युवचने च्येष्ठा वा प्रक्षीत्यक्षं च्येष्ठा गुर्केः प्रमंस्या। न तु वयो च्येष्ठा। मनुनापि वर्षक्षमेया च्येषं क्ष्यितम्। यदाहः। यदि खाच्य पराच्येव विन्देरन् योषितो दिजाः। तासां वर्षक्षमे- व्येव च्येष्यं पूजा च वेद्वस चिति ॥ च्यतः परिखयनवयोभ्यां किनस्यपि सवर्षोवासवर्षाः तेवच्येष्ठा सवर्षाखपि गुरुवतो। तथा च मनुः। भर्तुः प्ररीरश्चम्यां धर्माकार्यञ्च नित्यक्षम्। खा चव कुर्यात्यर्वे वाद्वासजातिः कथचन यन्त्र तत्वारयेन्नोद्दात् सजात्वा स्थितयाऽन्यया। यथा वाद्यायाचायदात्यः पूर्वदस्यक्षयेव सः ॥ योगीत्रदोऽपि। सवर्षासु विधी धर्षे च्येष्ठया न विनेतरा। तथा च यच्चस्यागात्यत्वामन्देनापि सेवाच्यते॥ सवर्षाया च्यापिते तु याऽनन्तरवर्षा सेव। तथा च विष्णुः। सवर्षाभावे तनन्तरेवापदि नत्वेव दिजः श्वर्या धर्माकार्थमिति। चच कुर्यादित्यनुवर्त्तते। तथा च वाद्यस्य व्यवस्य व्यवस्य चित्रयेवापदि न तु वैद्यस्पूर्वे परिक्षीते चपि। चित्रयस्य च्याचियाया चभावे विद्यवापि विद्यवापि स्वर्याया विद्यवापि विद्यवापि स्वर्यानन्तरापि स्वर्यात्य विद्यवापा सर्व्यावा विद्यवापि विद्यवापि स्वर्यानन्तरापि स्वर्यान्तरापि स्वर्यानन्तरापि स्वर्यान्तरापि स्वर्यान्तरापि स्वर्याना विद्यवापा व

तथा चानाग्रश्चितव्यभिचारा वर्णक्षमेख भर्दधनक्षृष्टीत्वान्याः सपत्नीः परिपा-कयेत्। वदुःसाद्यसम् यथा खं विभन्य स्टक्कीयुः। चतः पत्नीत्येकतचनं जात्वभि-प्रायेखं तसादपुत्रसासंदृष्टिने विभक्तस्य प्रमीतस्य साध्वी भार्या क्रत्स्वधनाधिकारियी चिनिक्तसंदृष्टिनेरपुत्रयोः साध्यऽपि भरयमात्रं भाष्ट्रग्रामप्रजा इत्यादि नारदादि वचनास्त्रभते। चिभित्रारियी तु भरयमपि न। चान्किन्दरितराखित्यभिधानात्।

यत्तं यभिचारिक्षीनामप्यभनवसनदानमुक्तम्। रवमेवंविधं कुर्याद्योधित्सं पतितासिषः। वस्तान्नमासां देयन्तं वसेयुख ग्रहान्तिके इति॥ तत्तः। इताधिकारामालिनां पिग्रहमात्रीपजीविनीम्। परिभूतामधःभय्यां वासयेद्यभिचारिक्षीमिति।
भक्तारं प्रस्तव्य यागीश्वरेवाभिधानात्तद्विसंवादेन भर्वविषयकम्। तद्पि प्रायखित्ताविधः। खावौद्धवात्तद्कुर्वन्तीनां लनेनापि निम्कासनिक्वादिप्रायिक्तप्रकारोः
विवेद्यामः।

पत्नीदु हितर इत्यस्य विभक्तासं स्टिविषयतं। विभागस्य पूर्वेमुक्ततात् संस्टिविषयतं। विभागस्य च सर्व्वापवादेगाये वन्यमायत्वादर्थाद्यवितस्त इति विचानेश्वरक्षयीधर-स्तिचित्रकाकारिविश्वरूपमेधाति स्थिमदनर स्नातादिनां भूयसां संमतम्।

11. खपुचपदं पत्नीत्वादिषु श्रूयमाणं पौचपपौचाभावापणच्चाम्। प्रपौचपर्यम्ताभाव रव पत्ना धनग्रहणौचित्वात्पुचपौचे ऋणं देयमिति वचने पौचरापि
ऋणदानेऽधिकाराभिधानादिक्खग्राहकान्तरसत्वे ऋक्यग्राह ऋणन्दाप्य इति वचनात्
तर्श्विर्वादानाधिकारे सत्वपि पौचे तं प्रति तिहिधानासम्भवाद्गोचजत्वादिना ऋक्यग्रहणे रित्थग्राह इत्वेतेनेव तर्शापि तित्सदेवेंयणं पौचिवधरेतः पौचेण पितामह
ऋक्याग्रहणेऽपि पुचवदणन्देयमित्रुक्ते द्रग्डापूष्मिया सति तिहक्क्येऽन्यस्य तद्ग्रहणाधिकारो दूरिनरक्तः। एव एव प्रपौचेऽपि न्यायः। चतरव प्रपौचसंग्रहाणं पुचपौचयोरिति वज्जवचनमितरणा हिवचनं श्रुक्यमिप्रायकं वज्जवचनमिति वा कल्यं
स्थात्। एवद्याथमर्थः। पुचच पौचच पुचस्य पौचः पुचपौचः सचेति वस्नीतत्पुक्योक्तरमारक्तपुचपौचपदे पुचच पौचच तावितिहन्दे पुचपौचौ च पुचपौचचिति वावत्
पौचपदं प्रपौचोपणच्चणं वा। पुचापेच्या पौचस्य तदपेच्या प्रपौचस्य ऋणदाने
विशेषप्रकारिविधरप्यत एव सङ्गक्कते। चन्यथा प्रपौचे विश्वश्वविधकत्यनापिकः।

त्रवाकान्त्रस्थोपकारित्वस्य पार्व्वविधिना पिखदानेन स्पष्टम्। तथा च मनः। चयाकासुदकद्वार्थ्यन्तिषु पिखः प्रवक्तते। चतुर्थः संप्रदातेषां पस्ति। नोपपदाते ॥ नोधायनोऽपि। पुत्रपोत्रप्रपोत्राननुकन्यास् प्रिपतामसः पितामसः पिता खयं सौदर्था भातरः सवर्थायाः पुत्रः पोत्रः प्रयोत्र स्तानिभक्तदायादान् सिपखानाचत्तते। विभक्तदायादां सकुल्यानाचत्तते। सख्यभुजेषु तद्गामी स्त्रर्थो भवतीति ॥ च्यस्पर्थः। पित्रादिपिखत्रवेषु सिपखनेन भोक्तत्वात्पृत्रादिभक्तत्पिखस्यैव दानात्। या स्त्रिजीवन् यत्पिखदाता सस्तः सन् सिपखनेन तित्यखभोक्ता। स्वं मध्यस्थितः पृक्षो जीवन् पूर्वेषां पिखदाता स्तर्य तत्यखभोक्ता परेषाञ्चीवतां पिखसंप्रदानं स्तर्यः वत्यक्षभोक्ता परेषाञ्चीवतां पिखसंप्रदानं स्तर्यः वतः सस् दौष्टित्रादिदेयपिखभोक्ता स्रते। येषामयं पिखदाता ये वा बद्दत्तिपखन्ते

मोक्तारक्तेऽविभक्तं पिग्छक्पं दायमश्रन्तीत्वविभक्तदायादाः सपिग्छा रक्षपिग्छसम्बन्धात् पश्चमस्य तु पूर्व्वस्य मध्यमः पश्चमा न पिग्छदाता न च तित्पिग्छभोक्ता रवमधक्तने।ऽपि पश्चमे। मध्यमस्य न पिग्छदाता नापि तद्भोक्ता। रतेन रुद्धपितामञ्चात् प्रस्ति पूर्व्वपुरुवास्त्रयः प्रतिप्रग्रामुप्रस्त्रयश्चिम् स्वाच्यादाः पश्चमप्रस्तय उभयतः सकुल्या हत्वाच्यते सुनिः कुलमान्रसम्बन्धात्।

इदं सिपखलं सकुल्यलं दायग्रह्योपयागित्वेनातां तत्रकरणपाठात्। चारीच-विवाहार्यण्नु पिखलेपस्रजामिष। लेपभाजस्वतुर्थाद्याः पिचाद्याः पिखसागिनः। पिग्छदः सप्तमक्तेषां सापिग्छंग्रं साप्तपौर्विमिति स्नर्यात्। सिप्छता तु पुरुषे सप्तमे विनिवर्त्तत इति च। पद्ममात् सप्तमादृद्धं माहतः पिह्नतक्त्रोति। योगीश्वरवाक्येक-वाक्यतया सप्तमे गुरुषे स्थिलाऽन्तमे विनिवर्त्ततं वा इति व्याख्येयम्। तेन यथाप्रता-नान्तु स्त्रीयान्त्रिपुरुषं विद्याय तद्याः श्रीचप्रकर्यपिठतं तन्मात्रोपयागि त्रिपुरुषं सापिग्छंग्रं तथेदं विभागमात्रोपयागीति ध्येयम्।

कात्यायनस्तु स्पष्टमेव पुत्रपौत्रायां धनग्रहक्षमाह । खिनिमक्ते स्ते पुत्रे तत्युतं रिक्यभागिनम् । कुर्वीत जीवनं येन सध्यं नैव पितामहात् । सभेतां सं पित्रन्तु पिद्धयात्तस्य वा स्ततात् । स स्वां प्रस्तु सर्वेषां भादृषां न्यायता भवेत् । सभेत तत्स्तो वापि निर्दत्तः परता भवेत् ॥ इति प्रपौत्रानन्तरमुक्तो यः प्रसाप्तु-प्रस्तवनिष्ठारः स सपिख्वेव ध्येयः । सकुत्यवेन त्वस्येव यथाप्रत्यासत्ति ।

भादृवामेकजातानामित्वादि तु दायातिरिक्तत्राद्धादिपुत्रकार्य्यकारित्वपरं भाद्धपुत्रस्य पुत्रीकरव्यसम्भवे नान्यः पुत्रीकरवीय इति नियमार्थम्। खन्यथा भाद्ध-पुत्रस्य भात्रनन्तरमभिधानमपुत्ररिक्यद्वार्य्यभिधायके वाक्ये क्रमपरे न सङ्गच्छेत।

पुत्रादीनात्वयाग्रान्यित्रादित्रिक्तमहोपकारकारित्वात् पुत्रादिनिग्र्यद्वीतं धनं खामिन एवे।पकारक्रमुपकारप्रत्यासत्या तदीयमेव । उपकारप्रत्यासत्ति खाण्यद्विता । यथाद्व । च्येक्षेन जातमात्रेण पुत्री भवति मानवः । पिद्रुवामच्छक्षेव स तस्मास्त्रव्युम्मद्वि ॥ तस्मादिति हेतुत्वेने।पकारित्वस्योपन्यासाद्वायभागप्रकर्णे धनसाम् पकारक-त्वातिश्वयो यत्र स्थितस्य तद्धनस्य भवति स एव तद्धनग्राद्वीति प्रत्यासत्तिरौत्वस्थीं चित स्रचितम् ।

पुत्रादोनां महोपकारकलसानेक सृतिसृतिपृराबादिप्रसिद्धम्। तत्र श्रुति-हरिस्वन्त्रोपाखाने बहु चब्रास्त्रके। यं लिमं पुत्रमिक्कृतिन ये विजानित ये चन। किंखित् पुत्रेक विन्देत तन्ममाचन्त्र नारदेति। गाधया हरिस्वन्त्रेक एको नारदेा दश्रमिगाधाभिः पुत्रमाहालग्रपराभिः प्रवेशिववानिल्कृतम् स रक्या एको दश्रभिः प्रख्वाच ऋकमिस्मन् सद्मयखम्दतस्य गक्कित। पिता पुत्रस्य जातस्य प्रशेषे ज्जीवती-मुखमिकादिना। स्मृतयस्व। मन्विष्णू। पृद्वामो नरकाद्यसात्यितरन्त्रायते सतः। तस्मात् पुत्र इति प्रोक्तः स्वयमेव स्वयम्भवा॥ श्रृक्ष्विवितौ। पिल्रृक्षामच्को जीवन्द्रृष्ट्वा पुत्र-मुखम्पिता। स्वर्गी स्रोन जातेन तस्मिन् संन्यस्य तदस्यम्। स्विष्ठी त्रन्त्रयो वेदा यज्ञास्वित सदिक्ताणाः । च्येष्ठपुत्रप्रसूतस्य कलां नार्श्वनि घोड्ग्रीम् ॥ मनुविखित-विश्वस्वहारीताः । पुत्रेण कीकान् जयित पौत्रेखानन्यमञ्जते । खय पुत्रस्य पौत्रेख अञ्चर्याप्रोति पिरुपम् ॥ याज्ञ्वस्काः । कीकानन्यन्दिवः प्राप्तिः पुत्रपौत्रकः । यस्मात्तस्मात् स्त्रियः सेव्याः कर्त्तव्याश्व सुरिच्चता इति ॥ पुराकादिषु तूपास्थानानि पुत्रादिप्रशंसाशंसीनि बङ्कनि ।

तसात् प्रयोचपर्यंन्ताभावे विभक्तासंख्छपतिरिक्यहारिखी पत्नीति सिद्धम्।

12. बात्र जोमूतवाइनः रहस्यितिविरोधान्नेयं यवस्या यदाइ। विमक्ता आतरी ये च संप्रीयकत्र संस्थिताः। पुनर्विभागकर्यो तेषां च्येषां न विद्यते। यदा किस्तिमीयेत प्रविजेदा कथस्वन। न लुप्यते तस्य भागः सेद्रियं य विधीयते। या तस्य भिग्नी सा तु ततीरं ग्रं कन्युमईति। व्यनप्रयस्य धर्मीर्वममार्थीपिटकस्य च। संस्थानान्त यः किसदिद्याभीर्थीदिना धनम्। प्राप्नोति तस्य दातंथी द्यंगः श्रेषाः समाग्निन इति॥ व्यत्रेपक्रमेगपसंदारयेः संस्थानिक्तिनात् तस्यन्दं प्रपतितद्व लुप्यते तस्य भागः सेद्रय्यस्य विधीयत इति वचनं संस्थायिवध्यमव्ययं वाच्यन्तव वानप्रस्य धर्मीर्यममार्थीपिटकस्य चेत्रिभिधानात् वदुव्विष्यम्भीपिट्यामभावे संस्थान्तव वानप्रस्य धर्मीर्यमभार्थीपिटकस्य चेत्रिभिधानात् वदुव्विष्यम्भीपिट्यामभावे संस्थानिक्षा चित्रप्रियमभार्थीपिटकस्य चेत्रिभिधानात् वदुव्विष्यम्भीपिट्यामभावे संस्थानिक्षा प्रतियत् स्ति कथमस्य प्रतिवध्यक्षम् । किस्त न लुप्यत इति संस्थाविभक्ताना प्रतियत्य स्ति विभक्तासंस्थान्य स्ति विभक्तासंस्थानिक्षा विभक्तासंस्थानिक्षा विभक्तासंस्थानिक्षा का विषयात्र तस्ति स्त्रीभूतस्य क्षेपाभक्षात्र विभक्तासंस्थान्य विभक्तासंस्थानिका विक्रादिष्य ।

किस् । पत्नीतः पूर्वं आत्रिक्षितार वेश्विक्षण्यादिव चनानां संख्छाविभक्तविष्ठयत्वं विस्पछ्व चनान्तराद्ध्यायादा प्रवलादु खते । नाद्यः विस्पछ्वि प्रवित्र चनाभावात् ।
संद्धिन न्तु संद्ध्छीत्यादि व च्यमायव चनन्तु आत्रिक्षितारावसरे विष्रो सक्ष्यनं नासुमर्थमवगमयित । दृष्टस्पतिव चनन्तु पुत्रादिपिद्धपर्थन्ताभावे संद्ध्यसे सराधिकार वेश्वकं
प्रयुतासंद्ध्यविषयकता मेवावगमयित । न दितीयः । न्यायो द्यायं वाचः । खिनभामसंसर्गयार्थे वेकस्य धनं तदेवापरस्यापोति स्ततस्य तत्र खत्वेऽपगतेऽपि जीवतस्तत्वत्वात्तद्रामिता युक्ता न खान्यन्तरकत्यनेति । न चासौ युक्तः । खिनभागसंसर्गवतामप्यविज्ञातेकदेशस्यवस्थितिप्रतिनियतात्र यमेव खत्वं नत्वेककः सर्वेषां नापि समग्रे
खनेकखत्वेत्यादिवनाश्चकत्यनाप्रसङ्गात् ।

किश्व। पास्तिग्रहणाजि सहत्विमित्वादिप्राम्लिखितगौतमादिवचनेभ्यः प्रत्नाः परिखयादुत्पन्नम्पतिधने सत्वमित्वभन्न संख्छभद्धं मरखे नम्प्रत्यन्त्रच च न नम्प्रतिति काल्पनायान्यमाखाभावः। पुंचादिषु सत्तु तदिधकारम्माख्यन्त्रच प्रत्नीखलनाम्नः काल्पते। खनापि संख्छाविभक्तभाचिकारमाख्याकाम्मः काल्पत इति चेत्। खन्यस्य तादममाख्यादर्भनात्। खस्य चेतरया खन्योन्याच्ययमस्त्रादसिद्धेः। सिद्धे च संख्छाविभक्तभद्धं मरखे प्रतिखामित्वनाम्मे आचिकारमाख्यस्य तदिषय-कालम्। सिद्धे च तस्मिन् प्रतीखत्वनाम्मक्त्यनेति। खतयव यागिष्यरिवकृत्वादिन्वचने पुचरादित्यमेवीपात्तं न तु विभक्तत्वासंख्यते। विभागस्थोक्कत्वात्वाद्धंदिनाच

बद्धमास्त्वादधाँदुपात्ते खवेति चेत्। तर्हि सुख्यगौसंपुत्रेषु रिक्यप्राहितयाक्षेषु तदितरिवधयत्वमध्यधाँत्विद्यतीत्वपुत्रत्वमपि नेपादेयम्। खपुत्रस्थैत खवानेमेव क्रमे-स्रोति नियमार्थेतया तत्कार्थक्यमन्ययारिप तुल्यम्। विभागोक्तपर्यंवसानन्तु न जात-मेव। संख्रिवचनं भात्रधिकारावसरे विधानार्थेद्य पत्नप्राद्यपवादार्थमित्युक्तमेव।

विद्य। प्रस्तुविखितादिवचनानामिवभक्तसंख्याष्ट्रणाढ्यपरे ताद्यस्यापुत्रस्य धनन्तिद्यभाढ्यामि तदमावे पितरौ हरेताभित्यस्य कार्र्थः। तदा च विकास्यनीयम्। विं विभक्तासंख्यौ पितरौ ग्रङ्गीयातामिति। उताविमक्तसंख्याविति।

तत्र न प्रथमः कल्पः। तार्र्याः पित्रोः पत्नीनाध्यलात्नधं आत्रभावे पत्नीतः पूर्वेन्योर्धिकारवेधः। नापि दितीयः। स्विनक्षसंस्टिप्टियाञ्चात् सर्वेधामिव-वादादत्रनवेयधीत्। स्विप च। यथा पित्रा आत्रा च विमक्षासंस्टिधने प्ररोदराष्ट्र-तया स्वात्मा वे जायते पुत्रः यथेवात्मा तथा सुत इत्वेक्तलस्तृतेर्द्वेनदेश्येष्य पौत्रयोः पितुः प्रमुत्वात्तित्वदेयपितामद्वपितामद्वपित्वदेयोदं सपित्वनेन स्तस्य पुत्रस्य भोक्तृ-त्वास्त्रीवित च पितरि पुत्रास्तां पार्वेशपित्वद्वयोद्वये सपित्वनेन स्तस्य पुत्रस्य भोक्तृ-त्वास्त्रीवित च पितरि पुत्रास्तां पार्वेशपित्वद्वयोद्वये सपित्वन्तिः पूर्वेन्यत्रीरिका-रक्त्रयेतरत्वापि युक्तः। स्विनागसंसर्भयारिकास्त्राद्वयोद्वयोद्वये स्वत्वादेशस्त्राचे युक्ते। न तु स्वात्मन्त्रावेपत्विति।

किस । पित्रोरिविभक्तसंख्यलिविशेष्वममुपपन्नं मात्रा सन्ध विभागाभावेगाविभक्तविशेषवामर्थकात् । कारव संसर्गभावे। पि । विभागपूर्वकात् स्य । यथान्त सन्धारिः । विभक्तो यः पुनः पित्रा भात्रा चैकत्र संस्थितः । पित्रथेवायवा प्रीत्या स तत्वंद्वय उच्चत हित ॥ रतेन येवामेव न्नि पित्रभाद्यपित्यवावां पित्रपितामन्ना- जितनविभक्तत्वसुत्पत्तिः सम्मवित तर्य विभक्ताः सन्तः परस्पर्प्रीत्या पूर्व्विभागभावे यत्त्व यत्तव धनन्तन्तम यच मम तत्त्वत्वभिन्नत्येकपाक्षेन पर्व्वदेकारित्वया स्थिताः संद्वयन्ते । न पुनरनेवन्भूता द्वयसंतर्गमात्रेव विभक्तामिप सम्भ्यसमुत्याने संद्ययत्ववन्तरापत्तेः । प्रीतिपूर्वेक्ताभिसन्धिरित्वानां सौकर्यादिवशाद् द्रयमिन्त्रवेन व्यवन्तरादिकुर्वतां भात्रादीनामयत्वय न संद्यव्यवन्तरः । तसान् माद्यत्वते भावत्वसङ्गावाधिकारविरोधो दुःसमाधः ।

चतः प्रभी चपर्यन्ताभाव रवाविश्रेषे वापु चप्रमीतभर्द्ध में समस्तेऽधिकारिको प्रसीयिव रमक्योयम्। नत्त्र ज्ञातासंख्य विभक्ता गोचरत्वक स्पना। जितेन्द्रियाद्ये। प्रयोजमाळः। प्रपीच पर्यम्ताभावे तस्या चिप भर्त्तः त्राद्धादिने। प्रकारक तिश्चयात्। पत्त्येव द्यात्तित्रक्षं द्यात्त्र स्वाच्ये व्यवस्थित। चाता प्रतिदिनम्मस्या भर्चे द्याच्या व्यवस्थित। क्रुं व्यवस्थित। व्यवसाय विविधान् क्रुं व्यवस्थित। द्याति विधाने क्रुं व्यवसाय विविधान् क्रं व्यवस्थित। द्यात् पृष्यविद्यत्ये। उपवासां च विविधान् क्रुं व्यवसाय व्यवसाय व्यवस्थित। तार्यत्यस्था नारी नित्यं धर्मिक्राये विविधान् विधाने वि

कुर्व्वन्ती खीयापुर्णेनार्डशरीरसंस्तवात्पत्यर्डं शरीरस्य यस्य भार्या सुराम्पिवेदित्वादि-लिक्सदर्शनात्पतिमपि पातयेदिति तया प्रश्तीतं खाम्यर्थमेव तद्धनं भवतीति सर्वेभ्यो-उन्येभ्यः पूर्वं पतन्था एव पतिधनग्रञ्चगं युक्तम्।

प्रश्वादिवचने तु व्यवहितयोजना कार्या। व्यपुत्रस्य पुत्रपौत्रप्रीत्रस्य स्वर्थातस्य थनं ज्येसा प्रस्तिमा पत्नी लभते। तदभाव दुष्टिहदौष्टित्रयोखामाव पितरौ लभेयातान्तदभावे आह्मामीति। तदभाव द्रति मध्यपितं पूर्वेत्ताराभानिविद्यासामीति। तदभाव द्रति मध्यपितं पूर्वेत्ताराभानिविद्यासामानिविद्यास्य पूर्वे मुक्तालाच सम्बध्यते। आह्मामप्रजाः प्रयादित्यादीनि नारदादि-वचनान्यपत्नीक्पपरिकीतस्त्रीविषयाणि। स्त्रीप्रव्यमात्रोपादानात्त्व। स्वर्णविषयाणि। स्त्रीप्रव्यमात्रोपादानात्त्व। स्वर्णव नारदस्त्रव वचनान्तरे। स्वन्यत्र नास्त्रात्तात्तान्तापि चापत्नीत्वं प्राक् प्रपिष्टतम्। स्वत्यव नारदस्त्रव वचनान्तरे। स्वन्यत्र नास्त्रात्तात्तान्ति स्त्राप्तिविद्यास्य स्त्रात्ता स्त्रात्ति स्त्राप्तिविद्यास्य स्त्रात्ति स्त्राद्य स्त्रात्ति स्त्रात्ति स्त्रात्ति स्त्रात्ति स्त्रात्ति स्तर्णात्ति स्त्रस्त्रात्ति स्त्रस्त्रात्ति स्त्रस्त्रात्ति स्त्रस्त्रात्ति स्त्रस्त्रात्ति स्त्रस्त्रात्ति स्त्रस्त्रात्ति स्त्रस्त्रात्ति स्त्रस्त्रमानिविद्याय्यक्तानिभाय स्त्रावे व्यप्त्रस्त्रात्ति स्त्रस्त्रात्ति स्त्रस्त्रात्ति स्त्रस्त्रात्ति स्त्रस्त्रप्ति स्त्रस्त्रात्ति स्त्रस्त्रात्ति स्त्रस्त्रात्ति स्त्रस्त्रात्ति स्त्रस्त्रात्ति स्त्रस्त्रात्ति स्त्रस्त्रात्ति स्तर्भावेति तत्रस्ति विविवितित्तस्य।

तचेदमालीचनीयं। नारदग्रस्कादिव चनानामविभक्तसंस्ट खिविषयस्वेन या खबस्या तत्र न्यायविरोधो वा दूषगं वचनविरोधो वा। न तावच्चायविरोधः। वाधकन्यायस्याभावात्। प्रत्युत साधको न्यायाऽक्ति। तथान्ति चविभक्तप्रमीते ताव-त्तस्यां प्रयु नाभू तिनियं ग्रहातु संस्थे जाते। उपां प्रानः साधार गस्तिनियं ग्रहातु संस्थे जाते। उपांपः पुनः साधार गस्तिनियं गतः। न च साधारणस्वाश्रयोऽप्यविविक्तस्त्रद्वागोऽस्यवेति वाचम्। स्रस्त तावतापि यस्रतियात्रिकं साधारणं खलन्तदपगमे विद्यमानखलकः संक्रम स्वाचितानलन्य स्रातेपत्तिक्ष्यना। पाणियद्यादि सहत्वक्षर्मसु तत्पतेषु द्रथपरिग्रहेषु चेति गौतमवचनात्पत्ना चापि तद्भागेऽविविक्षोऽपि खलमुत्पन्नं तन्नाणः किमिति तत्खले कत्यात इति चेन्न बै।पपत्तिकाऽस्ति न तु तात्त्विकः। पत्नाः पतिन्रशे खलं चीर्नीरव-देकली लीभावापनं सन्दाधिकारिकार्मी पयागि न तु आहु ग्रामिव परस्परम्। तत रव तेषां विभागी न तु जायापत्योः। रतन्त्रायमूजकमेन जायापत्योनं विभागोविद्यत इति वचनम्। तथा च पत्युः खलापगमे तस्याः खलापगमत्तत्रावस्थकः। एवद्याविभक्त-संस्टिएतिखापतेये पत्नाः खलात्पत्तिः कच्यतामविभक्तसंस्टिखलस्य सता-ऽसाधारकां वेति वीचायामुत्तरपचनचीनरसमेवेाचितं नाधवात्। न च पत्नेव विभागप्रतियागिनी । प्रापकप्रमायाभावात् । नचैतान्येव वचनानि प्रापकािन । तेषां विषयविवादाद्विभक्तासंस्टिश्विषयत्वेनाप्युपपत्तेः। अतरवान्यान्याश्रयोऽपि दवीयान्। विमर्भदशायान्तदप्रसङ्गात्। सति विमर्भे तदिषयत्विश्वयादेव।

चविभागसंसर्भवतामपीत्यादि च यदुक्तन्तद्रास्मत्यच्चतिच्चमम् । प्रतिनिय-

ताविविक्तखलखीकारेऽपि संख्छाविषयताया न्यायान्तरसिद्धलात्। नचात्रुतविभ-क्तासंख्छविषयलं पत्नोत्यादिवाक्यानामप्रमाखकम् विरद्धनारदादिवचनानां व्यवस्था-न्तरासम्भवे पूर्वेषपादितन्यायेषप्रक्यार्थापत्तरेव प्रमाखलात्। व्यवस्थान्तरासम्भवस्य वच्चामः।

न च यथाविभागस्योक्तालालंखिनाच वच्यमायालादधी दिभक्तासंखिधनपरणं प्रतीवादिरायातीति तदनुपादानन्त्रथा सुख्यगोयपुचविभागसुक्ता प्रतीवादिवचनारम्भादपुचधनविषयत्वमपि सिद्धाति तेषामित्यपुचस्रोत्यपि न वाच्यमिति वाच्यम् ।

रक रवौरसः पुचः न भातरा न पितरौ पुचा रिक्ष्यहराः पितुरित्यस्यार्थस्य सुन्यनतराक्तस्य यागीश्वरेया वचनान्तरेयानुक्तेस्तदवनेधनार्थलात् । खन्यथा जीवदजीवदिभागयोः सत्वपि पुचेषु पित्रपत्नीनां यथांग्रभाक्षन्त्रथाचापिति ग्रञ्चा स्यात् । पुचविभागपर्यवसान उक्तलाझ तच्छञ्जावसर इति यदि तिष्ट सुन्यन्तरम्बेक रवौरसे न
भातरा न पितरौ इति खतन्त्रस्य सुख्यगौयपुचसत्वे पत्न्याद्यमधिकारप्रतिपादकग्रास्त्रस्य सुतरामानर्थकां स्यात् स्पष्टीकरयार्थं चर्यन्यायसिद्धमपि निवध्यते व्यवहारग्रास्त्रस्य सुतरामानर्थकां स्यात् स्पष्टीकरयार्थं चर्यन्यायसिद्धमपि निवध्यते व्यवहारग्रास्त्रस्य सुतरामानर्थकां स्यात् स्पष्टीकरयार्थं चर्यन्यायसिद्धमपि निवध्यते व्यवहारग्रास्त्र इति समाधिः पदमाचे सुतरां सुवदः । स्पष्टार्थं विभक्तासंख्यत्वे चिप कुतेनिपात्त इति चेत् । खतन्त्रक्त्यलान्यनिनाम् । चारोपे सित निमित्तानुसरयमिति न्याये च यच न्यायार्थसिद्धनिनन्यनमित्त तच सिद्धस्य गतिस्वन्तनीयेति रीत्या स्पष्टीकरयार्थतया वैवर्थं परिक्रियते न तु तदिभिधानापादनं सब्वेचोच्यतम् ।

यच संस्थिनस्तु संस्थीत्यस्य भाष्मिकारावसरे विद्योषविधानमात्रार्थतद्व पत्न्याद्यपवादकत्विम् सुक्षान्तदिवार्त्तम्। तुम्रब्दिविशेषात्। उत्तरीत्तरपूर्व्वापवाद-सन्दर्भाच। स्वतरव प्रतिवाक्यं तुम्रब्दोपादानम्। क्वीवादिवाक्यं पुत्रादिसकत्वदाय-यम् साविधारियां क्वीवत्वादिनाधिकारापवादकमिति। स्वतरव मिताच्चरायां वि-च्यानेश्वरेश्व तथेव तानि वचनान्यवतारितानि व्याद्यतानि च।

यत्तु किञ्चेत्यादिना प्रञ्जलिखितवचने भाचभावे पित्रोरधिकारे। विकल्य-खिखतत्त्तद्यातिक्षगु । भवद्यमयापि खुत्कमेख विभक्तासंख्छिपत्रपरत्वे तस्य खाखातुं प्रकावनेवापर्यनुयोगात्।

यचापि चेत्वादि। तदपि तुच्ययागच्चेमित्वपेच्यम्।

यदिप किच्चेत्यादि। तदिप माचंग्रे विश्वेषणासम्बन्धेऽपि येग्यतया पिचंग्रे सम्बन्धादचीद्यम्। वस्तुतस्तु साम्चान्माचा विभागाभाविप जीविद्यभागे पिचिच्छ्या तस्या चिप भागसम्भवादजीविद्यभागे तु साम्चादेव विभागोक्तेः प्रीत्याऽभिसन्धिविश्वेष-पूर्वेकं पुत्रैः सह संसर्गसम्भवात्। न चैवं विभक्तो य इत्यादिरुहस्पतिवचनविरोधः। खतरव मितान्चराक्तताप्युक्तम्। संसर्गस्य न येन केनापि। किन्तु पिचा पिरुष्येष विश्वेष सम्मतित्वेन तदचनसुपन्यस्यतेति वाच्यम्। यतस्त्रचा सित सक्तक्षेषक्यवहार-सिद्धो दौहिचादिसंसर्गेऽप्यन्यायः स्यात्। तस्माद्येषां परस्परविभागस्त्रेषामेव तत्पूर्वेकः । परस्परसंसर्गेऽप्याभानिय विश्वेषपूर्वेका न परस्परस्थिनश्रीकर्यमाचेष

विज्ञगादीनामिवेत्वत्र रहस्पितवचनतात्पर्यंत्र मात्रादिनिरुत्तो । तिदेशपिरिसंख्यापत्तः । खतर्य भात्रा वा पिट्योगाय वेत्यनास्यायां वादिश्रस्तत्त्रोपातः । रक्षात्तरे
चर्छत्रशेषाप्युक्तम् । खनास्यायां वाकारः । येन पिट्यक्रेनांशिना स्रतिविभाग
रक्षत्र स्थितः संस्टरः सर्व्यतेकार्रहोते लभ्यत हित । वाचस्पितरप्येवमेवाइ । यनु
तेनोक्तं एचग्धनानामेकत्रमेलनमेव संसर्गीालाघवात् न तु विभागपूर्व्यक्तं तत्र विश्वेवयां परस्परामुमितच्य तत्र हेत्रिति । तत्र । पुनः श्रस्ट्विरोधात् विभागेऽपि संसर्गश्रस्टप्रयोगापत्तेः जन्मना खलानक्षीकारित्र तत्रापि एचग्धनमेलनात् खन्यचा विकल्प
उभवस्य श्रास्त्रार्थतात् पित्रादिसमुक्तितसंसर्गीपि सक्कलेकातसिद्धो व्याङ्ग्येत ।

िमताश्वराद्यतेषि न येन क्षेनापीतिवदते। यथाकयंचित्तद्यिमश्रवसंसर्गव्यादत्या
विभागपूर्व्वकाभिसन्धिविश्वष्ठतसंसर्गनियम स्वाभिभेते। न मात्रादिखारुत्तः ।

भाषाधिकारावसरे संस्थिते।दरत्वादिविशेषविधानार्थतं च यदस्य संस्थितं नस्तु संस्थिते।तस्ति तस्तितुष्क्म् पित्रादिषु गोत्रजादिषु चास्य प्रस्त्विदिधात् तस्त तत्रेव विकारेख बन्धामः।

तन तावत्यायविरोधो दूषसम्।

नापि वचनविरोधः। संख्यस्याप्यभाक्योपिद्यनस्यति तेन विश्वेषणादपत्याभाव इव भार्कापित्रमाव एव संख्रिभाद्धधनेऽधिकार खायातीति वाचम् । यतः संख्रि-धनग्रहमां संख्रिमां तु याभागः स तस्यानेष्यते वधीरिति नारदेन साज्ञादेव तङ्का-थायाः प्रतिविद्यम् संदर्शिनां तु याभागत्तेवामेव स इखते इति कल्पतव्यीदिप्रतपाठे-ऽप्येवकारिया पत्न्यादिप्रतिषेध स्वायात्येव । न सेवं नारदवसनम् स्राद्धामप्रजा इत्यस्य प्रकामबलातां स्टिश्विषयत्वे संस्टिशनां तु याभाग इत्यनेन पौनवत्त्रां स्थादतः स्त्रीश्रन्द-स्यात्र त्रवखादन्यत्र च पत्नीग्रन्दस्य पत्नीविषयत्वेन व्यवस्येव साधीयसीति वाच्यम्। पर्वेतित्विवरयोग स्त्रीधनाविभाज्यत्वतद्भरयमात्रविधानपरतथा तदप्रसितः। स्त्रीमात्रस तं क्रमग्रह्मस्य प्रतीत्वादिवाकीः प्रतोपदापते रप्रसक्तत्वेन तत्वति घेधासंभवाच । विश्वरू-वचने च रिक्थतामादितिनियागविश्येवसं भवन्मतेऽनुपपन्नं। पुत्रादिरहितपतिधनग्रहसं यदि विभागाविभागसंसर्गादविशेषेशैव तंस्याः सर्वादौ तर्हि रिक्यलेश्मेन निवागाः कीकारक्तस्याः कदा प्रसक्तो वे। निविध्यते । मन्मते तु संख्छाविभक्तभादसत्वे नार-दादिवचनात्तस्या चपुत्रधनसम्बन्धाभावेन पुत्रदारेव तत्सम्बन्धात्रसक्का रिक्यलाभेन नियागस्त्रीकारः प्रतिविध्यते । नचात्रापि पत्नीभिन्नाया भार्त्याया भर्त्तुर्धनानिधकारा-त्तस्या एव रिक्यक्ताभेन प्रसन्तो निविध्यते नियागसीकार इति न भवदुन्नप्रसन्ति-प्रतीचिति वाश्यम्। प्रक्रा एव तत्र प्रस्तुतत्वात्तिद्वित्रभार्थापरत्वानुपपत्तेः। स्वतरव धारेश्वरादिभिनियागार्धिपत्नीपरते पत्नीतादिवाकास्वेदमेव विश्वस्व प्रमासत-यापन्यसम् । तस्मान्नारदवशिखवाकावकात् संदर्शिभर्मृधनग्रहमप्रतिषेधः पन्नार स्टस्यतिवचने चानपत्यस्य धर्मोऽयमभार्थापित्रकस्य चेति स्वागत्यत्नां सत्वा बादरस्यापि संख्रिमाद्रधनग्रहणप्रतिषेध इति विरोध स्रावध्यकः कप्रसिद्धियय-

व्यवसाया परिवर्षकीं प्रिक्ति हो। यदिक्रियते । सन्दंशीत्यतप्रकर्यवनात्रसन्नमण्-भार्थापिद्यक्तस्य संस्वितिश्रेषणात्रमन्यथासिज्ञनारदादिवाक्यान्रेशधादसंस्वित्यराता-बग्रकतया बाध्यते। वाकाविरोधे प्रकरणस्याप्रयोजकातात्। व चायमिति सर्व्धनासा संदृष्टिधनग्रह्यक्ष्पधर्मास्य प्रकानास्यानेन विश्वेषाभिधानादनप्रत्यस्येतिवदभार्या-पिटकस्थेत्यस्थापि संस्वरिप्रमीतविश्रोधसाविभितिवाकाये।रेवायं विरोधः न वाकाप्रक-रखयारिति वाच्यम्। सर्व्वनाम्नः संस्थिधनग्रह्यपरामर्भनत्वेरीप सेाऽयमनप्रत्यसंस्थि-खामिधनग्रहबरूपे। धर्मी भार्थापिटरहितस्यासंस्टिनेऽप्यनपत्यस्य प्रमीतस्य। असंदरिविभन्नप्रभीतस्य धनन्तु भार्थापिष्टसिद्दतस्येवानपत्यस्य सेादरा राष्ट्रीयात्र भार्थापित्रस्वतरदितिवास्वार्थीपपत्तेः । चकाराऽप्येवमनक्तासंस्विससुत्रयार्थी खा-स्वयः। स्वतसासंस्कृतिष्ठयेगानेन प्रकर्णिवस्ते जाते संस्कृतानामा यः कसिदिन स्यामियां संस्कृपदीपादानम्पि सार्थकस्थवति खन्यया प्रक्रमादेवाचापि तल्लाभे तन्मन्दप्रयोजनं स्यात् । चतरव तात्तीये निविद्धिकरग्रेशमञ्जनिविदिन्धिः सामिधेन्यवान्तरप्रकरबाग्राञ्चसुपवीतं न सामिधेन्यकुमपि तु महाप्रकरबाइग्रे-पूर्वमासाक्रम्। ये तु पञ्चात्तनागुकास्ते पुनर्वचनादेव दृरस्थानवादेनेव दादश्रोपसा-क्ववत्सामिधेन्यव्वादेन विधोयना इतिभट्टमतेन सिद्धान्तितम्। वस्ततस्त या तस्य भिमिनी खनेन बें।दराभावे या भिमन्यधिकारः संख्यधने प्रतीयते । तस्यैवाव्यवस्तिन स्यानपत्यस्थेति वाकाश्चेषस्थेनाथिमति सर्वनामा परामर्घसात्र च न काेऽपि विरोधः चन्त्रिकायामध्येवमेवाक्तम्।

खिनितापुत्रपितखानिकारखधनयहरून पत्ना कात्यायनवचनिवद्धम्। यदाहः। खर्यते खानिन स्ति तु यासाच्छादनभागिनी। खिनिसत्ते धनांग्रन्तु प्राप्तो-त्वामरखानिकम्॥ तुग्रब्दो वाग्रव्दार्थे तथा चायमर्थः। यासाच्छादनमेव साच्चा-द्वामते खामरखानिकं यावकीवं यावता धनेन जीवनं स्प्राधिकारिकमावग्रक्ष कर्मे सिद्धाति तावक्तं धनांग्रं वा प्राप्नोति। धनांग्रमामरखानिकमित्वक्तेः क्रत्ख्वमनमित्नमत्तस्य पत्रुकंभत इति निरक्तम्। न च स्त्रीग्रब्दश्रवद्यात् पत्नीव्यतिरिक्तस्त्रीपरमिद्नमित्ति वाच्यम्। खिन्भक्त इति विग्रविकानर्थक्यापक्तेः। विभक्तेऽपि भक्तिर पत्नी-िभन्नाया चपुत्राया भरणमात्रोक्तेः। खतयव क्रतेऽपंग्र द्रवमुदक्ते। व्हस्पतिः। प्रदद्यक्तिव पिख्यस्य क्रेत्रांग्रं वा यदीच्छति। खत्य व्याख्यानं स्तृतिचित्रकत्रायम्। पिख्यस्य प्रवाद्यविव पिख्यस्य क्रेत्रांग्रं वा यदीच्छति। खत्य व्याख्यादेकं क्रेत्रांग्रं वा खत्या भन्ने- स्त्रविव्यविधवाये भानादिक्तद्वनयादी प्रद्यात्। व्यक्तारः प्रदानस्याव-ग्रक्तवार्थं इति। व्यविध्यक्तमेव नारदयचनम्। यावत्यो विधवाः साध्यो क्रिकेव . स्त्रवेष वा। गोन्नवेनापि वान्येन भक्तव्याञ्चादिति॥ भव्यव्यतिविध्यति स्त्रविधवार्ये स्त्रवार्यः स्थात्।

साध्वा रत्यनेन सर्वत्र साध्वीनामेव भरवमसाध्वीनान्तु पत्नीनाश्व न तदपि। धार्किन्युरितरास स्विति प्रागृक्तनारदवचनवाकाश्वेषादिश्वः। अतरव साध्वीनां

जीवनाधं श्वस्रदादिभिर्दत्तमन्येदिष दायादैनीयस्टबीयमित्यप्यास् सस्प्रतिः। स्थाव-दादिधनं स्त्रीभ्यो यद्त्तं श्वस्रदेश तु। न तष्क्त्यमपास्तुं दायादेदिस् कर्षिचिदिति॥

खन्यादधीनान्तु दत्तमप्यपद्यत्त्विमित्याच्च कात्यायनः। भोक्तुमईति क्षुप्तां ग्रं गुरुश्रुश्ववो रता। न कुर्य्याद्यदि श्रश्रुवाचे विपिग्छे नियोजयेत्। खपकारिक्रियायुक्ता निर्वाच्या चार्चनाधिका। व्यभिचाररता या च स्त्रीधनं न च साईति ॥ नाईतीत्यनेन न देयं जीवनपर्य्याप्तमिषि। दत्तमिष च तादृश्याः सकाग्रादपच्चरवीयिनिति द्वयमप्युक्तं भवति।

यम् तस्मात् स्तियोऽनिन्त्रिया खदाया इति श्रुतिवचनं तन्मूलकच्च खनिन्त्रिया

म्बादायादाः स्तियो नित्यमिति स्थितिरितिमनुवचनं तद्द्यमिप यासां प्रदुष्पादिकया
धनग्रह्यां ने ति तद्दिषयमवस्यम् । गौतमिमताच्चरायां हरद्वत्तोऽप्येवमेवाह ।
केचित्तं निरिन्त्रियपदसमिमयाहाराद्गिन्दामात्रपरं तदित्याङ्कत्त्व । दायादलांग्रे
निन्दाया निष्ठेधकत्त्वपनावश्यम्भावात् । रागाद्दायग्रह्यप्राप्तिनित्वानुवादासम्भवात् । खनिन्त्रियलन्तु पुम्पारतन्त्रगत् कथिद्दनुवादः । वक्तुसभावविपरीतिनिष्ठेधकत्त्वमस्य
बाधात् । तस्मात् पूर्वीक्त रव समाधिः । पराग्ररस्नृतिटीकायां विद्यारस्यश्चीचरयात्तु
श्रुतिमेवनामन्यथा व्याचन्त्रः पत्नीवनग्रहे पत्नग खंग्रो नास्तीत्यदायादपदस्यार्थः ।
तत्र हेतुरनिन्त्रिया इति इन्त्रियं व सेमपीथ इत सेमिऽपिन्त्रियग्रम्दप्रयोगात्तते।
निर्मता इति सेमपागानिधिकता इति पत्नीवनग्रहप्रशंसित ॥

इति पत्नप्रधिकारविचारः।

PART II.

यक्षाभावे दुष्टितरे। पुत्रविभक्षासंखिष्टधनमाजः। तथा च मनुः। यथैवातमा तथा पुत्रः पुत्रेब दुष्टिता समा। तस्यामात्मिन तिस्वत्यां कथमन्यो धनं इरेत्। स्व स्व पुत्रः पुत्रेब दुष्टिता समा। तस्यामात्मिन तिस्वत्यां कथमन्यो धनं इरेत्। स्व स्व पुत्रेब समा पुत्रविदित च साच्चाच्नन्यत्येऽपि पुत्रे पित्रवयवानां वाडक्येन संकान्तेदेषितरि च प्रक्षोनां। पुमान् पृंसे। प्रिक्षे सक्षे स्वी भवत्यिके खियाः। इत्यादिवचनेः स्वृतिब्वाय्वेदे च प्रतिपादनात् पुत्रत्यः दुष्टितुवक्षामिति द्रस्थ्यम्। खात्मिन। खात्मा व जायते पुत्र इत्यातमभूतपुत्रत्यायानित्यर्थः। तिस्वत्यामित्यनादरे सप्तमी तामनादृत्येत्वर्थः।

यद्यप्यनेनौरसप्त्रामावे दुहितुर्डनग्रह्णमित्यत्र न्याय उक्तक्तथापि गौजप्त्र-पत्नग्रोरमावे दुहितुर्डनग्रह्णमिति को न्यायः। उच्यते। नारदेन मन्दानुग्रहाव सेाऽपि स्पष्टीकृतः। यदाहः। पुत्रामावे तु दुहिता तुःख्यसन्तानदर्भगदिति । विद-तद्यदन्तेनेव। पुत्रस्य दुहिता चोमौ पित्रसन्तानकारकाविति। ध्ययमाप्रयः। पुत्र-दुहितरावुमौ पितुः पौत्रदौहित्राख्यसन्तानकारकावतः सन्तानप्रवर्भकातस्य तुःख्य-त्वात् दुहितुरपि पुत्रवद्धिकारः। पौत्रदौहित्राख्यसन्तानयोस्त स्वहृष्यतस्तुःख्य लाभावात्वार्ध्वतन्त्रस्थात्वस्थात्वम् । कार्ध्वमि नर्धापकरस्विरुद्धनन्त्रसम् पुत्र-पोत्रे क्रंबं देयम्। पितामङ्गस्यमिष्ठस्य च। तत्र स्थात्यदृशं सान्यमिमुः पुत्रस्य चोभवेदिति। वचनाभ्यां पोत्रे सति दो दित्रस्य तदनिधकारात्। तेनादृष्ठमत्र कार्यं त्राद्धकर्द्धतम्। पूर्व्ववान्त् स्थाकारे पोत्रा दो दित्रका मता इति विद्यूक्तेः। स्वष्य दृष्टादृष्टोपकारकस्वसन्तानसुखेनेपकारकपुत्रात् कोवनादृष्टोपकारकस्वसन्तानसुखेने-पकारिका दृष्टिता न्यूना। न चैवन्यतन्यपेत्त्रया प्रत्यासद्वा जन्या दृष्टितेति पत्नीतः पूर्वे सेव धनमईतीति वाच्यम्। यतः सङ्घिकारिकामिङ्गादिवेदिककर्मीपका-दिका कामास्थपुत्रवार्थसाधनतया सन्तानसाधनतया च दृष्टादृष्टोपकारकत्री देशर्ज्ञ-संस्तृता पत्न्येव तत्राद्धिका। ततस्य पुत्राभाव इति पत्नग्रभावस्याप्युपकत्त्वकं प्राम्ति-सित्वविद्युवचनादस्नाव योगीत्रस्वचनात्।

यर्थीप पुत्रकर्र्धकमाञ्जे सम्प्रदानतया स्वयमेवादकोपकारकः पिता दुवित्रपे-च्या प्रत्यासम्म इति पिता इरेदपुत्रस्य रिक्यमितिवचनस्यावसर उचिते दुवितः प्राक्। तथापि तस्यामात्मिन तिस्वन्यामित्यनेन प्ररीरप्रत्यासन्या सैवाग्रेसरीति तदभावे तदचनस्यावसरः। वा प्रस्दोपादानेन तस्य क्रमपरत्याभावात्।

2. जीमृतवाचनस्य दुचितुरिधकारे सन्तानकारकावस्य हेतार्बिर्रेशात्मनानस्य च पिखदस्येगेपकारकावादपिखदस्यानुपकारकावेनान्यसन्तानादसन्तानाचाविद्येषात् पुत्रवती सम्भावितपुत्रा वा दुचिता धनाधिकारिखी। विधवालवन्थात्वदुचित्रप्रस्तादिना विपर्यक्तपुत्रा पुनर्काधिकारिखोवेति दोच्चितमतमादरबीयमित्याच।

तदिष चिन्थम्। प्राथिमककन्याधिकारस्य । अपुत्रस्तस्य कुमारी ऋक्यं स्क्रीयात्तदभावे चोढित पराधरवचनात् कन्यान्यस्य पित्रवयादितिदेवजवचनास्त तेनेव प्रथमं कन्येवैका पित्रधनाधिकारियीत्यनेन स्रत्येनाभिधानात् तदानीं च पुत्रसन्भावनानिस्ययाभावात् । द्वेतुनिर्देशस्य प्रत्यासम्यतिष्रयमात्रप्रदर्शकतयास्त्रपप्रमत्तेः । क्यमेव कन्याया असम्भवे सम्भावितपुत्रायाः पुत्रवत्यास्विकार इति वदन् द्वेतिर्थभिचारितां दर्शयति । तस्नादसादुक्तरीत्येव प्रवासम्वर्थतया द्वेतु-र्थास्थ्येः ।

 भवन्मते चङ्गादङ्गात्मभवतीत्वादिना पुजिकाविषयेख वचसा पुजिकाया धनग्रह्यो उत्ते पुनः। सदधी सदधीने ाटा साध्वी सुख्रवे रता। ज्ञताऽज्ञता वा पुजस्य पितु-र्जनहरी तु सा॥ इत्यनेन पुनर्जनहरत्वप्रतिपादनन्तेनैव सुनिना क्रियमासं विवरस-माजतयार्पनरक्षक्रक्तंत्रं स्यात्। सामान्यविश्वेषविषयतया तु स्पष्टमेवापौनरक्ष्यम्। सद्भी पिट्रसवर्णा । सद्देशन सवर्णेनोहित प्रक्षद्यापक्षद्यवर्णसम्बन्धनिरासाय । तच्ना-तस्योत्तमवर्षभातामच्त्राद्वादिनिषेधादिति जीम्तवाचने । क्वापदेने-वाधमवर्णसम्बन्धनिरासात्। नद्यधमवर्णे जिल्लमु मनवर्णायाः सम्भवति। तस्रादुत्त-मवर्णिनिरासार्थमेव सदश्यादणम्। ननु नारदेन कन्यारूपाणां पिद्रभाद्ररिहताना सर्वासामेव दुन्तिह्यां पित्थनापाप्तिः संसर्गताऽभिन्तिता। यथान्। स्यासु चेत् दुचिता तस्याः पिन्योभोभरको मतः। स्वासंस्कारा खरेङ्गाम्परता विभ्रयात्पतिरिति॥ तस्या इति पतिपत्रविद्यीनपत्नीमधिकत्याद । तेन तादृत्या यदि दृष्टिता विद्यते तस्याभरगनिभित्तमात्रपित्रोंऽग्रससात् विवाइसंस्ताराद्भरगार्थमेव सा पिटधन-भागं इरेत्परते। विवाहादुर्धे पतिसां विश्वयात्। तेन तावत्वासभरवाविश्वक्रमपि तता ग्रङीयात्। यथेकविनियागार्थन्तु कन्यायाः पित्रधनग्रह्यां दूरापाक्तमेव। ततस्वास्यापवादकानि दुन्तितः पित्रधनप्राप्तिप्रतिपादकानि वचनानि सर्व्वाति प्रिका-विषयाख्येव वाचानि । खन्यथा द्वयारिप दुव्हिटसामान्यविषयतयात्मर्भापंवादत्वानुप-तसाडारेश्वरादिमतमनुमन्तव्यमिति चेत्र। स्यादेवं यदि नारदवचनं विभक्तविषयं स्यात्। पौर्वापर्यपर्याचाचनया संस्टाविभक्तविषयन्तत् स्कुटमवगन्यते। ततस विभक्तविषये द्विहमात्रस्य पत्न्यभावे पित्रधने ग्रह्णप्रतिपादकानि प्रापका-ख्येव नापवादकानीति न पुत्रिकामात्रविषयत्वे तेषां किमपि वीजम्पद्यामः। यत्तु संकलिप्रह्मिन प्रकृतिपादकतया कन्याभ्य इत्यादिदेव कवचनं जीमृतवा इने-नापन्यक्तं तत् पूर्व्वापरविषद्धम्। जीविद्यभागे कन्याभ्यः विवाहमात्रोपयक्षधने तस्य प्रमायातयापन्यासात् । तदपि चासाभिः प्राङ्निरक्तम् ।

- 4. दुन्दिव्यपि प्रथममप्रताः पित्रधनं ग्रङीयुक्तदभावे प्रताः तासामिप मध्ये प्राग्नपतिखिताक्तदभावे प्रतिखिता सर्व्याः समानस्याक्त समं विभन्य ग्रङीयुरि-त्यर्थः सिद्धम्। तथा च कात्यायनः। पत्नी पत्युर्द्धनन्दरी या स्यादयभिचारियी। तदभावे तु दुन्दिता यद्यनूण भवेत् तदेति । गौतमः स्त्रीधनं दुन्दित्याम-प्रतासिखतानास्रित। स्प्रातिखता निर्धनाः। यद्यपि स्त्रीधनमित्रकृतं तथापि तुस्यन्यायतया पित्रधनविषयमप्येतत् । बन्धतादिना सन्तानगरिकता प्रति-छितेति तु न युक्तम्। तस्याः सन्तानमुखेनादृष्टोपकाराभावेन धुन्द्वारित्या-यागात्।
- 5. सदशी सदशेनेाहेति प्राक्पिठितं रहस्पतिवचनं स्मृतिचित्रकाकार इत्यं याच्यो। स्वादानि चलारि विश्वेषणानि पत्ना ऊर्द्धमर्थग्राहिगीदुहिटविस-यागि। ततः प्राम्धनग्राहिगीदुहिटविश्वेषणे दे स्वविश्वे। ज्ञताश्वात वेत्वत्र

पृत्तिकेति विश्वेष्याध्याद्वारः । इतरच दुन्तिति विश्वेष्याध्याद्वारः । वाश्वव्यक्ष्यविद्यातिकिक्ष्यार्थः । स्वद्यायमर्थः । क्षीरसप्चविन्नीनस्य पितुर्द्धनं दिविधापि पृत्तिका प्रक्षाः पृत्वं स्वज्ञीयत् । सवर्णादिविश्वेषणोपेता तु दुन्तित तत ऊर्द्धिनित । सवर्णादिविश्वेषणोपेतप्रतिष्ठिताऽप्रतिष्ठितो । तत्र । दुन्दिवृषां समवाये प्रागनूष्टेव स्वज्ञाति पित्रा भर्त्तेष्यतात् । तद्भावे ज्ञाऽप्रतिष्ठिता । भर्त्रा भर्त्तेष्यतासामर्थेनाप्रतिष्ठितलात् । तद्भावे प्रागृक्षया प्रत्यासत्या सवर्षादिविश्वेषणोपेता प्रतिष्ठितापि धनं स्वज्ञाति ।

- अर्चेन्तु इतेति पुत्रिकापरमञ्जतेति दुन्तिहमात्रपरमभ्युपेख वाग्रस्टस्य नास्या-परत्वमास्यायाखिनं दुन्तिहमात्रविषयं विभ्रेष्याध्यान्तारमन्तरेखेव व्याख्यातम्। सेत्यनेन दुन्तिहमात्रपरामभ्रात्।
 - 6. दुव्तिर हित बज्जवचनं सजातीयानां समांश्रोशसमानजातीयानां वर्ध-क्रमेख विश्वेषांश्र हित प्रतिपादनाय।

इति दुचितुरिधकारः।

PART III.

- 1. दृष्टित्रभावे दौष्टियः। यग्रव्यादनुष्तसमुख्यार्थात्। तथा य विष्णुः। यग्रमीयसन्ताने दौष्टिया धनमाप्रयुः। पूर्व्यान्तु खधाकारे पौषदौष्टियकाः समाः ॥ खप्रपोष्रति दृष्टिवपर्यन्ताभावेषणद्याम्। मनुरिष। यद्यता वा कता वाषि यं विन्देख्टग्राख्तन्। पौषी मातामक्तिन द्यात्प्राखं इरेडनिनिति ॥ पौषी-खनेन यथा पुष्राभावे पौषः पितामक्ष्यनाधिकारी तथा दृष्टियभावे दौक्षित्र इत्युक्तम्। खक्ततिरिष । यथा पिद्धभने खान्यं तस्याः सख्विष नन्धृषु। तथेव तत्युते। प्राप्ति माद्यमातामक्षे भने ॥ यथा येन दौक्षित्रदेयपिष्केन दृष्टिता पिद्धभनिधकारिकारिका तथेव तेनेव पिष्ठदानेन दृष्टिद्युते। प्राप्तामक्षभने खामी सख्विष वन्धृषु पित्रादिब्वत्थर्थः।
- 2. न च पुचिकापुचिवयमिदं वचनम्। तस्या इति तस्युत इति च सर्व्वनामभ्यामम्भक्ततदु हिंद्धमाचपरामभ्रात्। चत्रय ममुरिप दो हिचमाचस्येव माता-मद्यमाधिकारं दर्भयति। दो हिचो च्याखिकं रिक्यमपुचस्य पितुईरेत्। स स्व दस्याद् दो पिखो पित्रे मातामद्याय च ॥ पौचदो हिचयोकिंके न विभ्रेषोऽक्ति धर्मतः। तयाद्वि मातापितरो सम्भूतो तस्य देवत इति ॥ पितुरिति मातुः पितुरिति व्याख्येयम्। चत्रयवाग्रे मातामद्याय चेत्याद्य। चथवा यथा स खिपतुरिखकं रिक्यं रहाति तथाऽपुचस्य मातामद्यस्यापि। खयमेव तत्युचकार्यकारित्वात्। तदे-वाइ स स्वेति। खिपने मातामद्याय चेत्यर्थः। मातापितराविति च न यथाक्रम-मन्त्रयः। किन्तु। पौचस्य पिता दौ हिन्स्य माता धनस्वामिनो देवतः सम्भूताविति यथायोग्रयम्।

3. बोचिदपुत्रपीत्रेति यथात्रुतिबसुवचनात्मज्ञीदुन्दिद्धतः प्राग् दौन्दित्रस्य धनाधिकारमाज्यस्योगीत्रप्रविदेशिक्षात्त्रभेष तस्युते।ऽपीति रहस्पतिवचनेऽपि दुन्दिदत- सास्य जवन्यभावावगर्भे द्वेयम् ।

इति दौडिवाधिकारः।

PART IV.

- 1. दौच्चिमाने पितरी धनभाजी।
- 2. खत्र मिताद्वारा। यद्यपि युगपदिधनरसवचनतायां दन्दस्नरसात्तदप्वादत्वाचित्रसेवस्य मातापित्रोद्धेनस्रद्धे क्रमे। न प्रतीयते। तद्यापि विसद्धवाच्ये
 मात्रस्रव्यस्य पूर्व्वनिपातादेवस्रोधाभावपद्ये च मातापितरावित्वत्र भाद्रसम्बर्स्य पूर्वअवसात्पाठकमादेवार्यक्रमे। द्वाग्यमानः क्रमानां द्यायां सत्यां न परित्यक्तुमई इति
 प्रथमं माता द्वाप्यम्यभाक् तद्भावे पिता। विच पिता पुत्रान्तरेव्यपि साधारस्रो
 मातात्तस्रिवासाधारस्रोति प्रवासन्यतिस्र्यादनन्तरः सपिखाद्यन्तस्य तस्य धनम्भवेदिति
 मनुना प्रवासन्यतिस्रयेन धनस्रद्याधिकारस्य विनिग्नमितत्वात्सपिख्यसमानादकादिव्यव विनिग्नमनाकाङ्गायामेतद्यनम्बर्धत्तेरचाप्यदख्यवारितत्वादिति।
- 3. अत्र स्तिचित्रिकाकारः प्रमक्भते। सारखतौभवत इखन्नोत्वित्तवाकी क्रमावग्रत्थभावेन याञ्चक्रमेख प्रधानानुस्रानक्रमः पद्मने निरूपिता नलेकप्रेषत रव तददंत्रापि क्रमार्धमम्यसमाग्रमन्वेषकीयमादनाव काचित्रमावगतिरूपपादिता । इतरेतरयागस्य दन्दवदेकमेघेऽप्यवगतेर्विभन्येव पित्रोत्तुत्यतया धनग्रहः युक्तम्। यतु पिता सपत्नीपुत्रेव्यपि साधारको माता त्रसाधारकेति प्रत्यासच्यतिक्रयात्रस्था एव पिटतः प्राम्धनग्रहणद्वायमित्वृक्तन्तद्यन्वायम्। निह जननीजनक्येर्जिणं प्रति प्रवासितितारतम्यमितः। पुत्रान्तरजनकत्याप्येतेच्जनकताया माहतुस्यतात्। निष्ठ जनकतापि वासन्ववित्तिनी। न च पिटार्रे हीतन्वनं भिन्नोदरेष्वपि संक्रामित। माद्यारहीतले तत्सहै।दरेखेवेति मातुरेव धनग्रहसमिति वाचम्। तत्याः प्रता-सत्ते भी हमसिनीधनाधिकार विनिम्मकतया जनका जनका धनग्रहणविनिमनकास-भावात्। दन्दस्थानीयैनभ्रेषात्तुस्थतावगतौ प्रत्यासत्तरप्रयाजकत्वाच। सत्वां दि क्रमाकाङ्गायां सा क्रमनियामका न त्यसत्वामि। तस्मात् वित्रीक्तुस्यखामादिभ-च्येवानप्रत्वविधुरपुत्रधनग्रहकमिति स्रीकरक्तदयुक्तम्। पिता इरेदपुत्रस्य रिक्बं। सर्वातस्य द्वापुत्रस्य माता दायमवाप्रयादित्यादिवचनेषु पितुर्मातुत्रस् निरपेद्वासाच-प्रतीतेयुँगपद् ग्रह्मायागात्। ब्रीहियवयार्निरपेक्तसाधनलप्रतीतौ मिश्रलायागवत्। केचित् मातुर्गर्भधारविपाववादिनात्यन्तोपकारित्वात् सद्यन्तु पितुर्माता मौरवेबा-तिरिचते इत्यादिसारवाच प्रधमं भातुर्धनाधिकारमाज्यसदिष तुक्म्। पितुरिष संस्कारटित्तसम्पादनादिना बङ्कधा संविधाद्यवात्तयारिय पिता श्रेयान् बीच्चप्राधान्य-दर्भगदिखादिसारखेन सत्रतिपचालाच। गौरवमात्रस्य धनग्रहसप्रयाजकाले। जन्मा-

दक्रक्सदात्रोगेरीयान् ब्रह्मदः पितेत्वादिस्मरकाच पिहते। प्रविभाचार्य्यसाधिका-रापत्रेश्रीहमाहपुत्रयोख सतोः पितामइपिहवादीनामेव प्रागधिकारापत्तेः।

- 4. जीमुतवाइनन् । पितरावित्यसात्पिद्धम रवावगण्यते । तथा हि पिद्ध-प्रातिपरिकात्ययमं पितुरवगतौ दिवचनवतेन तेनेकग्रोधकष्पनायां सरूपेकग्रोधासम्भवे विज्ञामन्वादिवचनसंवादाच विरूपेकग्रोधत्विनश्चवे मातुरवगमात् । जतः क्रमज्ञानं क्रमाभिधानव्याप्तं क्रमाभिधाने व्यापके निवर्त्तमाने निवर्त्तत इति श्रीकरोक्तिर्विप-रीतकमोक्तिच विज्ञानेश्वरीया न युक्तेत्वाइ ।
- 5. तसाज्ञैयायिकजमस्यात्रायवस्थितलाद् रहिद्यावनोत्तोः कम बादरबीयः। तत्र च दुहिद्यामीस्का तदभावे पिद्यामि तदभावे माद्यामीस्कृतम्।
 मितास्थराकारस्य तु प्रथमत एव तार्द्यपाठेनैव रहिद्यावननं लिखतकदिवद्धन्यायमात्रावकमनेन पितरावित्वत्र पिद्धतः प्राद्धातुः पुत्रधनाधिकारं सिद्धान्तयते। महत्वेव
 हृदयम्भाता प्रतिभाति । दौहित्रस्थापि दुहिद्धकाटिनिविद्यत्वाद् रहिद्याना
 एथमनभिधानं तेन दौहित्राभावादिष दुहित्यभावेनोपकस्थत इति मन्तस्यम्। तस्मात्
 स्मृतिचित्त्वकामदनरत्नकारकस्यतवरत्नाकरपारिजातकारप्रस्तीनां बद्धनां पितुरभावे
 भातः पुत्रधनाधिकार इत्येव सिद्धान्तः।

वाचरपतिमा तु तरभावे माहगामि तरभावे पिह्नगामीति रहिष्णुवचनं पिटिता वथा मिताच्चरायामेव सिद्धान्तितं तत्तु कुत्रापि तरितिरक्तग्रस्थे तथा पाठस्थानिस्नाद् स्नान्तिविकसितमेव।

6. विग्रह्माको माद्रप्रस्य पूर्वनिपातादिलापि मिताच्याग्रामो दुरुः विग्रह्माको पूर्वनिपातिनयमाभावात् समासे हि तिन्नयमः प्राव्दिकः सम्येते न तु विग्रह्माक्ष इत्वादिविचानेश्वरोक्तन्याये यद्वत्वमध्येक्षां तत्परिहाराय पराक्रम्यते । सुग्रपदिक्षकर व्यवस्थानेश्वर्याक्ष वचनाधिकर वे वार्त्तिके तन्मर के च महता प्रवन्नेश निरुक्ता । इतरेतर योगोऽपि परान्तरान्यये दन्हाक्का व्यर्शिया प्रतीयते तेन पितदौ धनभाकावित्यनेन युग्रपदन्वयेऽपि वन्तुगत्या तयोः क्रमेऽपि न वाक्यदेषः । सर्वेश्व श्रीकर निश्चादिभिक्तद भ्रुपगमात् सर्वे समाधेयिमर न् । एक्ष्रियाभावपचे च मातापितरौ मातरपितर वित्यच माद्रप्रवन्ध्य पूर्वश्ववयात् समासेक्ष्रियोख तुस्य-प्रतीतिजनकात्वाभावे विकल्यायाग्रह्मापि तथा प्रतीतिर श्रुपेषा विग्रह्माक्षेत्र पूर्वश्वविपातिनयमे नानुग्रासनिक्ष क्ष्यापि व्याख्याद्रसम्प्रदायसिद्रोऽप्रयोव । न हि क्षापि पिता च माता च पितराविति विग्रहं दृश्यते किन्तु माता पिता खिपतरावित्य विग्रवे विग्रवे विग्रवे विग्रवे विग्रवे तथातेन तस्वापि विनिग्रमकता सम्भवती-त्यनेन तथोकोः सम्भवः ।

पितुः पुत्रान्तरसाधारणं मातुक्वसाधारण्यमिति प्रवासत्तिरि जनकताया ज्ञ्ञासुन्त्रवित्तित्रिप तद्भिप्रायेखेवाका । साधारण्यासाधारण्ये हि सन्बन्धकते ज्ञासुन्त्रप्रकृतिविजम्बाविजम्बने भवत एव तथानुभवात्। वाक्याचेबोधे क्रमाभावे किमिति वस्तुक्रम खास्रीयत इति स्रीकरोक्तिस्तु वस-नान्तरे निरपेच्तसाम्यावगत्या क्रमापेच्यया स्मृतिचन्द्रिकाकारादिभिरप्यवश्यं निरस्तेव।

7. रहिष्णुवचनविरोधः परन्दुबत्तरे। दिश्राख्यते तत्रापि यथाश्राक्ति प्रतिविधीयते । गौरवप्रतिपादकानि वचनानि तावन्मातापिद्धविषयाणि विबद्धानि
दृश्यन्ते । तानि विषयव्यवस्थयावश्यमविरोधन्नेयानि । तथा हि । उपाध्यायादश्याचार्यः
स्थाचार्याणां श्रतिम्पता । सहस्रन्तु पितुर्माता गौरवेणातिरिच्यते ॥ गर्भधारणपिषाभ्यान्तेन माता गरीयसीत्यादीनि मातुरभ्यित्वत्पप्रतिपादकानि । तथारिष पिता
स्थेयान् वीजप्राधान्यदर्श्वनादित्यादिस्मृतिवचनानि । पित्राच्या परस्ररामेण मातुः ।
श्रिरिक्षम् । रघुनायेन कौश्रस्थया निवारितेनापि पित्राच्या राज्यं विद्याय
वनवास स्थादत हत्यादिपौराणिकान्यर्थदर्शनानि च पिद्यपुज्यताप्रत्यायकानि ।

तेवाचायमविरोधप्रकारः। यः पिता महागुरुकचार्योपेतः स गुरुर्यः क्रियाः क्रुत्वा वेदमसी प्रयक्ति वादियागिश्वरादिवचौभिः प्रतिपादिता माता च तदाचावश्वर्त्त-लादिपतिवतालप्रये।जनसमस्त्रनस्य स्वादिष्ता। तयार्मध्ये मातुरपेस्रया पितैवाधिका-भ्यर्ष्टितः। यत्र तु माताबन्धत्यादिवत्यमत्तपतित्रतागुर्वोपेता पिता तु जन्ममात्रप्रदः तत्र मातैव पितृरपे द्यथाभ्यधिकमान्या । चिरकारिकापाख्यानारौ महाभारता-दणेवसुपाखानसरसादयमर्थ उत्तीर्थते । तदत्रापि मन्वादिवचनेव्वपुत्रपुत्रधनग्रहमाः धिकारः क्रचित् मातुः प्रथमं क्रचित्यितुः प्रतोयमान रवमेव व्यवस्थापयितुमर्दः। तथा हि। खनपत्यस्य पुत्रस्य माता दायमवाप्र्यात्। मातर्थ्यपि च बत्तायां पितुर्भाता हरेडनिमिति मनुः। भार्या स्तिविहीनस्य तनयस्य स्टतस्य च। माता रिक्यहरी चेया भाता वा तदनुचयेति रुइस्पतिः। पुनर्मनुरेव। पिता इरेदपुचस्य रिक्यं भातर एव वेति ॥ तदभावे पिता तदभावे मातेति प्राग्दर्भितं रहिष्णुवचनादि । यागीश्वरवचने तु पितरावित्यच विज्ञानेश्वरोक्तरीत्या प्राक्नाता तदनु पिता। अन्य-मते सम्भयविभागः पितुर्वा प्राचन्यमिति विप्रतिपत्तौ पितुरधिकमान्या या माता सा पितुरपे ज्ञया प्रथमाधिकारिसी। या तु पितुरपे ज्ञया न्यूनमानभाक् सा पितुः पञ्चात्। युक्तञ्चेतत्। खत्वादिसम्बिधानमकुर्व्वतः पितुरपेच्यया मातुरेवाधिकापकारक-लाडनग्रहत्वम्। बन्धादिसन्विधानकर्तुंन्तुं तस्य यावन्त्रीवम्भरत्वपेषितादिनातिप्रिय-तापकारकस्य धनग्रहणमिति सर्व्यस्तीनां सर्व्यनिवन्धानाचादुःस्थता भवतीत्वादि सधीभिविभाव्यम् ।

PART V.

1. पित्रोरमावे स्नातरे धनमाजः। यद्यप्यपुत्रधनं स्नाह्मानि सपुत्रस्य स्व-र्थातस्य स्नाह्मानि त्रयं तदभावे पितरावित्यादिग्रस्युपेठीनसिवसनयोः। स्नातर रवेति मनेश्व पित्रतः प्राक् स्नाह्मां धनग्रस्यं प्रतीयते। मातर्थिप च सत्तायां पितुर्माता सरेद्धनमिति च मनुवसने स्नाह्मतः प्राक् पितामद्याः। तथापि क्रमपर्युगीनश्वर- रहिष्णुवचनाविरोधाय, तेषां धनाधिकारमात्रपरत्वमेतत्क्रमाविरोधसूचनार्धमेव मनुना भातर रव वेति पैठीनसिनापि च्येष्ठा वा पत्नीति वाग्रब्दः प्रयुक्तोऽन्यथा तुल्य-कत्त्राधिकारिषु तस्त्रयागोऽत्यन्तमयुक्तः स्यादिति मितान्त्रराकारादया बन्दवः।

कल्पतरकारस्त प्रतीभादस्येते स्राडाद्यधिकारियो साध्वी प्रती प्रथमाधिकारियो तदन्या तु भाद्यपिदते। प्रतिमास्य । पिद्धभादस्यते तु पिद्धपितामद्याद्यपार्जितं यिद्धभागेन पुत्रे संक्रान्तधनन्तसिव्वपुत्रे प्रमीते पित्रोः पिद्धवद्यादिरेधिन यत्तेने।पार्जिनतन्तियाः सते।रिप भाद्यामिनेत्वाद्य ।

मम तु प्रतिभाति मातर्थीप च रत्तायामिति मनुवाको। तदभावे मातापितराविति प्रस्नुपेठोनसिवचनयोः। तता दायमपुत्रस्य विभन्नेरन् सहोदराः। तुस्या
दुष्टितरेः वाणि त्रियमायः पितापि वा। सवर्षा भातरेः माता भार्या चेति यथा
क्रमम्। तेषामभावे प्रक्रीयः कुत्सानां सहवासिन इति देवजवचने। सर्वेत्रापि
रत्तायां तदभावे यथाक्रमित्यादिपदेः क्रमप्रतीतेयात्रिवरहृहिष्णुवचनयारेव
क्रमप्रत्विमतरेषान्वधिकारमात्रप्रत्वेन तद्दिरोधेन तत्त्तत्त्रस्यानिविष्णेऽप्यद्यतिरित
समाधिनव साधः जिन्त चेत्रजादिपुत्रस्थे यथा स्मृतिवचनक्रमविपर्यास स्थारसानुकूस्यपातिकूस्यगुव्यवत्त्वागुव्यवत्त्वादिभिर्यवस्थापितस्त्रधात्रापि दायभागप्रकर्ये
पुत्रादीनांम्पित्राद्यपकारकत्वित्तीर्त्तनस्य गुव्यवत्त्वादिभिर्ययावचनं
सत्तितारतम्यवत्। धनस्यान्यपकारातिष्रयानित्रप्रयगुव्यवत्त्वागुव्यवत्त्वादिभिर्यथावचनं
सन्तितारतम्यवत्। धनस्यान्यपकारातिष्रयानित्रप्रयगुव्यवत्त्वागुव्यवत्त्वादिभिर्यथावचनं
सन्तिरार्तियद्यासः समाधेयाऽन्ये तु समाध्यः कुष्रकाशावकम्यनमात्रस्था
सनुपादेया इति। स्वमग्रेऽपीति सर्व्यं सस्यम्।

2. आहम्बिप प्रथमं सहैदिराः। अननारः सिपछाद्यस्य तस्य धनस्भवे-दिति मनुना। बह्वो ज्ञातया यस्य सकुत्या बान्धवास्त्रथा। यस्वासन्नतरस्त्रेषां से। प्रवासन्तर्याः हरेदिति । रहस्पतिना च। प्रवासन्त्रात्रप्रस्वेवासित विश्वेषवचने विनिग्रमक्तवेने हिः। भिन्नोदराकां मार्ह्यतिविपकर्षात्। स्नातर इति सामान्य-यह्यात्मोदराभावे भिन्नोदराः। इदमेव खक्तमुक्तं संग्रहकारेया। से। दर्थाः सन्त्यसे।-दर्थाः आतरो दिविधा यदि। विद्यमाने प्रयसे। दर्थो से। दर्थाः धनभागिन इति।

इति भाषधिकारः।

PART VI.

1. आत्रभावे तत्सुताः आहस्ता धनभाजः। न च तथा तत्सुता इति तथाग्रन्थेन आहमाहपुत्रयोः साद्रग्रप्रतिपादनात्। चनेकिपिटकाखान्तु पिटता भागकल्पनेतिवचनाचानयोः पित्रभावे विभन्य धनप्रद्रखमस्विति वार्च। विष्णुवचनाविरोधात् तथाग्रन्थ्य चग्रन्दार्धतात्। चन्यथा तथापदस्य पूर्वेत्राप्यन्वयसम्भवेन पित्रोभीद्रुखाद्य विभन्यग्रद्दखमित्यपि कृता न स्थात्। तचे दिष्णुवचनविरोधान्ने युच्ये
से।ऽत्रापि तुन्थः। चनेकिपिटकाणानिवितवचने भात्रभावे तेवामधिकारे सम्पन्ने

किसिंखिदप्यपुचे भाति प्रमीते विद्यमानानां भाद्यसं सर्वेशक्त इनसम्बर्धे जाते तिसामात् प्रामेव तन्मधोऽपि यदि किसिन्मृतक्तदा तत्पुचाबान्पिष्टके सच्च समिविभागे प्रसित्ते सिप्टिविभागमेव ते विभव्य ग्राक्षीयुर्न सर्व्वे पिष्टिवसमिनिवेतदर्थम्। आहस्ते तत्पुचाबान्पिष्टव्यधनेऽनिधिकारात्। पूर्वभावे परः पर इति यागीन्यरवचनात्तदमावे भाह्यपुचमानिति विद्यावचने भाह्यपरामर्थकतत्पदेन भाचभावाभिधानाच।

2. बाह्य चेब्वि प्रत्यासच्यितप्रयातपूर्वं सेदरबाह्य खप्ताम निर्मादर्याः।
युक्तचैतत्। खसेदरबाह्य चे हि धनिने मातरं विद्याय खपिताम हिविधि स्रत्यः
धनिपितः पिर्यहन्द्दातीति सेदरबाह्य प्रचाच्च घच्च स्वामिकारीति। न च
सपत्नीकाले चयायां आद्धरेवताला स्वामिका चित्राम्यक्ति तमानुप्रवेध हित वाचम्। माचादिश्रव्यानां सजननीपित्रजननीपिताम चननिव्ये सुख्यला सेनेव च
रूपे आद्धानुप्रवेश्व स्वर्यात्। यथा स्वर्यन्ता। स्वेन भर्त्रा सच्च आद्धं माता सुद्धः
स्वर्यात्। पिताम ही च स्वेनेव सेनेव प्रपिताम हीति ॥ सपत्रमा चादीना मनुप्रवेधः
प्रस्तुत्। सप्त्रा ये स्वताः केचित्रवृष्या वा स्विभेदिष वा। तेषामिष च देर्य स्वरेकोदिस्त्र पार्वे सिति स्वर्यादायाति। किखा सपत्रो कदेवताक आद्धि विधः पुत्रा दिसर्वे जना धिकारिक त्यास्य प्रस्ता चादीना स्वामित्र त्यास्य विश्वेषा विश्व

इति भातृयुत्राधिकारः।

PART VII.

1. आढमुत्राभावे गोत्रजाः। पूर्वेतिसप्रिक्ष्माढततस्त्रतिमञ्जा ग्राम्बन्ते गोवनी-वर्देन्यायात्।

ते च पितामची सिप्यद्धाः समानेदिकाख । तच प्रथमियतामची धनभाक् । मान्तर्यापि च दक्तायां पितुम्मीता चरेडनिमिति मानवान्माचनन्तरिम्पतामच्चा धनग्रच्छे प्रसक्ते पिचादीनां चाह्यसुतपर्यान्ताम्बद्धकमामामन्तर्यदनुप्रवेधासम्भवादुत्वर्वेऽपग्रे तदुत्वावनकारमानाच्यामामाम्बद्धमामानाच्याप्रस्ते विचानेन्तरः।

2. अत्र स्मृतिचित्रिकायाष्ट्रोष्ट्रश्च स्वत्र सक्पेके प्रेमंस एव गोत्रजा न तु स्मिक्पाः। विक्पेक प्रेमो हि कुकुटानाय नियुनक्षियाम स्वादि वाका प्रेमायान्तरावगततात्पर्ययहिनन्यने न चात्र प्रमायानित्त। प्रस्तुत भाद्यस्तादिसाइचर्यं पृष्ठोत्रजयहृत एव साधकमितः। किस् प्रतीदृष्टिन्त्रादीनां स्वत्रयाहिकया धनयह्वाधिकारोक्षेत्रस्मात् स्त्रियो निरित्रिया सदायाहा सि अतेरस्त तद्यातिस्त्रविषयता गोत्रजादिस्त्रवे तिहरोधादिक्पेक प्रेषक स्वत्रवे हातुमहा। स्वत्यक स्रीवत्रवेशः पिता दायं विभवेदिकाप स्वत्रव्याच्या स्वने व हातुमहा। स्वत्यक स्वीवत्रवेशः पिता दायं विभवेदिकाप स्वत्रव्याच्या स्वत्रवेषि भाद्यपुत्रवेष स्वत्रविद्वप्यामिति पासिनिस्त्रयात् सुत्रवेष स्वत्र पुत्रास्य दिक्तरस्रिति पासिनिस्त्रयात् सुत्रवेष स्वत्र पुत्रास्य दिक्तरस्रिति

विष्ट्य विरूपेने से वे दुष्टि बामण्य पुषेऽनुप्रवेशः सकाते कर्त्तुं नाथापि पुमांसे दा-यादा न स्त्रियः। तसात् स्त्रिये। निरिन्त्रिया सदायादा इति स्रुतेरिति स्रुतिविरोधात्ता-त्यस्यादकमानाभावाच विरूपे क्रेसे वोऽनुस्रिकोऽण्यच न यास्त्र इति भाष्यकाराभिपायः।

जीमृतवाइने। प्रियाचनक्केन च वित्रादिदौद्दित्रस्थापि तद्गोत्रजातस्य पिख-दानानन्तर्थक्षमे वाश्विकारप्रतिपत्त्वर्थं गोत्रजपद्यद्वां क्रतम् । सपिखस्त्री वास् युदासार्थे व तासामतद्गोत्रजातत्वात् । चतर्यन च इति स्त्रीत्वनृष्टचौ नौधायनः । न दावित्रिरित्रया चदायादाच स्त्रिया मता इति श्रुतेरिति । न दायम् इति स्त्रीत्वन्तयः । प्रमादीनान्वधिकारोविश्येषवचनादिवद्य इति ।

3. तम्र साधः। मन्वादिवचनेषु प्राम्लिखितेषु पितामच्चा धनाधिकारस्य ऋष्ट्र-याच्चिकयेव विधानात्त्रदेकवाक्वतया याग्रीश्वरवचनस्यापि विरूपेक्क्रोपेख तत्संयहेऽपि स्रतेस्तदन्यंपरत्वेनाविरोधात्।

जीमृतवाइनस्य तु मायधिकारिवचारप्रसावे पितामद्यस्तानात्पूर्विम्पतामद्याव परतः पितामद्या धनाधिकारः। पिद्धः परते।मायधिकारवत्। याज्ञववकोन मायधिकारप्रदर्भनेनेव पिद्धव्यादिश्यः पूर्विम्पतामद्यपितामद्योरिधकारस्य सूचित-तात्प्रयङ्नेक्का इति वदते।ऽत्र च सपिख्द्योगुदासार्यक्रोत्रज्ञपद्यां वदतः पूर्वापर-विरोधानुसन्धानमपि नास्ति। प्रदक्ष्याद्यिकाय योजीश्वरवचने पितामद्याः पिद्धव्यादि-प्रक्रीवदनिभधानस्य तुल्यतात्तददेवादायादस्रुतिप्रवत्तेरिधात्।

विद्यारस्य स्वीक्षप्रसिक्षिते तस्माद्विदिन्त्रया इत्यादि स्वृतिस्यास्थाने तु स्वीक्षान्यप्रस्वप्रतिष्ठे भवने ने स्वाद्यः स्वृते क्षीक्षान्यप्रस्वप्रतिष्ठे भवने ने स्वाद्यान्य स्वाद्य स्

4. पितामच्या चभावे पितामचादयः समीचाः सपिखा धनभाजः। भिन्न-मीचाबां सपिखानां बन्धुग्रव्देन ग्रच्यात्।

तत्रापि पिढसन्तानाभावे पितामची पिवामचः पिढवास्तत्पुत्राख क्रमेख धन-भाजः। पितामच्यन्तानाभावे प्रवितामची प्रवितामचस्य स्थाता तत्सूनवखेवमासप्त-मात्समानग्रीत्राखां स्वविद्धानामपुत्रधनभाक्षम्।

सिप्रसामावे समाने।दकानाम्। ते च सिप्रसानामुपरि सप्त। जन्मनामचाना-विधवा वा। यथाच मनुः। सिप्रस्ता तु पृष्ठवे सप्तमे विनिवर्त्तते। समाने।दक्तभा-वन्तु निवर्त्तेताचतुर्द्भात्। जन्मनाम्नोः स्पृतेरेके तत्परं मोत्रमुखत इति । विख्युवचने वन्धुसकुल्यपदाभ्यां सिप्रसमोत्रौ स्टब्लेते इति प्रागेव प्रतिपादितम्। समाने।दका चिप्रस्यासत्तिक्रमेस धनभाजः।

5. समानेदिकाभावे बन्धवे धनभाजः । बन्धवस्य त्रिविधा सात्मबन्धवः पिद्ध-

बन्धवा मात्रवन्धवस्य । तथा स स्मृतिः । स्नात्मित्रत्वसः पुत्रा सात्ममात्रव्यसः स्ताः ॥ स्नात्ममातुष्वपुत्रास्य विद्येया स्नात्मवान्धवाः ॥ पितुः पित्रव्यसः पुत्राः पितुम्मीत्रव्यसः स्ताः । पितुम्मीतुष्वपुत्रास्य विद्येयाः पित्रवान्धवा ॥ मातुः पित्रव्यसः पुत्रा मातुम्मीत्र-व्यसः स्ताः । मातुम्मीतुष्वपुत्रास्य विद्येया मात्रवान्धवा इति ॥ तत्रापि प्रत्यासम्भवान्त्रयममात्मवन्धवस्तदनन्तरम्बित्रवन्धवस्तदन्तमात्रवन्धव इति क्रमः ।

मनुस्नृतौ तदभावे सकुत्थः स्यादाचार्यः शिष्य एव वेत्यत्र सकुत्यश्रब्देन समोत्रसमानादकानां मातुलादीनां वन्धत्रयस्य च ग्रह्यं यामीत्र्यवचनेऽपि बन्धपदेन मातुललच्यामन्यथा मातुलादीनामग्रह्यमेव प्रसन्धेतेति तत्पृत्राबान्धनाधिकारक्ततः प्रत्यासञ्जानान्तेषामेव स नेति महदनौचित्यमापद्येत ।

- 6. बन्धूनामभावे खाचार्कोधनभाक्। यद्यपि योगीश्वरवच्याचार्क्यानोपात्ततः चापि शिष्य उपात्तत्तः प्रधानतमः प्रत्यासद्वतम्खाचार्क्य बीवित्यादुपंत्रद्यश्चीयः। खाचार्कः शिष्य रववेति मनुना। पुत्राभावे प्रत्यासद्वः सपिग्रहत्तदभावे खाचार्कत्तद-भावेऽन्तेवासीत्वापत्तम्बेन च स्पष्टमेवाचार्काभावे शिष्यस्याधिकारबेधनाच।
- 7. शिव्याभावे समझचारी सङ्घाधावी धनभाक् । यस्येकस्मादाचार्याषुपन-यनाध्ययने ।
- 8. समस्मचारियोभावे ब्रास्मयहव्यक्यतिरिक्तं राजा ग्रञ्जीयात्। सद्दाध्या-यिपर्यंन्तमिधकारसुक्ता तदभावे ब्रास्मयधनवर्जं राजगामीति प्रागुदास्तविष्ठवच-नात्। सर्वेषामप्रभावे तु ब्रास्मया रिक्यभागिनः। त्रैविद्याः ग्रचयोदान्तास्त्रधाः धर्मो न स्थिते। खद्दार्यं ब्रास्मयधनं राज्ञा निव्यमिति स्थितिः। इतरेषान्तु वर्षानां सर्वाभावे स्रेमुप इति मनुवचनाच।
- 9. ब्राच्यवन्यं सब्द्यचारिपर्यन्ताभावे श्रोतिया ब्राच्यकः प्रथमं ग्रङ्गाति । तदभावे ब्राच्यक्यमाचम्। यथाङ् गौतमः। श्रोतिया ब्राच्यक्याग्यस्य रिक्यम्भजे-रिवित । ब्राच्यक्यमात्रन्तु मनुवचने ब्राच्यक्यमात्रग्रह्मात् । नारदीऽपि । ब्राच्यक्य-र्थस्य तद्याद्यक्षेत्र कस्यनं। ब्राच्यक्यस्य दातस्यमेनस्यी स्याद्यपि ॥

PART VIIL

1. पुत्रादीनां पत्नीपर्यन्तानान्दायस्यायां वानप्रस्थादिविषयेऽपवादमास् या-जीन्त्ररः। वानप्रस्थयतिमस्यचारियां रिक्यभाजिनः। क्रमेखाचार्य्यस्क्तिस्यधम्मे भानेकतीर्थिन इति। ब्रह्मचार्येत्र नैष्ठिका यतिसास्चर्यात्। तेनेप्रकुर्वाखस्य धनं पुत्रादिदौष्टित्रान्तानामसम्भवात्यित्रादय उक्तक्रमेख ग्रह्मोयुः।

क्रमसात्र प्रतिवेतिन स्रोयः। तथा स्व नैष्ठिकस्य स्तस्य धनमाचार्यस्य यतेः सिक्ष्यस्य वानप्रसास्य धर्मानात्रेकतीर्थिनः।

धर्म्यभाता प्रतिपन्नो भाता । तीर्घग्रन्द खात्रमवाचित्वादेकतीर्थ्योकाश्वमी। धर्म-भाता चासावेकतीर्थी चेत्वर्थः। शिष्यस्य सत्त्वन्तु न सद्दृत्तत्वम् । दुर्श्वतपुत्रादीनामपि धनानधिकारस्य प्रमाया-नारेखेव प्राप्तत्वात् । तत्र वच्छते । किन्त्यभ्यात्मश्रास्त्रश्रवयधारयातदर्थानुरु। स्वास्त्रम् । प्रास्त्रम् ।

मदनरत्नकारक्तु। वानप्रस्थधनमाचार्यो एक्टीयाक्तिस्थोवेति विष्णुवचनं विखि-लानुक्तामनेव क्रमं मक्ता वानप्रस्थधनमाचार्योभावे शिस्थो एक्टीयादित्याच् ।

- 2. नन्वनंशास्त्राश्वमान्तरगता इति विश्वस्वादिव चनेनेस्विकादीनान्धनसम्बन्धा-भावस्य वस्त्रमाखलात्तद्वनग्रस्वाधिकारिकथनमत्रानुपपम्नं। न च रिक्थग्रस्वस्य तेषां विश्वस्वादिभिनिषेधेऽपि प्रकारान्तरार्ज्ञिततदीयधनाधिकारप्रतिपादकमिदस्भविष्य-तीति वास्त्रम्। ब्रह्मचारी यितस्वेव प्रकामसामिनावुभाविति स्म्रते ब्रह्मचारिकस्य प्रति-ग्रहादिनिषेधात्। स्विनचयोभिन्त्रिति यतेष्ठैंश्वसस्वस्त्रेव निषेधादाधनमिति चेत्।
- न । वानप्रसास्य तावत् च्यज्ञोमासस्य वसां वा तथा संवत्सरस्य वा । चर्षस्य विचयं कुर्यात्मृतमान्यगुने स्वजेदिति॥वचनाङ्गोजनादिपर्याप्तयत्तिचिद्धनसंग्रहीऽस्त्येवः। यतेरिय । कौपीनाच्छादनार्थं दि वासे। व विभ्याद्यतिः । योगसम्भारभेदां च ग्रही-यात्पादुने तथित ॥ वचनादस्त्रपृक्तकादि किस्विदस्त्येव । नैस्विकस्यापि क्ररीरयाचार्थं वस्त्रादिसम्बन्ध चावस्त्रकः । तेन स्तानान्तेषां तत्तत्वेन ग्राष्ट्रामित्यपेद्यान्दायादानारा-मवादेनतेऽधिकारिया उच्यन्त इति ।

CHAPTER IV.

1. षय संविष्टधनविभागः। तत्र मनः। विभक्ताः सद्द जीवन्तो विभन्नेरन् पुनर्येदि। समस्तत्र विभागः स्थात् न्येद्यं तत्र न विद्यत इति॥ षत्र समविभागिनय-भादेव विषमविभागप्रकारिनरासे सिद्धे न्येद्यन्तत्र न विद्यत इति पुनर्वचनं न्येद्यादिकृत एव विषमविभागो न भवति वञ्चन्यधनसंसर्गानुरोधी तु विषमविभागो भवत्येवेति स्चनार्थम्।

केचित्र संस्टब्ड्योपचयां प्रन्येद्यादिकते विषमविभागो भवत्येव । संस्टब्ड्य-विभागस्त सम य्वेत्येतज्ज्ञापनाय च्येद्यमिति वाक्यप्रेष इत्याजः ।

तंत्र रतादृश्यवस्थाया चस्माद्यतीतेः। समस्तत्र विभागः स्यादित्युक्त्या द्रयोप-चयेऽपि साम्यनियमप्रतीतेः।

- 2. संव्हितिभागेऽप्यितभक्तितिभागवत्यं व्हट्ट व्याविरोधेन विद्यादि लक्ष्या-विभाज्यत्वन्तु स्थमेव प्राप्तमपवदित ब्हस्यितः। संव्हित्यान्तु यः कि सिद्धिद्या-भौर्यादिनाधिकम्। प्राप्तीति तस्य दातस्योद्यां श्रोषाः समाधिनः॥
- 3. संस्टिता च पित्रादिनैव कर्त्तवा नान्धेन विभक्तो यः पुनः पित्रेत्यादिः प्राक्षिक्तित्रस्यातिवचनादिति नहवः।

वयन्तूपत्रच्यास्मित्रादिग्रच्यासित्यादि प्रपश्चितम्।

4. खित्मक्तिमागवर्त्तस्विध्वपि मिघोविभागकर बात् प्राग्यास्तक्तस्य पुत्राः प्रमीतिपिद्धकाषान्तु पिद्धताभागकस्यनेतिवचनात् स्वस्पित्रं प्रविभन्य सङ्गीयः।

यस्य तु संविष्टिने स्टितस्य पुत्रादया न सिन्त तद्धनग्रह्यो प्रह्मीत्वादिवचनात्य-ह्मग्रदीनां प्राप्ते तद्यवादत्वेन खर्ष्यातस्य द्यपृत्रस्य वेत्वनृत्वसावाद्य यागीत्वरः संविष्टिनस्तु संविष्टीति । तुष्रव्दात्पूर्वीपवादः । खपृत्रस्य संविष्टिने स्टितस्य धनं संविष्ठ्येव ग्रद्धीयाद्य प्रह्मग्रदिरित्यर्थः । स्तेन प्रह्मग्रद्यपृत्रधनग्रह्याधिकारिग्रके आत्रिधकारावसरे वचन-मिदं प्रवर्त्तत इति व्याचन्ताको जीमृतवाद्यने आन्तरवेत्ववसेयम् ।

ष्यसाप्यपवादः। सेादरस्य तु सेादरः। दद्याचापचरेचांग्रञ्जातस्य च स्टतस्य-चेति । संस्टिंगः संस्टोलस्यात्रापि सम्बन्धः । तथाचायमर्थः । सेदरः संस्टि संस्-चिनः सेादरस्य जातस्य पुत्ररूपेकोत्यद्गयां ग्रन्दद्यात्तत्व त्राव द्यादिति यावत् । म्तत्स पुत्रादित्रयरूपेबापात्रीवतेश्वमपद्देशात्मसात्कुर्यात् सयमेव स्क्रीयांदिवर्धः । पदद्वयानुषद् विनेव थाख्याने तुश्रब्दवलायातमस्य पूर्व्वापवादत्वं भन्येत । रवस् साद-रासीदरमंद्रिसद्भावे सादर एव संदृष्टी सादरसंदृष्टिधनग्रह्याधिकारी न भिन्नोदर इति पूर्वीक्षापवादः। यत्र तु भिन्नोदर एवं संख्छी सेादरास्य न। तत्र दयार्विभन्य पुत्रादिर दितमाद्रधनग्रहणमिलाइ। अन्योदर्यसु संस्टी नान्योदर्थी धनं हरेत्। चसंख्छापि चाददात्संख्छोनान्यमाटज इति ॥ चत्रासंख्छिपदं काका-चिवत्यूर्वे। तरा इंगेरिय संबंधते। तथा संख्य इत्यपि। तथ पूर्वार्डे युकादरसंख्यः वादर इत्यर्थक उत्तरार्डे तु संस्टित्वार्थकं। अन्यमात्म इत्यनन्तरस्वेवकारीऽध्या-चार्यः। ततसायमर्थः। सन्योदर्योऽसादराऽपि संस्की चेद्रनं चरेत्। ससंस्की चेदन्गीदर्थी न इरेत्। तथा चान्यव्यतिरेकप्रदर्शनेन श्रिजीदरस्य संस्टिलमेवैकं धनग्रहमानारमं न भाटलमात्रमित्युत्तं भवति। तथा संस्टः शेदरीऽसंस्ट्यपि चेद्रमं इरेत्विमुत संस्कृत । संस्कृतः संस्क्ष्यप्यन्यमात्म स्वैकेत धमद्र इरेत्। किन्तु सेदरेकासंब्दिनापि सद्द विभन्य ग्रङीयात्। खत्रायं पर्थ्ववसिताऽर्घः। असंस्थिसेदरे संस्थिभिन्नोदरे च सत्यपुत्रभातुर्द्धनं सेदरलसंस्थिलक्पेनेक्यन-यद्यकार खयागातामं विभन्य यक्तीयाताम् । सेदिराऽपि चेत्रांक्की कार बदययागेन बजवन्तातार्वें स एव ग्रञ्जीयादिति।

अत्र चैकैकिनियमेगार्थाद्यरकारखनिराससिद्धाविप दृढीकरखाय पुनस्तिः रासः। उभयथापि वाकाशृत्यक्तेः।

पुंजिक्क संख्छोत्वादाविविच्चितमतस्य मनुना चेदरअंगिनीनामिष तद्धन-राच्यमुक्तम्। यथाइ। विभक्ताः सङ् जीवन्तो विभव्जेरन् पुनर्थदीति संख्छिविभाग्न-स्मक्रम्य। येथां व्येष्ठः किन्छो वा चीयेतांग्रप्रदानतः। नियेतान्यतदोवािष तस्य भाग्नो न ज्याये। चेदर्था विभव्जेयुक्तं समेत्व सिक्ताः समम्। आतदो ये च संख्छा भीग-न्यस्य सनाभय इति ॥ येथां संख्छिनां मध्येऽन्यतरः संख्छी व्येष्ठः किनक्कोऽपि मध्य-मेवांग्रप्रदानता चीयेतानिधकार्यंग्रप्रदाने स्थात्। सार्व्वविमिक्किकात्वात्वप्रमर्थे तसिः। विमागकाले पातित्वेनात्रमान्तरपरियष्टिय वा। क्षियेत वाऽप्रचीतभागएव। तिष्टं तस्य भागो न जुप्यते एचगुद्धरणीयः। स च प्रथमं तत्पृत्तादिभ्यैदियः। तदभावे वेदस्यां क्षातराऽसंख्या व्यपि। समेत्व देशान्तरगतात्तत व्यागत्व सिंहता मिलिताः। वे च क्षातरा भिन्नोदरा व्यपि संख्याः संख्यिनः सनामयास्तत्य सिंहादरा भगिन्य सममवेद्यके विमञ्जय्विभव्य प्रक्रोयुरित्वर्षः। वाच वेदरकातरभगिनीनामसंसर्गे-ऽपि संसर्गे च भिन्नोदराक्षामपि धनाधिकारमिनद्धता मनुना योगीत्रयरोक्त एवार्षः स्वयम्त्रों भवति।

5. खन्न श्रीकरः। संब्धिनन्तु संब्धीखसासीदरसंब्धिमान्नविषयतेद्रमानपेन्नालात् सेदरस्य तु सेदर इत्यसाप्यसंब्धसेदरमान्नविषयते तथालादसेदरे संब्धिति सेदरे चासंब्धिन्युभयोः प्राप्ती यदि दयमेव प्रवक्तते तदान्योद्रम्यसापेन्नयोत्तमयार्विधायकावं स्थात्। नचेकस्य सापेन्निरपेन्नोमयरूपतया विधायकावं
विधिवषम्यापादकम् चितम्। यथा दयोः प्रखयन्तीखस्य न वैद्यदेव उत्तरविदिमिखादिनिष्ठेधक्ततिकन्त्रमापेन्नं पर्वदये विधानमन्यपर्वदये तु निरपेन्नमिति सप्तमाधिक्रद्ये विधिवषम्भयादन्यथा सिद्धान्तितम्। तथा चासेदरे संब्धिन्यसंब्धिनि
च सेदरे उभयारप्रवत्तौ न केदिप तद्यनं प्रश्नीयदिखापतेत्। चतः संब्धिनविद्यत्यनेन संब्धिनेद्रिधनेद्रिधनार उक्ते तद्यवादेद्रयं सेदरस्य त्विति। तथा
च संब्धिनोद्रयसेदरस्य सेदरे संब्धित्यस्थिति विद्यापति । सिता नाधिकार हत्याच् ।

यदिष खयमुपवर्शितं संख्छिनिष्वत्वस्थापवादः छेादरस्य तित्वादिदिति। तदत्वसम्बद्धं। विनिगमकाभावेन वेपरोत्वस्थापि सम्भवात्। पौर्वापर्यभाषस्याप्रयोजन्वतात्। तषान्धोदर्यवचनं संख्छिनिष्वत्वस्थिव विवर्णार्थमित्युक्तं। तेन वचीभङ्गानर्थन्वमेव तस्थाक्तम्। किश्व सेादरेऽसंख्छिनि संख्छासे। स्राप्यादार्थं सेादरवचनस्य वर्षनात्योदरासे। दर्यात्वभयोरप्यसंख्छिते प्रवन्तभावात् तुत्त्याधिकारे। वा दयोरिष स्थात्। अधान्नापि सेादरवचनमेव प्रवन्ति तर्ज्यक्त संख्छिवचनवाधसापे सम्मयन तु निर्मेच्यमिति प्रत्युत तवेव विधिवक्ष्यम्। यथा सोमिकी वेदिविधिदीं च्याबीयादि-स्वितिद्वेश्वपाप्तदर्शयोर्थमासिकवेदिवाधेन विधीयेत ति त्व तनातिदेशवाधसापे च्यक्ति विधिरन्यन तिविधिरी च्यक्ति।

चस्मन्मते तु खास्थातरीत्वा दयाभिन्नविषयत्वेनामर्घकावेरूप्ययोन्ने प्रसन्तिरिति-क्वतं विस्तरेख ।

6. स्मृतिचिन्द्रिकाकारस्वाष्ट्र। येषां च्येष्ठः किनिक्रीवेत्यादिमनवचने चम्रब्देन चादरभादभगिन्यचादरसंख्यभाद्रवामितरेतरयुक्तानां विभागकर्देतायाः समेळ-सङ्गिप्रब्दाभ्यामवगतेर्थे। गीश्वरवचने च संदृष्टिसे दरसङ्घावे निन्नोदरस्यानधिकारा-वगतेरिक तावदनयार्विरोधे तद्विरोधपरिचारार्थं केचिदेवं मानवं व्याचकते। तमन्त्रमागं सेादरा यदि संस्कास्तरा तस्व ग्रङ्गोयुनीसंस्किनः सेादरा सपि। संख्छेचादरामावे सर्वे चादराः समेख मिलिला सहिताः समप्रधानभावेन सममन्यनाधिकं विभन्नेरन् सेादराबामभावे सनाभया भगिन्यक्तासामप्यमावेऽन्योदर्थाः इति। तदेतदनेकाध्याचारदेषादितिक्षिष्टलाचे।पेचाबीयम्। विचानेश्वरव्याख्यानमि मानवसंवादायान्योदर्थम्तु संस्कृती नान्योदर्थी धनं इरेदिति पाठेन यांगीत्रार-वचनस्य यत्तरप्याख्त्राश्चारादिना क्षिष्टमत्वन्ताप्रतीयमानार्धनं खप्रज्ञानिजसित-मात्रम्। तसाद्ययाप्रतीयमानार्थनाये। देव मनुयागीश्वरवाकाये। विषयकावस्रायेवावि-रोधो वाचो नाति सिछैनार्थीनेति । सैवीचिते । स्थावर जन्नमात्मकाभयविधधनसङ्घावे मनुवचनं संस्टिशसंस्टानां भादृयां भगिनीनाच विभन्य ग्रह्यं बेाधयति। यागीत्रर-वर्षेल नेवलस्यावरसद्भावे नेवलतदितरम्बसद्भावे वा तिष्वयम्। अनिर्वतन् यद्-त्रथं संख्छानान्तु तद्भवेत्। भूमि प्रचन्यसंख्छाः प्रश्रक्षोयुर्थथांश्रत इति प्रजापित-स्मृते । द्रथमिति गोवितवर्द्न्यायेन प्रकटस दिपदचतुष्पदादिरूपस जन्नमद्रथस ग्रहणम्। संख्छानां भिन्नोदराणामिति श्रोषः। यागीश्वरवचित नान्गोदर्थादिति पाठः। तसात् केवलस्थावरसद्भावे केवलजक्षमसद्भावे च यागोश्वरवचनादसंस्कृते-ऽपि सेादरसाइग्रङ्गीयात्र तु संस्क्ष्टोऽपि भिन्नोदरः । उभयविधधनसङ्कावे तु प्रजापितवचनाक्ष्यवस्थ्या संख्छाः सादरा भादभगिन्यः संख्छा भिन्नोदरास वि-भन्य स्इतियः। मनुवचनस्याप्येतदर्धतेवेति।

तदसत्। चध्याद्वारिक्षास्त्रतादिदेषस्य तवाप्यनपायात्। प्रजापितवचने सिख्यवस्याया विचानेश्वरीयस्थास्थाने ऽप्यविरोधात्। चतरव मदनरस्रकृता तद्वास्थानमध्यु-पेखेव प्रजापितवचनमपि स्थवस्थापकतया पठितम्। प्रस्तुत भवद्वास्थाने येगिश्वर-वचने पौनवस्यं दुष्परिद्यमापद्यते। चन्योदस्यं संस्त्री नान्योदर्थोधनं दृरेदि-स्वनेनोक्तस्यवार्थस्य संस्त्रीनान्यमाद्यज्ञ इस्वनेनान्यूनानितिरक्तस्य प्रतिपादनात्। मान-वसंवादिनोऽपुनवक्तस्यार्थस्य क्षेत्रोनापि वक्तं प्रकारते मूलभूतस्रुत्यन्तरकस्पनागौरवा-पादकस्यार्थान्तरस्य कल्पयितुमन्चितलाच।

7. याच्यक्कारस्तिटीकायां श्रूकपाशिः। चन्योदर्थः संस्कृति नाम्योदर्थधर्नं सङ्कृति वास्योदर्थाः सङ्कृति वास्यादर्थाः सन् संस्कृति पाठे चन्योदर्थः सन् संस्कृति धनं न सङ्कृत्यादिति चास्या। चनं चरिति पाठे चन्योदर्थः सन् संस्कृति धनं न सङ्कृत्यादिति चास्या। चर्मस्कितेत्वाच ।

तत्तु श्रीकरमतसमानयागन्तेमम् । रत्नाकरक्षत्ताष्ट्र यस्तु कस्पतरी मान्धीद-र्ष्यभनं इरेदिति पाठो दृश्यते स मूकभूतयाज्ञवस्कामितान्तरापारिजातष्ट्रसायध-याश्येषु मान्धोदर्थो धनं इरेदिति पाठदर्श्यमात्तदनुसारिखास्थानदर्शमाच किपिप्रमाद स्वेति ।

8. दायतत्त्वकारत्तं सेादरेऽसंखिति संखित्यसेादरे च कतरत्तावद् ग्रङीयात्। यवं सेादरासेादरयाः संखितिः सद्भावे कतर इत्यम प्रथम चाष्ट् चन्योदर्व्यक्ति। चन्योदर्वः पृनः संख्छी सन् ग्रङीयाज्ञान्योदर्व्यमामः। किन्वसंख्छापि
पूर्ववचनखासादरपदानुषद्भात् सेादरा ग्रङीयात्। तेनेकच विषये पूर्ववचनाक्तियाददलसंख्यित्यारेकणः सम्बन्धेन तुत्व्यत्वादिभन्यग्रहण्यमेतदुभयसत्त्वे वासेादरखासंख्यिनेऽतुत्व्यक्ष्पत्वाज्ञित। दितीय चाष्ट संख्यो नान्यमाद्यम इति। केादरे संख्ये
सत्यन्यमाद्यमः संख्योऽपि न ग्रङीयात्। चर्यात्त्व संख्यो सेादर यव ग्रङीयात्।
संख्यताविण्रेषेऽपि सेादरत्वन तस्त्वेव वलवन्तादित्याष्ट्र।

तदपि मिताचारादिसम्बाखेव खाखानाकौग्रलन्वधिकम्।

9. यदा तु संस्वः पिता पित्रः वा नाक्ति तदाऽसंस्वः भिन्नोदरी ग्रङी-यात्। तदभावे त्यसंस्वः पिता। तदभावे तत्यत्नी। तथा च प्रद्यः। खर्यातस्य द्यपुत्रस्यं भादगामि द्रष्यं तदभावे पितरौ द्वरेयातां न्येस्रा वा पत्नीति। खर्यातस्या-पुत्रस्य संस्वस्य संस्वः भावे भिन्नोदरासंस्वः भादगामि द्रव्यमित्यः। तेन संस्वः-भनविषये यथास्थितमेवेदं वा वचनमिति स्मृतिचित्रकामदनरत्नकारावाद्यः। संस्वः भादविषयमेवेतत्त्रेन पित्रपत्नगोक्तदभाव इति न विवद्यमिति मिताद्यरा-

संख्यभाद्धविषयमेवैतत्तेन पिद्धपद्ध्योत्त्वदभाव इति न विरद्धमिति मितास्त्ररा-कारादयः।

स्मृतिचित्रकायां प्रकृतचने व्येष्ठग्रह्यां सुसंयतलादिगुयावत्त्वकथनाथं न तु
मध्यमादिनिक्चर्यम्। पुनरिप तदभाव इति वक्षये वाण्यव्दः प्रयुक्तः प्रकसान्यात्।
तथा हि। वाण्यव्दादिकच्यः प्रतीयते। न चात्र खान्यरूपे बन्तुनि तुन्यवद्विकच्यः
सम्भवति न हि वक्तुनि विकच्यन्ते इति न्यायस्य प्रास्त्रसिद्धत्वात् उपपत्तिसिद्धत्वाच।
तस्मादत्र वाण्यव्दादभावविकच्यावगतेः प्रकसान्यमस्येव। यवद्यायं क्रमः भाषभावे
पिता तदभावे माता तदभावे व्येष्ठा प्रक्षीति।

मदनरत्ने तु मातापित्रोविपरीतक्रमः। मिताच्चरीक्तन्थायादिभक्तासंस्टिवि-षयिविष्णुवचनवदत्र न्यायबाधकवचनाभावादिति तदायग्रः। खतरव पत्नी दुच्चितर इतिवचने विष्णुवचनान्रेधिन स्मृतिचिन्द्रकावत्यितरावित्यत्र प्राक् पिता तदभावे मातेत्येव तत्रोक्तम्। प्रपश्चितच्चैतदिक्तरेबास्माभिः प्रागेव।

ततस्य प्रतीद्विचादिक्रमिविरोधादिविरोधायैतत्वं ख्रष्टभागविषयमिति काल्यते। विभक्तोक्षानेयायिकपत्नीदुव्वचादिक्षमाऽच वार्चानकक्षमेख वाध्यते । ख्रस्मिन् क्षमे कस्यक्रिद्यायस्थाभावादाचिनक स्वायं क्षमः। नारदेऽिष । स्वते पत्यौ तु भार्यास्तु ख्रभाद्विद्यमाद्वकाः। सर्वे सिपिखास्तु धनं विभन्नेयुर्यशांग्रत इति॥ ख्रस्यार्थः। भार्याः प्रत्यः । ख्याद्धपिद्धमाद्धवाः याः प्रत्युक्षीद्धपिद्धमातरक्षद्भावविविद्धाः इत्यर्थः । ख्या इन्द्रसमासे भाष्यपेद्धायाश्वरिक्षिपादिपदपूर्व्वनिपातं परित्यक्य वैपरीत्येन समासरचनां कुर्वेता नारदेन संस्ट्यापुष्पद्ययं प्रथमं भाद्धगामि तद्भावे पिद्धगामि तद्भावे स्त्रस्थाप्त्रमामीति द्धितम् ।

रवस संख्छपत्नीनां मुख्योग्रियमावे न प्रथमं दावस्यतं विन्तु संख्छि-सेदरिभिन्नोदरभादिपिदमादृगामप्यभावे इति नद्यस्। सर्वे सिपख्यास्वित्वादेस्वय-मर्थः। संख्छापुत्रस्य ये आद्यपिद्यमाद्यविदिक्ताः सिपख्या आद्यपुत्रादयस्ते खधनं पूर्वमपुत्रधनेन सम् सिप्यादिना संख्यं तदूर्द्धं तत्पत्नीभिः सम् ययांग्रता आद-पुत्रामां आत्रंशो भार्यामां भन्नेंग्र द्रश्वेनमंग्रानतिक्रमेस विभन्नेयुरिति।

- 19. पत्नाभावे संस्कापुत्रां तद्भागि जभते। तथा च रहस्यतिः। या तस्य भगिनी सा तु ततार्रं ग्रं जन्युमर्हति। धनपत्यस्य धन्मीर्ययमभार्थापिरकांस्य च ॥ धनारकस्य चेति चग्रन्दार्थः।
- 11. भिंगन्यभावे केवनाः सिपछा चनन्तराः सिपछा स्ट्राइन्द्र्यं विभन्नेरन् यथां प्रतः तद्द्यं तस्य तस्य धनन्भवेदिति मनूक्षप्रव्यासिक्ष केमेरन्। प्रतिपदी-क्षानामभावात्। तथा च स रव। स्तेत्रप्रव्योऽभार्यभ्रेदभार्द्रपिष्टमार्टकः। सर्वे सिपछात्तद्द्यं विभन्नेरन् यथां प्रतः॥ तद्द्यं संस्टिस्टियम्। स्ते । स्ते । प्रतिपदाक्षसंस्टिस्यम्। स्ते । प्रतिपदाक्षसंस्टिस्यम्। स्ते । प्रतिपदाक्षसंस्टिस्यभग्याद्विरिस्विदिस्यर्थः।

सिपाछाभावे तु विभक्तस्तधनवदेव संक्ष्यस्थातद्रयमि प्रागुक्तकमेब प्रत्या-सत्तितारतच्येन समाने।दकादिगामीति दृष्टयम्। संक्ष्यद्रयमधिकत्व सिपाछेभ्य ऊर्द्धः विभ्रोषासुतिरिति।

वैषणक्पवाकाभेदापत्तेः। किस पित्रादित्रख्यसाम्ये पुत्रतादिक्रमेवापिततत्वादिविभिष्टं प्रयोजकं न तु संस्टलविभिष्टमिप गौरवात्। तच सर्व्वां संस्टानामसंस्टानास् तुस्यमिति सर्व्वेषामेव पुत्रादीनामविग्रेषेण तद्धनग्रहणस्चितम्। न च विभागेन पित्रादित्रखाईत्वापग्रमः। सर्व्वेषु पुत्रेषु विभक्तासंस्टिख्यपुत्रवद्गार्थोदीनामेव तत्र धनाधिकारापत्तेः। प्रयुतापक्तम्बेन हारीतेन च विभागोत्तरमपि पितापुत्रयोः परस्परधनाधिकारप्रतिपादनाच। यथाहतुक्तो। जीवन्नेव वा विभन्य वनमात्रयेत् रद्धात्रमं वा गच्छेत् खल्पेन वा संविभन्य भूयिस्मादाय व सेत् यद्यपद्ययेत् पुनक्तेभ्यो ग्रिकीयात् जीयाद् विभन्नेदिति। रद्धात्रमं पारिन्नाच्यम्। उपद्ययेद्ग्ल्याभावेन जीयेत।

विभक्तजे तु सित पूर्वविभक्तानां पुत्राखां प्राप्तोऽपि पिट्टधनाधिकारो रहस्पति-वचनेनापाद्यते। यथाइ सः। खनीष्राः पूर्वजाः पित्रोक्षांतुर्भागे विभक्तजः। पुत्रैः सह विभक्तने पित्रा यत् खयमर्जितम्। विभक्तजस्य तत् सर्वमनीष्राः पर्वजाः स्नृताः। यथा धने तथार्षेच दानाधानक्रयेषु च। परस्परमनीष्राक्ते सुकाशौचोदकिवासिति॥

इति संख्छविभागः।

CHAPTER V.

PART I.

1. स्रय स्त्रीधनविभागं वक्तन्तत्सरूपन्त विद्वरूपते। तत्र मनः। स्रधान्य-धावहनिकन्दत्त प्रोतिकर्भीय। आद्यमादिपिद्धपाप्तं विद्वर्धं स्त्रीधनं स्नृतिनिति॥ विद्वधिमितिन्यूनसङ्गाद्यवन्त्रदेपरद्वाधिकानिरासाय। स्रतय्व ये।ग्रीश्वरेण पिद्यमाद्य-पित्माद्यस्त्रमध्यमुप्रपागतम् स्राधिवेदनिकाद्यस् स्त्रीधनं परिकीत्तितम्॥ हत्याद्यस्वद्य-प्रपात्तः। विष्णुनापि घडधिकानि स्त्रीधनान् क्तानि। स यथाद्य। पिद्यमाद्यस्त्रत्यस्त्रमध्यमुप्रपागतम्। स्राधिवेदनिकं बन्धुदत्तं शुल्कमन्वाधियमिति स्त्रीधनमिति॥ नारदः। स्रध्यमुप्रधावहनिकमाद्दरायस्त्रयेव च। आद्यद्तं पिद्यभाष्त्र विद्वर्थं स्त्रीधनं स्नृत-मिति। वृद्विधलं मानववदेव स्राख्येयम्।

2. स्त्रीधनग्रध्यस्यायं यौगिकः स्त्रीसाधिकत्यनिमिति । न तु पारिभाषिकः । यागसम्भवे परिभाषाया स्रन्थाय्यलात् । स्रतस्य यागिस्ररेश रिक्थक्रयादिसाधारस-स्रत्योगायसंग्रहायाद्यपदं प्रयुक्तम् ।

ननु च क्वचित् स्तीधनत्वनिषेधोऽनुपपन्न एवं सि। स्थात्। महि स्तीखामिकत्वं तच निषेडुं प्रकाते। वाधात्। यथाह कात्यायनः। तच सेपिध यह्तं यच योगन्वप्रेन वा। पित्रा स्वाचायवा पत्या न तत् स्त्रीधनसुच्यत इति ॥ उपिधकत्यवादा-वेवेदमस्य दत्तं त्या धार्य्यमलङ्कारादि नान्यदेतिनियमस्तत्पूर्वकदत्तं सेपिध। योगस्य न दायादानां कन्याये दत्तमिदन्तद्वनङ्कथं विभाज्यिनित। प्रास्त्रप्राप्तं सस्वादिश्यः प्रीत्या प्राप्तन्तदिप न स्त्रीधनमित्य याह स एव। प्राप्तं प्रास्त्रीत्या चेव यदन्यतः। मर्त्तुं खाम्यन्तदा तच प्रोवन्त स्त्रीधनं स्मृतिनित् । पारिभाधिकत्वे स्वाचादिदत्तत्वेन प्राप्तं स्त्रीधनं प्रतिविध्यते। तेनेतस्ताद्विद्यमेव पित्रादिदत्तं प्रिस्पादि-प्राप्तिमन्नं वा स्त्रीधनमिति परिभाष्यत इतिचेत्।

उचते। नाच स्तीधनलिनिष्धः। किन्तु तत्कार्यंविभागादिनिष्धेधः। स्वत्यं स्वेत्त्रस्त्रोके तच भर्तुः खान्यमित्युक्तम्। भर्त्तुं स्वितियोगे स्थातन्त्रम् स्विया-इत्यर्थः। प्रथमस्त्रोकेतु स्त्रीखलिनिष्धेर्रिष सम्भवति उपिध्येग्गपदयाकपादानात्। तादृश्चदाने च खलाभावण्य प्रसिद्धलात्। यागाधमनविक्रीतं येगादानप्रतिग्रहम्। यच चाण्यपिधम्प्रश्चेत्तसवें विनिवर्त्तयेदिति मनुवचनात्। भार्या पुचस्व दासस्य चय-स्वाधनाः स्पृताः। यत्ते समिध्याक्कृत्ति यस्य ते तस्य तद्धनिन्तयपि वचनम्भा-र्याविषये प्राल्पादिप्राप्तपरमेव। स्वमूलकल्पनालाधवात्।

3. खध्यम्प्रादिखरूपन्निरूपितं कात्यायनेन । विवाहकाने यत् स्त्रीभो दीयते द्वामिसिन्नियो । तद्य्यमिन्नतं सिद्धः स्त्रीधनं परिकोर्तितम् ॥ यत्पुनर्ह्वभते नारी नीयमाना पितुर्रदृशत् । खध्यावहनिक्षन्नाम स्त्रीधनन्तदुराहृतम् ॥ प्रोत्या दत्तं तु यत्विधिकृत्रा वा अत्रदेख वा । पादवन्दनिक्षन्नेव प्रीतिदत्तन्तदुखते ॥ विवाहात्परता यत्तु कथं भत्तृं कुकात् स्त्रिया । खन्वाधेयन्तु तत्रोक्तां यद्धव्यं खकु-कात्त्या ॥ प्रद्वापस्कार्याचानां दीद्याभरणकर्मधाम् । मृत्यं कथन्तु यत्विधिक्तस्कां परिकीर्तितम् ॥ उत्रव्या कन्यया वापि पत्यः रिष्ट्रप्रदेशि वा । भातुः सकाग्रात्यित्रोवतं कथं सौदायिकं स्नतम् ॥ भत्तुः सकाग्रादिति कल्पः व्यादौ पाठः । खध्यग्यादिश्वस्तान् यागरू विवाह्यस्त्रीधनस्व प्रयोगात् । प्रद्वीपस्करणदिनां यत्रमूत्यं कन्यापंत्रीपाधित्वेन वरादिभ्यः कन्याभरणक्ष्येण प्रद्वाते तत्कुस्कमिति मदनरत्ने खाख्यातम् । मिताच्चरायान्तु यद् प्रद्वीत्वा कन्या दीयते तत्कुस्कमित् मदनरत्ने खाख्यातम् । मिताच्चरायान्तु यद् प्रद्वीत्वा कन्या दीयते तत्कुस्कमित् । अभयचापिः प्रद्वीधनत्वव्यपदेग्रत्वानुपपत्तः । जोमृतवाहनेन तु कर्मिणामिति पठित्वा प्रद्वारिक्षिन्नः शिल्पिभक्तत्वर्मकर्यो भर्चादिपरकार्यं स्त्रिये यदुत्कोच-दानं तक्कुस्कं तदेव मूस्यमक्रत्वर्थत्वादिति व्याख्यातम् । पुनखोक्तम् । वदानेतु-दानं तक्कुस्कं तदेव मूस्यमक्रत्वर्थत्वादिति व्याख्यातम् । पुनखोक्तम् । वदानेतु-

भार्नु ग्रेष्ठे युक्तन्तत्परिकीर्तिति वासेति वा । भर्त्रृ ग्रहगमनार्घमृत्को चादि यह्तं तच्छुक्किम वर्षे इति । तदुभयमिष स्त्रीखामिकं भव येव तस्या एव दत्त-त्वादिति तत्र स्त्रीधनत्वयपदेश्रोऽन्यस्त्रोधनवत् सुगम एव ।

षाधिवेदनिकं स्त्रान्तरिववाहकाले पूर्वभार्थाये यहीयते। यदाह याच-वस्काः। षाधिवित्रस्तिये दद्यादाधिवेदनिकं समम्। न दत्तं स्त्राधनं यासान्दत्ते लर्डं प्रकल्पयेदिति॥

- 4. पित्रादिभिक्जीवनाधं स्त्रीभ्यो धनदाने विशेषमाइ कात्यायनः। पित्रमात्रपि आत्रज्ञातिमः स्त्रोधनं स्त्रिये। यथाग्रत्या दिसाइखाद्दातव्यं स्यावरादते॥
 स्यावरेतरधनं यथाग्रिक्त कार्षापणसङ्खद्यपर्यापं देयमित्वर्थः। व्यासाद्रिषः। दिसइखः परा दायः स्त्रिये देये। धनस्य तु। व्यादिसङ्खादिति कात्यायनेन पर इति
 च व्यासेनोक्तरितोऽधिकं धनिनापि न स्त्रीभ्यो देयमिति दर्शितम्। स्वयञ्च नियमः
 प्रतिवत्यरमसङ्घद्येणे च्रियस्तेनानेकवत्यरेषु जीवनाधं दीयमानमितोऽधिकमपि भवति
 चित्र देषः। जीवनार्धत्वाद्दानस्य यावज्ञोवश्च दिसाङ्खमात्रेण तिव्रवीद्धासम्भवात।
- 5. स्त्रीधनेऽपि भर्जनुमितमन्तरेष स्त्रीणात्र सातन्त्रामित्याह मनुः। न निर्हारं स्त्रियः कुर्युः कुटुम्बादक्रमध्यकात्। स्वकादिप च वित्ताद्धि स्वस्य भर्तुर-नाज्ञयेति॥ निर्हारो ययः।

काचित् तु स्त्रोधने तासां खातन्त्रामिन । यदा इसीदायिक खरूपमृक्षा काळा-यनः । सीदायिकं धनं प्राप्य स्त्रोणां खातन्त्रामिस्यते । यस्तात्तदान्द्रशंस्थायं तेर्द्वत्तमु-पजीवनम् । सीदायिके सदा स्त्रोणां खातन्त्रं परिकीर्त्तितम् । विक्रये चैव दाने च यथेस्टं स्थावरेष्ट्रापि ॥

मर्द्धरते तु स्थावरेतरस्य स्वातन्त्रामित्वाच्च नारदः। मर्चा प्रीतेन यहत्तं स्त्रिये तस्मिन् स्टतेऽपि तत्। सा यथाकाममश्रीयाद्द्याद्वा स्थावराद्दते॥ स्थावरे मर्द्धरत्ते स्त्रिया निवासाद्यप्रभोगमात्रं न दानविक्रयादिकमित्वर्थः। स्वपुत्रा प्रयनं भर्तुरित्यादि कात्यायनवचोऽपि भर्द्धदत्तस्थावरविषयमेव नारदेकवाक्यत्येति केचित्। स्यसामिन् प्रत्रो दृष्टितर इति स्थास्थानावसरेऽस्य विषयः प्रपश्चितः।

6. पुरवासामिप कसिन्नपि स्त्रीधने न स्नातन्त्रं सान्याभावादित्याह काटा-यनः। न भन्ना नेव च सतो न पिता भातरा नच। स्वादाने वा वित्रमें वा स्त्रीधने प्रभविष्यवः। यदि त्वेकतराद्रप्यमां स्त्रीधनं भक्तयेद् बलात्। सविक्षं स दाप्यः स्याद्रस्त्रेचेव समाप्रयात्। तदेव यदानृचाप्य भक्तयेत् प्रोतिपूर्व्वकम्। मूलमेव तदा दाप्यो यदा स धनवान् भवेत्। स्वथ चेत्सदिभार्यः स्याद्र च तां भजते प्नः। प्रीत्या विस्टरुमिप चेत् प्रतिदाप्यः स तद् बलात्। ग्रासाच्छादनवासानामुक्केरेरा यत्र योषितः। तत्र स्वमाददीत स्त्री विभागं रिक्शिनान्त्रथा।

व्यिया धनं ग्रहीला यद्यपरभार्थ्या सह वसत्येनाञ्चावमानीते तदा ग्रहीतं तद्यनं राष्ट्रा बजाहाप्यः। भक्ताच्छादननिवासान् यदि भक्तां न ददाति तदा तेऽपि स्त्रिया बलाद् ग्राह्मास्तत्पर्थाप्तं धनं वा ग्राह्मिति स्नोकदयस्याच चेदित्यस्याचं। इदमपि तस्या देषयाहित्वे बेध्यं दुद्या पुनः किमपि स्त्रीधनं न लभत इत्याह स रव। चपकारिकयायुक्ता निर्कर्जा चार्चनाभिका। व्यभिचाररता या च स्त्रीधनं न तु साईति॥ नाईतीत्वनेन तया लब्धमप्यास्क्रिय ग्राह्मिति स्रचितम्। चपकारिकयायुक्ता सदा भर्देपिकूलाचरणपरा। निर्मर्थादार्थनाभिकेत्वपि पाठः।

7. देवलः। रिद्धिराभरणं शुल्लं लाभच स्त्रोधनं भवेत्। भोकी तत् खयमेवेदं पितर्नाह्मत्यनापिद् । रुपा नेत्त्वे च भोगे च स्त्रिये दद्यात् सरुद्धिकिनिति ॥
रिद्धिवर्ध्वनार्थं पित्राद्दिना दत्तमिति स्नृतिचित्रकाराम् । मदनरत्ने तु रित्तिदिति
पितिम् । रित्तः वित्वादिभिद्तिमिति स्राख्यात् च । लाभो गौर्यादिप्रीत्ययं यक्षभ्यते कुतस्वत् । रुपा स्वापदमन्तरे । नेत्त्वस्थागोदानिमिति यावत् ।
स्वननुत्तातस्थागभोगविषयमेतत् । तदनुत्त्रया त्यनापद्यपि न देषः । स्वयमेवे स्वेवकारः स्वापत्यानां स्वुदासार्थः । भर्वस्थायः पितर्नाह्मतीत्रवेननाभिधानात् ॥ भर्वस्वुदासे तते विद्युद्धानां भाषादीनां स्वुदासस्य पितर्नाह्मतीत्वनेनाभिधानात् ॥ भर्वस्वुदासे तते विद्युद्धानां भाषादीनां स्वुदासस्य पितर्नाह्मतीत्वनेनाभिधानात् ॥ भर्वस्वापदीत्यभिधानादापदि न देषः । स्वत्यव पुत्रार्तिहरसे चापि स्त्रोधनभोक्षुमर्चतीति तस्यैव वाक्षप्रोधः । पितिरित्यनुष्यक्षः । पुत्रग्रहसं कुटुम्बोपलन्तनं तस्यार्तिभक्त्याद्यभावनिमित्ता पीड़ा तस्या हरस्य । च्यास्टाह्मद्विद्धात्व धनाभावनिमित्ते
सङ्गिटे स्त्रीधनमननुत्रातमिप पितस्यक्षां भोक्षुचार्ष्वतीत्वर्धः ।

नन् परधने त्यामभोगयाः स्थान्यनुष्या विना कथमईता वाधितानेन बेध्यते । अनुष्यायान्वनापद्यपि न विरोधः। उच्यते। वचनवलात्तादण्यविषये व्यये स्रत्मेन तस्य तचेत्वदेषः। खतरव यागीश्वरीऽपि। दुर्भिक्ते धर्मकार्य्ये च व्याधी सम्मितिरोधके। ग्रहीतं स्त्रीधनं भर्ता नाकामा दातुमईति॥ धर्मकार्य्ये व्यावध्यके नित्ये निमित्तिके च। सम्मितरोधके दखाद्यथं राष्ट्रावरोधे द्वते। वाचस्पितक्तु सम्मितिरोधक इति व्याधिविश्वयं कार्य्यानुस्नानाधक इति च तद्यं इत्याह। नाकामा दातुमईतीत्यपि दारिकादिग्रदिकतदानासामर्थ्ये वेष्यं। सति तु सामर्थ्ये दुर्भिक्तादिग्रही-तमप्यवश्यं देयम्। यतावतेव वचनेपपत्ती सामर्थ्येऽप्रदानमिक्क्येत्यस्य कल्पित्तमन्द्रिलात। पतिग्रह्यादापद्यपि पत्युरेव पत्नीधनग्रह्याधिकारो प्रतिदानश्चेष्क्या नान्यस्थेति ज्ञेयम्।

8. भर्ता दातुं प्रतिश्रृतं भार्याये तस्मिन् स्ते पुत्रादिभिक्तस्ये देयभिष्यपाद्य स रव । भर्ता प्रतिश्रृतं देयस्यावत् स्त्रीधनं स्तेरिति । सुत्रग्रह्यां पौत्रप्रपोत्तयोत्तस्य स्वपलच्यास्यावदित्यभिधानात् । स्वनेन स्त्रीधने जीवन्त्यान्तस्यां सुतानां जन्मना स्रवेदिति । स्ति गन्यते ।

एवं स्वीधनमृत्तम्।

PART II.

1. खय तिहभागो निरूपते। तत्र मनः। जनन्यां संस्थितायन्तः समं सर्वे सहीदराः। भजेरन् माहकं किन्यं भगिन्यस सनाभयः॥ सत्र दन्दसमाना-र्धकत्त्रस्यादानात् सेादरभाहमाजन।नां भित्तितानां माहधनाधिकारो गम्यते। सेादरग्रह्यां भिन्नोदरस्यादन्यर्थः।

देवलः । सामान्यं पुत्रकन्यानां स्टतायां स्त्रीधनं स्त्रियाम् । खप्रजायां हरेद् भी माता भावा पितापि वा ॥ खत्र तु दन्दस्येव अवणात्पुत्राणां वन्यानाञ्च सहाधिकारः प्रतीयते ।

.इद्शान्याभेयपितप्रोतिदत्ति विष्ठ स्त्री धनविषयम् । यणा स मनुरेव । खन्या थे-यश्च यद्दत्तं पत्या प्रातेन चेव यत् । पत्यो जीवित रुत्तायाः प्रजायास्त्र जन्मवेत् ॥ खन्याभेयं पूर्वलच्चितं यश्च पत्या प्रीत्या दत्तं तत् स्त्रीधनं रुत्तायाः स्टतायाः स्त्रियाः प्रजा प्रचद्षिहरूपा तस्याः खन्मवित । पत्यो जीवितीत्यनादरे सप्तमी । जीवन्तमिप पतिमनाद्येत्यर्थः । तस्यानिधकारस्त्रचेति यावत् । खन्न च प्रजाया इति सामा-न्याभिधानात् स्त्रां, पंसप्रजायाः समखान्यावम् तेन्तु स्वविभन्य माहधनसङ्खं । न पुनः प्रवासीनीनां तदभावे भाद्यामिति ।

भिगन्यस्य मनुवचनेऽनूष्टा याद्याः। तथा च रहस्पितः। स्त्रीधनं स्याद-पत्यानां दुष्टिता च तदंशिनी। खप्रत्ता चेत् समूष्टा तु लभते मानमाचकम्॥ स्वपत्यानां पुचायाम् दुष्टितुः एथगुपादानात्। तदंशिनी पुचसमांशिनी। मानमाच-कमिति गौरवार्थं तदनुसारेय किमपि लभते न तु पुचसमांशिमत्यर्थः।

खप्रत्तानामभावे प्रत्तानामिष सभर्दकाखां आहसमभागित्वमित्याः कात्यायनः। मिन्यो बान्धवेः सार्द्धं विभजेरन् सभर्दकाः। विभागकाले दे हिन्नेभ्योऽपि किस्विः ह्यम्। तथा च मनः। याक्तासां स्पर्दृष्टितरक्तासामिष यथाईतः। मातामद्याः धनात्विश्वित्यदेयं प्रीतिपूर्वकम्॥ यथाईत इत्यपयागदारिद्रगद्यपेत्त्रयेव्यर्थः। न च दौहिन्नीखां तदा धनखाम्णभावात् किमिति दानमिति वाच्यम्। यथा पेत्रके पुत्रस्त्वे कन्यानां दायानईत्येऽपि वचनवजात्त्रीयांप्रदानमेवमनाप्यपपत्तः। खत्यव प्रीतिपूर्वकमित्यक्तम्। प्रीतिपूर्वकत्ववचनादेवानावग्रयस्त्वभिष स्वितमन। तन्त्र तु प्रतिताः स्युर्दित्सव इति देषक्तीर्वनादावग्रयकत्वभिति भेदः।

2. यौतकन्तु कुमारीमामेव माल्रधनम् न पुत्रामां नापि प्रसद्विष्टुमामित्याच्च मन्देव । मातुन्तु यौतकं यत् स्यात् कुमारीमामस्य स इति । युमित्रमाइति धालनुसारादिवाच्चकाले स्कासनोपिवस्त्येविधूवरयार्थदान्धवेदीयते तद्युव्यादिदं यौतकिमिति खुत्पन्या यौतकिमिल्रण्यते । केचित्तु विवाद्धे स्त्रीपुंसयारेकग्रिरात्या मित्रता भवति । खिस्यिमिरस्यानि मासैकीसानि लेचा लचिमिति
स्रोतः । भर्तवध्यस्यादिमिरस्यादीन्धेकीभवन्तित्यर्थे इत्याद्धः । यदेवद् इदयन्तव
तदस्तु इदयं मम यदेवद् इदयं मम तदस्तु इदयन्तवित स्वत्र लिक्नादिवाच्छे

िस्रतेत्वन्धे। युतयेर्थेतिकमिति निघयटो। योजनं ये तुनस् तदिति ने वाद्योतुनकमित्वपि पाठः। भट्टेम्स्वन्धात्पृथम्धनतया पिट्टम्स्वन्धं माट्टधनं योतुकम्। योतस्रव्यम्परिति धातुपाठात्। युतसिद्धाविति प्रयोगाचिति देवसाम्यास्। तदसत् पिट्टम्स्यनाम्ययम्पर्या मर्टम्स्वन्धं योतक-मित्यस्यापि विनिगमकाभावे वक्षं स्वास्थास्य कल्पनामास्यतात्।

कुमारी वामनेकाले समंस्यादश्रु अलादिति न्यायेन समस्व विभागो विश्रेषा-श्रववात्।

- 3. रित्तिविधिभन्नं मात्रधनं दुष्टितृषाम्। तत्रापि प्रथममप्रत्तानां तदभावे प्रतानां तत्रापि प्रथममप्रतिष्ठितानां तदभावे प्रतिष्ठितानां सधवानां तदभावे विधवानाम्। तथा च गौतमः। स्त्रीधनं दुष्टितृषाकप्रत्तानामप्रतिष्ठितानाञ्चिति। स्प्रपिष्ठिता स्वनपत्या निर्द्धना दुर्भगा विधवा वित्यपरार्क्षेण कल्पनक्कारेण च व्याख्यातम्। प्राक्तनं द्वयमेव विद्यानेश्वरादिभिः। स्त्रच च स्त्रीधनमिति सामान्थो-क्तिरपि चिविधपागृक्तस्त्रीधनभिन्नविषया। स्तृतिचिन्नवामदनरत्वयोरेवमुक्तम्।
- 4. जोमूतवाइनसार्तभट्टाचार्याभ्यान्तु प्रागुक्तं गौतमवचनं । मातुर्दृ हितरीप्रभावे दु हिल्यां तदन्यय इति नारदवचनम् । दु हिल्यामभावे तु रिक्षयं पुचस्य
 तद्भवेत् इति कात्यायनवचनम् । मातुर्दृ हितरः ग्रेषम्यात् ताभ्यऋतेद्भवय इति
 यागोश्वरवचनम् । यवमन्यान्यपि स्त्रीधनस्य दु हिल्याद्भात्यपराणि स्तृतिवचनानि
 प्रागुक्तमन्यादिवचनविरोधान्मातुन् योतक्तिनि प्रागुक्तमनुवचनानुरोधान्मातुः पारिग्रायं स्त्रिया विभजेरिद्विति वाश्विष्ठानुसाराच योतकमाचिषयाग्रोशक्तम् । पारिग्राय्यं परिग्रयनक्तव्यं यौतकिमिति यावदिति ताभ्यां व्यक्ततम् । कल्पतरौ विवादचिन्तामग्री च पारिग्राय्यमिति परिल्या स्त्रीपरिक्ष्टरादर्शक् इतिकादीति वाख्यातम् ।

5. विज्ञानेश्वराम् ।

सर्वभेव स्त्रीधनं पुत्रादिसत्त्वेऽपि प्रथमं दुहिह्दरैष्टित्रीः हित्रगामि तदभावे पुत्रादिगामि। स्वप्रज्ञस्त्रीधनन्तु श्ववस्थापियस्ते। मातुर्दृहितरः भ्रोधम्यात्ताभ्यः स्त्रतेऽन्वय इति येग्निश्वरवचने दुहिह्मात्रन्ताभ्य इत्यनेन न पराम्ध्यते विन्तु दोहित्रोद्धित्रवादि। मातुर्दृहितरोऽभावे दुहिह्यां तदन्यय इति नारदवचनात्। स्त्रत्र तदन्यय इत्यनेन तस्त्रस्त्रेन दुहितरोऽनन्तराः पराम्ध्यते। तथा च दुहित्रन्त्यो दोहित्री देशित्रक्षां तत्रभावे देशित्रः। दुहिह्यां प्रस्ता चेदिति वस्त्रमाययोगीश्वरवाको दुहित्रसम्बद्धेन दुहिह्दुक्षां मातुर्दृहितर इत्यत्र तेनवेशक्तत्वात् पुनरुक्षापत्तेः। दुहिह्यामन्त्रयः हित्त सामान्ये हेर्देशिष्ट्वाधिकारोऽपि।

पुत्राधिकरिन् विभजेरन् सताः पित्रोरूई स्वयस्यं समित्यत्र पित्रोरिये-काशेषाक्षभ्यते तस प्रागेव प्रपश्चितम्। तान्य ऋतेऽन्य इत्यत्राप्यस्यपदेन याग्यत्यः ष्रद्यन्तमात्यदान्ययात् दुहित्रृयास्य एथगुपादानात् पुत्रादिरेव ग्रद्धाते। दुहित्रभावे तद्धिकारप्रतिपादनार्थत्वस्य न पौनवत्त्यम्।

जनन्यां संस्थितायान्तिति मनुवचनस्य त्वयमर्थः। सर्वे सहीदरा माहकं रिक्यं खाधिकारावसरे समं भजेरन् सनाभयः रे दिरा भगिन्यस्य खाधिकारावसरे। न तु इयेऽपि सम्भूय विभजेरिज्ञाव्यथः। इतरेतरयोगस्य इन्द्रेकग्रेषयेरभावादप्रतीतेः। चग्रन्दस्य तु विभागकहैत्वान्वयमाचेणाप्यपपत्तेः। यथा देवदत्तः कृषिं कुर्यादाज्ञ-दत्तस्रव्यक्ते नेतरेतरयोगप्रतीतिः। वाक्यान्तरेण च इयेरिप माहधनाधिकारे प्राप्तेऽपि समिम्यनेनाचोद्धारादिविषमविभागनिवन्त्यथं वचनम्।

सेादरसनाभिग्रहण्यमसेादरभावभिग्निनिष्टच्यर्थम्। खतरवाधमजािस्विधनं भिन्नोदरापि प्रक्रस्जातीयसपत्नीपुत्री तदभावे च तदपत्यं ग्रङ्कातीत्यस्तं मनुना। स्त्रियान् यद्भवेदित्तम्पत्रा दत्तं कथस्व। ब्राह्मणी तद्धरेकचा तदपत्यस्य वा भवेदिति॥ खत्रामपत्य ज्ञतियादिजातीयस्त्रिया इति विविच्चतं ब्राह्मणोपदस्वोत्तमजान्त्रपण्यचेष्म्। खप्रजस्त्रीधनं भर्तुरित्य य चायमपवादः। खतस्वानपत्यवैद्याधनं चित्रपाद्विता खनपत्यस्त्राधनस्व वैद्यादुष्ट्वता ग्रङ्काति। तदभावे तदपत्यानि तदभावेद्याजस्त्रीधनमित्रस्य तत्र प्रवित्तः।

तसात् स्त्रीधने सापत्यायाः प्राग् दुष्टित्राद्यधिकारस्तदनु पुत्रादीनामित्याज्ञः ।

6. खन जीमृतवाद्दनः । मनुष्टदस्यतिष्रकृषिणि वितवचनेषु दन्दाश्रवयोऽपि समुचयवाचित्रप्रव्देन तदर्थणाभाद्देवणवचने तु पुत्रकन्यानामिति दन्दस्यापि श्रवणा- संवादेन तन्नापि चप्रव्दस्येतरेतरयागार्थकत्वे चित्राद्ध भाद्यभीगिनां सेादराणां वि- भन्य सद्देव धनप्रदृष्णं युक्तम्। किस् । केवलदु चित्रुणामेव सक्षमाद्धधनाधिकारे यौतके विश्रोधवचनमन्ध्वम्। न च कुमारीपदापादानात्रत्तदु चित्रव्याद्यर्थन्तदिति युक्तम्। तद्यादक्तेः सर्वस्त्रीधन एव गौतमादिवचनेषृक्तत्वात्। कुमार्य्यभावे प्रत्ताद्य- धिकारस्यात्राप्यवर्जनीयत्वात्। तस्मात्पुत्रपुर्योक्तृत्व्यवदिधकार एव मन्याद्यभिष्रेता- ऽध्यम्प्रादिस्त्रीधनविषया यौतकविषयक्त पुत्रोमात्राधिकार द्व्यव व्यवस्या। स्वन्याधे- यपतिप्रीतिदत्तमात्रप्रकृत्वम् मनुवचनान्तरेऽध्यम्प्राद्यपत्वस्त्रामितर्था यौतके एथगा- रम्भस्यानर्थक्यापत्तिरित्याद्य।

दायतत्त्वद्वदादीनामप्येतदेव मतं।

7. खत्रदं प्रतिभाति खन्दाधेयादिग्रह्याखोपणच्चात्वे प्रमायाभावात्तदुभयव्यतिरिक्तसर्व्वमाद्धभे दुहिचिधकारः प्रथमन्तदनु पुत्राधिकारः। यौतके विश्रेषवचनन्तु प्रत्तादिनिख्चार्थम्। खन्यत्रापि सा समेवेति चेत्सत्वम्। किन्तु। न नियता
यौतके तु नियता। तेन यौतकं कुमार्यभावे विवाहभेदेन स्त्राधनभात्रीदीनामेव
भवति न प्रत्तादीनामिति स्मृतिचन्द्रिकाकारादीनामाश्रयः।

विज्ञानेश्वराचार्थाणां न्वयमिमायः । सामान्यतः स्त्रीधनमाचस्य दुव्तित्वयाञ्च-ताबेधकमनन्यचासिद्धवचनानुरोधेन सङ्गोचः कर्त्त्रयः । न च मन्यादिवचनमनन्यचा-सिद्धं पुचकन्यानां सद्याधिकारप्रतिपादकम । पुचाधिकारमाचप्रतिपादनमाचपर-स्वात् । न, च चम्रव्यद्वन्द्वाभ्यां सद्याधिकारः । विभागकर्द्वतान्वयेनापि तदुपपत्तेः । खन्यथा पितरावित्यादौ मातापित्रो स्तिदिखत इत्यादौ च द्वन्द्वेत्रभ्रो घश्रवण सकल-निवन्धसम्मतः क्रमे। मातापित्रो न स्यात्। विष्णुवचनादानुरोधात्तत्र भ्रव्दान्ययसाहि-त्यमात्रेण तद्पपत्तिरर्धक्रमस्वन्धयाप्यविषद्ध इत्युच्यते। तद्यां त्राप्य ऋतेऽन्ययः। दुच्चित्रुणामभावे तु रिक्यं पुत्रेषु तद्भवेदित्यादिये।शश्चरकात्यायनवचनावग्रतार्थ-क्रमान्ययाभावे दन्दचभ्रव्दादीनां भ्राव्दान्ययसाहित्यमात्रेणोपपत्तिरस्त न तु तदन्-रेधिन तेषामेवान्यविषयत्वम्। सिद्धे सद्दाधिकारे तेषां सङ्गोचस्तत्सङ्गोचे चैषां सद्दा-धिकारपरत्विद्यय इतीतरेतराश्चयत्वद्येति।

खन्याधेयादौ विश्रेषवचनमनर्धकिमिति चेत्। न। यौतके चिन्नकाकारादिमत-वदेव सार्थकत्वात्। चन्दाधेययच्यास्योपजच्यात्वया प्रजामाचाधिकारे तेन प्रतिपादिते जनन्यां संस्थितायान्त्वित्यादिवचनैः साम्यादिविधानिमत्येवं सर्व्वेषां सार्धकत्वात्। तस्मात्यव्वं सुस्थमिति।

श्रीविद्यारखश्रीचरणेन्तु स्मृतिचन्द्रिकामिताच्चरयोर्दयारप्यनुसारेण द्वयमि जिखितज्ञ तु विविक्तम्।

8. पुत्रादिभ्यः प्राग् दुहित्ददुष्टितुक्तदनु दौष्टित्रांग्रामधिकार इति तु मिता-व्हराचन्द्रिकामदनरत्नकारागाम्बिद्यारस्थश्रोचरगानां चाविसम्बादेन सम्मतः।

जीमूतवाइनदायतत्त्वकारौ तु दुष्टियभावे पुत्राव्यामेवाधिकारा न तुःदौष्टियाद्यधिकारानन्तरम्। तथाष्टि नारदवचने दुष्टिदृणान्तदन्त्यय इत्यत्र दुष्टित्रम्ययपदेनान्ययपुत्रादिवाचकेन नान्ययः सम्भवति। दुष्टिद्यपदस्य जन्यविश्वधिवचनस्य जन्यान्तरे
समत्वेन निरावाङ्गतयान्ययासम्भवात्। तच्चब्दस्यापि दुष्टिद्वत्वरूपेणवे तदुपस्यापकस्य
नैराकाष्ट्रगविश्वधेवात्। किञ्च। याज्ञवक्यवचने तावत्। दुष्टितर इति प्रथमान्तस्य
ताभ्य इति च पञ्चयन्तस्य च षद्यन्तान्वथयायोनान्वयपदेनानन्वयाद्यविष्ठतस्य।पि
भातुरित्यस्येवान्वयस्तदेकवाक्यतयाचापि मातुरन्वयस्य पुत्रादिग्रं द्वाते न दुष्टित्वन्वयः।
किञ्च। सत्वक्षजेषु तद्गामी द्वार्था भवतीति बौधायनवचनादनन्तराष्ट्रजपुत्राधिकार
स्व प्रत्यासत्तेवितो न तु व्यवद्विताङ्गजदे दित्रादिराखाद्वतुः।

तम्मन्दम्। जन्यवाचकस्य जन्यान्तरेगानम्वये पुत्र इत्यादाप्यम्वये। न स्यात्।
तच्चन्यप्रतिसम्बन्धितयान्वयाविरेधस्वचापि तुत्त्यः। स्वन्यया दुहितः पुत्र इत्यचाप्यन्वये। न स्यात्। तस्माच्चाब्द्युत्पत्त्यज्ञानमेवेदम्। याज्ञवस्कवचने च यद्यपि मातुरन्वयः पुत्रादिरेत्रोक्तत्त्त्त्यापि विभजेरन् सुताः पित्रोरित्यनेन प्राप्ताधिकाराणामेव
ऋग्वदानदुहित्रभावापाधिकत्वज्ञापनार्थाऽनुवादः। स च दौहित्रानन्तरमप्यविषद्धः ॥
सत्त्वक्षज्ञेष्विति बौधायनवचनन्तु मात्रसाधारस्थेन पुत्राग्वान्धनाधिकारमात्रमञ्जपदस्य
चापत्यमात्रवाचकत्वात् पुत्रदुहित्यसाधारस्यमधिकारं प्रतिपादयद्वचनान्तराविषद्धप्रत्यासन्यव यात्थातुं युक्तमिति न किश्चिदेतत्।

9. सन्तानाभावे त्वाह यागिश्वरः। खतीतायामप्रजसि बान्धवास्तद्वाप्रयुः। खप्रजसि दुह्मित्रप्रयोजपर्यन्तरहितायामतीतायां स्तायां बान्धवा दृक्षमायञ्चा-केासास्तत्स्त्रीधनमवाप्रयुः। विवाहभेदेन व्यवस्थया नान्धवानामधिकारमाह स एव। व्यप्नः स्तीधनमार्तु-र्ष्ट्राच्यादिषु चतुर्व्विष । दुष्टिदृणां प्रस्ता चेक्केषेषु पिटगामि तदिति ॥ चतुर्षु ब्राह्म-देवार्षपाजापत्थेषु । व्यपिणव्दाद्गान्धवपरिग्रद्यः । यदा व्यतद्गुणसंविज्ञानवज्जबीहिणा ब्राह्मभिन्ना देवार्षपाजापत्थगान्धवीव्यत्वारः । तेन ब्राह्मदेवार्धगान्धव्वपाजापत्थेषु यद्यनम् । व्यप्रजायामतीयां भर्तुरेव तदिष्यत इति मनुवचनाविसम्बादः ।

त्रास्मादिविवाहि। धंगमनपत्वाया भर्त्तुर्भवति । तदभावे भर्त्तुः प्रत्यासद्गा-नाम् । खामिप्रत्यासत्ते भेत्रैवान्तराये भर्त्वप्रत्यासत्ते रेव पुरस्तरक्षीयलात् ।

श्रेषेत्वासुरादिषु परिकोतायास्तु पित्रगामि । रक्षश्रेषेत्व मातापित्रगामि । तचापि प्रास्त्रात्मामि तदनु पित्रगामि । पितरावित्व नोक्तात्र्यायात् । विषद्धवचनान्त-रामावाच । खतर्व मनुना । यन्त्रस्याः स्याद्धनं दत्तं विवाहेत्वासुरादिषु । खतीती-यामप्रजिस मातापिचोक्तदिष्यत इति ॥ दन्दे मात्रश्रब्दपूर्व्वनिपातेन मातुः प्राथम्यम-वगमितम् ।

कन्याधने च मातुरभावे पितुरिधकार श्रवणादत्रापि तथैवौचित्यात्। यथा इ बौधायनः। रिक्यं स्तायाः कन्याया सङ्गीयः सेादराः खयम्। तदभावे भवेन्मातुल्त-दमावे भवेत्पितुरिति ॥ मातापित्रोरमावे तत्रत्यासद्गगामि।

पूर्व्वांक्षेषु सर्वेश्वेव विवाहेषु प्रस्तापत्ववतो चेत् दुहिंदृणां तडनम्। दुहिंद-शब्देन चात्र दुहिंददुहितरा बद्धान्ते इति प्रागेवाक्तम्। तत्राप्यनूजादिक्रमा गौत-मादिता दुहिंदधनग्रहणकाले दौहित्रीभ्योद्गि प्रीत्या किश्चिद्दानिमिति च प्रागेव निरूपितम्। दौहित्रीणाश्व मातामहीधनग्रहणं भिन्नमादकाणां विषमानां माद्ददारेण। पौत्राक्षां पिद्धदारेणेव। प्रतिमाद वा खवर्गीामाग्र इति गौतमसारणात्।

19. जीमूतवाइनस्त । ब्राह्मादिविवाहेषु यद्धनं तदेवानेन व्यवस्थाप्यते नतु तत्ति विवाहेषायाः सर्वे धनम् । ब्राह्मादिषु यद्धनिमित सम्बन्धे वर्त्तमानसम्बन्धे छत-काजनचायातस्तदूष्ण्योपरस्वेऽतीतिववाहिकयाद्वारकसम्बन्धे छतस्वच्याया जधन्यस्यादियाह ।

तदनुगामी दायतत्वक्षदप्येवम्।

तद्येश्वनम्। पूर्व्वचने खप्रजःस्त्रीधनं बान्धवा ग्रङ्कीय्दिति सामान्यत उन्ने कीद्दश्या खप्रजसः के बान्धवा ग्रङ्कीयुरियेवाकाङ्कोदयाद् ब्राष्ट्रादिपदानां तद्विश्रेषक-त्वस्योचित्यात्। यच वर्त्तमानभूतसम्बन्धस्ततं विनिगमक्तमुन्नां तदिप तुच्कम्। विभाग-कालेऽतीतत्वस्योभयचाविश्रेषात्। धनलाभकाले वर्त्तमानंत्वस्य चाप्रयाजकत्वात्। विवाहजन्यभार्थात्वसम्बन्धस्यान्तरङ्गत्वाच।

11. यत्त सर्वेष्विष विवाहेषु पित्रोः सकाशात् तया प्राप्तं विवाहित्तरं तद् आदृतामेव। यदाह कात्यायनः। पित्रश्याद्येव यहत्तं दुहितुः स्थावरं धनम्। स्वती-तायामप्रकृति आद्यामि तु सर्व्वदा॥

वित्रबंदिपजीमूतवाइनौ तु कन्यादग्रायां यत्पिद्रभ्यां दत्तं तद् आहगामि । विवा-

हात्परता लब्धस्यान्वाधेयलात्। विवाहकाललब्धस्य च विवाहभेदेन भक्षेग्रामिला-नातापिलगामिलाचेलाइतः।

- तद्र। स्थावरविषयत्वादस्याविरोधात्। न च दखाप्रिकया स्थावरयञ्चे जक्रमग्रहणं सालृगामायात्वेवेति वाच्यम्। अपवादे तद्यायाप्रहत्तेः।
- शुल्कन्तु सादराखामेव। भगिनीशुल्बं सादय्याखामिति गौतमवचनात् सोदराभावे मातुः। ऊर्द्धं मातुरिति तदचनादेव। पूर्व्यके इति तु परमतम्। 13. बन्धुदत्तं प्रथममप्रजसे। स्ताया बन्धूनां तदभावे भर्तुः। बन्धुदत्तन्तु बन्धू-
- भामभावे अर्द्धगामि तदिति कात्वायनवचनात्।
- 14. पूर्वीक्ताप्रजःस्त्रीधनाधिकार्यभावे लाइ रहस्पतिः। माहस्वसा मातुषानी पिट्रक्ति पिट्रव्यसा । श्वश्रुः पूर्वजपत्नी च माहतुस्थाः प्रकीर्त्तिताः। यदासामीरसे न स्थात् स्रते। दौहित्र एव वा । तत्सुते। वा धननासां ससीयाद्याः समाप्रयुः । सत्री-रसपदेन पुत्रपुत्रीरपादनन्तयाः सर्व्वापवादकत्वात्। खपवादक्रमख पागृक्त एव। सुतपदेन च सपत्नीपुचस्य। सर्व्वासामेकपत्नीगामेका चेत् पुचिश्री भवेत्। सर्व्वासा क्तेन पुत्रेत प्राष्ट्र पुत्रवती र्मनुरिति मनुवचनात्। न तु सुतपदमौरसविश्रेषणम्। स्थान-र्घकात् सपत्नीप् नसद्भावेऽपि सखीयाद्यधिकारापत्तेरमादिखवद्यारविरोधाच । तथा च दौहित्राभावे बीरसपृत्रादिस्तदमावे सपत्नीपृत्रः। तत्स्त इति तच्छव्देनं व्यवहित-यारौरससपत्नीपुत्रयावपादानं नानन्तरसापि दौहित्रसं दौहित्रपुत्रस्य तस्य पिख-दाने विद्यभीवात्। तथा च दौष्टिचपर्यम्ताभावे प्रथममौरसत्तदनु तत्पुचपौचाः। पुत्रपौत्रीत्रर्थं देयमिति ऋगापकरगाधिकारियां पिखदानाधिकारियाच्च तेषामेव . रिक्थग्रहगौचित्वात् तदभावे सपत्नीपुत्रतत्पुत्रतत्पुत्राबाम् । तेवाभेव तदा पिखस्पट-लाह्यापाक्रहेलाच । पागुक्तमनुवचनाच। तदेषामभावे सत्विप श्रश्ररादिषु सिपिसे-व्यनन्यगतिकतिद्वनवकाद्ग्रीमीपुत्राद्यानामेव मात्रव्यसादिधने प्रत्यासत्तितारतन्त्रेना-धिकारः।
- 15. खुषादीनां तु ग्रासाच्छादनमात्रभाक्तम्। वचनविरोधे सपिग्छवत्रत्वास-त्तरप्रयोजकातात्। तसात् स्त्रियानिरिन्त्रिया खदायादा इति श्रुतेः। खनिन्त्रियाच्य-दायाच स्त्रियेन्टतिनिति स्थितिरिति तन्मूलकमनुवचनाच । प्रदक्षप्राहिकया यत्र कर्योकः पत्नीदृष्टितर इत्यादौ यासां स्त्रीयान्धनाधिकारस्तासामेव । स्रन्यासान्त् श्रुतिमनुवचनाभ्यां दायग्रहण्यिषेधरवेति स्मृतिचन्त्रिकाकारहरदत्तादीनान्दाच्चित्रा-व्यनिबन्धृयाञ्चीमूतवाष्ट्रगादिपौरस्यसर्व्यनिबन्धृयां सिद्धान्ताच ।

इति स्त्रीधनविभागः।

CHAPTER VI.

- 1. ष्यथ विभागवानी केनचिद्पञ्चतस्य प्रसाद चातस्य विभागप्रकारः। तत्र मनः। ऋगे धने च सर्व्वसिन् प्रविभक्ते यथाविधि। प्रसाद् ग्रोत यितिष्वित्तस्र्व्वं समतान्नवेत् ॥ योगीश्वरः। चन्योन्यापच्चतन्त्रस्यं विभक्तेर्यत्र दृश्यते। तत् पुनन्ते समैरंभविभन्नेरिति स्थितिः॥ ष्यत्र समपदादुद्वारिवभागो निधिद्यः। विभन्नेरितिवचनाद् येनेव दृश्यनेवेव न याद्यं नाष्यपच्चे प्रस्पन्दातस्यमिति बेध्धते।
- रताकता वचनार्घवन्त्रे क्षेयदेशवाभावः समुदायम्यापद्वारे खन्ड्या ग्रही-तलादिति केवासिद्वचनं प्रकापः। साधारबद्दश्चे परस्वलस्थापि सत्वेन परसापद्वारस्थ क्तेयपदार्थस्यावारसीयत्वात्। खथ परकोयबुद्धाः न ग्रहीतिमिति न क्तेयिमिख्छते। तच व्याक्रवे परकीयब्द्धेरावश्यकातात्। व्यतस्वापद्यतिमत्यक्तम्। न तु मनुगा च्येष्ठस्येव समुदायम्यापद्वारे देाषो दिश्विता न ननीयसाम्। या नाभादिनिकुर्वीत च्येकी भाहन् यवोयसः। सेाऽच्येष्ठः स्यादभागच नियन्तव्यच राजभिरिति ॥ सत्यम् परना समावित बाख पिट्टखानीयख व्येष्ठखापि देव उक्के तत्परतन्त्रामां प्रवस्थानीयानान्-दखाप्पन्यायेन देावः सुतरामुक्त एव भवतीति। खतरव समुदायन्यापद्वारे समवि-भागवचनस्य स्वेयदेशवाभावपरत्वभाचन्तात्वा अनेन मनुवचनेन दृरापास्ताः। अविग्री-वेश देखप्रतिपादिकया श्रुत्या च यथा। या वे भागिनमागामुदते चयते न सः। खय वैनव चयतेऽय पुत्रमय पौत्रख्यत हति । या भागिनमागाई मागानुदते निर-स्यति। भागनासी कपश्चिद्धकाद् बस्नाया वा न प्रथक्तीति यावत्। समागात्रत्र एनं निक्तारस्थिते नाम्रथित देखिनमात्। यद्येनम नाम्रथित तस्य पुत्रं पौत्रं वा नाम्रय-तीति श्रुतेर्र्यः। श्रुवाचात्त् प्रचपन्तु नाम साधारयाद्रथापि परंचलेनापद्वारपदार्थाः नपायादित्युक्तमेव। यथा मीद्गे चरौ विपन्ने साद्यक्षात्रतिनिधितया माघेषु ग्रद्धमायोषु सुद्रावयवबुद्धा प्रश्नमायात्वादयित्रया व माघा इति निष्ठेधी न प्रवर्त्तते सुद्रावयवबुद्धा म्ब्रमाखलादिति पूर्वपत्तिते निधेषस्य प्राप्तिमात्रापेत्तिलात्तत्रापि माषावयवानाम-प्यवर्जनीयसञ्चां यज्ञसाधनलञ्चेति निषेधप्रवन्धनपायास्त्रतिनिधितयापि तदनुपादानं सिद्धान्तितम्।
- 3. राज्ञे तु भागिभिन्ने निवेदनोयं राज्ञे निवेदितमिष तेन सामादिनैव दापनीयमिति प्रीत्यविच्छेदादिहरूप्रयोजनक्तमेव कात्वायन चाह । वन्धनापद्धतं त्रव्यम्बजान्नेव
 प्रदापयेत्। चित्रभागकान्तेऽनेन वज्रभुक्तिमत्वपि न वक्तव्यं स्कामिष राज्ञा न याद्यमित्याप्रयेगान्द स यव । वन्धूनामित्रभक्तानाम्भोगन्नेव निवक्तयेदिति । निष्ट् न्यूनाधिकभोगो वार्यितुं प्रक्योऽवर्जनीयत्वादितिभावः। यवं दर्खार्थतयेवापपत्तौ नास्यापि
 क्रियदेशवाभावपरत्वमहर्खायंत्वापत्तेक्तस्मादचापि क्रियपायिक्तं राजद्बस्य भवत्येवेत्ववभ्रयम्।

CHAPTER VII.

1. खधाविभाज्यम्। तत्र यागीत्ररः। पित्रदशाविरोधेन यदन्यत् खयमितिन्तम्। मैत्रमौदान्तिकञ्चेव दायादानाज्ञ तद् भवेत्। क्षमादभ्यागतं द्रश्चे इतमभुद्धदेत्त् यः। दायादेभ्यो न तद्द्याद्विद्यया लक्षमेव च॥ पित्रद्रशाविरोधेनेति सर्व्वधिष्ठः। खातन्त्रेग पित्रद्रशोपघातेन यन्मेत्रादिकं तस्याप्यविभाज्यलापत्तौ महाजनाचारविरोधो विद्यालक्षे नारदवचनविरोधस्थ। कुटुम्बन्निस्याद्भातुर्थे। विद्यामिधगण्डतः। भागं विद्याधनत्तस्मात् स सभेतास्रते। प्रसिति ॥

कात्यायनस्विभाज्यविद्याधनलक्षत्रसमुखेनैतदेव द्राव्यति यथा ह। परभक्तोप-भोगेन विद्या प्राप्तान्यतस्तु या। तथा प्राप्तन्थनं यसु विद्याप्राप्तं तदुच्यत इति ॥ मनुर्यि स्पष्टमाह। स्वनुपञ्चन् पित्रदृष्टं स्रमेश यदुपार्जयेत्। दायादेभ्योः न तद्द्यादिद्यया क्षञ्जमेव च ॥ स्रमेश सेवादिना।

क्रमादम्यागतायाम्गिटद्रव्याविरोधेनेाज्ञृतायामपि भूम्यां विश्वेष उक्तः श्रञ्जेन। पूर्व्वन्छान्तु योभूमिनेकस्वेदुद्धरेत् श्रमात्। यथाभागं जभन्तेऽन्ये दलांश्चन्तु तुरीयक-मिति। उद्धर्ते चतुर्थांश्चमुद्धरेयामूल्यमधिकन्दलांश्चयं सर्वे समं विमनेरिज्ञवर्थः। यद्यप्येतादृश्चाविभाज्यलं यद्येन जन्यं तत्त्रस्थेवेति न्यायादेव प्राप्तं तथापि प्राया व्यवस्थार-शास्त्रे न्यायसिद्धानुवादकान्येव वचनानीति परिभाषाप्रकर्यो प्रपक्षितमिति न देशः।

- 2. चित्रभाज्यान्तरमण्यां मनुना। वस्त्रम्यत्रमण्यारं क्षताव्रमुदकं स्त्रियः। योगच्चेमं प्रचारस् न विभाज्यं प्रचन्धते॥ पत्रं वास्त्रम्। वस्त्रादि यद्येन एतं तत्त्र-स्वि। चएतन्तु विक्रयाद्यथं विभाज्यमेव। क्षताव्रं पक्षाव्रं सर्व्वेर्यथाप्रक्षि भोक्तव्यं न तु तेर्यात्रात्वा विभाज्यम्। उदक्रमुदक्षाधारः क्षूपादिः सर्व्वेर्यथोपयोग्रमुपभोज्यः। स्वियो-दास्योविष्ठमा न विभाज्याः पर्यायेग कर्म्म कारियत्ययाः। पित्रवरुत्रात्तु समा खिष न विभाज्याः। स्वीव्यवरुत्रासु न विभाग्र इति गौतमवचनात्। योगच्चेमप्रव्दाश्वामिष्ठा-पत्ते उच्यते। तथारविभाज्यत्वं पिष्टत्रव्यविरोधेनार्जितयारिष दश्चन्तत्योच्यते। न दि स्वतः पत्ततो वा तस्य विभागः सम्भवति पिष्टकस्य तु सतराम्। तथा चाच्च लौ-गान्तिः। चेत्रमणूर्ते योगमिष्टिमित्याञ्चत्त्वदर्धनः। खित्रभाज्ये च ते प्रोक्ते प्रयनासन्तेव च ॥ इति योगच्चेमप्रव्देन तत्कारियो राजमित्वपुरेवितादय उच्चन्ते इति केचित्। प्रस्त्रचामरोपानत्रभ्रतय इत्यन्ये। प्रचारा ग्रष्टारामादिप्रवेग्ननिर्गममार्गः। तस्याप्यविभाज्यत्यम्।
- 3. पित्रधतं वस्त्रादिकं श्राद्धभोक्ते दातव्यम् । यथाच्च रुचस्पतिः । वस्त्राल-इतरप्रय्यादि पितुर्यदाचनादिकम् । गन्धमास्यैः समभ्यर्थं श्राद्धभोक्ते तदर्पयेदिति ॥
- 4. स्त्रीप्रते (प्यलङ्कारी न विभाज्यः। पत्यौ जीवित यः स्त्रीभिरलङ्कारी धता भवेत्। न तम्भजेरन्दायादा भजमानाः पतिन्त ते इति। एत इत्वनेनापृतस्य विभाज्यत्वमेव। पत्यौ जीवितीत्वनेन पतिजीविनचित्रतया यत्र देशे या धार्य्यते स न विभाज्य इति स्रचितम्।



- 5. पिटप्रसादलक्ष्यापि न विभागः। पिटप्रसादाद मुज्यन्ते वस्त्राण्याभर-बानि च। मुज्यन्ते इति वचनादिवभाज्यत्वम्। तथा पिटट्रतस्यापि पिटभ्यां यस्य यहत्तन्तत्तस्येव धनम्भवेदिति च सारवात्। पिटप्रसाददानप्रीतिदाने चथौचित्यानुरो-धेनैव चेये। न तु यथाकामम्। मञ्चाननाचारिवरोधात्।
- 6. पित्रवयाविरेशघोपार्जितप्रपद्धाः भूयःसः ग्रौर्य्योदिविषयमादाय स्मृतिवचःसः दृश्यते स सम्माविष्यम् । किस्थते ।

CHAPTER VIII.

- 1. खय-विभागानिधकारियः। तत्र योगीत्रयः। क्रीवेाऽय प्रतितस्तव्यः प्रमुक्तमंत्रको जडः। खन्धोऽचिकित्य्यरेगाया भर्त्तयाः स्पृष्ठिरंग्रकाः॥ तव्यः प्रतितः। क्रीवान्धौ यदि जन्मत खारभ्य तदा विभागानानर्षावेव। यदि लन्तरा तदा तदपगमखेदौषधादिना तर्षि दृश्यादा तदिभागः स्यादायययविश्रोधितादिति रोत्याविभागार्षावेवेति ध्येयम्। खादायव्यदेनात्रमान्तरगतपित्व्वध्यपातिकविधरमूक्तिरिन्तिः याखां यष्ट्रखम्। यथाष्ट्र विश्वसः॥ खनंग्रास्वात्रमान्तरगता इति। नारदाऽपि। पित्व-दिद् पतितः वखा यखा स्यादौपपातिकः। बीरसा खिप नेतेऽंग्रं कभरन् चित्रजाः कुत-इति॥ मनुरिष। खनंग्रौ क्रीवपतितौ जात्यन्यविधरौ तथा। उन्मत्तजङ्मूकाख्य य च केचित्रिरिन्त्रया इति॥ व्याधिना निर्गतिमिन्त्रयं यस्य स निरिन्त्रयः। तेम क्रीवाद्वदः। किख्तु निरिन्त्रयः पात्रियादादिष्टीना इत्याष्ट् ।
- 2. यते क्षावादयाऽंग्रभाजा न भवन्ति किन्तु यासाच्छादनदानादिना भक्तियाः । पाष्ट्रविद्याः । यथाइ मनुः । सर्वेषामि चैतेषां दातुत्र्याय्यं मनीषिशा । यासाच्छादनमत्यन्तं पतितोऽह्यददद्ववेदिति ॥ चत्रवन्तं यावच्च विम् ।
- 3. तत्रापि पतिते।पपातिकने।याँवत्यायिक्ताचरणमनंश्रित्वम्। बैद्धित्या-दिना प्रायिक्तमकुर्वते।दुसु निपतनमेव।
- 4. रतेषां विभागात्मागेव देषभाक्षेऽनंशित्वम्। न पुनर्विभागोत्तरमि दत्तविभागापद्दर्यां प्रमायाभावात्।

पस्रादप्यौषधादिना देषिनिर्दृरग्रेऽस्थेवांग्रभागितेति विज्ञानेश्वराचार्याः । युक्त-चैतत् । देषप्रयुक्तत्वाद्विभागानर्द्दतायाः । विभक्तेषु स्रते जातः सवर्णायां विभागभा-गिति न्यायसान्यात् ।

- 5. प्रतितारिषु लिङ्गमविविच्चितमनुपारियत्वात्। त्राष्ट्राको न सुराम्पिवेदि-त्यादिवत्। तेन यथासम्भवे पत्नी दुष्टितर इत्यादेरप्ययमपवादः।
- 6. क्लोवादीनामनंश्रत्वेऽपि तत्पुत्राग्यामंश्रोऽक्तीत्वाच्च यागीश्वरः। श्रीरसाः चीत्र-जाक्वेषुः निर्देषा भागचारिग्यः। निर्देषाः पूर्व्वोक्तानंश्रत्वप्रयोजकदेषश्रन्थाः। तत्र क्लीवस्य जीत्रजपुत्रः सम्भवत्वन्येघामीरसेऽपि पुत्रदयग्रच्यामितरपुत्रस्थदासार्थम्।

- 7. पितततस्तियोर्ग भरवाम्। तथा च देवलः। स्रते पितिर न क्वीवकुशुम्मसः जलासकाः। पिततः पिततापत्यं लिक्की दायांग्रभागिनः॥ तेषां पिततवर्जभ्योभातां वस्त्रच दीयते। तत्स्ताः पिद्धदायांग्रं लभेरन् देषवर्जिता इति॥ लिक्की प्रविजतादिः। पिततपदेनाच पिततस्तिस्तिपि यष्ट्यं पिततितायव्यं पितत्तिस्ति। पितत्तायव्यं पिततिस्ति। प्रतितायव्यं पिततिसेवान्यच स्त्रियाः सा चि परगामिनी भवतीति स्नृतेः। स्त इति विभागकासो-पलच्यां जीवदिभागेऽप्यनर्ष्ट्लात।
- 8. कात्वायनाऽपि। स्वक्रमाढा स्तर्सेव सगोत्राद्यस्य जायते। प्रव्रक्यावसित-स्वेव न रिक्थन्तेषु चार्चति ॥ चीनस्त्रोपरिखयानन्तरमुत्तमस्त्रोपरिखयने द्यारप्यक्रमा-ढात्वन्तयाः। सगोत्रादनियागोत्यद्वः चोत्रजः पुत्री नार्चति धनम्।

न च क्रीवादेशपनयनाभावेन पतितलात् क्यं दारसम्बन्ध इति वाच्यम्। उपनः यनानद्वतयाऽनुपनीतत्वे श्रुद्रवदपतितलात्।

- 9. रतेषां स्तोवादोनां दुष्टितरा विवाष्ट्रपर्यन्तं भर्त्तं थाः संस्तर्त्तं थासः। तत्-स्तियस्त पुत्ररिताः साध्वप्रोभरयोया स्वप्नतिकूलास्वेत्। सन्यथा विद्यस्तयोयाः। तदाष्ट्र योगीत्रयः। सतास्वेषां प्रभर्त्तं या यावन्तो भर्वसात्नृताः। सपुत्रा योषितस्वेषां भर्त्तेथाः साधुकत्तयः। निर्वास्या यभिचारिखाः प्रतिकूलास्तयेव च ॥
- 10. बापस्तम्बः । खपपाचितस्य रिक्यपिग्छोदकानि निवर्त्त । खपपाचितेर मिन्नोदकीकृतः । तथा रुइस्पतिः । सवकाजाऽप्यगुखवान्नाईः स्यात् पृष्टके धने । तत्य-गुद्धः स्रोचिया ये तेषां तदिभधीयते । उत्तमकाधमर्खेभ्यः पितरकायते सुतः । खत-स्तिदिपरीतेन नास्ति तेन प्रयोजनम्। तया गवा कि नियते या न धेनुन्नं गर्भिका। काऽर्थः पुत्रेश जातेन या न विद्वान् न धार्मिकः । श्रास्त्रशौर्थार्थरिहतस्तिपोत्तान-विवर्जितः । खाचारहीनः पुत्रस्तु मृत्रोखारसमः स्नुतः ॥

खयमर्थः। पित्रादेरीईदेश्विकम्भगः कर्ता स्रोताऽसंख्नुताऽपि वरः श्रेष्ठः। न्येको वेदपारगोऽप्यपरा न वर इति।

पुद्रामो नरकाद्यसात् पितरन्त्रायते स्तः। तसात्मुत्र इति प्रोक्तः खयमेव खय-म्भवेति स्मृतेः पुत्रकर्मकर्तुः पिद्रधनखाम्यमेव वेतनमतस्तद्युर्क्वतः कुते। वेतनाधि कार इति भावः।

मनुर्पि। सर्व्व यव विकर्मासा नार्ष्ट्रीना भातरा धनमिति। श्रीतसार्त्त कर्माः निधकारियो विकर्मासकास भागानर्षः इति भावः।

इति विभागानिधकारियाः।

CHAPTER IX.

1. खघ विभक्तक्रत्यम् । तत्र नारदः । यद्येकजाता बह्वः एघग्धर्माः एघक्-क्रियाः । एघक्कर्मागुवापिता न चेत्कार्योषु संमताः । सभागान् यदि दद्युक्ते विक्रोक्षीयुर-धापि वा । कुर्युर्थेघेष्टं तत्सर्वेभीशास्त्रे स्वधनस्य हीति ॥ खार्यार्थः। रक्तसाच्चाता बद्दवा भातरा यदि विभक्ता इति भ्रेष इति केचित् वयन्तु एथम्बर्मा इत्यादेरेव विभक्ता इत्यर्थः। तिह्यानस्याचाप्रतीतेरानर्थकाष। एथ-गिविभन्नो धर्मो देविपिद्धिजार्षनरूपा येषां न त्विप्रदेशचादिरूपः। तस्य द्रव्यसाध्यत्वे-प्रयाविभागेऽपि एथकात्। तथा च रहस्यतिः। रक्तपाकेन वसतां पिद्धदेविद्या-र्षानम्। रक्तं भवेदिभक्तानां तदेव स्याद्गृष्टे ग्रष्टे। रवस्य पार्ड्निरूपितम्। एथक्तिया जौकिकक्तव्यादिरूपा येषां एथिग्विभन्ना ये कर्मांखां क्रव्यनपेषवादीनां गुवा उपसर्जन-भूता सुसलीक्ष्ववद्यदुपलादयक्ते येषाम्। ते चेत्कार्योषु न संमताः परस्परमनुमतिं यद्यपि न कुर्व्विन्ति। तथापि ते सभागान्यदि दद्युविक्रोबीयुर्वा। तत्स्व्वमन्यदप्या-धीकरवान्यवादानादि यथेष्टं सेन्क्या कुर्युः।

विभक्ता यद्यनुमितं कुर्व्वन्ति खब हारसीकार्यमात्रं भवति। खघ न कुर्व्वन्ति तथापि न दानाद्यनिष्यक्तिः। तत्र हेतुः हि यस्मात् ते खधनस्यासाधारयाखलापद्मस्य धनस्येद्याः खामिनः। साधारखे खले हि परस्यरानुमत्यपेक्षा न लसाधारखेद्रपीति भावः।

2. यत्तु ब्रह्स्पतिनेत्तम्। विमक्ता वाऽविभक्ताचा सिष्ण्याः स्थावरे समाः। यको द्यानीग्रः सर्व्यंत्र दानाधमनविक्रय इति ॥ तदप्यविभक्तानुमितं खवहारसौकर्यार्थमेन प्रतिपादयित ग्रामादानुमितविद्यविषयं। स्थावरे हि चिरकाकस्थापि नियतसाद्या-दिविग्रमे विभागाविभागनिर्वयो दुःग्रहः स्थात् काकान्तरे। सत्यास्वनुमतौ विभागनिर्वयानपेत्त यव खवहारः सिद्धिति सर्व्यानुमत्या दत्तत्वादित्वाग्रय इति विचानेश्वराद्यो वहव खाडः। स्मृतिचन्त्रिकाकारस्तु यदि विभक्ता खाप स्थावरविभागं दुष्कारं मन्यमानास्तत्वकामेव प्रवक्तां विभन्य भोद्याम इत्यभिसन्विना तदितरधनमेव प्रयग्-विभन्य ग्रहीत्वा स्थावरं मध्यक्रमेव स्थापयन्ति तादशस्थावरविषयमिदमित्वाह।

तत्व ल्पनामाचम्। अविभक्तत्वादेव तत्रानुमत्वपेद्याखात्।

3. स यव। येनांश्रो यादशोषन्यः प्राप्य तम्न विचाषयेदिति। प्राप्य खीछत्व। विभागकाने मत्त्वा पञ्चादिप्रतिपद्ममाने। राज्ञा वारबीयेऽत्वायष्टे रख्यचेत्वाच स यव। खेच्छागतविभागो यः पुनरेव विसम्बदेत्। स राज्ञांश्रो खन्ने खाप्यः श्रासनीयेऽनुबन्ध- क्रत्॥ चनुबन्धो निर्वन्ध चाग्रच इति यावत्।

इति विभन्नक्रत्वम्।

CHAPTER X.

अच विभागप्रकारे उक्ते तत्मन्देष्ठे निर्मायप्रकार उच्चते। तत्र याज्ञवक्कः।
 विभागनिक्रवे ज्ञातिबन्धसाद्धमिलेखितैः। विभागभावना ज्ञेया ग्रङ्क्वेत्रेख यौतकैः॥

विभागस्य निक्रवेऽपणापे विभक्तमध्ये केनिचल्कृते ज्ञातिभिः पित्रवन्धभिः। वन्ध-भिर्मातुषादिभिः सान्तिभिष्वोदासीनैः सान्तिणन्त्रयणन्तिः। यद्यपि ज्ञातिवन्धवेऽपि सान्तिविधयेव निर्योयकारमं तथापि विद्यक्तसान्त्रपेन्त्रयान्तरक्तान्ते आद्वादिएयग्- भावरूपविभागितान्त्रतत्त्वज्ञा विभागकत्तारखेति गोवनीवर्दन्यायेन एथगुपात्ताः। नेव्येन विभागपत्रेण च विभागस्य भावना निर्णयो ज्ञातयः। तथा यौतकेः एथक्कृतेः। युमि-श्रमामिश्रमयोदिति धालनुसारात्। ग्रः हैः चेत्रेख।

नारदः। विभागधर्मसन्देष्टे दायादानां विनिर्णयः। ज्ञातिभिर्भागलेखोन एच-क्नार्य्यप्रवर्त्तनात्॥ ज्ञातिग्रष्ट्यात् तेषु सत्यु नान्यसाच्चिप्रस्तार इत्येतदर्थम्। कार्य्यं क्राच्यादि तस्य एचन् प्रवर्त्तनात्।

प्रकः। गोत्रभागविभागार्थे सन्देष्ठे समुपस्थिते। गोत्रजेस्वाप्यविद्याते कुलं साच्चित्वमर्षति॥ कुलं बन्धवे। मातुलादयः। खतरव नारदेन मुख्यत्वाज्ञातय रव निर्दिश्चः। ज्ञाद्यभिदिति पाठस्वनाकरः पुरातनपुक्तकेषु निबन्धेषु चादर्शनात्।

लिखितन्त सान्त्रिभ्योवलवदिति परिभाषायां निरूपितम् ।

2. नार्दः। दानग्रह्यापश्वनग्रहृत्वेत्रपरिग्रहाः। विभक्तानां एषंग्रह्येयाः पाक्षधम्भागम्ययाः। सान्तित्वं प्रातिभाव्यद्य दानङ्गृह्यामेव च। विभक्ता भातरः कुर्यु- क्षीविभक्ताः कथस्वन। येषामेताः क्रिया लेको प्रवर्त्तन्ते सरिक्थतः। विभक्तानवगच्छे- युर्ह्वोत्व्यमप्यन्तरेय तान्॥ धर्मोविश्वदेवादि एकपाकेन वसतामिति प्रागुक्तवचनात्। भाद्यसमितिमक्तानामेको धर्माः प्रवर्त्तते। विभागे सित धर्मोऽपि भवेत् तेषां एथक् एथिगिति नारदेनैवाक्तत्वाच।

वश्यितः। साइसं खावरं न्यासः प्राग्विभागस्य रिक्थिनाम्। खनुमानेन विश्वयं न स्याताम्पत्रसाच्चियौ ॥ न स्यातामित्यत्र यदीत्यध्याश्चारः। एथगायव्ययधनाः कुसीद्य परस्परम्। विधान्पयस्य ये कुर्य्युर्विभक्तास्ते न संग्रयः॥ खाये।व्यये।धनस्य एथग्येषामिति विग्रष्टः। कुसीदं वद्यार्थं धनप्रयोगः। विधान्पयो वाध्याव्यम। परस्पर-मिति। एकोष्माते।त्तमर्थः परस्वाधमर्थः। एकोविकोष्योते परस्व क्रीबाति। इत्येव-मादिभिक्षिं क्रैविना विभागमनुषपद्यमानैर्विभागः प्रमातव्य इत्यर्थः।

रताः क्रिया इति बड्डवचनान्मिलितानामेवेषां लिङ्गलमिति न स्मित्यम्। यक्तसमक्तानामपि तिद्विधानात्। न्यायमूलकत्वाच वचनस्य।

- 3. अनुमानेनाप्यनिर्धाये दियोः प्रापयेश्व विषयास्पत्मभूयस्वानुसारेग निर्धायः । यक्तिष्वप्यसमयीसु प्रपर्धेरेव मर्द्धयेदिति परिभाषायां निरूपितं।
- 4. यत्र तु मानुषं निर्मायकत्रास्ति युक्तयस्वाभासाः। दिख्यप्रपणध्यवसायस्वान्यतरस्य न भवति। तत्र पुनर्विभागः कार्य्य इत्याद्य मनुः। विभागे यत्र सन्देष्टे। दायादानां परस्परम्। पुनर्विभागः कर्त्तयः एचक्स्यानस्वितेरपीति॥ स च परिभोध्योभयस्ययमित्यादि संस्टिखिनागादिरीत्येत्यनुसन्धेयम्।

यच मनुनेवाक्तम्। सक्तदंश्रो निपतित सक्तत्वच्या प्रदीयते। सक्तदाच ददानीति श्रीखोतानि सक्तत्यक्वदिति ॥ तत् पराव्यत्तिकार्यामावे। कन्यादानदानान्तरयारप्येवम्।

इति विमागसन्देष्ठे निर्धायः।

समाप्तचेदन्दायभागाखं विवादपदम्।

VIRAMITRODAYA.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ON PARTITION OF HERITAGE,

§ 1. Introduction.—2. Partition of Heritage defined.—3. Heritage defined .- 4. Partition defined .- 5. Heritage divided into two classes, obstructed and unobstructed.—6 to 22. Arguments against this division.—13 to 16. Notion of proprietory right derived from Sástras.—23 to 31. The above arguments answered.—32 to 43. Notion of proprietory right, established to be not of divine origin.—44 to 48. The object of the discussion regarding the origin of the notion of proprietory right.-49 to 53. Arguments in the Dáyabhága against right by birth, cited and criticized.—54. Conclusion that Heritage is two-fold.— 55, 56. Jímútaváhana's view of partition and heritage, is cited and criticized; Dayatattva cited.—57. Nature of the right of a co-sharer in joint property, &c., 1—43

Page

CHAPTER II.

LAW OF PARTITION. PART 1.

§§ 1—8. When and by whom partition is made.—9. Distribution by the father not arbitrary.—10. Of allotment of shares to wives.—11. Of equal distribution.—12. Father's double share in self-acquired property.—13. Not so in ancestral property.— 14. Equality of shares preferable in all cases.—15. Partition with one who wishes not to take any share.—16. Partition of heritage extends to the third degree; participation per stirpes not per capita.—17. Of partition of ancestral property recovered by father and of the father's right of disposal.—18. Mother's life no bar to partition.—19. The mother entitled to a share.— 20. Initiation of uninitiated brothers.—21. Marriage of sisters, &c.—22. Of alienation of immoveable property.—23. Partition may take place at the desire of a single co-sharer.—24. Of a co-sharer born after partition.—25. Of partition by brothers of

Digitized by Google

PART II.

CHAPTER III.

LAW OF SUCCESSION

TO THE ESTATE OF A PERSON SEPARATED AND NOT RE-UNITED.

PART I.

PART II.

§ 1. The daughter's succession and the reason for the same.—2. The reason stated by Jimutavahana excluding the barren and widow daughters noticed and criticized.—3. The opinion that the appointed daughter alone succeeds, is criticized.—4. The order of succession amongst daughters.—5. A text of Vrihaspati explained by the author of the Smritichandrika.—6. The plural number in 'daughters' in Yajnavalkya's text explained, ... 176—1

Pag	16
PART III. § 1. The daughter's son's succession.—2. The interpretation that	
the daughter's son means the appointed daughter's son is rejected.—3. The daughter's son is not entitled to preference to the widow and the daughter,	4
PART IV.	
§ 1. Succession of the parents.—2. A passage of the Mitákshará cited, where the order of succession between parents is determined.—3. A passage of the Smritichandriká cited, criticizing the Mitákshará.—4. The Dáyabhága cited.—5. Of the priority of the father.—6. Objections against the Mitákshará, removed.—7. The author's conclusion,	2
· PART V.	
§ 1. Succession of brothers.—2. Of whole brothers and half brothers,) 4
DADT M	
PART VI. § 1. Succession of the brother's son.—2. Uterine brother's son succeeds in preference to a half brother's son,	16
PART VII.	
§ 1. Of the gentiles; its meaning as in the Mitákshará.—2. The same as in the Smritichandriká and Dáyabhága.—3. Criticized.—4. Gentiles consist of the sapindas and samánodakas; these terms explained.—5. Cognates; three descriptions; maternal uncle &c.—6. Preceptor and pupil.—7. Fellow-student.—8. The king.—9. The Bráhmanas,	01
PART VIII.	
§ 1. Succession to the property of a hermit, &c. the text of Yájnavalkya explained.—2. An objection stated and answered, 202—20) 3
CHAPTER IV.	
RE-UNION.	
§ 1. Equal distribution.—2. Self-acquired property.—3. With whom re-union may be formed.—4. Succession to re-united property; two couplets of Yájnavalkya explained; Manu cited.—5. Interpretation by Sríkara.—6. Same as in the Smritichandriká.—7. Same by Súlapáni.—8. Same as in the Dáyatattva.—9. The wife's succession.—10. The Sister.—11. The	

sapindas, &c.—12. Sons re-united or not, equally succeed; an exception regarding a son born after partition.—13. Maintenance of the wife and daughters; the marriage of the latter, 204—219

CHAPTER V.

WOMAN'S PROPERTY.

PART I.

§ 1. Woman's property enumerated.—2. The term stridhanam bears no technical meaning.—3. The terms 'gift before the fire' &c., explained.—4. The amount of maintenance allowed to females.—5. The power of females over their property.—6. Males have no power over woman's property; maintenance may be exacted by the wife, if not wicked.—7. Husband's power over the wife's property in the event of distress.—8. What was promised by the husband to his wife must be given by his sons; sons cannot divide the mother's property during her life,.....220—228

PART II.

CHAPTER VI.

PARTITION OF CONCEALED PROPERTY.

CHAPTER VII.

OF IMPARTIBLE THINGS.

_	
Pane	

CHAPTER	VIII.
---------	-------

Exclusion from In	NHERITANCE.
-------------------	-------------

CHAPTER IX.

RIGHTS OF SEPARATED CO-SHARERS.

§ 1. Power of a separated co-sharer to dispose of his share.—2.

Immmoveables.—3. Partition cannot be re-opened, 257—259

CHAPTER X.

	ASCERTAINMENT OF A CONTESTED PARTITI	ON.
§ 1.	Evidence of partition. 2.—Circumstantial evidence.—Ordeals and oaths.—4. Partition over again,	-3. 260—262
Inda	77	265-286

ERRATA.

Page 11, line 14, for property read the notion of property.

- " 17, " 5, for the father read his father.
- " 19, " 10, for desires read the Rágas.
- " 29, " 24, for deities read deities being pleased.
- , 37, ,, 1, for even it read even if it.
- " 107, " 36, for fact read determinate thing.
- ", 125, ", 22, for shares read sharers.
- ,, 126, ,, 33, for give read pay.
- ,, ,, ,, 34, for of performing read for performing.
- " 160, " 22, for moreover read "moreover.
- " 165, " 21, for wife read wife".
- " 168, " 18, for with read by.
- " 175, " 13, 14, for what is contrary to the nature, meaning as it does of things read meaning as it does what is contrary to the nature of the thing.

VÍRAMITRODAYA.

PARTITION OF HERITAGE.

CHAPTER, I.

SEC. 1. Introduction.—2. Partition of Heritage defined.—3. Heritage defined.—4. Partition defined.—5. Heritage divided into two classes, obstructed and unobstructed.—6 to 22. Arguments against this division.—23 to 54. These arguments refuted.—55, 56. Jímútaváhana's view in respect of partition and heritage noticed and criticized.—57. Nature of the right of a co-sharer to the joint estate, &c.

1. Partition of Heritage, wherein the learned dispute in various ways about the interpretation of the texts of Manu and other sages, is to be explained by this treatise.

2. Nárada thus declares its definition:—"Where the division by the sons of the paternal property is treated of, that topic of litigation is by the wise called partition

of heritage."

"Paternal" signifies what belongs to the parents; for the affix ya (in the term pitrya rendered into paternal) is added to the term pitri which is the result of the uni-residual conjunctive compound (of two words mátri and pitri equivalent to mother and father respectively). Because the division of the mother's estate also has been in the sequel ordained (by Nárada).

Both the terms "paternal" and "sons" indicate any relation; for in the text,—"The wife and the daughters also, &c."—partition by other relations also, of the property of the husband and the like, is ordained (by

Yájnavalkya).

Digitized by Google

Accordingly the terms father and the like, are not used by Manu in premising the subject in the following text:—

"Thus has been declared to you the law of man and wife based upon affection; listen now to the law of heritage, and to the mode of having offspring on failure of the true son."

Here again, by the term "law of heritage," is intended the partition of heritage; for that alone is in the sequel explained (by Manu) after the laying down of its definition; and because, in the introduction also, that only has been set forth as the topic of litigation; thus,—"The law of man and wife and partition." Accordingly also, Manu ordains in the sequel, the partition of the estate by any relative.

3. The term "heritage" again, is said to be constituted of the property to which (one's) right accrues, solely by reason of (his) relation to the owner. Thus the author of the Nighantu says:—"The property of the father which is to be divided, the sages call heritage." Here too the term "father" stands for any relation, for the term heritage is used to denote also the estate of any other relative. "Which is to be divided" means what is capable of partition (and not what is to be necessarily divided;) for otherwise the term heritage would not include the estate which devolves on an only son or the like, by reason of the absence of (actual) partition.

As for what is said by Jímútaváhana, namely:—
"The term dáya (heritage) by derivation, signifies what is given: hence the use of the term dáya and the verb dá is in a secondary sense; inasmuch as there is a similarity (of the secondary with the primary meaning of the term) in the consequence, namely, the accrual of another's right after the extinction of the right of a person who is dead or gone to retirement or the like. But there is no abdication (as in the case of gift) on the part of the deceased or the like. The term heritage (dáya) has a technical meaning, signifying wealth in which one's right dependent on relation to the former owner arises on the extinction of his owner-ship."

That is not good: for if the meaning be admitted to be technical, then the supposition—that the use of the term dáya and the verb dá is in a secondary sense—is useless; because the meaning of a word is said to be technical. when there is utter absence of the meaning of its root. Nor can it be said that the meaning here is derivative as well as technical: because the inapplicability of the derivative meaning has been set out by (Jímútaváhana) him-To assert that the meaning of a term is derivative as well as technical, after assuming a figurative meaning of its root, is useless, involves the fallacy of mutual dependence, is against the order in which meanings are naturally suggested by words, and is a reductio ad absurdum. insertion of the phrase "on the extinction of his ownership" in the definition of heritage, it becomes too narrow. because it will be established, that right arises by birth also.

- The term "partition", however, signifies the adjustment into specific portions, of the divers rights which accrued to the entire estate. Hence the term "partition" is not used in cases of ownership of an only son &c., in the wealth of the father, and the like: "the heritage has been obtained by such a person" is the expression used (in such cases). Moreover where a single chattel, such as a female slave, or a cow, or the like is common to many co-parceners, then also the meaning of the term partition, namely, the adjustment of rights into specific portions, holds good; because the right of each (co-sharer) is made known by means of the service (of the slave) or the milking (of the cow) or the like, done at regulated intervals. Accordingly it will be shewn that (in such cases) partition is to be made in the mode declared in the following texts of Vrihaspati :-
- "A single female slave should be employed on labour in the houses (of the several co-sharers) successively according to the shares... and water of wells or ponds is to be drawn for use according to need....such property (as is regularly not divisible) should be distributed by equitable adjustment, else it would become useless."
- The heritage, as described above, is of two sorts. namely, unobstructed and obstructed. As the right of the



sons, &c. to the property of the father and the like, accrues from the very birth, through the relation of sonship, &c., although the (previous) owner, such as the father, is alive,—that is their unobstructed heritage, because the existence of the (previous) owner does not constitute an obstruction. But the property of a deceased person who is destitute of male issue, and who was separated but not re-united, when it devolves on the father, brother, or the like, is called the heritage with obstruction; for their right thereto accrues only on the cessation of the owner's existence which formed the obstruction.

6. But is not heritage in every case obstructed? For it cannot be asserted that the right even of sons, &c. arises by birth alone while the owner is alive.

Because if by birth alone the right of the sons and the like accrued to the property of the father, &c. then the property would be common (as well to the father, &c. as) to the sons and others as soon as they would be born; consequently without their permission the father and the like could have no right to the establishment of the sacred fires, which can be accomplished by means of wealth. But this would be opposed to the following Sruti:—" One who is black-haired and to whom a son has been born shall establish the sacred fires."

- 7. Moreover the texts declaring the impartibility of what has been, previously to partition, received by favor of the father and the like would become unmeaning. For, if the gift has been made by the father with the consent of the sons, then the gift is made by all; therefore the prohibition (of partition) becomes useless, in consequence of the very absence of the possibility of partition: again, in the absence of the consent (of the sons), no gift of joint property is possible. Hence the texts concerning the affectionate gift and the like, by the father and others would become unreasonable.
- 8. Similarly, because without the consent of sons, also the affectionate gift by the husband and others to the wife and the like, would be impossible, and in case of

their consent, the gift is made by sons also; hence in the following text—"What has been given by the affectionate husband to his wife, she may, even when he is dead, consume it or give it away, excepting immoveable property," -the declaration,-in the passage "consume it or give it away"—of the impartibility of what has been through affection given by the husband, would become meaning-Nor can it be contended that the text does not intend to establish the affectionate gift in the undivided state, and its impartibility; but, by construing together "what has been given" with "excepting immoveable property," it establishes that even after partition, immoveable property shall not be given, through affection, by the husband to the wife, and even if given by him through ignorance, shall be resumed and divided by the sons and the like, but that moveable property when given shall not be resumed is only a superfluous injunction; and it signifies, as its purport, only the prohibition of gift through affection of immoveable property to the wife. Because such a construction is unreasonable, involving as it does the connection of terms which are apart from each other. If the intention were merely the prohibition of affectionate gift of immoveables, then the other portion would become a superfluous precept which is another term for what is useless.

Now the text, namely,—"The father is master of all the gems, pearls and corals; but neither the father nor the grandfather is so of the whole immoveable property," -also the following text, viz.,-" By favor of the father, apparels and ornaments are used; but immoveable property may not be enjoyed even by favor of the father." must be admitted to imply the prohibition of affectionate gift of immoveable property, before partition; for the mention of its prohibition is preceded by the authorization of gifts through affection, of gems, pearls, &c.: otherwise these (texts) would be useless as superfluous precepts. Accordingly as the right of the sons and the like, arises by birth, therefore in the gift, even without their consent, of gems, pearls, and the like, the father is independent; but in the case of immoveable property, the distinction is, that a gift can be made only with their

consent. This being the plain meaning of the above two

texts, right by birth follows.

This is wrong:—for the texts refer to immoveable property inherited from the grandfather. The meaning of the texts is,—that although when the grandfather is deceased, his right being extinguished, the right to his estate is common to the father and the son, still the consent of the son is requisite in the case of immoveable property, but not in the case of gems, pearls, and the like.

10. As for the text of Gautama, namely,—"By birth alone one acquires ownership of property: this the sages declare,"—which is, by the author of the Mitakshará, cited as an authority for holding birth to be a

means of proprietory right.

That has been already explained (in a different way) by the author of the Dayatattva, thus,—"Inasmuch as it is through the relation of mere birth—which is the cause of sonship and which is stronger than any other relation, that the son's right to the property of the father accrues at the time of the cessation of the father's right, the son and not any other relative, should take that property; this the sages declare."—Its meaning, however, is not that even while the father's right continues, the son's right accrues thereto; for that would be in conflict with the texts of Nárada and Devala. Since in the text-"When the father is dead, the sons shall divide the wealth of the father,"-Narada speaks of the father's wealth, otherwise he would have simply said "shall divide the wealth;" also in the text—"When the father is dead, let the sons divide the father's wealth; for they have not ownership while the father is alive, and free from defect,"-Devala also, after having said "the father's wealth," has, by the latter half, viz., "for they have not ownership &c.," clearly set forth the absence of their right as the reason thereof. "Free from defect" signifies, having no defects, such as, degradation, &c., which extinguish right. Manu also clearly declares the absence of the ownership of the sons in his property while the father and the mother are alive, thus:-" After (the demise of) the father and the mother, the sons kaving

assembled together, shall divide the paternal heritage; for these are not masters while those are alive."

As for what is asserted, namely, Sankha and Likhita say, in the text,—"The sons shall not divide the heritage while the father is alive; although ownership is subsequently acquired by them, the sons are certainly incompetent by reason of the absence of independence in respect of wealth and religious duties,"-which has been interpreted by the author of the Smritichandriká in the following way:-" Although ownership" in the property of the father "is by them," i. e. by the sons "acquired," i. e., gained "subsequently," i. e., immediately after their birth and not afterwards, still "while the father is alive" they shall not divide his wealth except at his desire, the sons being incompetent to make partition "by reason of the absence of independence" i. e. by reason of their being dependent on the father "in respect of property and religious duties;"—hence from this text it follows that the right of sons, &c. to the property of the fatherand others accrues by birth.

This too is not tenable; for, consistently with the various texts of Manu and other sages, which ordain the absence of right (during the lifetime of the father), this text ought to be explained otherwise, and it has been so explained in the Kalpataru, thus:—"Although ownership is subsequently acquired in the wealth gained by the sons through learning &c., without making use of the paternal property; still by reason of the absence, during the lifetime of the father, of their independence in respect of property and religious duties, there is not (absolute) ownership even in the property so acquired,—then what ownership can there be in the father's estate?

12. Moreover the notion of the proprietory right (and of the means of its acquisition) is derived solely from the Sástras: but in these birth is not, as inheritance or purchase or the like is, set forth as a means of such right; therefore right by birth is without authority. Hence is refuted also the argument that as the text,—"A wife, a sone and a slave, these three are incapable of having pro-

perty: whatever they acquire belongs to him whose they are,"—is intended to establish mere dependence, so are the texts declaring the absence of ownership (during the lifetime of the father). Because in the cases of a wife, a son and the like, their ownership (in the wealth acquired by them) by means of spinning, &c. and of tutorship, being established by texts like,—"What has been obtained before the fire, &c,"—the interpretation that the above text refers only to the absence of independence is consistent with reason; for otherwise the competence—of sons and others, mentioned in the Puránas and the other Sástras, to the performance of religious duties, which can be accomplished by means of property, would also be contradicted. But here on the contrary there being no authority for holding that birth is a cause of proprietory right, it would be merely useless to put on various texts other interpretations (than what they plainly signify).

13. Besides if the notion of the proprietory right were derived from profane authority, then also the notion of the means of its acquisition would be deducible from profane authority; consequently the text of Gautama, namely,—"An owner is by inheritance, purchase, partition, seizure or finding: acceptance is an additional mode for a Bráhmana; conquest for a Kshatriya; gain for a Vaisya and a Súdra,"—would become unnecessary, for it would embody a superfluous injunction. Indeed useless sacred texts, embodying superfluous precepts, such as,—food is prepared from rice by cooking,—are not declared (by sages).

The meaning of the above text is as follows:—
"Inheritance" is heritage; "purchase" is well-known;
"partition" is the division of heritage, whereby the right
to specific portions is indicated; "seizure" is appropriating
grass, water, wood and the like appertaining to common
tracts such as forests,—which have not been appropriated
by any other; "finding" is obtaining hidden treasure
whereof the owner is unknown; a person is owner where
these causes of right exist and becomes one, whenever
these happen; "for a Bráhmana, acceptance" i. e. acquisition in the shape of receiving presents and the like
"is an additional," i. e. peculiar "mode,"—for inheri-

tance and the like are common to all (the classes): the terms "additional mode" is to be construed with all (the clauses that follow); "for a Kshatriya, conquest" i. e. what is gained through victory in battle as well as through fines and the like, is a peculiar mode; "gain (nirvesa) for a Vaisya" is what is acquired as profit from agriculture, tending of cattle, and the like, and "for a Súdra," what is received as wages for serving the twiceborn classes: the root Visa with the prefix nir signifies gain, for in the vocabulary called Trikandi, it is laid down that nirvesa signifies gain or enjoyment. The terms Vaisya and Súdra being illustrative, the occupations,—such as driving horses, &c. in the case of the Sútas,—of the mixed classes, namely, those that are sprung from a father of a superior class and a mother of an inferior class, as well as those that are descended from a mother of a superior class and a father of an inferior class,—which are laid down in the Ausanasa and the like, are included under the term "gain," for all these are in the nature of "gain."

14. Moreover, in the text,—"A Brahmana, who seeks even by officiating at sacrifices or by becoming a preceptor to obtain any property from the hands of one who takes what is not given to him is the same as a thief,"—the provision of punishment for one who acquires wealth even by means of his own (lawful) profession, such as officiating at sacrifices, "from one who takes what is not given to him" i. e, a thief, would be unreasonable, if the notion of proprietory right were derived from profane authority; since the acquisition through one's own (lawful) profession constitutes no offence.

In my opinion, however, right being derived from divine authority, no right can by virtue of this very text, accrue in the wealth given by a thief for officiating at the sacrifices performed by him, consequently the provi-

sion of punishment is very reasonable.

15. Again if the notion of right were derived from profane authority, then such language as 'my property has been stolen by this person,'—could not be used; for the thief himself would have right therein.



In my opinion such expression is correct, because theft, by reason of the prohibition of it cannot generate right.

16. If, like gold &c., the right too therein were perceivable by the authority of the senses, then it being ascertained, the doubt—whether a certain property is this person's or another's,—could not arise, just as no doubt arises as to what is gold. This is also what the author of the Sangraha has said:—"Whatever is in the hands of a person, he is not necessarily the owner of it. Is not the property of one found in the hands of another (transferred) by theft and the like? Therefore it is from the Sástras alone that the notion of proprietory right springs, and not even from perception. For otherwise it cannot reasonably be said that the property of one has been stolen by another. The means of acquisition are found in the Sástras and are likewise separately described."

"In the Sastras" such as "An owner is by inheritance, &c."; "the means of acquisition of wealth,"—both which are common (to all classes) as well as what are peculiar (to any one class,) "are separately described", and known therefrom. Otherwise if it were deducible from profane authority, the Sastras regarding it would be useless; the rest is clear. "As I have separately described," is the reading (of the above text) in the Smritichandrika; the prior reading is written in the Madanaratna.

17. Nor can it be contended that,—it being well-known to all people that what is capable of being used according to one's pleasure is his property,—the distinctive feature of property is the capability of being dealt with according to pleasure: hence there is not the defect of including (in the definition of property) what is acquired by theft or the like, for in such property there is not the capability of being used by the thief or the like according to pleasure; inasmuch as their fear is observed at the time of dealing with such property: accordingly there being no similarity between the proprietory right and gold, &c. as such, the doubt also (as to the right of any person to a particular property) is consistent.

Because it is impossible; for special rules are laid down by the Sastras, directing the use of property for the purposes of the support of the family and the like; and it is nowhere found that property consists in what can be dealt with according to pleasure. This too has been said by the author of the Sangraha after setting forth the opposite view, thus,—"Nor is that called property, which can be dealt with according to pleasure; the application of all this, is inculcated by the Sástras alone." Here in the first half the adverse opinion is set forth; and in the latter half, the same is refuted.

18. Nor can it be said that inasmuch as, utpatti also, which is another name for birth, is like inheritance, &c., set forth as a means of proprietory right, in the text of Gautama, namely, "By birth alone, &c."; therefore although property and the means of its acquisition be deducible from the Sástras alone, still the right by birth of the sons and the like, to the property of the father and the like, is unaffected.

Because it has been already stated, that the above (meaning) being open to many exceptions, a different interpretation is to be put upon the text. With this very intention, Dháresvara also has come to the conclusion, that the right of property is exclusively known from the Sástras alone.

Again, if right by birth of the sons and the like accrued even when the father and the like are alive, then partition would, at the desire of the sons and the like, take place even against the will of the father and the like. It cannot be contended that it would not take place by reason of the texts declaring absence of independence (of the sons during the father's lifetime). For in that case, (notwithstanding the texts declaring dependence), there would be a mere breach of the rules of morality and religion, but an action at law (for partition) would certainly lie. Just as on the occasion of explaining the text, namely,—"But when there is a mutual dispute between the preceptor and the disciple, the father and the son, the husband and the wife, or the master and the servant, no action lies,"—it has been previously shewn at length that the meaning of the text is, that if an action consisting of the four elements (viz.) the plaint, the written statement, the rejoinder, and

the determination of the matter contained therein) be instituted by the sons and the like against the father and the like, then there would be only injury to their welfare in this world and the next: the same would also be the case here. Nor can it be said, be it so; for that would be contrary to all the commentaries.

- 20. As to the passage in the ancient books, namely, "Sometimes by birth alone,"—that also is to be explained to mean the mediate cause; because the relation of the father and the son is based upon birth, and because the demise of the father is the cause of the extinction of his right.
- Besides, according to the contention, that the right of the sons accrues by birth, as the ownership of the sons also arises (in the property of the father) while the father is alive, and consequently partition might take place against his will,—therefore the text of Manu, namely, "After the demise of the father, &c." must be explained (consistently with the contention) to prohibit previous partition by declaring that it takes place by their desire after his demise. But this again would be unreasonable; for it would be liable to the objection of intending a meaning not its own. Nor is it reasonable to suppose that the object of the above text is to enjoin the time for partition to be on the demise of the father and to enjoin partition. For both the injunctions would be unreasonable, inasmuch as the purposes of partition are (only) secular (and no spiritual good is derived therefrom so as to require any injunction, the natural inducement of man to effect it being sufficient). Neither can it be an obligatory injunction regarding partition (viz., that it must be effected). For the making of partition is declared by Manu to be optional;—thus he says: "Either let them live together, or let them dwell apart for the sake of religious merit." If it be considered as a restrictive injunction as to the time (for partition), then partition must be made (if made at all) immediately after the death of the father and not afterwards, (for otherwise) there would be a contradiction of the rule, viz., the effect is the immediate sequence

of the cause. For there is not in this instance, as there is in that of the sacrifice on the birth of a child, an objection analogous to the hazard of the newborn infant's life (that it may be postponed).

22. Hence the texts of Manu and the other sages must be taken, as shewing that sons have no ownership in the property of the living parents, but in the estates of both when deceased. But partition, which may by reason of the ownership (accruing on their death) take place at that time, if desired, is (only) noticed (and is not enjoined, for that is not necessary to be enjoined, which men do of their own accord). Accordingly also by reason of the conflict with these texts, it cannot be asserted that right accrues by birth. It will be hereafter stated that degradation, &c. also cause, as death does, the extinction of the right of the father and the like.

Hence it is only on the extinction of the right of the father and the like, that the right of the sons and the like accrues to their property, but not while their right subsists. Consequently as the existence of the owner and the like constitutes the obstruction in all cases, therefore heritage is in all cases obstructed and never otherwise. Accordingly the division (of heritage) into two classes is unreasonable.

23. To (all) this we say. If it be only on the extinction of the right of the father and others, that the right of the sons &c. accrues to their property, in that case it would follow that while the father and others are alive and free from defect, the sons would be incompetent to perform the ceremonies enjoined by the Vedas,—which can be performed by (one's own) wealth, and consequently there would be the same (§ 6) conflict with the following Sruti, namely,—"One who is black-haired and to whom a son has been born shall establish the sacred fires." Nor, is the restriction (of the application) of the Sruti reasonable, for the purpose of conformity with a meaning of the Smritis which is evolved out of one's inner consciousness. Because the Sruti is, without distinction, applicable to sons &c., even while the father and the like who have

established the sacred fires, and who have performed the first sacrifice, are alive; and because performance of what is enjoined by the above Sruti, by all the learned persons who perform sacrifices,—is observed; and because in the gloss and the commentary &c. on the subject of conflicts, it has been concluded that the two terms "black-haired" and "to whom a son has been born" are intended to forbid the skipping over the seniors in age, but they are not to be taken in their literal sense which is indefinite. Nor can it be said that as in our opinion, the father's competence to the performance of sacrifices arises by permission of the sons, so in your opinion the competence of sons &c. would arise by permission of the father and the like. For, in the opinion of both, the father's right exists in the property, hence the accomplishment of what is of the essence (of sacrifices), namely, the relinquishment of property, is unobstructed; but, according to your opinion, how can the performance of what is of the essence of sacrifices &c. take place, inasmuch as the sons have no right at all (during the lifetime of the father), nor is proprietary right generated by permission? But in fact, however, the permission of the sons is not even required, the father being independent; but sons and the like are, on account of their dependence, under the need of permission of the father and the like; this much is the distinction,—in the same way, as women in performing religious and charitable acts by means of their own wealth are to take the permission of their husband by reason of the declaration of their dependence. But if the permission be not taken, then the independent conduct gives rise to sin or imperfection in the act, but what is of the essence of such acts is not (on that account) invalid. And the supposition, if made for the above reasons, that right is generated by permission of the father and the like, is supported by neither sacred nor profane authority. Therefore even if proprietary right be held to be deducible from the Sástras alone, then anyhow the inclusion of birth also by the term "finding" (adhigama) in the text,—"An owner is by inheritance, &c."—is necessary, for the sake of the right of the sons and the like to the performance of sacrifices, &c. even when the father and the like are alive and free from

defect,—(the right) which rests on the authority of the Sruti, the Smriti, the Puranas and the custom observed by the learned. It will be shewn that in fact, however, the notion proprietary right is derived from profane authority alone; and the ownership of the sons &c. in the estate of the father and the like (during their lifetime) is recognised by people (without the assistance of the Sastras): and (ownership itself,) by others (who have nothing whatever to do with your Sastras).

- 24. As also for what has been said (§ 6), namely, that if the right be common as well to the father or the like as to the sons &c. who are incapable of signifying permission, how can the ceremonies of establishing the sacred fires and the like, take place in the absence of their permission? That has already been almost refuted, thus—that the father, by reason of his independence, does not stand in need of the permission of sons &c. even when they are capable of giving permission; therefore a fortiori when they are incapable of giving permission. But Professor Vijnánesvara says—that the competence (of performing sacrifices at the expense of the joint property) follows by force of the very injunction for the performance of them.
- 25. Hence also the interpretation (§ 10) which is put by Jímútaváhana and Raghunandana upon the text of Gautama,—" By birth alone one acquires ownership of property,"—namely, that birth is intended to be the mediate cause of right,—is useless.
- 26. As for the text of Sankha, the interpretation (§ 11) given in the Smritichandriká is preferable: but if the interpretation were as put in the Kalpataru, then the terms like "acquired by learning" &c. being imported, (the defect of) the importation of many terms not occurring in the text would take place. The importation, however, of the term "birth" (in the interpretation given in the Smritichandriká) is not unreasonable, because it presents itself through the suggestion of the terms sons &c., and because the importation is of fewer terms.
- 27. Hence in conformity with the texts (§ 9) of the Smriti which are supported by the Sruti, it is more proper to



interpret that the texts (§ 10) of Manu, Nárada and Devala refer to the absence of independence (of sons &c. during the lifetime of the father and not to the absence of their right).

- 28. As also for what has been said (§ 7), namely, that on the hypothesis of right accruing by birth, the texts declaring the impartibility of what has been gifted through affection would become unreasonable; that too is not tenable, for they may be reconciled as having reference to (the sons') permission, and as having the object of establishing the invalidity of the affectionate gift of immoveable property: or, what is declared (in those texts) is the impartibility, by reason of the father's independence, of what, other than immoveable property, has been given by him even without the permission of the sons.
- Accordingly with regard to immoveable property, there is the following special rule, namely,—"Immoveables and bipeds although acquired by a man himself, shall not be gifted away or sold without the consent of all the sons." And the text, namely,—" The father is master of all the gems, &c." is, however, more reasonable on the hypothesis that right accrues by birth. Nor is it right to say that it refers only to immoveable property acquired by the grandfather, for both are enumerated in the text, "neither the father nor the grandfather." The declaration that what is even acquired by the grandfather himself is not to be given away when there is a son or even a grandson, indicates right by birth. As in the opinion of the adversary, the father alone has the right to the gems, pearls and corals of the grandfather, by reason of it being so declared; so, in this opinion also, notwithstanding the son and the like have a right thereto by birth, co-existing (with that of the father,) the father has the competency of making gifts: thus there is no difference.
- 30. Hence it is to be observed, that although the right of the sons &c. to the property of the father and the grandfather accrues by birth alone, still for the performance of the necessary religious ceremonies and for the purpose of affectionate gift, maintenance of the family, deliverance

from danger and the like that are prescribed by the sacred texts, the father possesses independence in dealing with the (joint) property other than immoveable: but with respect to immoveable property, whether self-acquired or inherited from the father or other ancestor, the dependence on the sons &c. is alike, by reason of the following text:—
"Although immoveables and bipeds be acquired by a man himself, there can neither be a sale nor a gift (of them) without convening all the sons. Those that have been born, as also those that are unborn, as well as those that are in the womb, all of them require maintenance: neither a gift nor a sale" (can take place).—To this (rule) again, there is an exception which will be mentioned.

- 31. As for what has been said, (§ 12) namely, that inasmuch as the notion of proprietary right is derived solely from the Sástras, and as the generation by birth of such right is nowhere declared in the sacred texts, how can it be admitted that the right of the sons &c. to the property of the father and the like, arises by birth? That, however, has been already refuted (§ 23), even granting that the idea of right is derived solely from the Sástras; since in the text of Gautama and others, birth also is declared as a means of right.
- 32. But, in fact however the proposition that the notion of right is derived solely from the Sástras, does not stand the test of reason. Amongst the Mlechchhas and the like also residing in their own country, who are devoid of even the slightest knowledge of the Sástras, the expression that "this much is so-and-so's property" and transactions, such as sale and purchase based thereupon are found. Therefore it must be admitted that property—which is determined by proprietorship—whereof purchase and the like are the means of acquisition is, by means of co-existence and absence of separate existence, known by them (the Mlechchhas) solely through the (profane) authority of the senses and the like, either as consisting in the capability of being dealt with according to pleasure, or as a substance of a distinct category of its own.
- 33. An enthymeme too based upon this reason has been mentioned by Vijnánayogin, thus:—"Property is



known from profane authority, for it effects transactions relative to profane purposes, like rice, &c.;" the instance shows co-existence: "the sacrificial fire and the like, that are known from sacred authority, do not give effect to transactions relative to profane purposes;" this is an instance shewing absence of separate existence. Hence the reason consists in co-existence and absence of separate existence. "Although sacrificial fire and the like effect also transactions relative to secular purposes, such as, the boiling of food; still they do so, in the character of fire &c., as known from profane authority, but not in the character of sacred fire &c.:" thus there is no infraction of the rule. "But here, purchase and the like are effected by means of gold &c. not as such but (by gold) as property only." Just as when gold &c. become the cause of secular works, such as, ornaments, that is the secular phase (of gold &c.), similarly property also which exists in all (in gold as well as in other things) is only secular. "Since in this world transactions such as purchase are not effected by what is not property."

34. Nor can it be said that in this view, an objection would arise, namely, that the texts of law such as,—" An owner is by inheritance &c.,"—would be useless as superfluous precepts, affirming, as they do, what is otherwise established by profane authority. For the above texts may reasonably be explained as referring to what conduces to spiritual good or to spiritual evil, like the consideration, in the Smriti of grammar, of the correctness and incorrectness (of words) consisting (respectively) in the expression of immemorial meaning or its absence.

Thus on the subject of correct expression, (in the Mímánsa) it has been concluded,—"That the Sástras treat of the correctness which is known from profane authority alone, but which is not discriminated by the people who use correct as well as incorrect words; but not of the correctness which is not deducible from profane authority: for (were it so, then) in the injunction,—'shall speak with correct words' &c. there would be the fallacy of mutual dependence &c." Similarly also is the case here.

35. Accordingly in the Nayaviveka, Bhavanath says:—" The means of acquisition such as birth &c. are

derived from the profane authority; for what are discriminated to be the impressions on the mind of the primeval men, are unimpeachable, and the Smriti has for its object the consolidation of them, like the Smriti of grammar and the like." By the term "&c." in the phrase "birth &c." are included purchase and the like; and by the term "and the like" in the phrase "grammar and the like" are included, music, examination of precious jewels, palmistry &c. It has been said by the venerable Professor while treating of the subject of Smriti, that desires and the like also which are undoubtedly deducible from profane authority are defined (in the sacred books) for the sole purpose of discriminating them for the benefit of the unthinking.

36. The text, namely, "An owner is by inheritance &c." has already been explained (§ 13). Professor Vijnánesvara, in the Mitákshará, has made the following comments:

—"The term 'inheritance' refers to unobstructed heritage; and the term 'partition' refers to obstructed heritage."

The author of the Smritichandriká, however, has, after commenting that the term 'inheritance' signifies birth alone which causes ownership of the sons &c. in the property of the father, and the like, explained the term partition to mean the distribution engendering ownership limited to a definite portion of the wealth of the father and the But this is not right. For partition is made of that in which proprietory right has already arisen, consequently partition cannot properly be set forth as a means of proprietory right. Indeed what is effected by partition is only the adjustment (of the proprietory right) into specific portions. If the enumeration be taken to comprise the principal as well as the secondary causes, then there would be variableness in the meaning of the term 'owner.' Accordingly in the Mitákshará, Professor Vijnánesvara says, that "the term partition is generally understood to relate to property belonging to several owners, and does not relate to what appertains to another nor to what is unowned;" and that "the right of the sons and the like, by birth alone is most familiar in the world."

37. As also for the text,—(relating to succession), namely,—" The wife and the daughters &c."; that again is



intended to prevent mistakes with regard to the proprietory right—notwithstanding it is derived from profane authority—when there are many persons who are recognized as heirs by reason of their relationship to the (late) owner. For it is held by all the commentators that the sacred Institutes on positive law mainly consist of superfluous precepts embodying matters derived from profane authority.

That property whereof the means of acquisition are prescribed, is deduced from profane authority alone is approved also by the venerable Guru. For while setting forth the third interpretation which the Aphorism on the desire of acquisition admits of, he in the following passage, doubts the possibility of the adverse argument, namely,-If restrictions relative to the acquisition of property referred to sacrifices, then there could be no property at all, since proprietory right is not derived from profane authority; -and then shows that the proper adverse argument is—That acceptance and the other modes of acquisition of property are the means of proprietory right, is a fact derived solely from profane authority:-" Nor does (the text relating to) the means of acquiring property concern sacrifices, for (if it did so), there could be no property at all, consequently sacrifice itself could not be performed. This has been irrationally asserted by some one. To say that acquisition does not produce proprietory right, is a contradiction in terms."

The meaning of this passage has been expounded by the commentator in the following way:—" If the restrictions regarding the acquisition of property (laid down in the texts such as,—' An owner is by inheritance &c.') related to sacrifices, (so that they could be performed only by property acquired agreeably to those restrictions), then this text could not signify that the restrictions relate to the means of acquisition of property; for by signifying that the restrictions relate to sacrifices, its power of signification becomes exhausted. That being so, there would be no authority to show that what is gained by acceptance (of presents), and the like, becomes property, consequently sacrifices consisting in the relinquishment of property, could

not be performed by that (i. e. any thing so acquired) which is not property; therefore, to what does relate the text embodying the rules regarding the acquisition of property? (i. e. does the text ordain that nothing but what is acquired in the modes mentioned, becomes property or that sacrifices can be performed by no other property than what is so acquired?) This is the adverse argument, the possibility of which is doubted: and the above is the meaning of the doubt. The passage beginning with 'This has been irrationally asserted &c.' constitutes the answer to it; its meaning is as follows: inasmuch as it is established by profane authority, that acceptance and the like, are the means of proprietory right, that cannot be a subject of the sacred books; consequently the text signifies only that the rules have reference to sacrifices: consequently neither is there the impossibility of performing sacrifices, nor are the restrictions useless."

Also in stating the conclusion, the venerable Guru does, upon the very assumption that the notion of property is derived from profane authority, explain the purpose of the disquisition thus,—" Hence a breach of the rules affects the person, not the sacrifice." The meaning of this passage also has been thus explained:—"If restrictions respecting the acquisition of property related to sacrifices, then a sacrifice might be performed with such property only as was acquired consistently with the restrictions, and not with property acquired by violating the restrictions; but the fault arising from the violation of the restrictions would not attach to the person (who This is agreeably to the adperforms the sacrifice). But what is affirmed in the concluverse argument. sion is, that inasmuch as the restrictions regarding the acquisition of property do not relate to sacrifices, but affect the person, the performance of a sacrifice is not imperfect even with property acquired by infringing the restrictions: therefore the fault of violating the restrictions attaches to the person only." It is here admitted that even what is acquired by infringing the restrictions, becomes property; because otherwise the statement that sacrifices may be performed thereby would be contradicteď.

- 39. While treating of the very same subject, the venerable Kumárilasvámin also is of the opinion that the notion of property is derived from profane authority. And this is easily accessible to those who feel curiosity for the valuable exposition of the subject (given by that venerable author).
- Accordingly in the Sástradípika, Párthasárathi says:-" Acquisition which takes place out of (man's) desire (for property) is not derived from the Sastras." It takes place from (human) desire as one of the ends of man, for property which when acquired delights the man, is from perception, known as one of the ends of man, it cannot from any inference, be deemed as having for its sole object the performance of sacrifices. Therefore it is to be remarked, that property which is one of the ends of man. is used for the performance of sacrifices, in the same way as for any other transactions, for a sacrifice also is one of the transactions of man: but property is not subservient to sacrifices only, because, if that were so, no sacrifice could take place inasmuch as life (of man) would be extinguished (for want of property to sustain it, consequently who is to perform sacrifices?) This (explanation) is given by Praghattaka. Here by refuting that acquisition is deduced from the Sastras, it is very clearly indicated that the notion of property and the means of its acquisition is derived from profane authority. It is further stated by him :-- "Hence acquisition of property,-which is one of the ends of man,—thus becomes one of which the object is temporal. But the restrictions (relative to acquisition of property), having no temporal object, must have some spiritual object. The spirituality again of the restrictions, referring as they do to acquisition—which is an end of man,—must be taken to affect the man alone; hence it is indicated that a person acquiring (property) in any other mode (than what are prescribed by the Sastras) commits sin."
- 41. Hence also, it cannot be apprehended that the texts like "An owner is by inheritance &c.," are unnecessary; since, by declaring as superfluous precepts, that inheritance and the like are the causes of proprietory



- right,—a fact deducible from profane authority they intend to lay down restrictive rules with a view to prohibit any other means of property than those (declared in the texts): like the restrictions relative to the direction of the posture of taking food which produces satisfaction of the appetite. The difference in the opinions of Bhatta and Guru consists in this only: (the one says) that the acquisition of property alone forms the instance in the disquisition of what affects sacrifices and of what affects the person (performing sacrifices); but the restriction is set forth as the argument of the adversary: (while the other says) that the restriction alone forms the instance there. both of them concur in holding that property is derived from profane authority. This is the substance (of what they say). The arguments for and against their respective opinions are dwelt upon in the works of the learned on the subject, but are not set forth here as they do not bear upon the point in question.
- Hence is refuted also the argument of Dháresvara and the author of the Sangraha, namely, that if the notion of property were derived from profane authority. then what is obtained by means of theft and the like would become property. For in the world, theft and the like are not recognized to be the means of proprietory right, inasmuch as such expression is used (in cases of theft &c.) as that "this property belongs to another and not to this person." Again a doubt relating to proprietory right in the form,—'Whether this property belongs to this person or to another'—(a doubt) which arises from a doubt regarding the (person's) means of acquiring the property, such as purchase—is not unreasonable. Hence also the argument, that if the notion of proprietory right were derived from profane authority, then no one could say "that my property has been stolen by him," for the property (which is the subject of theft) would belong to the thief alone,—entirely falls to the ground.
- 43. As for what has been said by the author of the Sangraha (§ 17), namely that, since the application of property is laid down by the Sastras, therefore it cannot possibly



be said that property consists in the capability of being dealt with according to pleasure; because the use to any purpose according to one's pleasure is impossible. This too is only plausible. For we say, not that it is what is used according to pleasure, but that it is what is capable of being so used. (Were it) otherwise, (then) when the will (to use property in a particular way) is restrained for fear of the King and others, it would cease to be property; moreover this anomaly would result, namely, that the same thing would be one's property when he desires to use it, and cease to be so while he feels no such desire. be that sometimes property is not dealt with according to pleasure, by reason of rules (regarding the use of property) laid down by the Sastras, as by reason of the restraint put by the King and others, but still the capability of being dealt with according to pleasure remains unaffected. Hence even if property be used by a person of perverse character in a way contrary to the Sastras, still it would not be a case of dealing with what is not property: but only sin would be incurred for violating the rules prescribed by the Sastras. For there is certainly the capability of being so dealt with arising from its being acquired (by him.) Accordingly it has been said also in the Nayaviveka, that "what is acquired by one is capable of it by him." "Capable of it" signifies, capable of being dealt with according to pleasure. (It is) similar to the capability in a seed of producing sprout,—resulting from the seed as such, although it does not produce a sprout owing to any obstacle. But in reality there is indeed a difference between the distinctive feature of property and the capability of being dealt with according to pleasure, in the same way as between the distinctive feature of seed and the capability of producing germ; otherwise so long as the differentia of the capability is unknown, the capability (itself) will remain indeterminate. Hence like the caste of Brahmanas, property is certainly a substance of a distinct category of its own, which is liable to production and destruction, and is manifested by the cognizance of its means. The only distinction is that the caste of Brahmanas being a class is This is explained in the treatise on the subject and in the Lilávati and other works.

- The object of the disquisition here, namely, whether the notion of proprietory right is derived from profane authority or from sacred authority has been explained in the Mitakshara, thus:—" If the notion of property were deduced from sacred authority alone, then by reason of the text of Manu, namely,—'If Bráhmanas acquire wealth by means of a blameable act, they become purified by the relinquishment of that wealth, with prayer and rigid austerity,'—a person having no right to the property acquired by means of improper acceptance of presents, or by other means which are prohibited to that person,—in the same way as to what is acquired by theft and the like, such property would not be partible even among his sons. But if the notion of property be derived from profane authority, then the father's right accrued to what was so acquired; consequently that being paternal property, may be divided by his sons. The acquirer alone is liable to perform expiation for the sin incurred in consequence of the violation of the prohibition: but his sons, who acquire that property by means of inheritance, which is not unlawful, are not required Since Manu says:even to perform the expiation. 'There are seven lawful means of the acquisition of property, namely, inheritance, finding, purchase, conquest, investment, performance of (religious) acts (for others,) and acceptance of presents from proper persons.'- Investment, is the laying out of property for the purpose of profit; 'performance of acts,' means, officiating as a priest; of these the three beginning with inheritance are lawful to the four classes alike; but conquest is so, to the Kshatriya; and investment when made in person, to the Vaisya and the Súdra; but when not carried on personally, or even if carried on personally in times of distress, to all the classes; but the performance of religious acts (on behalf of others) is peculiar to the Bráhmanas alone: this is the distinction."
- 45. To this, the author of the Madanaratna raises the following objection:—Even if the notion of property be taken to be derived from sacred authority alone, still the prohibition of the acceptance of presents from improper persons and of the other reprobated means, intends not that they do

not produce the proprietory right, but that they engender Because by the following texts, namely, merely sins. "A Brahmana taking food or accepting presents from any person, when in distress, is not tainted with sin, for he is equal to the burning sun; a twice-born is not stained with sin, if he carries on, but not personally, money-lending, agriculture, or trade, or does it personally at a time of distress,"—it is declared that he "is not stained with sin." Hence it appears that no sin is incurred at a time of distress, consequently it is clear that sin is incurred in the absence of distress; for it is proper that the prohibition and the exception to it should refer to the same subject. Accordingly when there is no distress, expiation consisting of prayer and rigid austerity after the abandonment of the property,—only has been ordained. But with regard to the acceptance of presents from improper persons, and other reprobated means of acquisition, there is no text whatever providing punishment, similar to that in cases of theft and the like. Hence agreeably to both, the adverse opinion and the conclusion, there being no difference as to the generation, by the acceptance of presents from improper persons and other reprobated means, of the proprietory right of the person acquiring by such means, the partibility too amongst the sons and the like, of what has been so acquired is alike (in both opinions). Therefore what has been said to be the object of this disquisition is not reasonable.

46. What we say here is this. As in the opinion of those who assert that the notion of property is derived from sacred authority alone, the prohibition of theft and the like implies the non-generation of proprietory right, the infliction of punishment and the liability to penance, similarly let the prohibition also of the acceptance of presents from improper persons and of the like imply the same. Again, in the event of distress, as by virtue of the exception laid down in the following text,—viz. "Thus likewise may a person who has not eaten at the time of six meals (i. e. has fasted for three days together,) steal at the time of the seventh meal, from a man of mean conduct, (so much as is sufficient for that day only) without intending

to provide for the morrow: and if the owner asks. it should be confessed to him when he asks,"—there is none of those three incidents in theft, let the same be the case in the acceptance of presents from improper persons, and in the like. For otherwise, in both the instances, the five great sacrifices and the like could not be performed by such property. It may be objected that upon the assumption that the notion of property is derived from the Sastras, how can the prohibition of theft which is not recognized (by the Sástras) as a means of property,—be justified? Hence it must be admitted that there is an indirect recognition of it by reason of its inclusion under "seizure." For otherwise the prohibition itself would be unreasonable. Also for fear of the objection that in the case of the prohibition of what has been enjoined by the Sástras, obedience would be optional, as in the instance, "The initiated are not to perform the homam," it must ex necessitate be acknowledged either according to the opinion of the author of the Bhasya, that the injunction refers to cases other than what are prohibited, or according to the other opinion, that agreeably to the rule governing general and particular provisions the prohibition which is particular supersedes the general injunction (in the cases to which the prohibition refers). But the acceptance of presents &c., as means of acquisition for Bráhmanas &c., have been declared (by the Sastras); hence in the event of distress and in its absence, the exception (to the prohibition) and the prohibition respectively are very reasonable, objected that, in that case a Brahmana would by accepting presents from improper persons and by personally carrying on trade and the like, otherwise than in the emergency of distress, be liable to judicial punishment. (The answer is) be it so; for it is not held by any one, that there is no judicial punishment for one who renounces the duties of his class. The punishment again which is to be inflicted in particular cases, is what is generally provided, while in some other cases it is specifically laid down: but this is a different question altogether. Hence there is also another defect in the opinion of those who maintain that the notion of property is derived from sacred authority, namely multiplicity, inasmuch as the prohibition of theft (according to

them) implies three things (namely, the non-generation of property, the infliction of punishment and the liability to penance); as well as the multiplicity consisting in the admission of the limitation of a general proposition. the opinion of those who assert that the notion of property is derived from profane authority, the prohibition implies punishment and sin only; because it is a matter derived from profane authority that theft and the like are not the means of property: and as the prohibition refers to what may happen under the influence of the springs of human action. there is no defect in the shape of the admission of the limitation of a general proposition. Hence (in this opinion) there is fewness (of assumptions as opposed to multiplicity in the other opinion). Therefore if the notion of property were held to be derived from sacred authority alone, then acceptance of presents from improper persons, and the like being not (lawful) means of property the father could have no right to what is so acquired; consequently as there can be no partition of the property acquired by the father by means of theft and the like, so also what has been acquired by means of acceptance of presents from improper persons would be impartible. But if the notion of property is derived from profane authority, then as these also are in the world considered to be legitimate means of acquisition. therefore it is established that what is so acquired is partible. Hence the object (of the disquisition) as set forth in the Mitákshará is perfectly consistent with reason. object (as set forth in the Mitakshara,) however, is illustrative; for agreeably to the adverse opinion, the sons &c., would have been liable to punishment and penance even in taking paternal property acquired by improper acceptance &c., just as in taking what has been acquired by the father by means of theft and the like. (To obviate) this too is to be properly considered as an object (of the disquisition) by reason of what has been said (in the Mitakshara), namely "The acquirer alone is to perform the penance."

47. But this question ought to be solved here,—namely, if the notion of property is derived from profane authority, and it is a matter established by profane authority,



that theft is not a means of property, then, when theft is allowed in the emergency of fasting for three days together, whether or not property arises in what is stolen accordingly. The first (alternative) is not tenable; for it being established by profane authority that theft is not a means of property, the generation of property by theft cannot be maintained. Indeed a fact against the authority of the senses, such as the generation of acid curd by water, cannot be established by a thousand texts. Neither is the second tenable; for the five great sacrifices which are principally considered cannot be performed by what is not property. Nor can it be said that let that stolen property accomplish only the gratification of the appetite and not any religious rite; because that would be contrary to the practice of the learned, and because it is ordained that, -"The learned never partakes of it without performing the five great sacrifices: the very same food which a person partakes in this world, is offered to his gods." Accordingly the following anecdote is related in the Puránas: -"When Visváinitra having stolen a hind leg of a dog from the house of a butcher, and having made up his mind to partake of the same, and to offer a portion of it to Indra and the other gods, was about to present to the gods their share, then Indra and the other deities created rain, and abundant crops instantly sprung up." But if property be held to be a matter derived from the Sastras, then the generation or the non-generation of property by theft and the like,—as is laid down by the Sastras, are not contradictory. While those who maintain that the notion of property and the means of its acquisition are derived from profane authority, are fixed on the horns of a dilemma.

48. The above argument we meet thus: Although it is not deduced from profane authority, that theft is a means of right, still it is derived from the very text cited above, which authorizes theft at the time of the seventh meal, by one who has not taken food during the time of six meals. But the position that the notion of property is solely derived from the Sástras is untenable, inasmuch as purchase and the like transactions that can be accomplished by property would be unaccounted for among those who are

ignorant of the Sastras. Hence the prohibition of theft indicates punishment and sin only; but it does not imply non-generation of right, since generation of right by theft is not recognized. As for instance although the class Bráhmanyam is perceptible in all (the individuals constituting the class) still in so far as regards the superiority of the caste, it is deduced from the Sastras alone; because the rules regarding the superiority and inferiority of men are derived solely from the Sastras. Thus the venerable preceptor says—"But here this much only is to be admitted as derived from the sacred authority, since this rule regarding the superiority and inferiority of men is not deducible from profane authority." He further says: —"Then again, the class Brahmanyam is manifested in an individual descended lineally from a particular person; hence what is derived from the Sastras is only the relation between that which is manifested and that whereby it is manifested, (i. e. between the class Brahmanyam and the descent from a particular person): and the class Brahmanyam in an individual described above, is certainly perceptible to a person who is conscious of that whereby it is manifested; inasmuch as there are all the conditions for the perception of the class after the perception of the individual." In the present case, however, unconditional theft alone being considered to be not a cause of property, only the generation of property by theft under the circumstances mentioned is taught by the Sastras. Nor can it be said that it is against the authority of the senses, and what is against the authority of the senses cannot be taught by a thousand texts. Because the non-generation too (by theft, of proprietory right) is not a matter derived from perception: but inasmuch as what is a means of property is deduced from the co-existence and the absence of separate existence, of that means and of the free use of property acquired thereby,—the fact that theft is a means of property is not deduced, since stolen property (as such) cannot be applied to any use. Just as the production of a son by means of the sacrifice for a son,—a fact which is beyond profane authority, is taught by the Sastras, notwithstanding there are visible means for the generation of a son; let the same be the case here also.

As for the sacrifices aiming at heavenly happiness, which are purely spiritual in their consequences, there is in addition the absence of visible means: but that is a different question. As (for another instance) the fact that the reviving mantras have the power of producing the burning property (of fire) which has been counteracted by any neutralizing agent is known from the Sastras such as the Arthavan, since it is not deducible from profane authority. Because it cannot be asserted that the reviving power is anything more than the causality of an effect counteracted by a neutralizing agent; since (if the power be held to be a separate substance, then) there would be great multiplicity in supposing the destruction of the power and the production of it.

As for what Jimutavahana has, while refuting the position that right accrues by birth, said,—after explaining that the intention of the ancient passage, viz., "Sometimes by birth," is to indicate the mediate cause, since birth is the cause of the relation of the father and son and the demise of the father is the cause of the (son's) right;—and anticipating the objection, viz., how can the son's right arise by the father's act consisting in the generation?—namely;—"The production of the right of one person even by the act of another is not inconsistent, it being based upon the authority of the Sastras; and that is also seen in the world, since in the case of donation, the donee's right to the thing arises from the act of the donor, namely from his relinquishment in favor of a sentient being. Neither is the right (of the donee) created by (his) acceptance, for then the acceptor himself would (virtually) be the donor; since gift consists in the effect of raising another's right to the property, and that effect would here depend on the donee. Just as a sacrificer (i. e. the person at whose cost and for whose benefit a sacrifice is performed),—though making relinquishment of (his right) to the things offered to the gods—is not called the hotá (the performer of the homam,) but the priest alone is denominated the hotá, as performing the act of throwing (the things in the sacrificial fire) which is the reason of the name homam (being applied to the ceremony). The same would be the

Besides the term gift is used even previous case here. to the acceptance (by the donee), in the following sacred text,—'Thinking in the mind of the intended donee shall pour water on the earth: an ocean has a limit, but a gift. has none.' But is not receipt acceptance? For the affix in the word svikára (acceptance) implies a thing becoming what it before was not; and the act of making his own, what before was not his, constitutes acceptance or svikára. How then can right (of the donee) accrue antecedent to The answer is, though right has already arisen, still it is by the act of the donee consisting in the knowledge that the property is his own, rendered capable of being dealt with according to pleasure; and such is the meaning of the term acceptance (svikára). From its association with officiating as a priest and teaching, receipt (pratigraha) is, without question, a mode of acquisition though it do not immediately create proprietory right: for in the case of officiating as a priest, and so forth, right (in the wealth so gained) arises solely from the gift of the fees. Or the survival of the son at the time of the father's demise, may constitute his acquisi-Besides in the case of property left by a brother or any other relative, the right of the rest of the brethren or other heirs must, however reluctantly, be acknowledged to arise either from the death (of the proprietor) or from the survival of the rest at the time of his decease. Let the same be the case here also."

50. But this is not tenable. For the argument, "it being based upon the authority of the Sastras,"—has already been obviated by the demonstrated conclusion that the notion of property is derived from profane authority. As also for what has been said in the passage,—"And that is also seen in the world &c.,"—that too is only specious; for should the donee refuse to accept, his right certainly does not arise; again, if by (mere) relinquishment in favor of a particular person, his right accrued, notwithstanding his refusal to accept (the gift,) then it would follow that the donor could not possibly grant (the property relinquished in favor of a particular person) to any other person. As also for the argument, "for then the acceptor

himself would (virtually) be the donor;" that again is not consistent with reason; because, gift being an act whereof the effect is the generation of another's right, the term gift implies the act of inference &c., (by the donor) in favor of the acceptance by the donee, but the production of that effect is not possible without the acceptance by the donee; hence the act of the donee completes the gift, but that alone does not constitute the gift. As also for what has been said in the passage "just as &c.,"—that too is not For the distinction does not obtain in the agnihotra and the like homas which are (personally) performed by the sacrificer; again in the darsapúrnamása and other sacrifices where the relinquishment only is made by the sacrificer, but the offerings are (actually) thrown (in the sacrificial fire) by the priests, the function (of the priests) being distinct (from that of the sacrificer,) the use of the term hotá (for a priest) implying that function, is not open to exception. The term homa, however, does not signify the throwing (by the priest) of what has not been relinquished (by the sacrificer). But whether that relinquishment which is the distinctive feature (of a homa) is carried out through the agency of one's self, or through the agency of another person, that makes no difference. Hence a sacrifice (yága) does not depend, for its completion, on the throwing (of offerings), but a homa depends on that alone. The act of the donee, however, is the sine qua non of gift, for without it gift cannot be accomplished.

Again what has been said in the passage, "Besides &c.," that also is nothing. For abdication alone is ordained therein, but not gift; accordingly it has (subsequently) been said that "the donor reaps its fruit," for otherwise this (portion) would be superfluous. Had the fruit of gift been otherwise deducible in what is intended for gift, the passage "the donor reaps its fruit," would have become useless. Hence what is intended by the verb "give" (in the term gift) in the passage cited before, is abdication only—consisting of the pouring of water, in favor of the intended donee, but the completion of the gift takes place only in case of acceptance by the donee of what is so abdicated. This is the best interpretation. Accordingly, in the formula for declaring the

intention (of making a gift,) the expression used by the learned is, "I abdicate," and not "I will give" or "I give." Hence, although the fruit of gift arises (before acceptance), still because the right of the donee accrues from acceptance, therefore the proposition that acceptance is an acquisition, is not liable to exception. For the term acquisition means an act producing property. ingly Prabhákara says:—"This has been irrationally asserted by some one: to say that acquisition does not produce property is a contradiction in terms." The text of this has already been explained. Moreover if acceptance, consisting in the knowledge that this property is mine, did only render that property to be capable of being dealt with, wherein the right accrued merely by the act of the donor, then the term acquisition as applied to acceptance would be metaphorical in its meaning; and the bestowal of that property on any other person (in case the intended donee refuse to accept the gift) would be, as mentioned before, unreasonable; also in case of his non-acceptance, the destruction of his right already produced will have to be assumed. Nor can it be said that it must be acknowledged by you also, that by the act of the donor his right being extinguished, a common right of donees is produced; otherwise if his right be extinguished and no other's right accrue, then the thing being without an owner, the right of any person might, by means of seizure &c., arise in that thing, just as in grass, fuel, &c. of a forest, which have not been appropriated, and the preservation (of the thing by the donor so long as it is not given to any other person) would be impossible: so also in our opinion, the right of a particular person produced on the abdication in favor of that particular person, is extinguished by his non-acceptance, and the right of another arises by his acceptance; thus there is no such contradiction as the destruction of a common right and the production of an exclusive right (which you cannot but admit). Because a common right in such a thing being not recognized, the production thereof is without authority, and is neither acknowledged by reason of multiplicity. But notwithstanding the extinction of the donor's proprietory right, consisting in the capability of being dealt with according to pleasure, the gift

itself being incomplete in the absence of the effect, namely, the production of another's property, the donor who aims at attaining the merit held out by the injunction (for gifts) certainly retains the right of preserving (the subject of the gift) till the bestowal (of the same on some other fit person); in the same way as (a sacrificer has the right of preserving) the clarified butter poured on the sacrificial fire until it is burnt to ashes, by reason of the declaration of imperfection which would otherwise be the consequence of non-conformity with the prohibition of (the offering) being touched by what should not be touched. Hence it follows that although another's right be not generated, still there is no harm in not preventing (by the supposition of a common right) the (supposed) consequences of the thing being without an owner, and of its seizure. Upon this alone is based the practice of the learned, consisting in the preservation of the subject of gifts (to men and gods). Nor can it be argued that the injunction being assumed by us to refer solely to abdication, the fact of the production of another's right would not at all be important, because abdication, such as is described above, is what (we say) is intended by the injunction, for otherwise in the case of homa also, the state of being burnt to ashes would be unimportant.

As for what has been said, namely,—from its association with officiating as a priest and teaching, acceptance though it do not immediately create proprietory right, is still an acquisition in a metaphorical sense only,—that also is from ignorance. Since in the case of officiating at a sacrifice, the shares to which the priests and others are entitled, are, at the time of distributing the fees (dakshiná), allotted to them in the shape of wages. Accordingly in the aphorism of Jaimini, viz., "Salary is the service of a master," the use of salary (to signify the fees) has been ascertained: the details, however are to be found there. Salary is no other than the wages causing inducement of a servant. So also, in teaching, the pupil at the end of his education gives to the teacher such wages for teaching as satisfies him. But in case of regular service for wages, the paid tuition is quasi degradation. Hence as distinguished from acceptance as well as from service (nirvesa) implying

(regular) wages, officiating at a sacrifice and teaching have been separately enumerated as being a mixture of both. Hence these too are acquisitions in the primary sense. Accordingly also the term honorarium (dakshina) is ap-

plied to what is given to a priest and a teacher.

As also for the argument that it is undisputed that in the property left by a brother or any other relation the right of the rest of the brethren or other heirs is produced either by the demise of the owner or by the survival of the brethren &c. at the time of his decease; therefore also in the case of sons &c. let the demise of the father &c., or the survival at the time of their decease, be the cause of right, but not the birth of the sons &c., which is not applicable to all cases;—that also has been already confuted by showing that it must be admitted that birth is a cause of right.

- As also for what has been said, namely, that if birth be held to be a cause of proprietory right, then the text of Manu, viz:—"After the father and mother &c.," cannot consistently be explained;—for if it be considered to mean the prohibition of previous partition, then the objection would arise that it intends a meaning not its own; and as the purpose of partition is mundane, an injunction for partition as well as an injunction for its time is impossible. Nor can it be taken to mean an obligatory injunction regarding partition which stands (but for this injunction) optional, for in that case there would be a conflict with the injunction regarding dwelling together; therefore it must be admitted that the text is intended for establishing that while the father and the mother are alive there is no ownership by birth to their property, but that it is on their demise that the right of the sons &c. accrues to their estate.
- 52. The above argument is extremely unsound. Because the objection that it imparts a meaning not its own, is equally applicable (to the view taken by him); and because there can be no incongruity in considering the above text to be an injunction as to the time for partition, inasmuch as there was no independence (of the sons) before

(the demise of the father); and because even it be held as a superfluous injunction regarding the time (for partition) which proceeds from the desire (of the co-sharers for partition) there can be no impropriety, it being a text on positive law.

Hence is obviated also the objection that partition would be admissible only at the moment immediately following the father's decease, for there is not in this instance any particular objection like the danger to the new-born infant's life in the case of a sacrifice on the birth of a son,—against the immediate sequence of the effect (when the cause is present) Neither is the causality of the father's decease indicated by the injunction regarding the time for partition, for otherwise, as the effect must necessarily follow the cause, it would be sinful if partition be made after the death of the parents (and not immediately on their death). Moreover the extinction of the father's right arises also from degradation and retirement: but the right (of the sons) by birth holds equally good (in these cases). In the case of degradation, however, the extinction of right and the disqualification for participation arise only if expiation be not performed. wise penance too, which can be accomplished with (one's own) wealth, could not be performed by the parents with their own wealth.

Accordingly, (it must be admitted that) the following text also, namely, "When the mother is past child-bearing &c.," declares an injunction with reference to the time for partition. There is not, however, in that event the extinction of right as in degradation &c.: but the extinction of (the father's) right is deduced solely from profane authority as well as from the prohibition of (his) participation, as in the case of a brother and others (who are excluded from inheritance by reason of disqualification); this will be mentioned (hereafter).

53. Moreover, Jímútaváhana himself appears to give up his prior contention, and to admit partition by sons even when the father's right is not extinguished; for he has, after having asserted that—"Thus there are two periods of partition: one, when the father's right ceases; the

other, by his choice while his right endures,"—and then meanwhile having found fault with the three periods of partition mentioned in the Mitákshará—come to the conclusion that, -"Therefore two periods of partition are rightly affirmed: one, when the father's right is extinguished by degradation, extinction of temporal affections and death; the other, by the choice of the father while his right subsists." Now how does (in the latter case) the right of the sons arise in the property of the father? And how is it that there is no conflict with the texts ordaining absence of ownership (of the sons) while the parents are alive? Partition being impossible of what is not property, how can partition be made by them? Where is the consistency of one part with another of his (Jímútaváhana's) own book? For (in another part) he says, "The cessation only of the father's right is intended by the text, 'After (the demise of) the father and mother &c.'; with this purpose the term after is used instead of the term dead: the meaning being "after the cessation of the father's right, and the cessation of the father's right arises as well from his degradation and extinction of worldly affections as from his death &c."

Again he says:—"Here also, as it is indicated that the son's right in the father's wealth arises from such causes as the extinction of the temporal affections, this is one period of partition." Now if by the term, "from such causes as the extinction of the temporal affections," the cessation alone of the father's right be intended, in that case it is contradictory to what has been said, namely, the other period of partition is by the choice of the father while his right subsists.

Again when he maintains that the survival alone of the sons and others at the time of the extinction of the father's right is a means of acquisition, how can he assert the right of the sons to the property of the father while the father's right subsists. Certainly the father's right cannot (according to his opinion) cease simply by reason of the mother's being past child-bearing in the absence of the father's retirement to a forest; therefore it becomes difficult to apply the term 'heritage' to the property where-of partition is made while the father's right is not extin-

guished; for the meaning of the term heritage as explained by himself is wanting, viz.: "The term heritage is technically used to signify wealth in which right dependent on relation to the former owner arises on the extinction of his right." These and similar confusions arise (in pursuance of the doctrines propounded by Jimútaváhana).

54. But it is to be observed by those that are unprejudiced that every thing becomes consistent if right by birth be admitted. Accordingly in the Mitakshara and other works it has been said that the term heritage signifies that wealth wherein another's right arises dependent on relation to the former owner: but the phrase "on cessation of the previous owner's right" has also not been inserted in it. Hence it is established that heritage is two-fold.

The argument in support of the three periods of partition mentioned in the Mitakshara will be set forth at length when that subject will be dealt with; there is no use of discussing here what is incidental to the subject under enquiry.

The term 'partition' has been explained in the Mitákshará, thus, "Partition is the adjustment into specific portions, of divers rights arisen in the entire estate." But Jimútaváhana introduces this definition as the opinion of the adversary in the following passage,—"Nor can it be affirmed that partition is the adjustment into a particular portion of that right which all the co-sharers have through the sameness of their relation over the entire property;"—and then finds faults with it, thus,—"Because the relation (of one co-heir to the owner) opposed by the coexistence of another relative produces a right—determinable by partition—to portions only of the estate; for (otherwise) there would be multiplicity in the assumption of the accrual and extinction of a right to the entire estate; and it would be useless as there would not result the effect, viz. the power of dealing with the property according to pleasure;" and then goes on,-"What we say is, that partition consists in the act of manifesting, by the casting of lot or otherwise, the right which had arisen in lands, gold &c. and which extended only to a portion of them, and which was previously unascertained, being unfit for exclusive appropriation, because no evidence of any ground of discrimination existed; or partition is the act of ascertaining the right or of making it known,—by the derivation of the term."

56. The author of the Dáyatattva has referred to this view of Jímútaváhana, and censured it thus:—" For how may it be certainly known, since no text declares it, that the lot for each person falls precisely on that article

which was already his.

"Again if wealth be gained after the father's demise, by a brother riding one of two horses, which belonged to the father, it is universally acknowledged, that two shares of it appertain to the acquirer; and one to any other co-heir. In such a case when the original property is subsequently divided, if that very horse be obtained by the acquirer, then according to the opinion of those who affirm partial rights, the horse was already his; why then should another brother share the wealth gained by him? But if the horse be obtained by another, equal participation of wealth so acquired would be proper, since it is gained by the personal labour of the one and by the work of a horse belonging to the other.

"But in fact, partition is the adjustment by lot or otherwise into a right over a specific portion, of that right which did, by reason of the same relation of the co-heirs, accrue to the whole property, upon the extinction of the

right of the previous owner.

"Thus, even the accrual and extinction of rights over the entire estate are to be admitted, in the same manner, as in the case of the re-union of co-heirs, the destruction of rights over portions, and the production of

rights over the entire estate, are acknowledged.

"This too is (in a manner) acknowledged by the author of the Dayabhaga who himself writes:—In the following text of Vrihaspati, namely: 'He who being (once) separated dwells again through affection, with his father, brother or paternal uncle is termed re-united,' because the father, the brother, the paternal uncle and the like, are from their birth likely to be united as regards

the property acquired by the father or the grandfather; they alone may become re-united, when being once separated they annul, through mutual affection, the previous partition with the agreement to this effect, that the wealth which is thine is mine, and what is mine is thine, and remain like one house-holder in any transaction. But not an association of merchants who, unlike the co-parceners, are by the mere union of stocks formed into a partnership, nor the mere union of estate of separated co-parceners without the stipulation based upon affection (are to be looked upon as instances of re-union).

"By reason of the right being common, the text of Katyayana, which says: 'A co-parcener is not liable for the use of any article which belongs to all the undivided relatives,' becomes consistent in its literal sense; inasmuch as his own right extends over every article; accordingly there can be no theft in such a case, as will

be shewn hereafter.

"Similarly also, by the text of Narada, namely: Separated, not unseparated, brethren may reciprocally bear testimony, become sureties, bestow gifts and accept presents,' the prohibition of mutual gift &c. amongst undivided co-parceners becomes logically consistent; because (in such a case) there is an impossibility of gift and acceptance, inasmuch as the acceptor had a right to the property given, even before a gift of it was made.

"All the co-parceners are entitled to the fruits of all acts, either temporal or spiritual, which are performed with the use of the joint property; since their right is common. This is affirmed also by Nárada: 'Among undivided brethren, duties continue common; but when partition takes place, their duties also become different.'

"Vyasa ordains: 'Let no one without the consent of the others, make a sale or gift of the whole immoveable estate nor of what is common to the family.' Here, from the use of the adjective 'whole,' it appears that the right of each parcener accrues to the entire estate.

"Therefore, when there are two persons equally related to the deceased, each of them considers the property left by the deceased to belong to himself as well as to the other coheir. Gift and the like by the one for his own pur-

pose, is prohibited, should the other's consent be wanting.

"Therefore it is established that the right does not accrue to a fractional portion."

57. It appears that this is subscribed to also by the author of the Mitákshará; for, he says: "Partition is the adjustment into specific portions, of divers rights which have arisen in the entire estate."

But what is to be decided here is this: Whether ownership inhering in the owners and determined by the whole of the property, also whether property inhering in the entire estate and determined by the owners, exists jointly in all or exists separately in each? The first (alternative) is not tenable. Since in case of destruction of any one of those in which the ownership or the property inheres, there would be great multiplicity in assuming their destruction, and the production of them in all the remaining ones; and since the dealing with any article by any one (of the co-owners) would be impracticable in consequence of the want of power (in any one co-owner) of giving away or selling or using in any other way, according to pleasure. Neither is the second (alternative) tenable; because on partition the destruction and the reproduction of all of them would have to be assumed; and because that would be contrary to the following passage (of the Miták-"Partition is made of what was property, but shará), viz. property is not generated by partition."

What we say here is this:—there are certainly rights existing separately in each, by reason of the sameness of the relation: when partition takes place amongst the co-owners, the right of each ceases to what is allotted to the others, in the same way as by death, retirement and the like: so there is no inconsistency. And this is what is meant by "adjustment;" otherwise, the generation of right to a specific portion would have been used. Accordingly the cessation only of the right is assumed, but the production of a different right is not assumed. Agreeably to the opinion of Jímútaváhana, it being not determined previous to partition, as to what property the right of a co-sharer accrues in reality, there would be an end of all temporal

affairs as well as spiritual ones enjoined by the Sruti and the Smriti;—which can be performed by wealth. You (Jímútaváhana) impute to the author of the Mitákshará, the defect of multiplicity for his assumption of the destruction and the production of rights, but yours is a still greater one (that of inconsistency) when you admit the production of a different right of each (of the co-sharers) in the property of the others by consent given by all (on re-union) after partition. You ascribe uselessness to the right over the entire estate by reason of its unfitness for use: but the same is equal if the right be admitted to arise in a fractional portion. There is no use in spinning out the matter.

CHAPTER II.

LAW OF PARTITION.

PART I.

SEC. 1—8. When and by whom partition is made.—9. Distribution by the father not arbitrary.—10. Of allotment of shares to wives.—

11. Of equal Distribution.—12. Father's double share in self-acquired property.—13. Not so in ancestral property.—14. Equality of shares preferable in all cases.—15. Partition with one who wishes not to take any share.—16. Partition of heritage extends to the third degree; participation per stirpes not per capita.—17. Of partition of ancestral property recovered by father and of the father's right of disposal.—18. Mother's life no bar to partition.—19. The mother entitled to a share.—20. Initiation of uninitiated brothers.—21. Marriage of sisters, &c.—22. Of alienation of immoveable property.—23. Partition may take place at the desire of a single co-sharer.—24. Of a co-sharer born after partition.—25. Of partition by brothers of different classes.

1. Now are determined the periods, when, and the

persons by whom, partition may be made.

On that subject Manu says:—" After (the death of) the father and also the mother, the brethren being assembled together shall equally divide the paternal estate; for

they are not masters while those are alive."

"Paternal," signifies, belonging to the parents, since both are previously mentioned: hence by the phrase "after the father," a period of partition of the paternal property, is expressed; and by the phrase "after the mother," a period of partition of the maternal property, is shown; the term "and also" (cha) however, is used for the purpose of indicating other periods, but not for the purpose of laying down the restriction, (that partition is to be made only) "after the death of both," for the mother's life does not constitute a bar to the partition of the pater-

nal property, nor the father's life to the partition of the

maternal property.

Accordingly the author of the Sangraha says:—"Partition of paternal property may take place notwithstanding the mother is alive, because in the absence of the husband, the mother has no independent ownership (in the property of her husband;) likewise also the partition of the maternal property may be made while the father is alive, for when there are children, a woman's lord is not the lord of her property." The meaning is: Inasmuch as, when there are sons, the mother has not independent ownership in the property of her husband even after his death, therefore even while she is alive the partition of the paternal property is reasonable; and because the husband has no right to the property of the wife, when there are children, therefore even while he is alive the sons are entitled to divide the maternal property.

Hence also the text, "For they are not masters while those are alive" is to be held as establishing the absence of independence in respect of the property of the father and mother respectively; and not as establishing the absence of right, since it has been demonstrated that the sons' right to the property of the father (and the mother?)

accrues by birth.

In the following text, namely,-" Should the father effect partition, he may separate the sons at his own desire, or (may separate) the eldest son with the best share; or all may be equal sharers;"-Yajnavalkya, by declaring that the father may separate the sons at his desire, indicates that while the father is alive, that too is a period of partition when the father feels a desire for it. In that case, again, the father alone is the person who is competent to make partition; since the want of the sons' independence has been established by the text, viz.,—"For they have no right while the father is alive and free from defect." From the adjective "free from defect," it appears that what is meant is, that although the father be alive who has defects like degradation, still because the sons are not required to remain under his control, therefore that too is a period of partition when they desire; and in that case the sons are competent to make partition.

There is also another period of partition at the desire of the sons, namely, when the father feels no concern for property and has his sexual appetite extinct, and the mother is past child-bearing. Thus Nárada having spoken of partition after (the demise of) the father, in the text, namely,—" Hence after (the demise of) the father, the sons may divide his estate equally;"—goes on to say:—" Also when the mother is past child-bearing and the sisters have been given in marriage; or when the father's sexual propensity has become extinct and his affection (for property) has ceased."

Jimutavahana, however, reads the text as "the father is lost or houseless," (instead of "the father's sexual propensity has become extinct;") and explains that "lost," means, degraded; and "houseless," signifies, no longer a householder. He also says that the reading, viz.,—"the father's sexual propensity has become extinct," is unauthorized. But this is unreasonable, for that reading has been adopted in the Mitakshara and other commentaries. The passage "the sons may divide his estate" (occurring in the preceding text) is to be construed with the latter text (of Narada).

Gautama also, after declaring,—"After (the demise of) the father, the sons may divide his wealth,"—goes on to say,—"Also in his lifetime, when he desires, if the

mother be past child-bearing."

Also Vrihaspati ordains,—"On the demise of the parents, partition among brethren has been declared; it may also take place while they are alive if the mother be past child-bearing."

Again even when the mother is capable of bearing more sons, and the father is unwilling, partition may take place at the desire of the sons, if the father suffer from a lasting disease or be addicted to vice. Thus Sankha says:—"Partition of inheritance may take place against the will of the father, if he be old, diseased, and have his intellect perverted;"—also Nárada says:—"A father who is afflicted with disease, or is influenced with wrath, or whose mind is engrossed with a beloved object, or who acts otherwise than the Sástras permit, is not competent to make partition."

To what has been said on the subject in the Mitákshará, namely, that the father's death is one period, when the mother is past child-bearing is the second, and the third is in the lifetime of the father when he desires, the following objection is raised by Jímútaváhana:— "If the cessation of the mother's courses be joined, as a condition, with the extinction of the father's affections. then since the nubile age is ordained by Manu in the text. viz.,—'A man of thirty years shall marry a lovely girl of twelve years; or a man of twenty four, a girl of eight vears: one who marries sooner deviates from virtue;'-and since the same sage ordains the age in which a man should adopt another order, in the text,—'After fifty a man shall retire to a forest;'—therefore at that time, the cessation of the mother's courses being impossible, there could be no partition at the desire of the sons although the father become a hermit or his temporal affections be extinct. it be said that the extinction of the father's temporal affections without the condition annexed to it, constitutes a period of partition of paternal property, then even when the father is degraded partition could not take place if his temporal affections be not extinct. If it be alleged that this too is another period of partition, then there would be four periods of partition, viz., the demise of the father, his degradation, the extinction of his affections and his desire. Hence two periods only are reasonable: one, when the father's right ceases by death, degradation or the extinction of terporal affections; the other, at the pleasure of the father while his right subsists."

This objection has arisen from not understanding the intention of the author of the Mitákshará. For he does not lay down the restrictive rule that there are only three periods of partition; because he does immediately establish other periods by the passage 'likewise, &c.,' and because there is no reason for such a rule. The proposition, again, that one period of partition is on the cessation of the father's right, and the other, at the father's desire although his ownership have not ceased,—is erroneous. Since in that case, the text, "when the mother is past child-bearing," would become unmeaning, for the father's right is not extinguished by reason of the mere fact of the cessation

of the mother's courses; and since the cessation of the father's right cannot possibly be the occasion of partition, inasmuch as right has been established to accrue by birth. Similarly also, right does not cease under the circumstance of being afflicted with a lasting disease; hence also the restrictive rule asserted by you that there are only two periods of partition is difficult to be maintained. Nor can you say that you approve the proposition that right does not cease when the father is afflicted with a lasting disease, for it would be contrary to the text which enjoins partition on that event.

As for what has been said by the same author, namely,—"The condition when the mother is past childbearing,' refers to the property inherited from the grandfather and other ancestors. Since, the mother being past child-bearing, the birth of more sons becomes impossible. hence partition among sons may then take place, but by the choice of the father, for if ancestral property were divided while the mother was capable of bearing children, then those born subsequently would be deprived of subsistence; nor is that reasonable, for it is ordained,—'Those who are born and those who are not yet begotten, as well as those who are in the womb, all require maintenance; the dissipation of their hereditary source of maintenance is censured.'—Inasmuch as there are two periods for partition of paternal wealth, therefore Manu, Gautama and other sages have used the term 'after,' leaving the term death. 'After,' signifies, extinction of the father's right. But if the above text referred to paternal property, then the text,— 'But one born after partition shall take the father's share only,'-would be without any subject to which it may be applicable, because there is no possibility of the birth of more sons, when the mother is past child-bearing; nor can it be at all supposed to relate to the mother's estate, for in that case the mother would be deprived of her property. Hence the condition 'when the mother is past child-bearing,' refers to the estate of the grandfather. Nor can the circumstance of the mother being incapable of bearing more children be a cause of partition independently of choice, for there can be no partition without a will to effect it; then

the question occurs, whose must that will be? and the solution is that it must be the father's will, as deduced from the text of Gautama, which says,—' After (the demise of) the father, the sons may divide the estate, or while he lives if the mother be past child-bearing, and he desires it.' Hence there are only two periods for partition of the grandfather's estate; one is, when the parents are no more, and the other, when the mother is past child-bearing and the father desires it."

This too is, but the effect of carelessness: because the objection of dissipation of the subsistence is equally applicable to paternal property; and because the objection that the text, 'But one born after partition, &c.,' would be without a subject, holds equally good in case that text be held to refer to the estate of the grandfather and other ancestors; also because it cannot but be admitted, as it is universally admitted, that when a father who retains his temporal affections becomes tainted with degradation and the like, partition of even the grandfather's estate may take place at the desire of the sons. But as it will be established that in the property of the grandfather, the ownership of the father and the sons is equal by reason of texts such as, —"The ownership of the father and the son is the same &c.,"—therefore in fact partition thereof at the desire of the sons is not improper. As for a different interpretation of the above text, and the supposition that the absence of mastery relates to his estate &c., all these will be refuted on the occasion of considering that text.

4. We say that there are only three periods of partition in this way, namely, when the father is alive and worthy of independence, his desire alone is the cause of partition; but if he is not worthy of it by reason of degradation, mendicancy and the like, then the desire of the sons only; on the demise of the father, however, the causality of the sons' desire, necessarily follows. Otherwise there would be great confusion, for it would be unreasonable to suppose that the circumstances, namely, extinction of desires and the like, do sometimes separately and sometimes conjointly constitute the cause of partition, and because it would be difficult to discriminate between what

constitutes the principal cause and what its concomitants. Hence in certain texts the enumeration of some of the circumstances and the omission of the others become consistent.

By reason of the simplicity of the supposition of one radical revelation, all the texts should be considered to indicate only the absence of the father's independence by 'extinction of desire' and the like. To this very effect is the import of texts like the following:—"For they are not masters while the parents are alive:" (Manu). "For sons have not ownership while the father is alive and free from defect:" (Devala). "And it is right even

while they are both living:" (Vrihaspati).

Hence Vyása and other sages have declared two alternatives, namely, one which is preferable, is the common abode of brothers while the parents are alive; the other, where by their consent and the like, the eldest or any other who is capable of managing the affairs of the family becomes the head of the family and the rest live under his Thus Vyása says:--"For brothers, common abode is ordained while the parents are alive." Háríta declares,-" While the father lives, the sons have no independence with regard to receipt, expenditure and deposit of wealth. But if he be deceased, remotely absent, or afflicted with disease, let the eldest manage the estate." and Likhita, however, most clearly declare,—"If the father becomes incapable, let the eldest manage the affairs of the family, or with his consent a younger brother conversant with business; partition of the wealth does not take place, if the father be not desirous of it; when he is old or his mental faculties are impaired, or his body is afflicted with a lasting disease let the eldest like a father protect the goods of the rest; as (the support of) the family depends upon the wealth, they are not independent while they have their father living, or while the mother is so."

Therefore there are only three periods for partition, in the way mentioned above.

5. In the text of Manu on this subject the term "assembled together" only recites (but does not enjoin) the

assemblage (of co-sharers) which may take place, like the plurality (recited by the plural number in the term "brethren,") otherwise partition could not take place, at the desire of one co-parcener or where there are two brothers. The term "equally" however is restrictive; but this will be fully considered hereafter.

6. Jimutavahana says:— "Since the term parents' (in Vrihaspati's text) bears the dual number, therefore partition by uterine brothers, of even the paternal property should be made only on the demise of the mother. But the use of the mother's demise has no reference to the partition of the mother's estate; because the text even while they are living cannot consistently refer to the mother's estate, therefore it must be admitted to refer to another's property: hence, because by the term even in the text even while they are both living, the existence of the parents is declared to relate to the very same case to which the non-existence of the parents stands as the cause, therefore the demise of the mother ought not to be interpreted as referring to the estate of the mother."

But this is not consistent; for in the text of Manu the terms 'father' and 'mother' are separately set out: also where it is otherwise, (as in Vrihaspati's text) it is reasonable to interpret the dual number as only intending reference to partition. If it were not so, then there would be no earthly reason for connecting the property of one with the demise of another.

What again is the meaning of the passage, namely,—
"Because the text, 'even while they are both living &c.'
cannot consistently refer to the estate of the mother
&c."? If it be that the text does not refer to the property
of the mother, by reason of the absence of her independence while the father is alive, in that case the father has
ownership even in the property of his wife notwithstanding the sons, therefore her demise too cannot have any
bearing upon that, hence would arise the objection of having
reference to something else.

And as for a different meaning of the above passage, it will be shown that that is an absurd assertion. Hence the proposition, affirmed by the author of the Sangraha

and others,—viz., that the mother's demise relates to her property,—is consistent; since the reason is earthly.

7. The common abode of the brethren, however, is preferable, as while the parents are alive as likewise after their demise. Thus Sankha and Likhita declare,—"They may live together if they please, for being united together they may attain to prosperity." The meaning is, that being "united together," i., e., dwelling together they may attain to prosperity through the assistance rendered by each other in the acquisition of property. So Nárada says.—"Let the eldest brother, like a father maintain the rest together; or let a younger brother who is capable, do so: the maintenance of the family depends upon ability."

So Manu ordains,—"The eldest brother may take the patrimony entire, and the rest may live under him as under a father. By the eldest son as soon as born, a man becomes father of male issue, and is exonerated from the debt to the ancestors: such a son therefore is entitled to take the entire heritage. That son alone on whom he devolves his debt and through whom he tastes immortality was begotten from a sense of duty; the rest are considered as begotten from love of pleasure. Let the eldest like a father, support the younger brothers, and let them according to law behave like sons towards the eldest The firstborn exalts the family, or on the conbrother. trary, destroys it; the firstborn is the most respectable in society, the firstborn is honored by the good in this world. If the eldest brother acts as an eldest brother should do, he is as a mother, he is as a father. But one who does not act as an eldest brother should do, is still to be respected as a relative. The eldest brother who from avarice defrauds his younger brethren shall not be considered as the eldest, shall forfeit his share and shall be punished by the king."

Agreeably to all these texts, the joint abode of all the brethren in obedience to the eldest brother who is

possessed of good qualities, is preferable.

But if increase of religious merit be desired then partition should be made. It has been so declared by Manu and Prajápati;—"Thus let them dwell together, or apart for the sake of religious merit, since religious duties are

multiplied apart, therefore separation is virtuous." Religious duties consist in the worship of gods &c., for that alone is never heard to be separate in a joint family. Accordingly Vrihaspati says:—"Among those who live in commensality, the worship of the manes of ancestors and of gods and Brahmanas, is common: but among the separated the very

same worship takes place in the house of each."

The author of the Sangraha, however, says that the term increase of religious merit, includes also the increase of religious merit by means of the establishment of the sacred fires and the like ceremonies:—thus he says,—By partition the paternal estate is rendered the property of the sons; when the right of property arises, they commence; hence separation is virtuous: "commence," i. e. accomplish the ceremonies of establishing the sacred fires and the like.

But this has already been refuted by us when establishing the right of sons to the performance of ceremonies enjoined by the Sruti and the Smriti, even before partition by reason of the sons' right to the paternal property accruing by birth alone. Therefore by the term religious duties, are to be understood only such religious duties as the five great sacrifices.

- 8. The phrase "and the sisters given in marriage," is however inserted not for the purpose of marking a period of partition, but for the purpose of shewing that their marriage must be celebrated: similarly the text of Nárada, viz.,—"Whatever remains after the father's gifts are given and the paternal debts liquidated out of it, should be divided by the brothers so that the father may not remain a debtor,"—ordains the obligation of paying off the father's debts, but not a period of partition.
- 9. Again when the father separates the sons at his desire, then also arbitrary will shall not be exercised, but the meaning of Yogisvara's text is, that of the two methods viz. "Or (may separate) the eldest with the best share, or all may be equal sharers,"—that method which he chooses may be adopted.

Professor Vijnánesvara explains the above text in the following way:—"The eldest, with the best share; the middlemost, with the middlemost share; the youngest, with the smallest share; or all the eldest and the rest may be made equal sharers."

The oriental writers, however, say that the phrase 'at his desire' indicates a separate method altogether, and distinct shares of the eldest and others and equal shares constitute two methods: thus there are three methods; accordingly the first term "or" in the text "or (may separate) the eldest,"—becomes significant, as having reference to the mode indicated by the phrase "at his desire:" it would become far-fetched, had it reference to the method which is

subsequently set forth.

And they assign the following reason for that (view):. -In the text of Narada, viz.,-" Or the father himself when old may separate the sons, either (he may separate) the eldest with the best share, or in any way he pleases," because one mode of unequal distribution is set forth by the passage "either the eldest &c.," and then it is said "or in any way &c." therefore it is indicated that there is also another mode of distribution by the desire of the father. Also Háríta says:—" A father, having during his lifetime distributed his property may retire to the forest, or enter into the order suitable to an aged man; or he may remain at home having distributed a small portion (of his property amongst his sons) and retaining a greater portion; should he be pinched, he may take back from them."-" The order suitable to an aged man," means the fourth order; "be pinched," means, be reduced to poverty:—here too a different mode is expressed by the passage "having distributed a small portion." Therefore by reason of the same foundation (of Yogísvara's text) with these (texts) it is reasonable to say, in order to include the above mode of partition in Yogisvara's text, that the passage "at his desire" (in Yogisvara's text) indicates nothing but a separate mode.

This is wrong: for the term "or" does not become farfetched (by having reference to the subsequent mode,) since it may, with propriety, be construed in either way. Neither is the reason assigned correct. Because if the object of the phrase 'at his desire' (in Yogísvara's text) be to include another mode mentioned in other texts, then the latter half (of Yogisvara's text) would be merely unnecessary; for as those two modes also are mentioned in other texts, these may likewise be included under the phrase "at his desire": there would certainly be very little necessity if the object of that phrase were to include a mode other than these (two modes). And because desire being under no restraint, the meaning of that (other supposed mode) cannot be ascertained without consulting other texts, (but it must be ascertained) so that arbitrariness may be prevented: but there would be no necessity for consulting other texts, if the phrase "at his desire" be interpreted to be inserted for the purpose of removing the idea of any rule regarding the applicability of the two modes mentioned by (Yogísvara) himself. Nor can it be said that inasmuch as option is indicated by the very assertion of the alternative, the phrase "at his desire" is useless; since it is far more reasonable to say that the phrase though it is superfluous, is intended to have reference to the two modes mentioned by himself, with the object of removing the idea of the alternative being governed by any rule, rather than that the latter half (of Yogisvara's text) is useless.

Again, the same foundation (of Yogisvara's text) with the texts of Nárada and other sages, is not inconsistent with the interpretation put by Vijnánesvara; for the two modes mentioned in Yogísvara's text, are declared in other texts also. Nor can it be said that let the meaning of Yogísvara's text be, that arbitrary will alone constitutes a distinct mode; for in that case the following text would be meaningless, viz.: "A father who acts otherwise than the Sástras permit has no power in distribution"; for, if (the exercise of) unqualified will were agreeable to the Sastras, then acting otherwise than the Sastras permit, would be impossible. Had will been the only cause, then the following text of Kátyáyana also would have been useless, viz.:— "But let not the father distinguish one son at a partition made in his lifetime, nor whimsically deprive any one (of his share) without sufficient cause."—"Let not distinguish," means, let him not make any son benefitted by any arbitrary special consideration, otherwise than by the

specific deductions for the eldest and others,—as enjoined by the Sástras; "sufficient cause" again, is such as degradation &c., permitted by the Sástras; "whimsically" means, through anger or through affection towards the son of a beloved wife; "deprive" signifies, render destitute of shares.

As for the following text of Yogísvara, namely,—"Among those separated with greater or less allotments, (the distribution) made by the father is pronounced, lawful,"—that again has, consistently with the text, viz.,—"A father who is afflicted with disease or incensed with wrath &c,"—been explained by Vijnánesvara himself to mean only this:—"lawful" i. e., if in accordance with law, then what is made by the father is pronounced as finally made i. e., cannot be revoked; but what is not lawful i. e., not made agreeably to the Sástras, can certainly be revoked.

Similarly are to be explained also the following texts of Vrihaspati and Nárada (respectively):—" Shares which have been assigned by the father to the sons, whether equal, greater or less, ought to be kept unaltered by them: else they shall be chastised."—" For such as have been separated by their father with equal, greater or less allotments of wealth, the same is a lawful distribution; for the father is the lord of all."—The meaning is that even in case of partition with the best and the like shares allotted by the father to the eldest and the like respectively, the others should not be dissatisfied; nor should the eldest and others be so, in case of partition with equal allotments: accordingly Nárada says, that "that is a lawful distribution."

Partition with the best and the like shares has been declared also by Manu thus,—"The twentieth part of the estate together with the best of all chattels, constitutes the specific deduction for the eldest; half of that for the middle-most; and a quarter, for the youngest." Baudháyana has declared the case of equal shares, thus:—"Manu distributed the heritage among his sons; hence the share of all is equal by reason of the absence of distinction." The meaning is, that all the sons shall have equal shares inasmuch as no distinction is mentioned in the Sruti, viz., "Manu distributed the heritage among his sons."

If a father, by his own will, separates his sons with equal shares, then he must give to each of his wives a share equal to that of a son. Thus Yajnavalkya says:-"If he makes the allotments equal, then his wives to whom woman's property has not been given by the husband or father-in-law, shall be made equal sharers."—To whom woman's property has not been given through affection &c., by the husband or the father-in-law: the mention of the husband &c. is illustrative; the meaning is, who are devoid of woman's property described hereafter. What is laid down is, that each of such wives is entitled only to a share equal to that of a son. Thus the following meaning is deduced: -When the father separates his sons even with the best and the like shares, then also after having deducted the best and the like shares he shall. out of the whole property from which the specific deductions have been made, allot to each of his wives a share equal to that of a son; but they are not entitled to specific deductions for their seniority.

Whatever, however, a wife is entitled to as her specific deduction, that too the wife gets; accordingly A'pastamba says:—"The furniture in the house and the jewels belong to the wife."—"Furniture" means pots for eating and the like. What furniture of a woman is not joint property and what ornament is not so, will be

considered hereafter.

Nor is it reasonable to say that when Vijnánesvara explains the above text (of Yogísvara) to intend that a wife is entitled to a share equal to that of a son in both the modes (of partition), then the condition consisting in the equality of shares, as ordained in the passage, "If he makes the allotments equal,"—is useless: this much only ought to have been said that the wives do not get specific deductions according to their seniority. Because a mode of mere unequal distribution without the specific deductions,—has been declared by Manu in the text,—"When the specific deductions have thus been made, let equal shares (of the residue) be allotted: but if the specific deductions be not made, then the distribution of shares among the sons shall be in this manner,—let the eldest have a double share; the next born, a share and a

half, and the younger sons each a share: this is the settled law,"-by Gautama in the text,-" Or the first-born may have a double share, and the rest one share each,"—by Vasishtha, in the text,—"The partition of heritage among brothers is now declared: let the eldest take two shares, to him also belongs a tenth of the oxen and horses; the goats, the sheep and the house belongs to the youngest; the iron instruments and the furniture of the house belong to the middlemost,"—and by Nárada, in the text,— "To the eldest an additional share should be given; for the youngest the best share is ordained; the rest shall partake of equal shares and so the unmarried sister."— If this mode be adopted, then in order to establish the absence of the wives' shares in that case, the restrictive rule, namely, "If he makes the allotments equal,"—has been ordained. Hence there is no defect.

Accordingly ininterpreting the following text of Manu, viz.—"Among undivided brethren, if there be exertion in common, then the father shall on no account make unequal allotments,"—which prohibits the distribution of unequal shares, if in acquiring the property there has been "in common" i. e., equal "exertion" i. e., labour of all the brethren,—Jimútaváhana says:—But the specific deductions may certainly be given by the father, these do not partake of the nature of allotments; unequal allotments only being prohibited.

The following is the opinion of Vijnánayogin:—Hence also in a case of partition with specific deductions, as declared by Yájnavalkya in the text, "or the eldest with the best share,"—the sons certainly take equal shares; consequently to that case also, the above text (of Yájnavalkya) is applicable. But it does not apply to the case of

partition with double shares &c.

But if woman's property has been given (to a wife,) in that case the allotment of a half share is subsequently ordained in the text,—"If any have been assigned, let him allot the half." Although this has been ordained with reference to what the husband is to give to a wife who is superseded by the marriage of another wife, still by parity of reason it is to be applied to the present case where the question occurs (as to what should be allotted to a wife who

has received woman's property). For Baudhayana says:—
"What is affirmed of even one among many that have a common property, the same is to be extended to all, since

they are declared to be similar."

Jímútaváhana and his follower the author of the Dáyatattva appear to explain the term "exertion in common" in the text of Manu, viz.,-" Among undivided brothers &c.,"—to mean, if all ask for partition; for thev say:—"But when the sons request partition in the father's lifetime, an unequal distribution should not be made by him." But this interpretation is improper inasmuch as the term "in common" (saha) becomes unmeaning, and the term. "exertion" (utthanam) although importing labor must be taken to signify, desire for partition; hence the interpretation put by us is to be preferred: thus we get also harmony with the following text of Yogisvara, viz.,— "When there is an augmentation of the common stock, then however, the distribution is ordained to be equal": hence that text is reasonably construed by putting no other interpretation than what is approved by us.

It has been said in the Mitákshará:—"Again in the text,—'If any have been assigned, let him allot the half,'—the term 'half' does not signify an exact equal division; hence so much should be given as what was given before and what is given now may be equal (to the share of a son)." The purport of which is this:—although the term ardha (half), in the neuter gender, signifies equal division according to the kosha (vocabulary) which says,—"ardha in the neuter gender, implies equal division,"—still the intention is that a wife is entitled only to a share equal to that of a son, so that the share of a wife may not be unsettled, that is, sometimes greater than that of a son, and sometimes less; also that the restriction as to an exact half share may

not have an ultra-mundane object.

With regard to this the author of the Madanaratna says:—"From the plural number in the term 'wives,' (in Yajnavalkya's text) it appears that the father himself is to take a share for each wife; but separate shares are not to be allotted to them; since that would be contrary to Harita's text which ordains,—'There can be no partition between husband and wife.'"



This is not tenable; for partition between husband and wife is not affirmed here, so that there would be conflict with the text of Hárita, but (what is affirmed is) the gift to the wives, at the time of separating the sons, of shares equal to theirs, like the gift through affection; for this reason it has been said that a half share shall be assigned if woman's property has been given. Hence there is no defect.

11. The partition, however, which takes place at the desire of the sons during the lifetime of the father,—must be equal; because there is no provision for inequality (of distribution,) and because the term "equally" which occurs in the previous text is to be construed with the text of Manu (Nárada?) viz.,—"When the mother is past child-bearing."

So also the partition after the demise of the father must be equal; for it is so declared by the term, "equally" in Manu's text cited before; also Haríta says, "When the father is dead, the division of the heritage shall be equal;"—so Paithínasi declares,—"When the paternal property is to be divided, the shares of the brothers shall be equal"; so also Yájnavalkya ordains,—"After the demise of the parents, the sons shall equally divide the heritage and the debts."

This text (of Yajnavalkya) has been explained in the Mitakshara, thus:—"After the demise of the parents," indicates the period of partition, "the sons" shows the persons by whom partition is to be made, "equally" restricts the mode of partition.

If it be said that when Manu, after having premised partition after the demise of the father, and having ordained the alternative of joint abode to be preferable, in the following text,—"The eldest alone, however, may take the paternal estate in its entirety, and the rest may live under him as under a father,"—has also spoken of unequal division in the text,—"The specific deduction for the eldest is the twentieth part &c.":—then how can the restriction, be obtained that the distribution shall be equal? The answer is, although this unequal distribution is laid down by the Sástras, whether the father be alive or dead; still

the restriction,—that the distribution shall be but equal in this *kaliyugam* (age of discord,)—is to be maintained in pursuance of other texts; for Yogísvara ordains,—"But practise not what is abhorred in the world though it be

legal, for it secures not spiritual good."

Here the term "world," means yugam (age); the meaning is, "what is abhorred" i. e., prohibited to be practised in one age, although it may be legal in another age, ought not to be practised. Otherwise there would be the following defects:—it would be contradictory to say that the same thing is legal, and (at the same time) is one which secures not spiritual good; the abhorrence of what is agreeable to the Sástras by one who is versed in them would be contradictory; the abhorrence of mortals in ignorance of the Sastras does not, however, render anything incapable of affording spiritual good, because the same might extend to cruelty &c. in the ceremonies of agnisoma and the like. Accordingly, those only that are ordained to be shunned in the kaliyugam, such as the killing of cattle in honor of a venerable guest and the sacrifice of cows, have been set forth in the Mitakshara as examples of what are abhorred in the world.

Again wherever the re-marriage of an undefiled widow, and the like, have been mentioned under what are to be shunned in the kaliyugam, there have been also included the specific deductions for the eldest &c.; thus in the A'dipurána it has been said,—"The remarriage of a woman once married, the specific deduction for the eldest, the sacrifice of kine likewise, the intercourse with a brother's wife, and the use of a kamandalu; these five shall not be done in the kaliyugam." also it has been said in the Smritisangraha,—"As neither the law of appointment to raise issue, nor the sacrifice of kine, so neither the partition with specific deductions, now exist."—" The law of appointment to raise issue," means, intercourse,—in the prescribed way, by appointment of venerable relatives,—with a brother's affianced bride if the brother dies, (before the completion of marriage); "the sacrifice of kine," is as ordained in the text,-" Sacrifice a barren cow as a victim consecrated to Mitra and Varuna;" "now," means, in the kaliyugam.

Accordingly A'pastamba, having declared his own opinion,—"A father, in his lifetime, shall equally distribute the heritage among the sons;"—and having stated as the opinion of some, the taking of the entire estate by the eldest, in the text,—"Some (say that) the eldest is the heir;"—and having shewn, as the opinion of others. a distribution with specific deductions, in the text,—"In some countries, the gold, the kine, and the black produce of the earth belong to the eldest; the car appertains to the father; and the furniture in the house and ornaments are the wife's, as also wealth (received by her) from kinsmen;"—has refuted the same in the text,—" That is contrary to the Sastras;"-and has himself explained the inconsistency with the Sastras, in the text,—"No distinction is mentioned in the Sruti,—'Manu distributed his heritage among his sons."

Hence unequal distribution, though ordained by the

Sástras, ought not to be carried out in the kali age.

As for what has been said by the author of the Mitakshara, namely,—"it is also contrary to scripture;"—that is open to question. For if there be inconsistency with scripture, then unequal distribution could not be practised in other ages also (besides the kali age,) consequently the texts ordaining it would be altogether without authority; hence it is inconsistent to say that it is one which is to be shunned in the kali age. Neither is here direct conflict with scripture; for inasmuch as distinction is not ordained in the Sruti (cited above), therefore equality (of distribution) is inferred according to the maxim,—"Equality is the rule where no distinction is expressed."

In the following passage of the Smritichandriká, however, there is written a different text of scripture, cited by Baudháyana, which ordains unequal distribution:—He himself has declared that there is a different text of scripture, bearing upon the specific deductions for seniority, "The eldest shall set apart one from every kind of property agreeably to the Sruti,—'Therefore set the eldest son at ease with a property;" by speaking of "one from every kind of property," he indicates that the singular number in the term 'a property,' occurring in the Sruti, is significant to the strategy of the singular of the singular number of the singular of the

ficant; 'set at ease,' means satisfy.

Jimútaváhana and others, however, say that the equal or unequal distribution are determined respectively with reference to the consent or not (of the younger brothers,) in the passage:-"When there is the consent of the brothers by reason of great respect &c., (for the eldest) then there may be unequal distribution with specific deductions and the like: accordingly equal division alone is observed in the world, because persons of the present day (who are younger brothers) entertain no great respect (for their elders), also because elder brothers deserving of deducted allotments are now rare."—This is, however, not acceptable as it is inconsistent with the first half (of Yajnavalkya's text,) because in that case, the sons' desire alone would be the cause; and the interpretation,—that the father's will constitutes another independent mode (of partition)—has, however, been previously shewn to be erroneous.

12. When the father distributes his self-acquired property amongst the sons, he shall himself take two shares. This has been declared by Nárada,—"The father while dividing his own property shall take two shares." Also Vrihaspati says,—"If partition takes place in his lifetime, the father shall take two shares."

It is said by Sankha and Likhita that the father takes two shares in case he has an only son; thus,—"If he be the father of an only son, he shall allot two shares to himself." The author of the Vyávahárapárijáta, however, has explained the above text, thus;—Here the term "only" (eka) means, excellent; accordingly if the son, being accomplished, is capable of acquiring wealth, then on separation with him, two shares shall be taken by the father.

Jimútaváhana, however, has explained the above text, thus;—"The term ekaputra (rendered above into 'the father of an only son') signifies, the son of one father, i. e., the true (aurasa) son; it is not a compound called vahubrihi, signifying, 'the father of an only son'; for, as in a vahubrihi compound what is principally considered is an object different from what the constituent words of such a compound mean, it is not preferrable to a shashthitatpurusha; accordingly the wife's son (kshetraja) is excluded by reason of his being the son of two fathers: hence a father being

a true son (of his own father) shall take two shares out of the estate of his own father, but not a father who is kshetraja

or the wife's son."

This is wrong, for in that case this text would refer to the estate of the grandfather; but it will be established that even a father who is a true son (of his father) is entitled to (no more than) a share equal to that of a son, because the father and the sons have equal right to the estate of the grandfather: accordingly here the vahubrihi compound is to be necessarily preferred.

The author of the Mitakshara, however, has not

noticed the above text at all.

Kátyáyana says,—"A father takes either a double share or a moiety by reason of his acquisition of both son and wealth; and a mother also, if the father be deceased,

is entitled to a share equal to that of a son."

(In commenting) on this text Jimutaváhána says:— "The term putravittárjanát (rendered above into 'by reason of his aquisition of both son and wealth') means, from a son's acquisition of wealth, i. e., the father is entitled to two shares of the wealth acquired even by a son, in the same manner as of his self-acquired property: but it does not signify, 'by reason of the acquisition of both son and wealth; for it is admitted that when partition is made with brothers, then even one who has not got a son takes two shares as the gainer of the wealth; hence it must be affirmed (by the adversary to be the meaning of the above text) that if any relative exist who is entitled to participate, the acquirer takes two shares &c.; but if there be none, he takes the whole. But thus the specific mention of father and son would be unmeaning, like the singing of a drunkard. Besides acquisition is an act causing right of property, for it has been declared that 'it is a contradiction to say that acquisition does not produce right of property'; but it has been shewn under the topic of the gift of whatever a man owns that there can be no such right over sons; hence the term acquisition would be metaphorical in regard to sons and literal in respect of wealth; but this two-fold meaning of a term once uttered is unreason-Nor can it be argued that the text would be superfluous, since the son's right to a double share is obtained

from the fact of his being the acquirer, and since the father's right to two shares is also deducible from other texts, independently of the above text. For this text is not superfluous; since without this text there is no authority for holding that the father is entitled to two shares of his son's wealth."

This is not tenable; for the compound (putravittárjanát,) as explained by you, conveys a secondary meaning, depending at it does upon the genitive case to be imported, and as such, is less reasonable than the conjunctive form (maintained by us). As for the objection raised to the conjunctive form by the argument "for it is admitted &c."; that is extremely incongruous; for the text does not relate to participation &c. by brothers, the father's property being the subject dealt with. Nor can it be contended that the term putra "son" (in the above text) is useless, the acquisition of property alone being a sufficient cause for taking two shares. Because the term shows the absence of independence (in the son): the purport is, a son too being acquired by him like property is dependent, and as such can be no obstacle to the taking by the father, of two shares of his self-acquired property. As for the objection, "but this two-fold meaning &c."; that too is not good. For the father's right over the sons too is admitted. It cannot be said that this would be contradictory to what is said under the topic of the gift of whatever a man owns, the purport of what is said there being against such right of the father and others. Because the absence of the gift of sons &c. which is concluded in that topic, has been established by reason of conflict (of the gift of sons &c.) with what is shewn in the Bháshya, to be the inducement (for giving away all that a man owns). It is for this reason that the provisions regarding the gift &c. of sons and daughters, bear only the primary meaning, they do not convey gift &c. that are secondary, such as making sons &c. dependents of others.

13. But the appropriation of two shares by a father relates to his self-acquired property; it has no reference to the property acquired by his father. For the father and the sons are entitled to equal shares of the grand-

father's estate, since their co-equal ownership therein has been ordained by Yajnavalkya in the following text,—"The ownership of father and son is, indeed, similar in the acquisitions of the grandfather, whether land, any settled income or moveables."

And the meaning of this text is this:—"land," signifies, rice-field and the like; "any settled income," is what is given by reason of written grants by kings to the following effect,—"To such and such a person, so many betel-leaves or the like shall be given from such and such a plantation of betel leaves or orchard of betel-nuts;" "moveables," are gold &c.; by the term "indeed," it is indicated that the ownership of father and son in these is well-known, right accruing by birth alone; that again is "similar," i. e., co-equal: hence in respect of the grand-father's estate, the sons are not dependent on the father, as they are in respect of the father's self-acquired property; consequently partition (of the grandfather's estate) may be made (by the sons) even against the father's will, and the rule regarding the father's two shares does not obtain.

So Vrihaspati has declared,—"In the property acquired by the grandfather, whether immoveable or moveable, the parcenership of both father and son is ordained to be co-equal indeed."

The author of the Madanaratna says:—The meaning is that the father shall take an equal share only, but not a double share as in the case of his self-acquired property, nor shall adopt the mode of unequal distribution.

On this, Jimutavahana says:—"Where of two brothers, one dies, while the father is alive, leaving a son, and the other brother survives and subsequently the father dies; in that case the son alone, by reason of his proximity, would have inherited the father's estate, but not the grandson whose father is previously deceased, by reason of his distance: in order to prevent this, it has been declared that 'the ownership is similar;' hence, as the father had ownership in the grandfather's estate, so his son too has: there is, however, no distinction by reason of greater or less propinquity, both being equally competent to offer oblations in the párvana mode. This is the purport. Hence also a great-grandson whose father and grandfather

are dead is equally entitled to the estate of the great-grandfather, for there is no distinction as to the offering of oblations. But if the sons had ownership in the grandfather's property while the father is alive, then on partition by two brothers having sons, their sons too would have been entitled to shares by reason of their equal ownership. Hence the text (of Yajnavalkya) relates to a grandson whose father is dead and not to grandsons generally. Nor can it be said that such cannot be the purport of the text, as being not the subject premised. Because the case of grandsons by different fathers is the subject previously proposed. But what is intended to be shewn by the declaration of the similarity of ownership, is that there cannot be unequal distribution by the father at his will, as it can be in the case of self-acquired property. Thus Vishnu says:—'When a father separates his sons from himself, his will regulates the division of the wealth acquired by himself; but in the estate inherited from the grandfather, the ownership of father and son is co-equal.' Hence as regards self-acquired property, a father may separate his sons with unequal allotments; but in the grandfather's estate the ownership being co-equal, the father cannot act according to his pleasure. These texts being reasonably construed by this interpretation alone. the general rule,—that the father's desire constitutes the period of partition, and that the father is entitled to a double share,—is not affected (by them). Again, although it may be conceded, as is maintained by Dharesvara, that the texts relate even to grandsons whose father is alive, still the object is no other than to prevent unequal distribution by the choice of the father; they do not however shew that partition may take place at the desire of the sons, nor that the father is not entitled to two shares. When, agreeably to the following text of Vrihaspati, viz.— 'The eldest by birth, by science, and by good qualities shall obtain a double share of the heritage; and the rest shall share alike: for he is as a father to them,'—a father, who delivers his father from the lower regions and is the eldest by good qualities,—is, on partition with his brothers entitled to a double share as being like a father: then it is not proper on the part of yourself and the sages, to say

that the father himself, on partition with his sons does not obtain a double share of the estate inherited from the grandfather, although it is through him alone that the relation of the sons arises to the grandfather's property. Hence the rule that the father's desire constitutes the period for partition, as set forth in the text, 'He may separate his sons by his choice' and that the father is entitled to a double share, as is laid down in the text,-'shall take two shares,'-is applicable also to the property inherited from the grandfather; but it is only the unequal distribution amongst the sons, that does not take place at his will. Nor can it be said that in the following text, viz.,—'In the property acquired by the grandfather, whether immoveable or moveable the parcenership of both father and son is ordained to be equal indeed,'—the equality of the shares of father and son being clearly declared by Vrihaspati, how are two shares for the father obtained in this case too? Because the meaning is that 'the parcenership,' i. e., the act of one who distributes is 'equal,' that is to say, the father is not, however, entitled to make a distribution of greater and less shares at his choice: it it does not imply that the shares must be alike. declaration of equal parcenership may be taken to have reference to a father who is the son of two fathers, such as the wife's son, since it has been shown that the term ekaputra in the text,—'If he be the father of an only son &c.,' -refers to one who is a true son."

This is not acceptable, being opposed to the context. Since after ordaining that among grandsons by different fathers the allotment of shares is according to the father,—it is declared,—"The ownership of father and son is, indeed, similar in the acquisitions of the grandfather whether land, any settled income, or moveables."—Now here three doubts arise, namely, whether, when the father is alive, the grandsons have no ownership in the grandfather's property, or there can be no partition, or partition can take place only by the choice of the father as in the case of his self-acquired property. Hence what the author of the Mitákshará says, namely, that the latter text is ordained only with a view to remove these doubts,—is consistent with the proper mode of interpretation. Where-

fore should it be restricted to the case of grandsons whose father is dead? Nor, can it agreeably to what is maintained by Dháresvara, be said, that the text is intended to prevent only unequal distribution by the choice of the father, and not the determination of the time for partition by the father's choice, nor his double share, which are without distinction applicable to this case. there is no ground of discrimination (as to what is the intention).—Moreover, the causality of the father's desire, is literal, being expressed by the instrumental case in the text, "may separate by his choice;" but the determination, by the father's desire, of the time for partition, is only inferential: it is very strange that when the literal causality is prevented by this text, it does not prevent the determination (by the father's choice) of the time for partition—which is inferential. And if the ownership be admitted to be co-equal, as you have taken upon yourself the difficulty of admitting it,—then the causality of the son's desire, and the determination by it, of the time, cannot be opposed.

If it be said,—That the father is entitled to a double share by reason of his being the father and not by reason of his greater right, nor by reason of his being the acquirer; for (otherwise) that (i. e., the acquirer's double share) being established by the general text of Vasishtha, namely,—"Whatever any one of them has himself acquired, he is certainly entitled to two shares" (of the same,)—the particular text,—viz.—"The father.....shall himself take two shares,"—would be useless; therefore in the same way as, by virtue of special texts, he is, by reason of his being the eldest son, entitled to two shares of the property acquired by his father, so likewise is the father, of the property inherited from the grandfather: hence in our opinion the father is entitled to a double share

even of the property acquired by a son.

(The answer is,) true, but the text which ordains coequality of right, and which is applicable without restric-

tion, is against that (conclusion).

That the father is not entitled to a double share of the property acquired by a son, has been already established by impugning the meaning assigned by you, to the text



cited by you, namely, putravittárjanát. Nor can it be said. that even if a double share cannot be deduced from that text, still the father's double share in the property acquired by a son, follows from the general text itself. For (in that case), the specification of the acquisition of the property as the reason thereof,—would become meaningless. Nor can it be argued that that part of the text which specifies the reason, is merely illustrative, otherwise there would be no use of this special text inasmuch as a double share by reason of acquisition is established by the very text of Vasishtha. Since, as the double share of the son, by reason of his being the acquirer, is not prohibited in that text, therefore although the father be entitled to two shares by reason of his being the father, still the result would be the equality of shares; but the father's share does not become greater than the son's share, as you contend, for there is no express text to that effect.

As for the impropriety mentioned in the passage, "Moreover &c."; that is nothing. For there can be no question of propriety as to the equality ordained by a text of law: neither can impropriety be avoided by you, (for you say) the eldest is entitled to two shares by reason of his being the eldest, and the father is so entitled by reason of his being the father, hence follows the equality (of the father) with the eldest son.

14. It appears, however, from the following text of Katyayana, cited in the Madanaratna, that the participation of equal shares by all the brothers, and by the father and sons, is the preferable mode:—"When the parents and the brothers take in equal shares, all sorts of properties, such a partition is declared to be lawful."—Accordingly, Yogísvara has employed the term "all" in the text, "or all may be equal sharers," otherwise he would have said "or shall make the sons equal sharers."

15. But with reference to a co-parcener who is capaable of maintaining himself by his own exertion and does not wish to take a share of the paternal property &c., it is said by Manu:—"If any one of the brethren having a competence by his own exertion, feels no desire for the heritage, he may be debarred from his share by giving him something in lieu of maintenance." So Yájnavalkya says:—"The separation of one who is able to support himself and is not desirous (of taking his share) is to be effected by giving him something."—"May be debarred," signifies, may be made to have no concern (with the property); the same is the meaning of the term "separation" (in Yájnavalkya's text); "by giving him something," means, by giving him anything, even a trifle, as a sign of partition: and this is to be done for the purpose of preventing his sons from claiming the inheritance.

Haláyudha, however, has in order to make the above text of Manu correspond with the following text of Nárada, viz.,—" He who being employed in the management of the affairs of the family, performs its business, is to be honored by the brethren with food, raiment and conveyance,"— assumed the reading sunirvátyas and has explained the meaning to be,—his share is to be made up by the brethren who have taken their shares, by deducting wealth from the share of each. But this is to be rejected; because the term "feels no desire" would become meaningless, and because it is improper to assume a reading which is not noticed by the commentators such as Medhátithi; and because the other reading is consistent with the clear declaration (in Yájnavalkya's text) of "separation."

The author of the Prakasa, however, has, even adopting the correct reading (nirvasyas), explained the text of Manu in the following way:—"If any one of the cosharers who are engaged in the acquisition of wealth, do not through negligence or laziness, 'feel desire' i. e., cooperate, i. e., render any assistance, although 'having competence,' i. e., capable of rendering assistance 'by his own exertion,' i. e., by his co-operation, he should be debarred from his share, i. e., from the wealth acquired by the others' own exertion, 'by giving him something in lieu of maintenance,' i. e., by allowing him to participate in the capital alone." This is not reasonable; because the term "although" (api) is to be imported, and because the meaning which is consistent with the text of Yogisvara, does most clearly appear, and because the interpretation put by you depends upon a different text.

16. Kátyáyana says:—"When one himself dies unseparated, his son who has not received maintenance from the grandfather, shall be made participator of the heritage; he is to get, however, the paternal share from the uncle or uncle's son: the very same share shall equitably belong to all the brothers: or his son also shall get: afterwards cessation (of succession) takes place."

"One himself," signifies, a brother,—"his son," the brother's son; "maintenance," means share; the question occurring,—'what short of share is he to get?" it is said, "the paternal share;" "his son," intends the great-grandson of the person whose estate is divided, because the case of a grandson is considered; "afterwards," i. e., after his son, "cessation" i. e., cessation of succession takes place; the meaning is that the great-grandson's son is not entitled to any share.

Accordingly also Devala says:—"Partition of heritage among undivided parceners and second partition among divided parceners dwelling together, extends to the fourth in descent: this is the settled law."—The meaning is that partition of heritage extends to the fourth degree counting from the proprietor. This rule is alike applicable if divided coparceners dwell together after re-union, by

reason of the expression "dwelling together."

The term "the paternal share" being used by Kátyáyana, it is indicated that the allotment of shares is to be according to the fathers. Accordingly Yajnavalkya says: -"Among grandsons by different fathers the allotment of shares is according to the fathers."—The meaning is this:—The right by birth of grandsons to the estate of the grandfather is not distinguishable from that of the sons; hence although it is proper that the grandsons who are alike to the sons, should have a share equal to that of a son; -still their share being adjusted through their father, they are entitled to the shares of their fathers respectively; the participation, however in the grandfather's property is not with reference to themselves. What is intended is this:—If unseparated brothers die leaving sons, and the number of sons be unequal, one leaving two sons, and others three, four &c., the two shall take the share of their father by dividing

it into two; the three, four &c. also shall take the share of their fathers by dividing the same into three, four &c. respectively: but the distribution of the grandfather's estate is not to be made according to the number of grandsons. In the same way when some of the brothers are alive, and the others die leaving sons, then the surviving brothers shall take their own shares, and the sons of the others shall take the shares of their fathers respectively: this distinction is based upon the authority of the texts. Hence this text indicating as it does, the case of similar co-heirs (i. e., the case of grandsons only) is superfluous. Unequal distribution with specific deductions also is based upon the 'authority of texts. But equal participation which follows from the co-equality of ownership has been superfluously laid down by the texts.

17. Whatever property of the grandfather was lost by theft or the like, but has been recovered by the father, therein the grandsons participate, only by the choice of the father, in the same way as in the property acquired by the father. This has been declared by Manu,—"But if a father recovers his paternal property, which was not recovered before, he shall not, if unwilling, share that property with his sons, (like what is) acquired by himself."

The term "acquired by himself" is to be construed by supplying the term "like what is"; or it may be construed in this way,—because that property passed from the grandfather, and was recovered by him alone, hence it became as it were his self-acquired property; the term "if unwilling" shows that it is by the choice of the father alone and not by the choice of the sons, that partition takes place of such property although inherited from the grandfather.

Likewise there is another passage of law:—"Whatever property of the grandfather was taken away, but has been recovered by the father by his own exertion, and whatever has been acquired by means of science heroism, &c., therein the father's ownership is ordained; he may at his pleasure, make a gift of it or allow partition to be made of such property; but in his absence, the sons are pronounced to be equal sharers."

Digitized by Google

"Taken away," i. e., wrongfully taken possession of by strangers; the meaning is, that it was not recovered by the grandfather but was recovered by the father: the meaning of the expression "by his own exertion," is, without the use of the grandfather's property; but if it be recovered by means of the grandfather's property, then the father obtains two shares on account of his being the acquirer by reason of the text of Vrihaspati, namely,—"Among these, he who acquires himself, shall get only two shares." And this is to be construed also with what is acquired by means of science &c.; but this will be (hereafter) stated at length.

The substance of what is intended in the above text is this:—Although the ownership of the sons and the grandsons in the property of the father and the grandfather arises by birth alone, still by reason of the texts previously cited, the sons being dependent on the father, with respect to the father's self-acquired property, and the father being entitled to superiority on account of his being the acquirer, the sons must give their assent to the disposal by the father of his self-acquired property excepting land and slaves, by reason of the previously cited text, namely,— "Immoveables and bipeds &c." With respect to the grandfather's property, however, there is also the power of forbidding (any disposal by the father); but with respect to property which was not recovered by the grandfather but has been recovered by the father, the sons are certainly dependent on the father's will, although the property be the grandfather's; but as regards gems, pearls &c., though inherited from the grandfather, the father alone has independence by reason of the previously cited texts, namely, —"The father is master of all the gems, pearls, and corals &c."

18. Jímútaváhana says:—" When partition is made by the brothers after the demise of the father, then as regards the paternal estate too, it should take place after the demise of both the parents, since the demise of the father as well as of the mother is mentioned (in the text of Manu). The opinion of the author of the Sangraha, that the demise of the mother refers to the maternal

property is not, however, to be preferred; because there is no authority to support the supposition that the term 'paternal' is the result of the uni-residual conjunctive compound, signifying, belonging to the parents. because, if this be taken to be a provision regarding partition of the mother's estate, then there would be tautology, since partition of the mother's estate has been subsequently declared (by Manu) in the text,—' But when the mother is dead, let all the uterine brothers and the uterine sisters equally divide the maternal estate.'-Yájnavalkya also has, in the following text, namely,—'Let sons divide equally the effects and the debts, after the death, of both parents: but daughters share the residue of their mother's property after payment of her debts; and the (male) issue, in default of daughters;'-declared the partition of the mother's estate in the passage, 'but daughters &c.' And the construction intended (of the first part of this text) is not that 'Let sons divide the effects of both parents,'-but that 'after the demise of both parents': it is, however, by implication that the relation, namely,—' the effects and debts of the father,'—is obtained, because in the latter part the partition of the mother's effects and debts has been mentioned. Accordingly in the previously cited text of Sankha and Likhita, namely,—'Since the support of the family depends on the wealth, the sons are not independent when the father is alive, as also while the mother is so,'—the meaning expressed by the portion 'as also while the mother is so,' is, that the uterine brothers are not independent of the mother, and are not entitled to effect partition even while she is alive. Hence also in the text of Vyása, namely,— 'For brothers, a common abode is ordained so long as both the parents are alive: if separated after their demise, the religious merit of them increases,'-separation being prohibited by the injunction regarding the common abode, and partition being prohibited in the lifetime of the father and the mother, the association of their lives is not intended by the passage, 'while the parents are alive': hence if any one of the parents be living, partition is not lawful; but it is so, when both are gone to rest.

"Also in the text of Vrihaspati, namely,—'On the demise of the parents, partition among brothers is allowed, and even while they are both living, it is right if the mother be past child-bearing,'—since partition during the lifetime of the mother who is past child-bearing, cannot be relative to the mother's property, and since the very partition which is mentioned to take place after the demise of both parents, and which is referred to by the particle 'even' in the passage 'even while they are both living'—is pronounced to be right; therefore it is ascertained that the partition among brothers after the death of the parents is relative to the father's estate alone.

"Accordingly Vyása propounds that if partition takes place in the lifetime of the mothers, it is to be made according to the mothers:—' If there be sons of one man. by different mothers, but equal in number and alike by class, a distribution among the mothers is approved.' -Likewise Vrihaspati ordains,- 'If there be many sprung from one, alike in number and class, but born of rival mothers, then according to law, partition should be made by them, by distribution amongst the mothers.'—Since there is not in reality any difference in the shares of (the different sets of) the half brothers, for they are equal in number and in class, hence the provision of allotment of shares to the mothers refers to the superiority of the mothers. And the purport is, that this is not a partition among the sons, but the partition is to be made avowing it to be one among Therefore as in the mother's property, so the mothers. in this case also, the separation of the sons from each other is not lawful in the lifetime of the mother. Hence what is said by Gautama and other sages, namely,—'In partition there is increase of religious merit,'-must be understood to refer to one after the demise of the mother."

This has already been refuted on the ground that some spiritual object will have to be assumed, if it be held that the mother's death has reference to paternal property.

As for what has been said, namely,—that the term "paternal" has no reference to the mother's property, because there is no authority for considering it to be the result of the uni-residual conjunctive compound, and because there would be tautology;—that again is unreasonable.

Because for fear of the objection of assuming some spiritual object it cannot but be admitted that the term is the result of the uni-residual conjunctive compound; the objection of tautology, however, is not consistent with reason, for the injunction regarding the partition of maternal property may rightly be taken to be a repetition with a view to lay down particular rules.

As for the text of Yajnavalkya, the author of the Mítákshará construes it thus, "Let the sons divide the effects of the father and the mother;" he has removed the objection of tautology by introducing the latter half thus, "The sage states an exception in regard to the mother's separate property"; and he has,—after explaining the text, "and the issue succeeds on their default," thus, "In default of daughters, the issue, i. e., the son and the like, shall take the mother's wealth after payment of debts,"—said,—"Although this is established by the first part of the text, namely,—'Let the sons divide equally the effects and the debts, after the demise, of the parents,'—still it is again declared for the sake of greater perspicuity."

Nor can it be argued that let this only be the construction here, namely, "after the demise of the parents;" the terms "the effects and the debts" become by implication connected with "father's", since in the latter half, the partition of the mother's estate is ordained; and thus the portion,—"the issue succeeds on their default"—does not become an useless repetition. Because, the terms "the effects and the debts" implying as they do, relation to some person, the question occurs who is that person, consequently the construction of these terms with the term "of the parents" which occurs in the same sentence—is preferrable to the construction of these terms with the term "of the father", which is to be known by implication after the perusal of the whole verse; and it is proper even to admit, as a consequence of such a construction, that the portion, "the issue succeeds on their default,"—is a mere repetition. According to the opinion of those, however, who explain the term "issue" to mean, the issue of the daughter, i. e., the daughter's son,—there can be no fear whatever of that portion being a useless repetition. All this will be dwelt upon at length when the partition of woman's property_will be discussed.

The absence of independence in the lifetime of the mother, as ordained by Sankha and Likhita, may certainly be reconciled by supposing it to be intended to extol the veneration due to the mother, or to refer to her pro-

perty.

Also the text of Vyása, namely,—"For brothers &c.,"—merely lays down that during the joint lives of both the parents, the common abode is approved; neither is there any defect in considering that the association of their lives is intended by the phrase, "while both the parents are alive." But, in fact, the joint abode is preferable also after the demise of the parents by reason of the text "The eldest alone shall take the entire property &c.," and partition is calculated to increase religious merit, and religious duties such as the five great sacrifices must be performed even while the mother is alive, hence for the purpose of increas-

ing it, partition is certainly proper.

As to what has been said, namely, "Also in the text of Vrihaspati,—'On the demise of parents' &c., since partition during the lifetime of the mother who is past child-bearing &c.,"—the answer is: By the first half (of the text) it is declared that the common abode is preferable while both parents are alive, and that partition takes place after their demise; therefore the meaning (of the latter half) is, that inasmuch as there is a possibility of the birth of other sons if the mother be not past child-bearing, and the dissipation of the means of their support is censured by the text,-"Those that are born and those that are not yet begotten &c.,"—but that it is not possible if the mother be past child-bearing, therefore partition is approved just as when the father's affections become extinct: that being so, the mother being past child-bearing, there is no possibility of the birth of daughters who are entitled to her wealth (in preference to sons), therefore the sons may, by her choice, divide her wealth also; hence this text may relate also to maternal property. Therefore the objection is nothing.

As for what has been said in the texts of Vyása and Vrihaspati, namely, that partition by half brothers is to be made by a distribution amongst the mothers;—that is not against my opinion. Since, just as by virtue of the texts, like—"A person with his family shall not be independent

while the parents are alive,"—the dependence on the father and mother continues even after partition, so likewise by virtue of the above texts, (the half brothers) shall, as long as the mothers are alive, remain obedient to their orders, thinking the partition to be as between the mothers only. How from this can it follow, that there is no right to the partition of the paternal property while the mother is alive? There is no use in enlarging upon the subject.

19. As in the case of partition during the lifetime of the father, the father is to make his wives equal sharers with his sons, so also in the case of partition after his demise the sons are to make them partakers of shares equal to those of themselves: this has been ordained by Yájnavalkya,—"The mother also, of those effecting partition after the demise of the father, shall get an equal share."—If stridhanam has not been given (to her): when it has been given, then it is ordained that a half share shall be allotted. Notwithstanding, the term "half" here does not signify a moiety (or equal division); but what is intended is, that so much shall be given which (together with her stridhanam) will make her an equal sharer with a son.

The term "mother" which signifies the parent does not include a step-mother also; for the term mother which has been once used (in the text) cannot reasonably convey two meanings one of which is primary and the other

secondary.

From the following text of Vyása, namely,—"The father's sonless wives, however, shall be made equal sharers; as also the paternal grandmothers, for they are declared to be equal to mothers;"—and from the use of the term "wives" in the text of Yogísvara (§ 10), it follows that, in partition during the lifetime of the father, all his wives without distinction are entitled to equal shares with the sons; for the terms "son" and "wife" convey meanings in correlation with "father," hence there can be no objection of their bearing primary and secondary meanings. But in partition after the demise of the father, it is effected by the sons, and the term mother which appears to be used in correlation to them, cannot, by reason of the variableness in its meaning, imply a step-mother also; therefore those



only who are mothers of sons, are entitled to shares equally with their own sons. But those who are sonless are entitled to food and raiment only, like the wives of coparceners who are undivided or re-united. And this is reasonable, since the father is independent in partition during his lifetime, and the sons are independent in partition after his demise; and since this appears to be the intention of the use of the term "mother" and the term "wife." It is also reasonable that those who are destitute of sons are entitled only to maintenance. This appears to be the intention of various commentaries.

That all the wives of the father, whether sonless or having sons, are entitled to shares equally with the sons, even in partition after the father's demise—appears to be the opinion of the learned author of the Mitákshará; since he introduces the text of Yájnavalkya, namely "The mothers also of those effecting partition after the demise &c.,"—with these remarks:—"It has been ordained that the wives are entitled to shares equally with the sons in partition during the lifetime of the father, now the sage declares that the wives are entitled to shares equally with the sons in partition after the demise of the father."

Accordingly also the author of the Madanaratna says:—
"The use of the term mother indicates also the sonless step-mothers, as also the paternal grandmothers, agreeably to the text of Vyása,—'The father's sonless wives &c.'"

The following seems to be the intention of the authors of the Mitakshara and the Madanaratna:—And this is consistent with reason, since otherwise, in the phrase "father's wives," (in Vyása's text) the use of the term father, the correlative of son,—would be useless. Had the participation of equal shares with the sons, referred to the partition in the lifetime of the father, then the term "mothers" would have been used instead of "the father's wives." Hence it follows that it is only in consequence of their being the wives of the father, that they get equal shares with the sons, whether the partition takes place in the lifetime of the father or after his demise.

But if the genitive case in the term "father's" (in Vyása's text) be held to be used to denote the agent, then what is affirmed (in the text of Vyása) amounts to

this,—"The wives are equal sharers in partition made by the father," and it follows by implication that the term "wives" stands in correlation with him; hence it is proper to say that this text relates only to partition in the lifetime of the father. But in Yajnavalkya's text the term mother cannot properly refer to the parent as well as to the stepmother; and for its correlative the term sons occurs suggested by the term mother itself; therefore in order that the term mother may have its primary meaning it is proper that it should imply the parent alone. This is also the practice of the learned. This is here reasonable; this ought to be accepted: there is no use in dilating upon the matter.

-Vrihaspati ordains:—"After his death, however, the mother (janani) or the daughter gets an equal share." Here by the context the term "his" means, the father's.

20. If at the time when the father is dead, any of the brothers be uninitiated, then after having performed their initiation at the charge of whole estate, the residue shall be divided according to shares. Thus Yájnavalkya says:—"The uninitiated ought to be initiated by the brothers who have been previously initiated."—From the mention of the term "by the brothers," it appears that "the uninitiated" brothers are intended. The mere provision that they ought to be initiated, having no concern with the subject of the Partition of Heritage, what is intended is,—at the charge of the whole estate. Accordingly Vyása says:—"Those, however, among them, that are uninitiated shall be initiated by the elder brothers, out of the patrimony; so also the maiden daughters according to law."

Nárada declares the necessity of the initiation of the uninitiated, although no wealth of the father exists, thus:—
"If no wealth of the father exists, the initiation must, without fail, be made by brothers already initiated contributing funds out of their own shares."

21. The marriage of unmarried sisters also is necessary. If there be paternal property, then shares also are to be allotted to them. This is ordained by Yajnavalkya,—"The sisters also, giving (them) a fourth part from one's own share." The passage "uninitiated ought to be



initiated" (occurring in the previous text § 20) is to be construed with this text. Manu says:—" To the maiden daughters, however, let the brothers give separately from their own shares; (they) shall be degraded, if unwilling to

give a fourth part from every one's share."

In the Ratnákara and the Chintámani it has been explained that, here the meaning of both the texts (of Manu and Yájnavalkya) is not that to each of the sisters is to be given by all the brothers a fourth part of every one's own allotted share; for in that case she who has many brothers would get much wealth, and a brother who has many sisters would be deprived of everything; therefore what is intended, is only the allotment of so much property as is sufficient for marriage. And in support of their view the following text of Vishnu is set forth:—"The marriage of the maiden daughters, however, shall be effected according to the estate."

This is not reasonable. Since it cannot properly be said that in neither of the texts the allotment of shares is intended; and since the sin for refusal to allot shares has been mentioned as distinguished from the sin for non-performance of marriage; otherwise, also the declaration of sin for refusal to give (shares) in the text,—" shall be degraded if unwilling to give,"—would have to be interpreted to intend sin for non-performance of marriage.

For this reason Medhatithi and the author of the Mitákshará and others have explained the texts thus:— The ablative case in the terms "from one's own share" (nijádansát) and "from every one's share" (svát svádansát) is, however used in the stead of a participle understood; that being so, the meaning is having-regard-to that (i. e. "one's own share" and "every one's share.") Hence, to a maiden daughter shall be allotted a fourth part of such a share as is assignable to a son of the same class with her. Accordingly the following meaning is deduced: if the maiden be daughter of a Bráhmaní, her share is the quarter part of what will be stated hereafter to be the allotment for a son by a Bráhmaní wife; similarly also if the maiden be daughter of a Kshatriyá or the like. For instance if a Bráhmaní is the only wife of any person, and she has one son and one daughter; then dividing the whole paternal

property into two parts, and subdividing one such part into four shares, he shall give one such share to the sister, and himself take the residue. Similarly if there be two sons and one maiden daughter, then dividing the entire property into three parts, and sub-dividing one such part into four shares, one such share shall be given to the sister, and the remainder shall be divided by the two brothers. according to shares. But if there be one son and two maiden daughters, then dividing the property into three parts and subdividing one such part into four shares, and allotting two shares to the two maiden daughters, the rest shall be taken by him. Similarly when the brothers and sisters are of the same class, whether their number is equal (or unequal), it is to be understood that in all cases the sisters are entitled to get a quarter of the share assignable to a brother of the same class. But if there be one son by a Bráhmaní wife and one daughter by a Kshatriyá wife, then dividing the paternal property into seven parts and subdividing the three parts which would be the allotment for a son by a Kshatriyá wife into four shares, and giving one such share to the daughter of the Kshatriya wife, the son of the Brahmani wife shall take the residue. But when there are two sons by the Brahmani wife and one daughter by the Kshatrivá wife, then the paternal estate is to be divided into eleven parts; and the three parts which would be assignable to a son by a Kshatriyá wife, must be subdivided into four shares; and giving one such share to the daughter of the Kshatriyá, the two sons of the Bráhman shall take the whole of the rest dividing the same. must be similarly understood in any case of equal or unequal number of brothers and sisters dissimilar in caste.

Also Vishnu says:—"Mothers are entitled to shares according to the shares of the sons; also the maiden daughters, according to the shares of the sons: as the sons are entitled to four shares, or three, or two, or one, according to the classes, so are the wives of the same class." Here by the passage "the maiden daughters are entitled to shares according to the shares of the sons,"—although it appears that the daughters are entitled to all the shares, namely four, &c (equally with the sons of the same class;) still because Manu and Yogísvara have declared the allotment

(to them) of a fourth part of a share in the passages "from one's own share," and "from every one's share," therefore the accordance with the shares of the sons is to be understood in that way only; but they are not entitled to shares equal to those of the brothers of the same class. Thus there is no conflict.

Vrihaspati distinctly says:—"The mothers, however, are equal sharers with them, and the maiden daughters are entitled to a quarter share." This is approved also by Katyayana, for he says:—"For unmarried daughters, a fourth share is intended, and for the sons, three shares: but equality is ordained if the property be small." The meaning, however, of the passage "but equality &c." is this:—if there be not paternal property even sufficient for marriage, then the daughters are entitled to shares equally with the sons.

Also the text of Vishnu, namely, "The marriage of the maiden daughters, &c.," (para. 2)—is not opposed to the explanation given by Medhátithi and others. The marriage of the unmarried daughters of the father, i. e. of their own sisters shall be performed according to wealth. By this, only the necessity of marriage is ordained, but

not the giving or not giving of shares.

The author of the Smritichandriká, however, has, in accordance with the following text of Devala, namely, —"And to the maiden daughters shall be given the father's wealth, (and) nuptial property"—held that property sufficient for marriage is to be allotted; his intention is that the qualifying term "nuptial" in the passage "nuptial property" would otherwise become meaningless.

What we say here is this. The passage "To the maiden daughters, shall be given paternal wealth," constitutes a distinct injunction; and that consists only of a fourth part, according to Manu and others. And the portion "nuptial property," forms a different injunction, being in accordance with the following text of Sankha;—"When the heritage is divided, a maiden daughter gets the ornaments and nuptial stridhanam." And this text of Sankha has been explained by the venerable Vidyáranya in his commentary on the Institutes of Parásara, thus:—"At the time of partition of the paternal estate, a maiden

daughter gets also the ornaments put on by her, as is declared by Sankha." But if the meaning (of the text of Devala) were that "the father's wealth" which is "nuptial" i. e. so much as is sufficient for marriage, shall be given to the maiden daughters; then the term "property" would be superfluous. Therefore it is reasonable to suppose that here are two distinct injunctions.

This text (of Devala,) however, is read by the author of the Dayatattva, thus,—"To the maiden daughters shall be given nuptial property from the father's wealth." It is to be observed that in this reading too, the explanation given by us deserves to be preferred, so that this text may have the same meaning with the text of Sankha; it does not however intend that property sufficient for marriage is

to be given.

Now although, sometimes the term "sister" and sometimes the term "maiden daughter &c." are used in the texts of Manu and others, still it is to be held that the subject being the partition by brothers, they convey the same meaning by interpreting the term "sister" to be used in correlation with the brothers, and the term "daughter," in correlation with their father.

Hence in partition after the demise of the father, the (maiden) sisters are entitled to get shares out of the paternal property; and not that they are only to be disposed of in marriage. But if (partition takes place) previously (to the father's decease) they get only whatever the father gives, for there is no particular text regarding the point.

But Jimutavahana says:—Since Manu and Yajnaval-kya have respectively declared "let the brothers give" and "giving a fourth part," therefore the sisters are not to take the fourth part, under the impression that they have a right thereto: certainly it is never said that let one brother give from his own share to another brother, what the latter has a right to get; similarly (is to be understood) also the giving of a fourth part. The brothers incur moral guilt, if they refuse to give; but the sister has no right to compel them.

This is not reasonable. For this conclusion does not follow from what is merely a variety of expression, just as in the texts,—"He may separate the sons by his choice" and "giving deductions to the eldest" and the like.

As for what he has said again, namely,—"Since in the text of Nárada,—'Of those whose forms of initiation have not been regularly performed by the father, these ceremonies must be completed by the brothers out of the patrimony,'—the proneun 'whose'(yeshám) is used in the masculine gender; and since immediately after this text, is commenced the following text,—'If no wealth of the father exists &c.,' therefore the text refers only to the initiation of a brother. Hence, when there is paternal property then since the necessity of the sister's marriage appears from the texts of Manu and other sages, therefore the intention is that only so much property as is sufficient for marriage shall be given."

That is to be rejected; for the necessity of the sister's marriage appears from other texts. Thus in the text,— "The father, the paternal grandfather, a brother, a kinsman (sakulya) the mother likewise; on failure of the first among these the next in order who is of sane mind is the giver of a girl in marriage; and omitting to dispose of the girl in marriage becomes guilty of causing miscarriage in every course" -Yogísvara declares that a brother too failing to perform the ceremony of a sister's marriage becomes guilty of causing miscarriage. Hence because the text of Nárada is also based upon the same foundation with Yogísvara's text, it is proper to admit that the terms "whose" (yeshám) and "of those" (teshám) are in the genitive case in the neuter gender, by reason of the rule that neuter gender is to be used when both the sexes are intended and by reason of the rule that a term is to be taken in its widest acceptance; or that the terms are the results of the uni-residual conjunctive compound of dissimilar terms.

The author of the Madanaratna reads a text of Vrihaspati, thus,—"The younger brothers, however, who may be uninitiated, shall be initiated by the elder ones out of the common paternal property"—intending that the term yabiyasas "younger" (in later Sanskrit yabiyansas) is used in the Vedic form; and explains it thus,—the term "brothers" is illustrative, it includes the sisters also.

Here again it is to be understood that the maiden daughters are intended by reason of association with initiation, and because the adjective "unmarried" is mentioned in the text (of Kátyáyana),—"For unmarried daughters &c.": hence the maiden sisters alone get a quarter share, the others get some trifle out of propriety. This will be explained in detail while treating of the mother's property.

Of immoveable property, whether ancestral or self-acquired, the father may make gift and the like only with the consent of the sons, by reason of the text previously cited, viz.,—"Immoveables and bipeds although acquired by a man himself, shall not be gifted away or sold-without the consent of all the sons." By the passage "although acquired by a man himself" it is a fortiori shewn that the consent of the sons is indispensable in (the disposal of) ancestral property. But in case of distress of the whole family, any member is competent, even without the consent of the rest, to make a sale, gift or the like (disposal) of immoveable property, since the support of the family is indispensably necessary, by reason of the following text,—"Even a single coparcener may make a gift, mortgage or sale of immoveable property at a time of danger, for a family purpose and especially for religious purposes."-By "religious purposes" are intended, indispensable religious ceremonies such as the sráddha of the father.

But a passage of law runs as follows:—"Separated or unseparated kinsmen are equal in respect of immoveable property; for in both cases one member is incompetent to make a gift, mortgage or sale;"—which is to be interpreted in this way. Although the incompetency without the consent of the others, is settled by reason of the co-equality of ownership, in joint property, of undivided coparceners, still the same is here particularly mentioned in respect of immoveable property for the purpose of extolling its worth. But as regards the separated coparceners, what is said in this text is for the purpose of facility of proof in case of dispute; for if, at a future time, the question arises whether the family is separated or undivided, then in that case, the fact of partition must be made out by the evidence of witnesses or the like; because



otherwise the gift or the like of joint property would be But if there be consent of the other co-sharers. the transaction is valid, independently of partition. Nor can it be said that let the ownership of even the separated coparceners be, as is ordained by this text, common in immoveable property. For then it would follow that partition (of immoveable property) takes place for some ultra-mundane purpose. Hence the validity of the gift or the like, as regards its essence, may be established even in the absence of the consent of the other co-sharers: and the determination of the dispute can take place on proof of partition. (The consent of the separated cosharers is) like the consent of the village-men and the consent of the headman of the village, as in the text,-" Land passes by six formalities: by the consent of (the owner) himself, of the village-men, of kinsmen, of the headman of the village, and of heirs, and by gift of gold and water." But the consent of the headman is also for the purpose of preventing boundary dispute. The consent of the kinsmen and the heirs, however, is to be explained in the very same way as is previously mentioned; accordingly there is another passage of law, viz.—" Acceptance shall be public especially of immoveable property." Otherwise, gift or other alienation would be invalid for want of the consent of also the village-men and the headman of the village. The passage, "by gift of gold and water," shows that since the sale of immoveable property is prohibited by the text,-"There can be no sale of immoveable property; mortgage may be made with the consent,"—and since gift is praised in the text,—"He who accepts land and he who gives it, they both are performers of a virtuous act and will certainly go to heaven";—therefore when a sale is indispensable for the maintenance of the family and the like (necessity), the sale of immoveable property shall be made with the formalities of gift by giving gold and water to the purchasers, so that there may be even one element of gift.

But Jimutavahana, after citing the two texts of Vyasa namely,—"One parcener, shall not, without the consent of the others, make a gift or sale of the whole immoveable property common to the family; separated or unseparated

kinsmen are equal in respect of immoveable property; for in both cases a single member is incompetent to make a gift, mortgage or sale,"-says:-" These are not for establishing that one coparcener has no power to make a sale, gift or other transfer. Since as the proprietory right which is defined to consist in the power of disposal according to pleasure, exists without distinction in immoveable as in any other property, these texts cannot show the incompleteness of the relinquishment of right; for a fact cannot be altered by a hundred texts. But the prohibition is levelled against wicked persons, and is intended to show that an alienation is sinful if it is made to the injury of the family when there is no necessity for alienation such as distress of the family. Accordingly Nárada authorizes generally a sale or any other alienation:—'When there are many persons sprung from one man who have duties apart and transactions apart, and are separate in business and character, if they be not accordant in affairs, should they give or sell their own shares, they may do all that they please, for they are masters of their own wealth.' Since this text specifies the reason in the passage 'for they are masters of their own wealth,' it relates to immoveables also, for else it would be unmeaning."

This is all right, but that it is not reasonable to say that it is intended to show that an alienation is sinful. Since the sale of immoveable property even by all the co-sharers being prohibited in the absence of necessity, an objection would arise that the use of the term "a single member" is unmeaning; and since it is unreasonable to assume an ultra-mundane object in a rule of positive law, when there may be a visible object such as facility of proof in case of dispute: otherwise, even in case of the consent of co-sharers, the objection of injuring the family may arise; hence the texts would have to be interpreted as referring solely to sin in consequence of injuring the family, as is laid down in other texts.

23. Here again, partition at the desire of the sons, whether in the lifetime of the father or after his demise, may take place by the choice of a single co-parcener, since there is no distinction. Hence what, after premising par-

12

tition, is said by Kátyáyana, in the text,—"The wealth of those who have not attained to maturity and likewise of those who are absent in a distant place, shall be deposited, free from disbursement, with relatives and friends,"—is also in support of this view. Otherwise if partition could not take place without their consent, the declaration of the deposit of their wealth with relatives and friends would be unreasonable. So also Vishnu says:—"Likewise the wealth of a minor shall be preserved till he attains to majority."

This distribution among sons extends equally to them and to grandsons and great-grandsons in the male There is not here an order of succession following the order of proximity according to birth. For the three descendants, namely, the son, the grandson and the greatgrandson are competent to offer oblations in the parva occasions. Hence it is that Devala says:—"A father, a grandfather and likewise a great-grandfather assiduously cherish a new-born son, as birds the holy fig-tree, (reflecting) he will present to us a funeral repast with honey, meat and herbs, with milk, and with sweet rice and milk in the season of rains and under the asterism Maghás." Likewise Sankha, Likhita and Gautama says:—"A father, a grandfather and likewise a great-grandfather welcome a new-born son as birds the holy fig-tree, (reflecting) he will give us satisfaction with honey and meat and especially the flesh of the rhinoceros and with milk, and with sweet rice and milk in the season of rains and under the asterism Maghás." Thus the competency being equal and the right by birth also being equal, equal participation would have followed but is prevented by the text,—"Among grandsons by different fathers the allotment of shares is according to the fathers."

Jímútaváhana says:—"The grandsons and the great-grandsons whose fathers are alive cannot confer oblations in the parva occasions, they are not therefore entitled to the estate of their grandfather and great-grandfather respectively. If there be one son, and sons of another son (who is dead,) then one share appertains to the surviving son, and the other share goes to all the grandsons) for

their interest in the grandfather's wealth is founded on their relation by birth to their own father, consequently they have a right to just so much as should have been their father's share."

This, however, is not acceptable; because, it has been established that in the grandfather's property the grandsons also acquire ownership by birth; hence the equality of the grandsons' share (with a son's share) in the grandfather's property is based upon the authority of the texts, and not founded upon any equitable principle.

and not founded upon any equitable principle.

As for what he has further said, namely,—"Where one brother has left a large number of sons, and another a lesser number, there the text,—'Among grandsons by different fathers &c.'—is intended to prevent equal distribution amongst all of them by reason of their being grandsons; but if the grandsons had ownership in the estate of the grandfather while the father is living, then in the case of partition by two brothers, one of whom has sons and the other has none, the sons also of that brother would have been entitled to share by reason of the co-equality of right."

That has already been refuted before. By this again is removed also the above-mentioned incongruity. Hence is refuted also the objection that when there are uncles and nephews, then because the property belonged to the father of the uncles, therefore the nephews would get no share by

reason of the absence of their ownership.

As for what has been said, namely,—"The grandsons and the great-grandsons whose fathers are alive &c."—that too is wrong. For the capacity for presenting funeral oblations is not alone the criterion of the right to heritage, since the younger brothers are entitled to the heritage although they are not competent to offer oblations while there is the eldest brother. And the fitness for presenting oblations, (which the younger brothers have) is not wanting in grandsons too (while their father is alive). But when there are many claimants to the heritage, amongst the gentiles (gotrajas,) and the like, then the fact of conferring benefits on the proprietor of the wealth by means of the offering of oblations and the like,—only excludes those that do not confer (such) benefit: it is not, however, the criterion here.

24. Whether partition is made in the lifetime of the father or after his demise, if the pregnancy of any of the father's wives or of any of a brother's wives, be evident, then partition ought to be postponed till parturition, by reason of the following text of Vasishtha,—"Now, the partition of heritage amongst brothers takes place after the delivery of sons by those women who are childless (but pregnant"). From the passage "after the delivery of sons" it appears that the postponement is to be made if their pregnancy is evident, but not if it is not evident.

Hence it is that Yogisvara has declared the mode of participation by one who is born subsequently to partition; -" One who is begotten by one of equal class, after tho co-parceners have been separated, is taker of the share." When the co-parceners have been separated during the lifetime of the parents, whether by the desire of the father or by the desire of the sons, one who is subsequently brought forth by a wife of equal class is taker of the share: "is taker of the share," means, gets the share allotted to the parents. The meaning is, that after the parents, he alone gets their share: the distinction is, that he gets the mother's share if there be no daughters. From the adjective "one of equal class," (savarnáyám) it appears that one who is begotten, however, by a wife of a different class, gets only his proper share from the father's wealth, and the entire share of his mother should there be no daughter. For this very reason, a son begotten by a wife of an unequal class after partition, gets only the share proper to his class, although the partition took place during the lifetime of the father: it must not be concluded that he is entitled to obtain all that belong to the father.

With this very intention, Manu says:—"But he who is born after partition shall get only the paternal wealth." He shall get "the paternal wealth," i. e. the wealth belonging to both the parents in the manner mentioned above; the term "only" shows that the brothers are not to make him participant of a share equal to their own, by deducting from their own shares. Also Gautama says:—"One born after partition (shall get) the paternal (share) only."

But those who have been separated during the lifetime of the father, not knowing at the time that the mother or her co-wife was with child, shall make the brother, born subsequently to partition, participant of a share equal to their own by deducting from their own shares. Thus Vishnu says:—"To one born after partition, his share shall be given by those who have been separated with the father." And it is the father alone who, by taking that share of the new-born son, given by the brothers, shall maintain him; by reason of his having a preferable right thereto, and by reason of the previously cited text, namely, "The wealth of those who have not attained to maturity, &c." (§. 23.)

Also the text, namely,—"One born before has no claim in the allotment of the parents; nor one begotten after partition, in that of a brother"—refers to this very subject. The meaning is, one born before partition, and (consequently) who has received his share of the paternal property, has no claim, *i. e.*, has no ownership in the allotment of the parents; and one begotten after partition has no claim in the share of a brother who has previously been

separated.

And also what is acquired by the father, after partition, belongs only to the son born after partition, by reason of the following text of Vrihaspati;—"Whatever is acquired by the father himself who has been separated with his sons; all that belongs to the son born after partition; therein the sons born before have no claim; as in the wealth, so in the debts likewise, and in gifts, mortgages and purchases. They have no claims on each other, except for acts of mourning, and libations of water." He also says;—"The younger brothers of those who have made a partition with the father, whether children of the same or of a different mother, shall however take the paternal allotment." The reason here is the same as is declared in the text,—"One born before has no claim, &c."

But if some of the sons have been re-united with the father, then the after-born son is not entitled to the whole of the paternal property, but he shall participate with them. This is declared by Manu;—"Or he shall participate with those that are re-united with him." "Him," i. e., the father.

If after the paternal property has been taken by the brothers, on partition after the demise of the father, a son is delivered by a wife of the father, whose pregnancy was not known at the time of partition; they shall make him participant of a share equal to theirs, out of their own shares as modified by income and expenditure. This is said by Yájnavalkya; -- "Or his allotment must be made out of the visible estate corrected for income and expenditure."-" Visible estate," means what has been taken by the brothers. "Income," means monthly, daily and annual increment to the visible estate. "Expenditure," means the liquidation of the father's debts, and the expenses attending the initiation of brothers and sisters, for it must be made at the expense of the common property; it does not, however, include any expense that a brother had to incur, for that has no concern with it.—The meaning is, that out of the paternal property corrected for such income and expenditure, one born after partition shall get an equal share with those previously separated. What is said is this: including in the share of each of the cosharers, the income arising therefrom, and subtracting the necessary common expenditure, and deducting a part from the remainder of every one's share, a (posthumous) son born after partition shall be made an equal sharer. particle "or" signifies an alternative based on distinct circumstances, with reference to the first half of this text, namely,—"One who is begotten by one of equal class after the co-parceners have been separated is taker of the share,"—and the distinct circumstances (to which the first half is applicable) have already been set forth.

Halayudha, however, after interpreting the term "out of the visible estate" to mean, from the perceptible property of the father, but not from what is concealed,—says that this alternative refers to a son born after partition, who is possessed of less good qualities than the

separated brothers.

This is to be rejected. Since concealed property too, when discovered after partition, is liable to be divided in equal shares, and there is no authority to show the inapplicability of the above rule to this case; and since in supposing the above text to embody this restriction, there

would arise the objection of assuming some ultra-mundane purpose; and since the text becomes perfectly consistent

by the interpretation put by Vijnánesvara.

25. The mode of partition among brothers dissimilar in class is declared by Yogísvara:—"The sons of a Brahmana, in the several classes, (varnasas), have four shares or three or two or one; the sons of a Kshatriya have three shares or two or one; and the sons of a Vaisya have two shares or one."

In the text, namely,—"The wives of a Bráhmana, a Kshatriya and a Vaisya may, as regards the classes, be three, two and one respectively; the wife of a Súdra is one of the same class,"-Yogísvara has declared that a Bráhmana may have three wives belonging to the (inferior) classes, different from that of himself; (similarly) a Kshatriya two, and a Vaisya, one: and including one of the same class with them, a Brahmana may have four, a Kshatriya three, and a Vaisya two. If the enumeration referred to wives of similar as well as dissimilar tribes, then a wife of the Súdra class being excluded, the two of a Vaisya also, would be reduced to one of his own class: consequently the part "the wife of a Súdra is one of his own class" could not consistently be put in contradistinction to a Vaisya; hence this enumeration is intended to have reference to the wives of dissimilar classes. This text has been so explained by Vijnánayogin.

That being so, (the meaning of the text in the first para. is this:—) "The sons of a Bráhmana" born of wives belonging to the Bráhmana and other classes respectively; "in the several classes, (varnasas)" i. e. according to the classes to which their mothers belong,—the affix sas (in varnasas) shows that the term varna (class) is in the locative case and bears a distributive sense, agreeably to the grammatical rule,—"To a noun in the singular number, signifying quantity, the particle sas is affixed in a distributive sense:"-to those who are begotten by a Bráhmana or the like father on a Kshatriya or the like wife, is applied the term játi (mixed class) such as that of Múrdhábhishikta, and játi cannot possibly be comprised by the term class, therefore the meaning is, according to the classes to which the mothers belong; "have four shares or three or two or one,"—what is said is, that the sons of a Brahmana, born of a mother of the same class, shall each get four shares; the sons of the same Bráhmana born of a Kshatrivá mother. three shares each; the sons of the same person, born of a Vaisyá mother, two shares each; sons of the same person born of a Sudrá mother one share each. The passage. "in the several tribes" is to be construed with every clause in the latter half of the text: that being so, the sons of a Kshatriya born of Kshatriya and other mothers shall each respectively get three shares, or two, or one; the sons of a Vaisya born of Vaisyá and Súdrá mothers shall each get two shares, or one respectively. A Súdra cannot have a wife of a different class, partition among his sons must be one among the sons of the same class,—which has been

already mentioned.

Although the marriage of a Súdrá woman by a twiceborn person is much censured, and espousing a Súdrá with the intent of having sons by her is on all hands prohibited, as in the text of Manu and Vishnu,—"Men of the twice-born classes, who, through infatuation, marry women of the lowest class, very soon degrade their family with their progeny to the state of a Súdra: according to Attri and the son of Utathya, he who marries a woman of the Súdra class, becomes degraded instantly; according to Saunaka, by the birth of a son; and according to Bhrigu, by having issue by her"—"by having issue by her," means by having issue born of the Súdrá wife alone; —and marriage of a Súdrá woman by a Bráhmana, however, is declared by them, to be more reprehensible than by a Kshatriya or Vaisya, thus,—"A Bráhmana, if he takes a Súdrá woman to his bed, becomes degraded, and by begetting a son on her, he loses his priestly rank too"; -Yogísvara also says,-"The marriage of Súdrá wives by the twice born persons, as has been declared (by other sages), is not approved by me, inasmuch as a person himself is born of her (in the shape of a son)"—and it may hence occur, that as there cannot be a son begotten by a Bráhmana &c., on a Súdrá wife, why has his allotment been declared?

Still, a marriage for the purpose of pleasure, and a marriage for the purpose of religion (i. e. for the purpose



of having sons) being secondary to each other, a son may be born of a married woman of the Súdrá class by reason of the relation of the purposes through the act (whereby any one of the purposes may be attained); consequently the declaration of his allotment is certainly reasonable, in the same way as the declaration of his caste (játi) in the text,—"One born of a Súdrá mother (by a Bráhmana father) is called a nisháda or párasava." To this effect is the conclusion demonstrated in the Mitakshara on the book of Achára (or customary rites). Hence in the text,— "But for such as are impelled by love of pleasure the following may, in the order of the classes, be (wives of the twice-born) though not preferrable,"-Manu by saying "by love of pleasure" and "not preferrable" ordains that the marriage of a wife of the same class is preferrable. Sankha and Likhita say,—"Wives must be espoused, women of the same class are preferrable for all persons: this is the principal rule. The succedaneous mode is: (wives of) four (classes) are allowed to a Brahmana, in the direct order; (wives of) three (classes), to a Kshatriya; (wives of) two (classes), to a Vaisya; (wives of) one (class), to a Sudra." By the term "in the direct order," the inferiority of the next in order is indicated.

But Manu has declared two modes of partition among sons of the four classes, thus,—"Let a Bráhmana son take three shares; a son born of a Kshatriyá mother, two shares; a son born of a Vaisya mother, one share and a half; and a son of a Súdrá mother, one share: or by dividing into ten equal shares, the entire property of all descriptions, let a lawyer allot legal shares in the following manner: a Bráhmana shall get four shares; a son of a Kshatriyá mother, three shares; a son of a Vaisyá mother, two shares; a son of a Súdra mother, one share."-Of these the latter mode corresponds with what is declared by Yogisvara (para. 1.) And these are to be reconciled, as having reference to the sons of the Kshatriya mothers &c., according as they are possessed of good qualities or are not possessed of good qualities. Hence it is that if the son of a Bráhmana, born of a Kshatriyá mother, be the eldest by birth and possessed of good qualities, he gets an equal share with a son of a Brahmani mother; again

13

if a son begotten on a Vaisyá mother by a Bráhmana or a Kshatriya father, be of the same description, he takes an equal share with a son born of a Kshatrivá mother. This is declared by Vrihaspati,—"A son begotten on a Kshatrivá mother by a Bráhmana father, if eldest by birth and possessed of good qualities, becomes equal sharer with a son of the Bráhmana class; so likewise a son born of a Vaisvá mother." Likewise Baudháyana says,--" If, between a son born of a wife of the same class, and a son born of a wife of the class next in order, the son born of a wife of the class next in order be possessed of good qualities, he shall take the share of the eldest; for one possessed of good qualities becomes the supporter of the rest."— Since it has been generally laid down in this text that a son born of a wife of the class next in order takes, by reason of his good qualities and seniority, an equal share with a son of the next better class, therefore it is to be observed, though it is not mentioned by Vrihaspati, that a son begotten on a Súdrá mother by a Vaisyá father, if, of the above character, gets an equal share with a son of the Vaisyá mother. The meaning of the portion,—"shall take the share of the eldest," is only this,—shall take an equal share with a son of the next better class, by reason of this being consistent with the text of Vrihaspati, and by reason of the impropriety of taking a larger share than that of a son of a superior class.

When, however, a Bráhmana has only one son born of a Súdrá wife, then he shall get a third part of his property; the remaining two parts shall go to sapindas, in their default to the sakulyas, and in their default to him who performs the funeral obsequies: as is declared by Devala,—"If a nisháda be the only son of a Bráhmana, he gets a third part; a sapinda or a sakulya or the giver of the oblations, takes the other two parts",—"nisháda" means a son born of a Súdrá mother by a Bráhmana father.

But if a Súdra be the only son of a Kshatriya or a Vaisya, he gets a moiety, the other half is taken by those entitled to succeed to the property of a sonless man, in the same order. Accordingly Vishnu says,—"But when a Súdra is the only son of the twice-born he gets a moiety; the succession to the other moiety is the same as to the

property of a sonless man." By the term "twice-born" here, the Kshatriyas and the Vaisyas only are intended, because Devala has declared a distinct rule with regard to the Bráhmaṇas. "Only son" (ekaputra) is a compound of an adjective and noun.

But this rule (regarding a third and a moiety) has reference to a son by a Súdrá wife, having good character and many good qualities; for else, this would be in conflict with the text of Manu, namely,—"But whether he has or has not sons by other wives, no more than a tenth part shall be given to his son by a Súdrá wife,"—and,—"The son of a Bráhmana, a Kshatriya or a Vaisya, by a wife of the Súdra class, shall not share the inheritance; whatever his father may give him, let that only be his

property."

Although this mode of partition is generally laid down, still it refers to property other than land acquired by means of acceptance (of gift); because participation of that by sons begotten by a Kshatriyá or the like wife, is prohibited. So Vrihaspati says,—"Land received by acceptance shall never be given to sons by a wife of the Kshatriya or the like class; even if their father gives it. the son by a Brahmana wife may, nevertheless, resume it after the father's death."—Here the term "acceptance" being used, it is indicated that of lands acquired by means of purchase &c., they too shall have shares proper to their caste. Hence it is that, with regard to lands generally, Devala has laid down a separate prohibition levelled against a son by a Súdrá wife.—"A son sprung from a Súdrá mother and a twice-born father, is not entitled to a . share of land; those born of wives of the same class shall take the whole of it: this is the settled law."

But as for the text of Manu,—"The son of a Bráhmana, a Kshatriyá, or a Vaisya, by a wife of the servile class, shall not share the heritage; whatever his father may give him, let that only be his property,"—that has been explained by the southern writers, to apply when there is property given by the father through affection. But the oriental commentators say that it refers to a son by an unmarried Súdrá woman, destitute of good qualities. This is wrong; because it is not proper to discard the distinction men-

tioned in the latter part.—"whatever his father may give &c.," and to assume a distinction between having and not having good qualities,—which is not mentioned (in the text); and because the share of a son by an unmarried Súdra woman will be stated (by Manu) when treating the subject of slaves. Hence the previous distinction only is right.

PART II.

- § 1. Principal and subsidiary sons, described by Yájnavalkya.—2. The legitimate son.—3. The son of the appointed daughter.—4. The wife's son including the son of two fathers.—5. The secret-born son.—6. The maiden-born son.—7. The son of the twice-married woman.—8. The adopted son.—9. The purchased son.—10. The son made.—11. The self-given son.—12. The son received with a bride.—13. The deserted son.—14. The son by a Sudra woman.—15. The aurasa is the principal, the rest subsidiary.—16. Partition by these.—17. Partition by the legitimate son and the son of the appointed daughter.—18. Partition by the legitimate son and the adopted son &c.—19. The conflicting tests, dividing the twelve sons into two classes the first of whom are heirs to kinsmen, how reconciled.—20. All this is relative to the same class.—21. The son by a Sudra woman cannot get the whole property.—22. Of the son of a Sudra by a female slave.—23. Of the son of a twice-born by a female slave.
- 1. In order to show the law of partition among principal and subsidiary sons, their nature is ascertained. On this subject, Yájnavalkya says:—"The legitimate son (aurasa) is one born of a lawful wife. Similar to him is the son of an appointed daughter (putrikásuta). A son begotten on a wife by a kinsman (sagotra) or any other is the wife's son. One secretly begotten in the house is declared the secret-born son. The maiden-born son is one born of an unmarried daughter; and is considered as son of the maternal grandsire. A son begotten on a woman who has not been deflowered, or on one who has been deflowered, is called the son of a twice-married woman. He whom his father or mother gives for adoption is declared to be the son given. The son bought is one who was sold by them. The son made, is one adopted by

one's self. One who gives himself is self-given. One received while yet in the womb is the son received with a bride. He, who is taken for adoption, having been forsaken by his parents, is the deserted son."

It is said in the Mitákshará:—"A woman of equal class, espoused in a lawful form of marriage, is 'a lawful wife'; one born of her is the legitimate (aurasa) son". But in fact it is not to be so understood; for it is contradictory to what (the author of the Mitákshará) himself has said, viz.,-" because the murddhabhishikta and other mixed classes sprung from superior fathers and inferior mothers, are included under the term legitimate sons "; and since, if the sons born of women espoused in forms of marriage which are not strictly lawful for Bráhmanas and others respectively, were not legitimate sons, then notwithstanding such sons, others would take the heritage. Hence the term "of equal class" is to be held to be used (in the Mitakshara) for the purpose of indicating superiority. But what is mentioned in the text, namely—"One born of a lawful wife," constitutes the definition, which excludes the wife's son.

Accordingly Manu says:-"He, whom a man himself has begotten on his own wedded wife, is the legitimate and the principal son." Vasishtha also says:-"Only twelve kinds of sons are mentioned by the ancients; the first is the legitimate son begotten by a man himself on his own wedded wife." Also Vishnu says, "Now there are twelve kinds of sons, the first is the legitimate son, begotten by a man himself on his own wedded wife." Here in both the texts (of Vasishtha and Vishnu), the term "wedded" (sanskritáyám) is to be considered as an explanatory adjunct of the term "own wife" (svakshetre) for otherwise there would be repetition. Devala says:— "He, who is begotten by a man himself on his own wedded wife, is called the legitimate son, is the first in rank and the perpetuator of the father's lineage." A'pastamba says:—"The sons of one who in proper time meets a lawfully wedded wife of the same class; they have a religious connection and cannot be deprived of the property of the father and the mother." Baudhayana says:-" One



who is begotten by a man himself on a wedded woman of the same class is known as the legitimate son. Also it is declared (by the ancient sages):—You are born from every limb, you are sprung from the heart, you are one's self in the name of son, you, who are such, live for hundred years; the ancestors put on a garland of lotus, (in joy) when you were in the womb; just as a person himself is in this world, so you become born here (a part of him); a man himself is called by the name of put-tra on account of the benefits conferred upon the father and the mother; because you deliver from the lower regions called put, therefore you are named put-tra."

In the texts of A'pastamba and Baudháyana, the term "of the same class," is used with the intention of indicating superiority. Hence the mention of the mode of partition among the sons too, who are begotten on wives of dissimilar class, while dealing with legitimate sons, becomes consistent. The text of A'pastamba is read in the Ratnákara as—"of the same class, who had no previous (husband)"—and is explained thus: "who had no previous (apúrvám) i. e. who had no previous husband; the meaning is—one who was not even affianced to another; this is said by the author of the Prakása." In the Párijáta also it is said:—The term, "of the same class," here means that a woman of any twice-born class, is of the same class with a man of any twice-born class; and that a Súdra woman is of the same class with a Súdra.

It does not, however, imply that a Bráhmani woman is equal in class to a Bráhmana; a Kshatriyá to a Kshatriya and a Vaisyá to a Vaisyá: for if that were so, then the sons of Kshatriyá or other women espoused by a Bráhmana or any other (of a superior class) would not be included under any of the twelve kinds of sons.

3. "The son of an appointed daughter (puttrikasuta) is similar to him" (i. e. the legitimate son). The same is described by Vasishtha,—"This damsel who has no brother, I will give unto thee, decked with ornaments: the son that may be born of her shall be my son." Also Manu says,—"He who has no son may appoint his daughter in this form to raise up issue for him: whatever child may

be born of her shall perform my obsequies. In this very mode Daksha himself, a creator of beings, appointed daughters for the purpose of multiplying his race. He, with a delighted heart, gave ten daughters to Dharma, thirteen to Kasyapa, and twenty-seven to the king Soma (moon) having received them with honor." Here it is laid down that a son, born of a daughter who is given in marriage with the express declaration of appointment, becomes the puttrika-puttra of his maternal grandfather. That a son born of a daughter who is given in marriage without such express declaration, may be the puttrika-puttra—is determined in the following passage of the Mitakshará in the book of A'chara: -- "The epithet 'having brother' has been used to prevent the apprehension of the bride's appointment; by this it appears that a daughter may be appointed, though not declared to be so." Accordingly, also Gautama says:-"The sonless father shall give away the appointed daughter in marriage with the express agreement that the issue shall be mine. Some say that (even in the absence of any express agreement) a daughter becomes appointed by the mere intention of the father." It is said also in the Brahmapurana:-" A daughter who has been appointed to raise issue by her sonless father, . whether mentally or in the presence of the king, fire and kinsmen, or anywhere else, previously to conception, even if she has received fees (from the bridegroom) and is given to the bridegroom whether by the father (himself) or (by any other) when the father is dead,—is known as the appointed daughter. Such a daughter gets an equal share from the father's property." Manu says:-" A son of the appointed daughter shall offer the first oblation to his mother, the second to her father, and the third to the father's father."

Or the (compound) term puttrika-suta (in Yajnavalkya's text § 1) may mean the appointed daughter as well as son, i. e. the appointed daughter herself is the substitute of a son. Our opinion is that although she is (like a son) sprung from the breast (uras), still being a daughter she is similar to (and not the same as) a legitimate (aurasa) son. But the author of the Mitakshara says:—"She is declared to be similar to a legitimate son because (in a female child)

there are more of the mother's limbs, than of the father's limbs". So Vasishtha says:—"The appointed daughter herself, is the second son."

4. The Dvyámushyáyana or the son of two fathers is as described by Yájnavalkya in the following text—"A son begotten by one who is without male issue, on the soil of another, under an appointment, becomes legally the heir and the giver of oblations to both." Although he is sprung from the breast (or aurasa son) of the owner of the seed, still being begotten on another's wife, he is certainly inferior to the aurasa or legitimate son. Hence it is that the sage himself has given the following definition of the aurasa or legitimate son:—"The aurasa or legitimate son is one born of a lawful wife," (§ 1.) And we also will explain the Dvyámushyáyana as falling under the description of the wife's son, since the distinctive feature of the wife's son is not wanting in him.

Also Manu says:—"When by a contract of work, the soil is given in consideration of the seed: the owner of the soil and the owner of the seed are found in the world to be sharers of that."-Just as in the world by a contract . for cultivation—when one has land but has no seed such as paddy for sowing, and another has seed, but no land; and if they enter into a contract, i. e. an agreement, that mine is the seed and yours the land, let us cultivate by sowing that in this, and let the produce grown therein be ours, then it is observed that both become sharers of the crops thereof. Similarly also, in the case of the Dvyámushyayana or the son of two fathers, if one sows his (virile) seed in the soil of another, by an agreement that let the son begotten on the soil be ours,—then the issue begotten thereon belongs to both. Such a son of the wife, belonging to two fathers is called the Dvyámushyáyana.

Yájnavalkya, in defining the Dvyámushyáyana, (para. 1) has said "begotten under appointment", therefore what is intended is that the husband's younger brother or any other sapinda can, only when appointed by her venerable protector, beget a son on the wife of a brother and the like, in the prescribed mode such as rubbing the body with clarified butter; otherwise sin would be incurred by

both. Accordingly Manu says:—"The husband's younger brother, or a sapinda or a sagotra, being appointed by the venerable protector, and rubbing his body with clarified butter, shall with the desire of begetting a son, have an interview with a sonless woman after catamenia: one born in this mode becomes the son of the wife of a person."

When, however, without the agreement that the produce is to belong to both, seed is sown in the soil of another by the husband's younger brother or the like, then that son belongs to the owner of the soil alone. This also is declared by Manu,—"Should there be no agreement that the produce is to belong to the owner of the soil as well as to the owner of the seed, then clearly the fruit belongs to the owner of the soil, for the soil is more important than the seed."—Where without the agreement about the produce which is here the offspring, a child is begotten on the soil of another, that belongs to the owner of the soil alone. The meaning of the term "clearly" is that as in the world, if seed be sown in the land of another without any agreement with him, or if an elephant, a horse or the like belonging to one person causes a female of the same species belonging to another person to conceive, then in both cases, the fruit produced therein is seen to belong to the owner of the soil alone: and the reason for this is stated in the passage, "for the soil is more important than the seed;" the purport is that this is found in the case of cows, mares Accordingly the meaning which follows is, that if there be an agreement, then only the wife's son becomes the son of two fathers or Dvyámushyáyana, by reason of the right of the owner of the seed; but the owner of the soil has right over the wife's son in both the cases, (i. e. whether there be an agreement or not). Hence it is that although Yajnavalkya has made no mention of the agreement with the owner of the seed, in the text,—"A son begotten by one without male issue &c.,"—still that is to be understood since the text is based upon the same foundation with that of Manu. Accordingly in the text,—"A son begotten on a wife by a kinsman (sagotra) or any other,"—a comprehensive definition of the wife's son is given, irrespective of the agreement; otherwise there would have been repeti-14

tion: "a kinsman (sagotra)" means, the husband's younger brother or a sapinda or the like: "any other," signifies one other than a sagotra; this is the secondary alternative, for

Manu says,—"or a sapinda or a sagotra."

The A'charyas say that appointment to raise issue is relative to an affianced woman only. Because raising up issue in pursuance of appointment is restricted by Manu to her case only, as in the text,—"When the husband dies after the verbal betrothal of a damsel, her husband's vounger brother shall have intercourse with her in this mode." And because the appointment of a widow is rather prohibited; since after setting forth the appointment of a widow in the text,—"On failure of issue, the desired offspring may be obtained by a woman duly authorized, from the husband's younger brother or a sapinda: but one who is appointed to raise issue on widow, shall, rubbing his body with clarified butter, and being silent, beget in night only one son and by no means a second,"-Manu himself forbids it in the following text,—"No widow should be authorized by regenerate men to beget children by other persons, for those that authorise her to conceive by other men, violate the primeval law: such appointment is nowhere mentioned in the Vedic texts on marriage; neither is the re-marriage of widows mentioned in the law of marriage: this practice, fit only for brutes, and reprehended by learned regenerate men was introduced among men while Vena held the sovereign sway: he, ruling the whole earth, and eminent among the royal saints, gave rise to confusion of tribes, while his intellect was perverted by passion: since his time, the virtuous censure him who through delusion of mind authorizes a widow to have intercourse with another man for the sake of progeny."

Here it is to be remarked that the term "affianced" means a damsel who has been given in marriage by the person having the right to give, with the declaratory sentence,—"I give unto thee;" and that the term "widow" signifies one who has been married with the connubial ceremony ending in the rite of going seven steps, but whose husband is subsequently dead. But the term "affianced" does not include one who has been betrothed

by a promise at an indefinite time before marriage, such as with the following declaratory sentence,—"I will give this damsel in marriage, in the presence of gods, the spiritual preceptor and the holy fire, to him (or thee) who is (or art) not destitute of any limb, or not impotent, not degraded and free from the ten defects." Hence it is that the term "husband" has been used by Manu; the previous executory promise being no part of the marriage ceremony, the promisee's status of husband does not arise thereby, consequently he cannot reasonably be referred to by the term "husband." Although a person does not become the husband of even a damsel betrothed by a promise, inasmuch as like the status of wife, the status of husband, which consists in the sacred initiation and which is to be effected by the ceremony of marriage, can never arise before its completion; still in the commencement of the connubial ceremony the use of the term "husband." the status whereof will be the effect of it, is not unreasonable, like the use of the word sacrificial fire before the commencement of the sacrifice by the sacrificer. Hence it is that among western, northern and the like people, if the promisee dies a little before the marriage of the betrothed damsel, her marriage with another person is allowed by the learned, who are not censured. Otherwise in the kali age when the appointment to raise issue is prohibited, if the re-marriage of those whose marriage is not consummated be also forbidden, it would be a very objectionable practice. Accordingly the meaning (of the text of Manu) is this,—When "the husband" i. e. person about whom the ceremony of marriage takes place whereby the status of husband is effected, "dies after the verbal betrothal," i. e. after the gift has been made with the declaratory sentence. Nor can it be said that let the appointment of widows to raise issue be optional, inasmuch as it is prohibited after having been enjoined. Because option cannot reasonably be supposed with reference to a fact. for it is not reasonable to say that a person undertaking to procreate issue on a widow, under appointment, does or does not incur sin. And because the law of appointment to raise issue cannot apply to widows, as it is restricted to affianced damsels, by the text,-" When the husband

And because the injunction and the prohibition are not of equal force, inasmuch as those who give the authority are censured, as in speaking of the duties of women, unchastity has been declared to be the source of numerous faults, and as a life of austerity (led by the widows) has been highly praised. Accordingly in the text,—"Let her rather emaciate her body by (living upon) the pure flowers, roots and fruits; but let her not when the husband is dead, pronounce even the name of another man,"-Manu himself has prohibited the resorting to the protection of another man, for livelihood; and in the text, -"Longing for the unparalleled virtue of those having only one husband, shall continue till death, forgiving all injuries, observing strictly the rules and foregoing all sensual pleasure: many thousands of bachelor Vipras continuing in the order of the student have ascended the celestial regions without leaving any issue: like those life-long students, a chaste woman leading a life of austerities after the death of her husband goes to heaven though destitute of sons: a woman who being covetous for offspring proves faithless to her (deceased) husband, brings disgrace on herself in this world, and becomes excluded from the regions of her lord (in the next world,)"—he has forbidden with extreme censure the living with another man for progeny; and subsequently in the text,—"When the husband dies &c."-he himself has declared the legality of appointment relative to an affianced damsel. Having mentioned, "in this mode," he has declared other ceremonies, in the text,-" Having espoused her in due form, she being clad in a white robe, and pure in her conduct, let him privately approach her once after each course till delivery." The pronoun "this" in the passage "in this mode" means the mode which has been mentioned before, viz. rubbing of the body with clarified butter, appointment by the venerable protector, &c.,—and includes what is stated in other Smritis. The term "husband's younger brother" includes a sapinda and the like, in conformity with other texts. The term "husband" and the expression "after the verbal betrothal" have been already explained.

The following passage of the Mitákshará, namely,—
"From this very text it appears that the person to whom
the damsel is betrothed becomes her husband even without
acceptance,"—must be taken as implying the meaning
explained by us, since it has been shewn that the meaning
which appears on the face of the passage, is erroneous.
Accordingly there is the following passage further down,—
"This espousal with the restrictions, namely, sprinkling
the body with clarified butter &c. forms part of the intercourse to be had with the woman appointed to raise issue;
but it does not secure for her the status of a wife of
the husband's younger brother. Hence the offspring begotten on her belongs to the owner of the soil, should there
be no agreement; but if there be an agreement, it appertains to both by virtue of the agreement itself."

Nárada says:—"The issue of the seed sown in another's soil by the owner's permission is considered as belonging to both the owner of the seed and the owner of the soil." Sankha and Likhita say:—"According to Angirasas, the offspring belongs to him who espoused her with Vedic texts: but Usanás holds that the produce of the seed sown with an agreement between the owner of the seed and the owner of the soil belongs to both." Kátyáyana ordains:—"When one raises produce with the consent of the owner of the soil; then both of them become here the sharers of the same, since the fruit could not

come into existence in the absence of either."

Harita says:—"(If begotten) in the lifetime (of the husband) he is called the wife's son, by reason of the absence of independence; but after the death, he is called the son of two fathers, by reason of the seed not being sown (by the husband): others say that soil bears not fruit without seed, nor does seed germinate without soil, hence both being necessary, the offspring belongs to both. Of these two fathers, he becomes first the offspring of the natural father. Let them offer two pindas in the (nirvápa) sacrifice in honor of the ancestors, or in one pinda declare the name of both (the fathers); let his son do the same when offering the second pinda, and his grandson when offering the third pinda. And let the remote descendants down to the seventh, pronounce the name of two while

offering lepa or divided oblations to the three ancestors entitled to the lepa or divided oblations."

The meaning of this text is:—If begotten "in the lifetime" i. e. of the owner of the soil, he is, by some, called the wife's son, who belongs to the owner of the soil alone; the reason for this is,—"by reason of the absence of independence" i. e. of the wife: "but after the death," i. e. of the owner of the soil; although the absence of independence is the same, by reason of the subsequently cited text of Manu, viz.—" A sonless woman keeping unsullied &c.;" -still the son does not belong to the owner of the soil alone; and the reason for this is, "by reason of the seed being not sown" i. e. the owner of the soil must have given permission to the owner of the seed; "soil bears not fruit &c." shows that what has been said is reasonable: "in the nirvápa" which means that in which oblations are given, i. e. the sacrifice in honor of ancestors; there let the Dyvámushyayanas "offer" separately "two pindas" to two fathers, "or in one pinda, declare the name of both" the fathers: it is to be understood that in each of the pindus the names of two ancestors are to be declared; for Apastamba ordains,—"If he be the son of two fathers, he shall offer each oblation to two ancestors"—i. e. by reason of the three ancestors being double; "the second," i. e. in offering the second and the third oblations: "the three ancestors entitled to the lepa," i. e. while offering divided oblations to them shall pronounce the names of two.

Also Nárada says:—"The sons of two fathers shall separately offer to the two (sets of ancestors) the *pindas* and libations of water; and shall likewise take a moiety of the property of the owner of the seed and of the owner of the soil."—The term "moiety" indicates a share that is reasonable under the circumstances.

Baudhayana says:—"The son of two fathers shall offer oblations (in this way); shall proclaim the names of both in each oblation; three oblations shall be offered to the six: he who does so, errs not."—"The six" means the two fathers, the two grandfathers and the two great-grandfathers. He again says:—"The son begotten on the wife of a person deceased or impotent or diseased, by one duly authorized, is the wife's son; he is the son of two fathers,

belongs to two gotras, performs the funeral obsequies of both and takes their heritage."

Manu says:—"He who is begotten on the duly appointed wife of a man deceased or impotent or diseased is called the son of the wife."

Here in all cases where the owner of the soil is alive, but is incapable of begetting a son on account of disease &c., the appointment and the agreement may, according to the circumstances, be made by the venerable protectors and the husband also; but if he be dead, then by the venerable protectors alone.

Thus there are two descriptions of the kshetraja or wife's son: one has two fathers, and the other has the owner of the soil for his father.

- 5. "One secretly begotten in the house" by a gallant, and subsequently ascertained to be of the same class, is the secret-born son of the owner of the soil. Thus Manu says,—"When a son is begotten on one's wife, and it is not known who is its father, he is the secret-born in the house and belongs to him from whose soil he is sprung,"—"And it is not known &c.," means, that although it is not known by what particular person he is procreated, still it must be held that it is known that he is begotten by a person of equal class, by reason of the following text of Yogisvara.—"This law is propounded by me in regard to sons equal by class." This text will be explained hereafter.
- 6. "The maiden-born son is one born of an unmarried daughter," begotton by a man of equal class, he "is considered as a son of the maternal grandsire:" that is, the son belongs to him, of whose daughter he is born. But one born of a married daughter becomes the secret-born son of the husband; as is said by Manu.—"When a maiden daughter secretly conceives a son in her father's house, that son sprung from the maiden daughter is called by the name of the maiden-born son and belongs to the husband."—From these texts it appears that one begotten on an unmarried damsel residing at her father's house, by a gallant of equal class, is called a maiden-born son, and that he becomes son of the maternal grandfather.



But in conflict with this is the following passage of the Brahmapurána cited in the Ratnákara,—"But one begotten in the father's house, on a damsel who has not been given (in marriage), by a man of equal class is called the maiden-born son and becomes the son of him to whom she is given (in marriage);" also the following text of Nárada cited in the same book,—" The maiden-born son, also the son received with the bride, and he who is secretly born: their mother's husband is to be known as their father; and they are pronounced to be heirs." Here (i. e. in the passage of the Brahmapurána) there is no conflict as to his being the maiden-born son, who is begotten on an unmarried damsel in her father's house, by a man of equal class: but the conflict lies in the portion,—"and becomes the son of him to whom she is given in marriage;" also in what has been declared in the above text of Nárada, namely,—that the damsel's husband becomes the father of the maiden-born son, of the son received with a bride, and of him who is secretly born; and in what Manu says, namely,-" and belongs to the husband:" since it is not said (in these texts) that he becomes a son of the maternal As for the reconciliation made by the author of the Mitákshárá, namely,—" if begotten on a maiden daughter, he becomes the son of the maternal grandfather, and of the husband alone, if begotten on a married daughter,"—that is not satisfactory. For if that were so, then such a son could not be called a maiden-born son (kanina), being not begotten on an unmarried daughter, meant by the term maiden or kanyá. It cannot, however, be said that the term kanyá (maiden daughter) refers to any female child (whether married or unmarried). definition (of the maiden-born son) would be unmeaning, inasmuch as it would not exclude the secret-born son, who is begotten by a daughter,—all women being daughters of some body. Again, the conflict with the passage of the Brahmapurána is not got rid of (by this), for there the term—" who has not been given in marriage"—has been Accordingly also, it is difficult to reconcile the inconsistency with the text of Manu. The author of the Kalpataru, however, who has cited the texts contradictory to each other, has not at all reconciled the conflict, for like a thoughtless man he makes no mention of the distinct cases to which the texts are applicable. Indeed, he having set forth many texts showing that the maiden-born son belongs to the maternal grandfather, has immediately cited the text of Nárada and the passage of the Brahmapurána, which are in conflict with the above texts. There are cited the following text of Vasishtha,—"The maiden-born son is the fifth; he, whom an unmarried damsel begets through passion in her father's house, is the maiden-born son, he becomes the maternal grandfather's son: this is also declared (by the ancient sages),—'If a sonless daughter begets a son in the house; in him the maternal grandfather has a son's son, he shall offer pinda and take the property'"—likewise the following text of Nárada,— "The maiden-born son, whose father is unknown, and whose mother was senseless, shall offer pinda to the maternal grandfather and take his property"—and also the following text of Baudháyana,—"If one approaches a damsel who has not been espoused and who has not been given; the son begotten on her is the maiden-born son."

We remove the difficulty thus: The texts which declare that the maiden-born son belongs to the maternal grandfather, are relative to a son begotten by a man of equal class on a damsel who has not in any way been given: and the texts which declare that such a son belongs to the husband, have reference to the son begotten by a man of equal class, on a damsel who has been declared to be given but who has not acquired the status of wife, which is effected by the marriage ceremony ending in the rite of going seven steps. The term, "who has not been given" in the text of Nárada (in the passage of the Brahmapurána?), and the term "who has not been given," in the text of Baudháyana mean, the ceremony of whose marriage has not been completed,—but they do not signify, who has not at all been given. And this is consistent with reason. By the declaration of the intention (to give the damsel in marriage), the destruction of the father's right and the generation of the bridegroom's right are commenced; and the father's right not being wholly destroyed (just after the declaration of the intention) the term "maiden-born son" may reasonably be applied,

and there being the commencement of the bridegroom's right, the son may reasonably belong to him; but it is consistent with reason that when the father's right is complete (over the damsel), the son born of her becomes the son of the maternal grandfather. The same is also the meaning of the text of Manu (para. 1):—A damsel, who has been declared to be given, but whose marriage ceremony. has not been completed, continues a maiden, because the status of the intended bridegroom's wife has not been acquired; a son sprung from such a maiden daughter is called by the name of the maiden-born son and belongs to the husband i. e. to the person by whom she is married: hence the phrase "in her father's house" is consistent as supporting this meaning, for immediately after the marriage she enters the husband's house. The passage of the Mitákshará also (on this subject) bears the same meaning: "unmarried" i. e. whose marriage ceremony is not commenced, "married" i. e. whose marriage ceremony has commenced; -the past participle in the word "married" údhá is used in the sense that the act is commenced, but not in the sense that the act is completed. But if the marriage ceremony of a damsel has been completed, then a son procreated on her by a gallant of equal class, becomes the secret-born son: hence it is said,—" one begotten secretly in the house" i. e. born in the husband's house without his knowledge.

7. Twice married women are of two descriptions: the first is one who was not deflowered on her first marriage, and is espoused by another; and the second is one who has, previously to the marriage, been polluted by intercourse with the other sex. One born of such a woman is the son of the twice married woman; hence it is declared (by Yajnavalkya § 1),—"begotten on a woman who has not been deflowered or on one who has been deflowered." Manu says:—"If a woman who has been deserted by the husband or a widow begets (a son) by becoming, of their own accord, the wife of another person; he is called the son of the twice-married woman." Kátyáyana says:—"When a woman having deserted a husband who is impotent or degraded, gets another husband;

a son born of her is the son of the twice-married woman. and it is clear that he belongs to his natural father." Vasishtha and Vishnu say:—"The fourth is the son of the twice-married woman." His being the fourth is agreeably to the order stated by them.

He, whom the mother with her husband's assent or the father gives to another, becomes his adopted son; thus Manu says:-" That son whom his mother or father affectionately gives with water, at a time of distress, and who is alike (by class) is known as the adopted son." By specifying "at a time of distress," it is indicated that the giver incurs sin in the absence of distress; the mother and the father (may give) separately or jointly; the term "with water," indicates the mode of gift and acceptance; "alike" means equal in class; "affectionately" (pritisanyuktam) is an adverb.

An only son shall neither be given nor accepted. So Vasishtha ordains,—"A person, produced from the virile seed and the uterine blood, is an effect whereof the mother and the father are the cause: the mother and the father are competent to give, to sell, or to abandom him. But let no one give or accept an only son, since he is to continue the line of the ancestors. Let not a woman, however, give or accept a son unless with the assent of her husband.'

Some say that the adoption of a son by a woman without the assent of her husband, being prohibited in this text, the son taken by a widow whose husband died without giving authority does not become an adopted son. This is not tenable; since a sonless person has no access to heaven, and the procreation of a son is ordained to be necessary, therefore the permission which he was bound under the Sastras to give, is not to be considered as wanting in such a case. Nor can it be said that thus the portion, namely, "unless with the assent of her husband"—would be useless, inasmuch as there is no case to be excluded, and as the authority which a person is bound under the Sástras to give, is in all cases necessary (and so assumed as given). Because the prohibition is levelled against a woman who wishes to adopt a son for her own sake, when her husband who is desirous of having

moksha or freedom from the necessity of repeated deaths and births, or who has a son by another wife, cannot possibly give an authority to adopt. So it is declared,— "If one among all the wives of the same person be mother of a son, then all of them becomes, by that son, mothers of male issue: this is ordained by Manu." The purpose for which a son is desired, namely, the performance of sráddha &c. being served by the son of a co-wife, no son need be adopted by such a woman without the assent of her husband. The purport is, that in such a case, the object of both (the husband and the wife) is accomplished by that son; since he being the aurasa, is the principal son to the husband, while to the wife, he is a subsidiary son, like an adopted son; hence another son shall not be taken in adoption without the permission of the husband. But in reality the meaning of the part,—"unless with the assent of her husband,"-is, that while the husband is alive, a son shall not be adopted by the wife without the permission of the husband; because the following text,— "If among uterine brothers, one becomes father of a son, then all of them become by that son, fathers of male issue: this has been declared by Manu"—which is similar to the previous text,—(If one among all the wives &c.)—has been explained in the Mitakshara and the Smritichandrika to mean that when a brother's son is available for making a subsidiary son, such as an adopted son, any other shall not be made a substitutionary son.

But when the husband is dead, the assent of those only is necessary, on whom she is dependent. In this view, the object of the prohibition becomes reasonable. Therefore, although the husband be deceased without giving permission to adopt, still an adoption by the widow is not invalid. The reason also for putting the interpretation mentioned above on the two texts of Manu—has been set forth in the Mitákshará itself, thus:—"Otherwise in the texts, namely,—"The wife and the daughters also &c."—and—"The property of a woman without issue &c."—which refer to the heirs who take the property of one destitute of issue,—the declaration of the succession of the brother's son and the step-son respectively, in default of the wife &c., and in default of the husband &c., would be

in conflict with the above texts." This will be dealt with in detail while explaining the texts.

Although there may be many sons, still the eldest shall not be given in adoption; for in the text,—"As soon as the eldest is born, a man becomes father of a son" —he is declared to be preferable in performing the duties of a son.

The reason being equal, the prohibition in respect of an only son and the eldest son, applies to the cases of the son bought, the son self-given, and the son made. Hence in the anecdote of Harischandra in the Bahbricha Bráhmana, there is found a suggestion of the prohibition in respect of the eldest son in the case of the son bought:—

"He, on taking the eldest son, said."

The mode of accepting a son is propounded by Vasishtha,—"A person being about to adopt a son shall take an unremote kinsman, or a near relation of a kinsman, having convened his kindred and announced his intention to the king, having performed the homam with recitation of the hymns denominated vyáhriti in the middle of the dwelling-house." Here by the term "unremote kinsman" is intended, the exclusion of one who is remote by country and language. Similarly, in the cases of the son bought and the like, for the reason is the In the Kalpataru, however, the text is read as adúrabándhavam asannikrishtam eva, and is explained thus: adúrabándhavam, (rendered above into an unremote kinsman), means, one whose maternal uncle &c. are near; asannikrishtam, means, one whose virtues and defects are unknown; eva means even. And he has written the following as the remaining portion of the text of Vasishtha:-"But if a doubt arise, let him set apart like a Súdra one whose kindred are remote, for it is declared (in the Vedas), 'many are saved by one,' "-and explained thus: 'But if a doubt arise,' i. e., should a doubt with respect to his caste arise, on account of his kinsmen not being near, 'let him set apart like a Súdra' destitute of initiation: the intention is that even a Súdra may be a son adopted.

"A son bought is one who was sold by them,"— "by them," i. e., by the mother and the father: that is,



one given to another by the mother with the husband's assent, or by the father, on receipt of price; 'excepting an only son and the eldest son, at a time of distress,'—is also to be inserted (in the definition); he must be one of the same class, by reason of the concluding text,—"This law is propounded by me in regard to sons equal in class." As for the text of Manu,—"He, who is purchased from the mother and the father to become a son, is the purchaser's son bought, whether similar or dissimilar,"—that is interpreted,—"whether similar or dissimilar" in good qualities, but not dissimilar in class, for there would be conflict with the text,—"This law is propounded, &c." Also Baudhayana says,—"He, who being purchased from the mother and the father, or from either, is taken for progeny, is the son bought."

- having been induced by the show of money, field, &c., is asked—'be you my son,' and "is adopted by the man himself" who is desirous of having male issue; provided that he is destitute of the mother and the father, for if they be alive he cannot, by reason of his dependence on them, become another's son. Also Manu and Vishnu say,—"When one alike (in class), capable of discriminating between right and wrong and possessed of the virtues of a son, is adopted, he is to be known as the son made";—"alike," i.e., alike in class, "is adopted" by the mother and the father jointly or separately.
- 11. "One who gives himself is self-given," i. e., one who himself has given himself to another, i. e., one who comes of his own accord by saying, 'I become your son,' and is bereft of the mother and father, or is abandoned by them, is equal in class and is not degraded,—is called a self-given son. So Manu says,—"He, who being bereft of the mother and the father or abandoned (by them) without any cause, delivers himself to another, is pronounced his self-given son";—"abandoned," i. e., by the mother and the father at a time of famine or the like, on account of inability to afford maintenance, &c., "without any cause" such as degradation,—that is to say, independent, (so that he can give himself).

- 12. "One received, while yet in the womb, is a son received with a bride," i. e., one, who is in the womb, being begotton by a gallant of equal class in the unmarried state of a damsel, and is received or vinna,—vinna being the past participle of vid, to get,—when she is married in the pregnant state,—is called one received with a bride, and becomes the husband's son. So Manu says,—"When a pregnant damsel is espoused, whether known or not known (to be so), the child in the womb belongs to the husband and is called the son received with a bride." Also Vishnu says,—"The seventh is the son received with a bride; he is the son of a damsel married when pregnant, and belongs to the husband." "The seventh," i. e., with reference to the order in which the enumeration is made by the sage.
 - 13. "He, who is taken for adoption, having been forsaken (by the parents), is a deserted son," i. e., one who is abandoned by the mother and the father, and is taken by a person desirous of having male issue,—becomes son of the taker, and is called a deserted son. These two must be alike in class. Likewise, Vishnu also says,—"The eleventh is the deserted son, belonging to him by whom he is taken, having been forsaken by the father and the mother." Vasishtha says,—"The fifth is the deserted son, who is taken, having been forsaken by the mother and the father." "The eleventh" and "the fifth" place is agreeably to the order in which enumeration is made by the two sages respectively.
 - 14. The son of a Súdra woman, however, who is called párasava, and is enumerated by Manu among the subsidiary sons, is not mentioned by Yájnavalkya; inasmuch as the sage lays down a restrictive rule in the shape of the conclusion contained in the text,—"This law is propounded by me in respect of sons equal in class,"—and as he can, by no means, be considered as equal in class. Hence, the sage speaks of such a son in the text,—"One begotton even on a female slave &c. (§ 22)," since a son of a twice-born by a Súdra woman, cannot succeed to his paternal property even in default of other sons.

This will be resumed. Likewise, Manu says,—"The son whom a Bráhmana impelled by passion begets on a woman of the servile class, is a carcass though living and therefore called a párasava, (a living carcass)." Also Baudháyana says,—"A párasava is one begotton on a woman of the servile class by a person belonging to the first of the regenerate tribes, impelled by passion."

15. Of these (twelve descriptions of sons,) those described after the aurasa or legitimate son are subsidiary sons, but the aurasa alone is the principal one. Accordingly Manu says, -- "These eleven (kinds of sons,) beginning with the wife's son, as have been described above, are declared by the wise substitutes of sons-for failure of the object."—The term "for failure of the object," i. e. for failure of the object of marriage &c.—forms the reason for substitution. But in the Smritichandriká it has been explained thus,—The wise, i. e. the sages apprehending, in default of the legitimate son, the extinction of the ceremonies of the sráddha and the like that might be performed by him, have declared the eleven substitutionary sons, as what should be adopted. Vrihaspati says,—"There are thirteen kinds of sons, that are described by Manu in the order of priority: of them the legitimate son perpetuates the lineage, the appointed daughter and the rest,"—this text has been explained by adding,—'are declared as what should be made subsidiary sons.' Vrihaspati declares,— "As in the absence of clarified butter, the linseed oil is declared by the virtuous, as the substitute, so are the eleven descriptions of sons, in the absence of the legitimate son and the appointed daughter." In the Brahmapurána, (it is said):—"The son given, the son self-given, the son made, as well also the son purchased, and the deserted son are always to be maintained: those that belong to a different gotra or family, present distinct oblations, and perpetuate a different lineage, become impure for three days on the occasions of birth and death, as well of those that give food and raiment as of those to whom the seed and the soil belong. The Vipras have rarely a párasava son of the servile Súdra class. But persons of the royal class, that is, labouring under a curse, and is gradually perishing, and

is always engaged in warfare, have sometimes these; if there be neither the legitimate son nor the appointed daughter, then they have eleven sons of different descriptions beginning with the wife's son, who, however, merely perpetuate the lineage; all of them perform like a slave, their sráddha &c. on the specified occasions. The secret-born son, the maiden-born son, the son received with a pregnant bride, the wife's son and the son of the twice-married woman, these five, the wealthy Vaisyas may not have even for fear of punishment from the king; they may have all the rest. The Súdras whose occupation is service, who depend upon others for livelihood, and whose person is under the control of others, can have no son anywhere; therefore of a male slave and a female slave, none but a slave can spring."

- 16. Having thus determined the nature of these sons, their right to heritage is now determined, on this Yogisvara says,—"In default of the preceding one among these, every succeeding one is the giver of the *pinda* and the taker of the heritage." Inasmuch as a distributive sense is indicated by the term "every succeeding one," the term "the preceding one," also, is to be taken in a distributive sense.
- 17. When there are a legitimate son and the son of an appointed daughter, then agreeably to the above text it would follow that the son of the appointed daughter is not entitled to the heritage while there is the legitimate son, but Manu propounds an exception (to the above rule,) in the text,—"A daughter having been appointed, if a son be afterwards born, the division of heritage must in that case be equal; since a woman has no right to specific deductions for seniority." Also Vrihaspati says, -" The legitimate son alone is pronounced to be the owner of the paternal property; an appointed daughter is declared to be equal to him; the other sons, however, are to be maintained." Nor is it reasonable to say that if the son of the appointed daughter be born first-(in point of time) and subsequently the legitimate son be born, then because the son of the appointed daughter 16

is the eldest by birth and not a female, he is therefore entitled to specific deductions for seniority. holds the status of a son's son, as is declared by Manu in the text,—"When a daughter, appointed or not appointed to raise issue, gives birth to a son begotten by a man of equal class; in that son, the maternal grandsire has a son's son; let him present oblations and take the heritage;"-" has a son's son," since the appointed daughter is a (subsidiary) son, hence her son though a daughter's son is a son's son. And since it is nowhere declared that a son's son is entitled to a greater share (than a son) by reason of seniority. Nor can it be said that this is in conflict with the text,—"The son that will be born of ber shall be my son,"—as it affirms sonship of the son of an appointed daughter. Because the above meaning being in conflict with Manu, this text must be explained as intending the term son in a secondary sense on account of his being the giver of oblations. As the term son is applied to an appointed daughter in a secondary sense she being not a male child, so also to the son begotten by an appointed daughter who is begotten by a man himself: since although he is male he is not begotten by the man himself, and since the term 'son' primarily signifies a male child begotten by a man himself.

Likewise it would follow from that (text of Yogisvara § 16), that other sons too are not entitled to any share, should there be the next preceding son; but an exception is ordained by Vasishtha in the text,—"If a legitimate son be born after a son has been adopted, the son given is entitled to a quarter share." Here the term "son given" is indicative of others also, such as a son bought, for they are equally adopted; accordingly Kátyáyana says,—"If a legitimate son be born, the rest of the sons are entitled to a quarter share provided they be savarna (of the same class); but if they be asavarna (of a different class) they are entitled to food and raiment only." The meaning of the text of Kátyáyana is this: savarna, i. e. the wife's son, the son given &c., they are entitled to a quarter share when there is a legitimate son; asavarna, i. e. the maiden-born son, the secret-born son, the son received

with a pregnant bride and the son of the twice-married woman; these however, are not entitled even to a quarter share when there is a legitimate son, but are entitled to food and raiment. Accordingly Vishnu prohibits the participation of a quarter share by a maiden-born son and the like, if there be a legitimate son, in the text,—"But the maiden-born son, the secret-born son, the son received with a pregnant bride and the son of the twice-married woman are not preferable; they are not at all entitled to participate in the pinda and the heritage." the legitimate son &c., the maiden-born son &c., are certainly entitled to take the paternal property in its entirety, by reason of the text—"In default of the preceding one among these, every succeeding one &c.," (§16.) As for the text of Manu, viz., -" The legitimate son alone is the master of the paternal estate; but for the sake of humanity, he shall allow sufficient maintenance to the rest,"—that also is to be explained to prohibit the quarter share in case the son given and the like be inimical to the legitimate son and devoid of good qualities; and to refer to the maiden-born son &c., since they being declared (in the text of Kátyáyana) to be entitled to food and raiment only, this text should be taken to be based upon the same foundation.

Again Manu himself has declared that the wife's son is entitled to a fifth or sixth share,—"Let the legitimate son, when dividing the paternal heritage, allot to the wife's son a fifth or a sixth share out of the patrimony." The distinction is, that a sixth share should be allotted to him, if there be both animosity (towards the legitimate son) and want of good qualities; and a fifth, if there be either of these defects. But the quarter share for the son of an appointed daughter, whom Manu has declared to be entitled to an equal share, and the third share for the wife's son who has been declared to be entitled to a fifth or sixth share,—as mentioned in the passage of the Brahmapurána, namely,--" The legitimate son though next born, is entitled to the entire patrimony; the wife's son takes a third share; and the son of the appointed daughter, a fourth,"—are to be considered to refer to a son of the appointed daughter who is utterly devoid of good qualities

and is of a different class, and to a son of the wife who is highly endowed with good qualities and friendly to the

legitimate son.

In order to show that, in default of the legitimate son, the son given takes the entire estate, Manu has set about the text,—"But if the son given of a person be endowed with all good qualities, he shall certainly take the estate of that person,—though accepted from a different gotra or family,"—the particle 'though' signifies, and a fortiori if accepted from the same gotra or family. The very same sage has prohibited the taking by the son given of the property belonging to the natural father, in the text,-"A given son must not claim the family and the estate of the natural father: to him who gives away his son in adoption, the ambrosial pinda which follows the family and the estate is lost." The pinda which the giver would have received from that son is lost to him; "ambrosial," i. e. causing satisfaction to the manes of ancestors,—is the adjunct of pinda; "which follows the family and the estate," embodies the reason.

The following text relative to the given son alone and showing his right to a quarter share when there is a legitimate son, is declared by Vasishtha,—"If after he has been taken in adoption a legitimate son be born, the given son takes a quarter share." A text of Kátyáyana has already been cited (para. 1) which is applicable also to the son bought and the like. That text is read in the Kalpataru,—"are entitled to a third share;" and if this reading be correct, then that text is to be explained to mean that the participation of a third share takes place in case the son given and the like are endowed with more good qualities than the legitimate son.

Manu himself has declared also the equal participation of the wife's son with a legitimate son, in the texts,—"If a younger brother begets a son on the wife of an elder brother, then the distribution in such a case shall be equal; this is the settled law. The (wife's son who is) inferior, cannot get in right of the superior; the father is superior on account of pro-creation, therefore (the wife's son) shall legally take the aforesaid share. He, who protects the estate and the wife of a deceased brother,

shall, after generating a son to the brother, make over his estate to him. If there be a legitimate son and a wife's son entitled to the property of the same father, each shall. take what belonged to his natural father, and not the other." The legitimate son being the subject commenced. although it seems that the equal participation of the wife's son is mentioned relatively to the legitimate son, still because the meaning that is suggested by the context cannot be adopted should there be conflict of texts, therefore it is to be understood that the above text means the participation of a share equal to that of the natural father. Hence in the subsequent passage the superiority of the natural father is set forth. Also by the text,—"he shall, after generating a son to the brother &c.,"—it is declared that he shall give him the property of him to whom the wife's son belongs, i. e. such a son being the representative of the brother shall take a share equal to his.

Similarly are to be anyhow reconciled the texts of Vrihaspati and other sages, which declare greater or lesser shares for the wife's son &c. Thus Vrihaspati says. "The other five or six sons beginning with the wife's son are equal shares." Háríta ordains,—"One about to distribute shall allot one-twenty-first to the maiden-born son, one-twentieth to the son of a twice-married woman, onenineteenth to the son of two fathers, one-eighteenth to the wife's son, one-seventeenth to the son of an appointed daughter; and the rest shall be given to the legitimate In the Brahmapurana it is said, "A legitimate son though next born (or begotten on a woman of inferior class) takes the entire estate, the wife's son takes a third part, the son of an appointed daughter a fourth, the son made a fifth share, the secret-born son a sixth, the deserted son a seventh share, the maiden-born son an eighth share, the son received with a pregnant bride a ninth part, the son bought gets a tenth, the son of a twice-married woman, however, obtains the next, the self-given son a-twelfth; but the son of a Súdra woman, a thirteenth part of the paternal property; a person of the same gotra or a virtuous student (shall take the remainder)." Here with every clause should be construed, 'when there is a legitimate son, by reason of the text,—" In default of the preceding

one among these, every succeeding one &c.," (§16.) It has previously been shown (para. 2) to what case is applicable the first verse of the above passage, namely, "A legitimate son &c." The reconciliation of the others also is to be made as is proper according to the local customs or agreeable to a comparison of the qualities.

Manu has divided the sons into two sets of six, and declared that the first six are heirs (dáyádas) and kinsmen, and that the latter six are not heirs but kinsmen, as in the text,—"The legitimate son and the wife's son also, the son given and the son made, the secret-born son and the deserted son, these six are heirs (dáyádas) and kinsmen: the maiden-born son, the son received with a pregnant bride, the son bought, likewise the son of a twicemarried woman, the self-given son and the son of a Súdra woman, these six are not heirs but Kinsmen." The meaning of this text is as follows:—In default of any near heir of the sapindas and the samánodakas of their father, the first six are entitled to their estate, but the latter six are not entitled to the same; but the division into those that are heirs (dáyádas) to the father and those that are not so, would not be reasonable, because the right of all the sons in default of the preceding one, to take the property of the father is equal, by reason of the text,—"In default of the preceding one among these &c.," (§16); and because the text,—" Neither the brothers nor the parents but the sons take the estate of the father,"—which is declared after the text,-" The legitimate son alone is the master of the paternal property"—establishes that all the subsidiary sons are entitled to take the paternal property; and because the term dáyáda is mostly applied to heirs other than the son, in many texts such as,—"Shall compel even the dáyádas to give:" but the status of kinsman, i. e. the qualification of performing the ceremonies of offering libations of water &c., by reason of being sapinda or samánodaka, is common to both the sets of six.

But Háríta says,—"Six are kinsmen and heirs; the son begotten by a man himself on his chaste wife, the wife's son, the son of the twice-married woman, the maiden-born son, the son of the appointed daughter, and one secretly born in the house are kinsmen and heirs: the son given, the son bought, the deserted son, the son received with a pregnant bride, the son self-given and the son found by chance are not heirs of kinsmen."—"The son begotten by a man himself on his chaste wife," means the legitimate son; "the son found by chance" is one that is bereft of the mother, father &c., and is suddenly found by a person who, after satisfying him says,—'be you my son,' and so adopts him,—that is to say, the son made.

Now here the conflict with Manu is clear. Because by him, the maiden-born son and the son of the twice-married woman are enumerated among those that are not heirs to kinsmen; while by Háríta among those that are kinsmen as well as heirs: again the son given, the son made and the deserted son are reversely enumerated. Hence the conflict is to be removed thus; their applicability is to be determined with reference to qualities such as equality in class, or with reference to local customs.

Baudhayana, however, concurs with Manu in what he says (about this subject) in the text,—"The legitimate son, the son of the appointed daughter, the wife's son, the son given, the son made, the secret-born son and the deserted son are pronounced to be heirs: the maiden-born son, the son received with a pregnant bride, the son bought, likewise the son of the twice-married woman, the self-given son and the son of a Súdra woman are pronounced to be kinsmen."

Devala, having described the legitimate son, the son of the appointed daughter, the wife's son, the maiden-born son, the secret born son, the deserted son, the son received with a pregnant bride, the son of the twice-married woman, the son given, the self-given son, the son made and the son bought, says,—"These twelve sons are declared for the sake of issue: some are sprung from himself; some are sprung from another; some are acquired; and others become sons independent of any exertion. Of these, the first six are heirs to kinsmen, the latter six are so to the father alone: a distinction also among the sons according to the priority in the order of enumeration is ordained: all these sons indeed are considered entitled to take the heritage of one having no legiti-

mate son; but should a legitimate son be subsequently born, they have no right on account of seniority: of these sons, those that are equal in class take a third share; but those inferior in class, shall remain dependent upon him, receiving food and raiment."—Of the sons enumerated, it

is clear who are sprung from himself and so forth.

Nárada also says,—"The legitimate son, the wife's son, the son of the appointed daughter, the maiden-born son, the son received with a pregnant bride, likewise the secret-born son, the son of the twice-married woman, the deserted son, the son given, the son bought, likewise the son made, and the self given son; these are pronounced to be the twelve descriptions of sons. Of these, six are kinsmen and heirs; and six are not heirs but kinsmen. Each, according to the priority in order, is considered as superior; and the next in order, as inferior. On the death of the father, they succeed to his estate according to their order: on default of the superior let the inferior take the estate."

Manu says;—"On failure of the superior, the inferior in order is entitled to the heritage; but if there be

many equal, all become sharers of the estate."

Vrihaspati says,—"The son given, the deserted son, the son bought, the son made and likewise the son of a Súdra woman; all these when pure in class, are considered as sons of middle rank, entitled to the heritage: the wife's son is censured by the virtuous, so likewise are the son of the twice-married woman, the maiden-born son, the son received with a pregnant bride and the secret-born son."

Harita says,—"The son of a Súdra woman, the self-given son, and the son purchased; all these who are pronounced kinsmen are undoubtedly kándaprishtha; there is no doubt that, inasmuch as he having left his own family joins a different family, therefore by reason of that miscon-

duct he is called kándaprishtha.

Yama says,—"The son given at a time of distress, the self-given son and the son of a Vaishnaví, all these three described by Manu are kándaprishtha; since the family is called the kánda, and they left their previous family. But let him who is eldest remain in the family. He, who having left his own family, betakes himself to a different

family is considered as kándaprishtha on account of that misconduct."—In the Kalpataru it is said that Vaishnaví means a Súdra woman.

20. In the following text, Yogisvara lays down a restrictive rule in the shape of the conclusion of what has been said,—"This law propounded by me refers to sons equal in class."—This law which is propounded by me in the text,—"In default of the preceding one among these, every succeeding one &c.,"—is to be understood to refer to the wife's son &c., that belong to the same class with the father, and not to those of a different class. Of them the maiden-born son, the secret-born son, the son received with a pregnant bride and the son of the twice-married woman can be of the same class, through their natural father; for they themselves have not the distinctive feature of the pure and mixed classes. Since Yogisvara himself having discriminated the pure and mixed classes, says, "This law is declared to refer to married women."

The sons sprung from a father of a superior class and a mother of an inferior class,—and belonging to the mixed classes such as the Múrdhábhishikta, are included under the definition of the legitimate; hence the mode of partition by them has been declared by the text,—" The sons of a Bráhmana have four shares or three or two or one according to the class &c.," (Part 1, § 25, para. 1.) Consequently, it is on their default, that the wife's son and the rest are entitled to the paternal estate.

21. The son of a Súdra woman, however, although legitimate, is not entitled to take the entire paternal property, notwithstanding the default of other sons. Accordingly, Manu says,—"Whether one has a son or is destitute of a son, let him not, according to law, give more than a tenth to a son by a Súdra woman." Whether one has a son by a wife of equal class or destitute of sons by a wife of equal class; when he is dead let not his wife's son &c., or any other heir give to a son by a Súdra woman more than a tenth out of his property. From this text it appears that in default of a son by a wife of equal class, a son by a Kshatriya or a Vaisya wife, takes the entire paternal property. As for the right of a son by a

Súdra woman to take one share, declared by Yogísvara and other sages in texts like,—"The sons of a Bráhmana, according to the class, take four shares, or three, or two, or one &c.,"—that is to be understood to refer to a Súdra woman's son of a very good character; since, otherwise, there would be conflict with Manu. And the text of Manu, namely,—"A son of a Brahmana, a Kshatriya or a Vaisya, by a Súdra woman, is not entitled to take the heritage,"—has already been explained.

- 22. A special rule is propounded by Yajnavalkya with regard to the partition of the property of a Súdra, in the text,—"One begotten by a person of the servile class. even on a female slave takes a share by the choice (of the father); when the father is dead, let the brothers make him partaker of a half share: when there is no brother, let him take the whole, provided there be no daughter's A son begotten on a female slave by a Súdra obtains a share by the choice of the father: after the father's death, however, let the brothers, i. e., the sons by a Súdra woman lawfully wedded, make him, i. e., the son of the female slave, partaker of a share equal to half of their own share. Here from the plural number (in brothers) it should not be erroneously concluded that every one must give half of his share; for if that were so, then one having many brothers would get a much larger portion of the property than they, and that would be very unreasonable: but the sons by a Súdra woman, each take a half share of what is allotted to a legitimate son; the singular number (him) and the plural number (brothers) indicate the class and the individual. But in default of a son by a lawfully wedded Súdra woman and of his sons &c., the son of a female slave, also, gets the entire property of the Súdra father; this appears to be the purport.
- 23. From the use of the term "a person of the servile class" (in Yájnavalkya's text, § 22) it appears that one begotten by a twice-born person on a female slave, cannot, notwithstanding the desire of the father, get a share, or a half share after his death; the taking of his entire property is out of the question: but he is entitled only to maintenance, provided he be not disobedient. "

CHAPTER III.

LAW OF SUCCESSION

TO THE ESTATE OF A PERSON SEPARATED AND NOT RE-UNITED.

PART I.

- § 1.—General rule of succession.—2. The wife's succession; wives of different classes; effect of marriage in different forms; her right to perform religious ceremonies, and to take the entire estate:—3. Limitation of her right; two texts of Kátyáyana, interpretation of these by the author of Smritichandriká; that by Jímútaváhana, stated and criticized; conclusion.—4. Other texts on the priority of the wife's succession.—5. Texts in conflict with these.—6. Reconciliation by Dháresvara.—7. Criticized.—8. Reconciliation by Sríkara; criticized.—9. Another reconciliation; criticized.—10. Reconciliation by the author.—11. The term "sonless" in texts on succession explained; sapinda relationship explained.—12. Jímútaváhana's objection to the above reconciliation, stated at length.—13. The same criticized; re-union explained; chaste widows entitled to maintenance only when the husband is unseparated.
- 1. Now are mentioned those, who, in default of the principal and subsidiary sons, are entitled to take the estate of one who is deceased, degraded, gone to retirement or the like.

On this Yogisvara says,—"The wife (patni) and the daughters also, the parents, brothers likewise, their sons, the gentiles (gotraja), cognates (bandhu), a pupil, the fellow student: in the absence of the preceding one, every succeeding one is indeed heir to the estate of a sonless person, who departed for heaven. This rule extends to all classes." The meaning is: The wife and the rest shall, agreeably to the order in which they are mentioned, i. e., in the absence of each preceding one, the next succeeding one,—take the estate of a person who departed for heaven, i. e., is deceased, and is sonless, i. e., destitute of

the twelve kinds of sons previously described; this rule is to be understood to apply to all, i. e., the mixed classes whether they are sprung from a high-caste father and a low-caste mother, or from a low-caste father and a high-caste mother,—as well as to the (four principal) classes, such as the Bráhmana.

2. First of all the patni or the lawfully wedded wife takes the estate. The term patni itself signifies a woman espoused in the prescribed form of marriage, agreeably to the Aphorism of Pánini,—"The term pati (husband) is changed into patni (meaning the correlative) implying relation through a sacrifice." The singular number (in the term patni in Yogisvara's text, § 1) implies the class; hence if a person leaves more wives than one, then all of them,—first those of the same class (with the husband) and after them those of a different class,—shall take the husband's pro-

perty dividing the same amongst themselves. From the use of the term patni (in Yajnavalkya's text, § 1) it appears that a wife espoused in the ásura or the like (disapproved) form of marriage has no right to take the property when there is another wife espoused in a lawful form of marriage. To this effect is the following passage of law,—"A woman, however, who is purchased by giving price, is not to be considered as a patni; for neither in a sacrifice in honor of the gods, nor in one in honor of the departed ancestors she (can be the companion of her husband, i. e., the purchaser, when performing such a sacrifice): the poets (prophets or sages) look upon her as a female slave."—In this text her status of a female slave is mentioned with the intention that she has not the right of becoming the indispensable companion in the performance of ceremonies having spiritual merit for their end, but not with the intention that intercourse with her is forbidden; for she being espoused (though in a disapproved form), the objection of her being the wife of another man, cannot arise. Accordingly Manu, having described the virtuous and the vicious forms of marriage, declares that the virtues and vices attach solely to the issue (of such marriages),— "If a wife is espoused by a man in the blameless forms of marriage, the offspring becomes unblameable; and if in the

reprehensible forms, the progeny becomes reprehensible; therefore the reprehensible forms should be studiously avoided." The reprehensibility of the offspring, again, refers to the absence of good conduct and character, not, however, to exclusion from the castes pure or mixed; for the sole fact of being begotten on a married woman by the man who marries her, determines the caste pure or mixed (of the offspring,) by reason of the text,—"This law is ordained with regard to married women." Hence, by the text,—"For neither in a sacrifice in honor of the gods, nor in one in honor of the departed ancestors she &c."—the right to be the companion is prohibited.

Accordingly it is indicated by the term patni that the competency also, of performing the rites in honor of the ancestors, is a reason for the succession to the property of the husband. Hence Prajapati says that the estate of the husband may be taken only by a wife who is chaste and who is competent to associate with the husband in the performance of ceremonies enjoined in the Sruti and the Smriti, as in the text,—"Dying before the husband, a wife devoted to the husband partakes of his consecrated fire; but if the husband die before her, she takes his property: this is the primeval law." Also Vriddha Manu says.— "The sonless wife (patni) alone, keeping unsullied the bed of her husband and persevering in religious observances, shall offer oblations to him and take his entire share." With reference to this text, the author of the Smritichandrika says, that since the order of reading of the latter half. is opposed by the order indicated by the sense, therefore the widow first obtains his entire share and then presents This is to be rejected. Because nothing is intended to be expressed by the order: the sole object of the text is to establish her right to both. Otherwise the funeral ceremonies would have to be postponed till the share be obtained: but that is prohibited in various passages of law. Also because there would arise the objection of assuming some spiritual purpose. By the particle "alone" in the term "the wife alone," it is shown that even to the performance of the funeral ceremonies of her sonless husband, she alone, like a son (had there been one) of her sonless. husband, is entitled, notwithstanding a brother and

the rest enumerated in the text,-" The wife and the

daughters also &c."

The very same meaning is expressed at length by Prajápati,—"Having taken his moveable and immoveable property, the precious and the base metals, the grains. the liquids, and the clothes, let her duly offer his monthly, half yearly and other funeral oblations. With funeral repast and by pious liberality, let her honor the paternal uncle of her husband, the spiritual preceptor (or the parents) and daughter's sons, the children of the sisters, the maternal uncle, and also decrepit persons, guests and females (or the other wives of inferior status)."— "The base metals" are lead, tin and the like (i. e. other than gold and silver;) "funeral repast" signifies the food intended for the ancestors; "pious liberality" means reservoir of water and the like (works for public good) or the fees and the like (given to Brahmanas) for the performance of a ceremony. What is intended is this: Having obtained the husband's entire estate including even the immoveables, the patni should, under the superintendence of the husband's relatives, perform the ceremonies conducive to the spiritual benefit of her husband and herself, (the ceremonies) which can be accomplished by wealth and which a female is competent to perform.

The same sage declares that those that cause injury to her who conducts herself in this way are to be punished as robbers,—"The gentiles and the cognates, however, who become her adversaries or injure her property, let the king chastise by inflicting on them the punishment of a robber."

The following passage prohibitory of the taking by the patni of immoveable property, is quoted in the Smritichandriká as a text of Vrihaspati;—"When the husband is separated, the pledge and various others that are recognised as property, the wife (jáyá), after the death of her husband, obtains, excepting the immoveable."—And in order to prevent the inconsistency of this text with that of Prajápati, namely,—"Having taken his moveable and immoveable &c."—it is concluded that this refers to a wife destitute of daughters, by rejecting the opinion of others, namely, that this passage refers either to a wife

without good character or to the property of an unseparated husband,—as being contradictory to the remaining part of the above text, namely,—"Even when partition has been made, the wife (stri), though preserving her cha-

racter, is not entitled to immoveable property."

The author of the Madanaratna points out a defect in the above conclusion on the ground that the above text of Vrihaspati is an interpolation inasmuch as it is not cited in the Mitakshara, the Kalpataru, the Halayudha and the other commentaries,—but that the text of Prajapati, namely, "Having taken his moveable and immoveable &c." —is a genuine one, since it is quoted in all the commenta. ries; and characterizes the conclusion come to by the author of the Smritichandriká to be unreasonable, being simply an emanation from his inner consciousness: and he himself forms the following reconciliation, supposing the text of Vrihaspati to be a genuine one, namely, that the taking of the entire property including the immoveable—refers to a wife espoused in the forms of marriage, called Brahma and the like, inasmuch as the term patni is used in these texts; but that the text of Vrihaspati is relative to a wife espoused in the A'sura or the like form of marriage, because the terms jáyá and strí only are employed in that text.

This is refuted in the Smritichandriká itself, in which it is said that a wife wedded in the A'sura or the like form is not comprised by the term patni; and the texts also, in which the term jáyá and the like occur, refer to her (i. e., the patni), inasmuch as these texts rest on the same foundation (with the texts in which the term patni is used). As for what is said, namely, that the conclusion arrived at by the author of the Smritichandriká is a dogmatic one, that also is not tenable. Because, if there be a daughter, then through her son there is a possibility of the enjoyment of immoveables, and of the spiritual benefit of the proprietor, therefore even the immoveables are taken (by the wife); but one that is destitute of daughter does not take the immoveable property by reason of the absence of such possibility: in this therefore may consist the reason (for the above conclusion of the author of the Smritichandriká). Accordingly it has been previously set forth



that without the consent of the sons the father has no

right to alienate even his self-acquired property.

As for what appears from the text of Kátyáyana, viz.—"When the husband is dead, (the wife) preserving the honor of the family shall take the share of the husband for her life (or livelihood), not, however, the right to make gift, mortgage or sale,"—namely, that the wife succeeding to the property of the husband is entitled to mere maintenance out of the estate, but has no right to make gift, mortgage or sale thereof;—that also refers to the want of right to make gifts to players, dancers, &c. for secular purposes. Because he (Kátyáyana) himself sets out her right to make gifts for spiritual purposes, also to mortgage or sell so much as is sufficient for such purposes, in the text,—" Persevering in religious observances and fasting, leading a life of austerity, and constantly engaged in the control of passion and in making gifts, (the widow) though sonless, ascends to heaven,"-from the phrase "ascends to heaven" it appears that she has power to make gifts, &c., even in religious ceremonies that are optional, and a fortiori in those daily and occasional ceremonies which are enjoined by the Sástras, and the omission whereof entails demerit. And because to the same effect is the text of Prajapati cited before, namely—"Having taken the move-ables and immoveables &c." The author of the Smritichandriká, and others, say, that in this text too, the first (of the series of duties) being enumerated, her power to perform the optional ceremonies (at the expense of her husband's property) follows.

There is again another text of Kátyáyana himself, namely,—" Let the sonless (widow), preserving unsullied the bed of her husband, and abiding with her venerable protector, only enjoy (her husband's property) being moderate until her death, after her, let the heirs (or co-heirs, dáyádas) take."

In interpreting this text the author of the Smritichandriká says;—The meaning is, "let her being moderate," i. e., patiently enduring any opposition, offered by the (husband's) co-heirs (dáyádas), to the application of the wealth, "enjoy until her death." This again refers to such undivided property as the widow herself has taken for her livelihood, when the father-in-law &c. being engaged in other pursuits are unable to afford protection, maintenance and the like; for had it referred to divided property, it would have been contrary to the doctrine propounded by Manu and others.

The oriental commentators, however, putting an interpretation which appears on the face of the text (of Kátyáyana) say that the wife has no power of making gift, mortgage, or the like (disposition) of her husband's property, in the following passage:-" 'Abiding with her venerable protector,' i.e., with her father-in-law or the like (kinsman of her husband), let her only enjoy her husband's estate during her life; but let her not, according to her pleasure, deal with it as with stridhan by making a gift, mortgage, sale, or the like: after her, let the heirs, i. e., the daughters and others who would be entitled to his property (in default of the wife), take the estate, but not the kinsmen; since they being inferior to the daughter &c., ought not to exclude these: for the widow debars them (the daughter &c. from succession), and the absence of the obstacle (in the shape of the widow) is equal either in the case of the destruction, or in the case of utter absence, of her right; they (the daughters &c.) therefore cannot reasonably be excluded. Nor can it be said that "let the heirs" to stridhan "take," for then there would be tautology, inasmuch as Kátyáyana himself has declared in other texts the heirs to stridhan. Hence those persons who, in the text,—"The wife and the daughters also &c."—are in the absence of the preceding ones, exhibited as next heirs to the property of a sonless deceased person who was separated and not re-united shall, in like manner as they would have succeeded in case of the utter absence of the wife's succession, succeed to the residue of the estate after her enjoyment, upon the demise of the wife in whom the succession had vested. At that time the succession of the daughters &c. is proper, since they confer greater spiritual benefits than others. The following passage of the Mahábhárata in the chapter on the Religious merit of Gifts, is also in support of the above view,—'It is ordained that the property of the husband when devolving on wives has enjoyment (upabhoga) for its use: let not women on any account make a waste of her husband's property.'—Enjoyment again should not be by wearing delicate apparel and similar

luxuries; but since a widow may benefit her husband by the preservation of her person, the enjoyment of property sufficient for that purpose is authorized. Thus in the text,— 'With funeral repast and pious liberality &c.'—Vrihaspati intends by the term paternal uncle, any sapinda of her husband; by the term daughter's son, the progeny of her husband's daughter; by the term sister's son, the husband's sister's son; and by the term maternal uncle, her husband's mother's family: to these alone, let her give presents in proportion to the wealth, at her husband's funeral rites. and not to the family of her own father. With their consent, however, she may give to them also. Accordingly Nárada says,—"When the husband is dead, his kin are the guardians of his sonless widow. In the disposal of property, and care of herself, as well as in her maintenance, they have full power. But if the husband's family be extinct or contain no male, or be helpless, the kin of her own father are the guardians of the widow, if there be no relations of her husband within the degree of a sapinda."

On this it is to be said. Is it, that even when a gift or the like disposition of her husband's property is made by the widow,—this is per se invalid? This, however, is not reasonable, since her succession to the entire estate of her husband being declared in the texts of Manu and other sages, her proprietory right arises thereto; hence it would be contradictory to say that gifts &c. (made by her) are per se invalid. Accordingly Jimútaváhana himself, having cited the following texts prohibiting gift and the like disposal of immoveable property, namely,-" But neither the father nor the grandfather is so, of the whole immoveable property,"—"Separated or unseparated kinsmen are equal in respect of immoveables &c."—and—"Immoveables and bipeds, although acquired by a man himself &c."—concludes that these texts are intended to show that moral guilt is incurred by a man of evil disposition, who makes gift and the like merely for the purpose of putting the family to distress; but they do not establish the invalidity of gifts and the like in themselves; for it would be unreasonable to say that they do so, because the proprietory right which is defined to be the power of disposal according to pleasure,—in the immoveable property is not dis-

tinct from what it is in other objects, and because a fact cannot be altered even by a hundred texts. Hence in the manner mentioned by him, let, in this instance too, moral offence, by reason of the violation of the prohibition, be incurred by a widow who out of evil disposition makes gifts &c. of her husband's estate, solely for the purpose of putting the kinsmen (of her husband) to distress. certainly a moral offence too is not committed by one who makes gifts for religious purposes, or who sells or mortgages for the purpose of her own maintenance. Nor can it be said that from the restriction expressed by the term, "only enjoy," as well as from the declaration—"After her let the heirs take,"—what alone can follow is her incompetency to make gifts &c. as in the case of joint property. Because this (i. e. the separate property) which is the subject of exclusive right is different from joint property which is the subject of common right. Nor can it be asserted that inasmuch as the enjoyment by the widow (of her husband's estate), which follows (from the assertion of her heirship,) cannot be taken to be intended to be declared (in the text of Kátyáyana), therefore the text is solely for the purpose of prohibiting gifts &c., and accordingly her want of right to make gifts &c. inevitably follows. cause, (you say) a fact cannot be altered, hence it cannot but be admitted for the sake of the consistency of that rule, that the text is intended to prohibit the waste of the property by useless gifts &c. Otherwise if her right (to make gifts &c.) be not admitted, then there would be an irreconcileable conflict (of the text of Kátyáyana) with the texts enjoining gifts, namely,-" ... engaged in the control of passions and in making gifts ...,"—and—" ... with funeral repast and pious liberality let her honor &c." As for what is said, namely, that let the heirs, i. e., the daughters &c. who are declared in the text,—" The wife and the daughters also &c."—to be entitled to the estate in default of the wife, take, since the default of the wife who forms the obstacle (to the succession of the daughters &c.) is equal, as in the utter absence, so in the destruction, of her right:—that is only plausible. Again, as there would be tautology if the term "heirs" be interpreted to signify the beirs to stridhan by reason of their being mentioned in

another text, similarly there would be the same defect of tautology (in the interpretation put by you), for the heirs of the husband also are mentioned by Kátyáyana in a

separate text.

But in fact when a person in whom right vested dies, it is proper that his property should be inherited by his near relations; hence, as the words wife and the like are relative terms, what have the daughters and the like of the former proprietor to do, when right to the husband's estate had vested in the wife? Hence, although the absence of the preceding one, the previous absence (of something that subsequently comes into existence) the destruction (or the future absence of some thing previously existing), the utter absence (or the absence without relation to any particular time), the relative absence of the obstacle, and the reciprocal absence (or the negation of identity) are similar (all these being of the same category, namely, negation), still when the owner of any property is dead, then if he leave no male issue, his property is inherited by his relations, such as his wife &c.: this is what the text (of Yájnavalkya, § 1) means. Otherwise there would be great confusion, since if the daughters and the rest having succeeded to the property of their father &c. die, then in supercession of their children, the father &c. of the father who was the previous owner, would take the property. Hence when the wife after having succeeded to the property of her husband dies, the residue of the property after her enjoyment would have devolved on ther heirs such as) the daughters and the like, by reason of texts like the following,—" And the daughters, the residue of the mother's property after liquidating her debts &c.":—but it is prevented by the passage,—"After her let the heirs take:" And the construction of the text (of Kátyáyana) is arrived at thus: on perusing "let the heirs take," the question occurs, whose heirs? and the word "of the husband" connected with the word "bed" suggests itself and is construed with "heirs;" accordingly the signification of the text is as follows,—" After her let the husband's heirs or dáyádas", i. e., those that are entitled to take his undivided property, "take" also what remains of the estate of a separated brother after the enjoyment thereof by his wife; and not the heirs to

the estate of the wife, such as daughters and the like. Thus the last part (of Kátyáyana's text) expressing a meaning which is not expressed anywhere else, becomes significant: but according to the other view, this part would become useless, inasmuch as it would merely repeat what is declared in other texts.

Therefore, it is established that in making gifts for spiritual purpose as well as in making sale or mortgage for the purpose of performing what is necessary in a spiritual or temporal point of view, the widow's right does certainly extend to the entire estate of her husband; the restriction, however, is intended to prohibit gifts to players, dancers and the like, as well as sale or mortgage without necessity. Accordingly the term "being moderate" is inserted; the meaning is, that on obtaining the property she shall not uselessly spend the property. The passage in the Mahábhárata on the religious merit of gifts, however, strongly supports our view, for it begins thus: "It is ordained that the property of the husband when devolving on wives has enjoyment for its use." Here enjoyment Jupabhoga) signifies enjoyment allied to religious duty, not however vicious enjoyment; "ordained," i. e., declared by In the latter half (of the passage) the Manu and others. very same thing is expressed, namely, "women shall not waste", i. e., uselessly expend the property of their husband; by the phrase "on any account" it is intimated, that waste is under all circumstances reprehensible; apahára (waste) is theft,—making useless gifts to dancers, players, and the like, and the wearing of delicate apparel &c., the tasting of rich food &c. and the like, also being improper for a widow who is enjoined to restrain her passions, are equal to theft: thus the term apahára (waste) is used in a secondary sense. But gifts and the like for religious purposes are not so, and consequently cannot be included under the term apahára Therefore everything is consistent. or waste.

4. There are also many other passages of law, establishing the preferable right of the wife to succeed to the estate of her sonless husband who was separated but not re-united. Thus Vrihaspati says,—"In the Vedas and in the Smritis as well as in popular practice, a wife is de-

clared by the wise to be half the body of her husband equally sharing the fruit of pure as well as impure acts. Of him, whose wife is not deceased, half the body survives. Why then should another get his property, while half his person is alive? Let the wife of a sonless deceased man take his share notwithstanding kinsmen, the father, the mother, or the uterine brother be present."

Yogisvara also by declaring the right of every succeeding one to accrue in default of the preceding one, ordains

the wife's succession in preference to all others.

Also Vishnu says,—"The wealth of a sonless man goes to his wife; on failure of her it devolves on daughters; if there be none, it belongs to the father; if he be dead, it goes to the mother; on failure of her, it goes to the brothers; on their default, it goes to the brother's sons; if none exist, it passes to a kinsman /bandhu/; on their default, it devolves on a distant kinsman (sakulya); on failure of these, it comes to the fellow-student; and for want of all those heirs the property goes to the king, excepting the wealth of a Brahmana."—Here the term bandhu (kinsman) signifies a sapinda, and the term sakulya (distant kinsman) means a sagotra or one descended from a common ancestor in the male line (other than a sapinda): if by the term bandhu the cognates of the father and the like were comprised, then there would be a conflict with the order mentioned by Yogisvara.

Also Kátyáyana says,—" The wife is entitled to the estate of the husband, provided she is not unchaste; but on her default, a daughter, if she be then unmarried."

There is also another passage of law,—"Now of a sonless person, the wife born in a (good) family, or also the daughters, in their default the father, the mother, the brother and (his) sons are pronounced (to be heirs)."

In these texts it is established that the wife is first of

all entitled to the estate left by the husband.

5. There are texts again, which are in conflict with the above texts. Thus Narada declares the succession of the brothers in spite of the wife, and the maintenance of his wife, as in the text,—"Among brothers if any one die without issue or enter a religious order, let the rest (of the

brothers) divide his wealth, excepting the wife's separate property. Let them allow a maintenance to his wives (strinam) until the end of their lives, provided they preserve unsullied the bed of their husband; but if they behave otherwise, the brothers may resume her allowance."

Also Manu declares that the father or a brother is entitled to succeed to the property of a sonless person, not the wife, as in the text,—" Let the father or the brothers

take the estate of a sonless person."

The following passage of law asserts that the mother or the paternal grandmother is entitled to succeed to the estate of a sonless person,—"Let the mother take the estate of her childless son; and if the mother too be dead, let the father's mother take the property."

Also Sankha, Likhita, Paithínasi and Yama declare the succession of the wife in default of the brothers and the parents as in the text. "The weelth of a senless person

parents, as in the text,—"The wealth of a sonless person, who departs for heaven, goes to the brothers; if there benone, let the parents take, or let the senior wife take."

The wife who is, by Yogisvara, placed first to the exclusion of others, is declared also by Devala, to be entitled to succeed on failure of the brothers and the like, as in the text,—"Next let brothers of the whole blood divide the estate of a sonless person, or daughters also equal (in class); or let the father if he survive, or (half) brothers of the same class, or the mother, or the wife inherit in their order."—Here by the term "brothers", half brothers are meant, since whole brothers are separately enumerated.

Also in the following text, the wife is not even enumerated by Kátyáyana, though father and others are mentioned as heirs,—"When a man who is separated, dies, then in default of sons let the father, or the brother, or the mother, or the father's mother in their order take the

estate."

6. Of these texts, conflicting with each other, Dháresvara makes the following reconciliation:—If the wife of a sonless brother who was separated but not re-united, accepts the appointment to raise issue, then and then only she obtains the estate of the husband; but if she be not solicitous of the appointment, then she gets mere maintenance like the wife of one who was unseparated or re-uni-



ted: for it is through appointment alone, that the right of the wife of a sonless person accrues to the estate of her husband. Nor (can it be said) on what principle is this conclusion based? Because the wife's right of inheritance is shewn in many passages of law to arise through children Accordingly Gautama says,—"Let kinsmen allied by the pinda or funeral oblation, by gotra or family name, and by descent from the same patriarch share the heritage; or the wife of the childless person, or she (may) seek to raise up offspring."-Let kinsmen allied by funeral oblation, by family name, and by descent from the same patriarch, take the heritage of a childless man; or let his wife take the heritage, if she seek to raise up issue to him: the particle 'or' conveys the meaning of 'if'; otherwise, the sense of alternative would be unreasonable, since there is no similarity between taking of the heritage and seeking. to raise up issue. Likewise, also Manu declares that the wife's succession to the divided property is in right of the progeny, as in the text-"He who protects the estate and the wife of a deceased brother, shall after generating a son to the brother, make over his estate to him." So likewise, even if partition has not taken place, Manu intimates that the right of inheritance arises through the offspring, thus, -" If a younger brother begets a son on the wife of an elder brother, then the distribution in such a case shall be equal; this is the settled law." Therefore by the principle of co-existence and the absence of separate existence, it is established that the wife's right of inheritance is in right of progeny and not otherwise. Vasishtha also, in the text,—" An appointment shall not be accepted through covetousness for the heritage"-forbids an appointment to raise up issue to the husband if sought from covetousness, and thereby clearly intimates that the widow is entitled to the succession if she consents to the appointment and not otherwise. Accordingly it follows that the text of Nárada, namely,—"If any one of the brothers die &c.,"—and similar texts refer to a widow who is unwilling to be appointed. Likewise in the text, namely,—"Their childless wives, conducting themselves aright, must be supported; but such as are unchaste should be expelled, and so indeed should be those that are perverse"—Yogisvara also, by

ordaining maintenance for the wives of the blind and the like who are destitute of sons, and thus intimating the superiority of the son's right to the wealth, indicates, by the parity of reason, that the wife's right of succession is in right of the progeny alone. The following passage of law, namely,—"Property has come into existence for the purpose of sacrifices; therefore those, who are incompetent to perform these, are not entitled to inheritance, but are entitled to food and raiment"-by declaring the exclusion from inheritance, of sons &c. though males who are incapable of performing sacrifices, does a fortiori oppose the right of succession of widows who are incapable of performing sacrifices. So also another text of law, namely,—"Property is ordained for sacrifices; therefore it should be given to virtuous persons, and not to women, to the ignorant or to the vicious"-prohibiting even the gift of property to women and others, greatly depreciates the taking, directly by the widow, of the entire estate.

This view is not endorsed by Vijnánesvara and others; because in texts like—"The wife and the daughters also &c.,"—there is no express mention of appointment, nor is it suggested by the context. Moreover, what is the cause of the widow's right to the heritage? Is it the appointment or the progeny sprung therefrom? If it be the first, then the heritage would belong to the widow who accepts the appointment although no son be born, and (even if a son be born) it would not belong to the son begotten through the appointment, for (agreeably to this alternative) right to the husband's estate arises from the appointment alone. If it be the second, then the enumeration of the wife (as an heir in the texts) would be useless, since the children's right to the heritage is established by other texts. Again, if the argument be that women may have right to property through their husband alone, and not in any other way, therefore so long as the husband is alive, they have it through him; but in order to show that when the husband is dead they may have it through the progeny, 'the wife' is so enumerated, which refers to a wife willing to accept the appointment. Then it is not a sound one; because it is shown by texts which will be cited hereafter, such as,—"What was given before the nuptial fire, what was presented in the bridal procession &c."—that they may have right to property in other ways also. If it be said that it is only in the twofold way that her right to the husband's property arises. In that case, the text dealing with the estate of a sonless person ought not to commence with "the wife;" because while the husband is alive, her right to his property is established by the text of Gautama, namely,—"Union (of the husband and the wife) arises indeed from the joining of hands (i. e. marriage);" and because, to say that when he is dead the right to his property arises by reason of appointment, is to affirm it only of the wife's son, but that

also has previously been declared.

Again the text of Gautama, namely,—"Or she (may) seek to raise up offspring"—has been interpreted to mean, 'if she seek to raise up issue,' and has been set forth as an authority in support of the position that the wife of a sonless person may have the right of succession through appointment alone But that is not reasonable. cause the sense of 'if' is not conveyed by 'or' that marks an alternative. Nor can it be argued that, when it becomes unreasonable to say that 'or' marks an alternative by reason of the dissimilarity in meaning between the succession to the estate and the desire for appointment, then inasmuch as indeclinable words convey various meanings, the particle 'or' may certainly be taken to convey the meaning of 'if,' which renders the construction of the latter part with the first part (of the text of Gautama) reasonable. Because it is certainly reasonable to say that 'or' marks an alternative, since it may refer to another duty suggested by the context, thus—'or she may seek to raise issue or restrain her passions.' Accordingly the succession to the husband's estate, independently of the appointment, becomes affirmed by also the text of Gautama. Moreover, since the appointment of a widow is prohibited; and since by texts of Manu and others, such as—"The sonless wife preserving unsullied the bed of her husband &c."—it is established that a widow is entitled to the estate, provided she remain chaste; and since by the text,—"such as are unchaste should be expelled"—even maintenance itself is disallowed to those that fail to continue in the path of duty; therefore the right (of unchaste widows) to the entire estate of the hus-

band is certainly unreasonable.

As for the argument, namely, that from the texts of Manu and others, such as—"He who protects the estate and the wife &c."—"If a younger brother begets a son on the wife of an elder brother &c."-and-"An appointment shall not be accepted through covetousness"—it appears, by reason of co-existence and the absence of senarate existence, that the widow's right to the estate of her husband whether separated or unseparated arises through progeny alone;—that is only plausible, the language of the texts does not convey the meaning deduced: the intention of the texts being that when the husband who is unseparated or re-united dies, then her right to his estate arises through progeny alone, and that the appointment should not be accepted from covetousness. Accordingly, Nárada having declared,—" The sages hold that amongst the re-united brethren however, that share (which would go to the husband on partition) she is not entitled to" establishes mere maintenance of his childless wives. can it be argued that if the text of Nárada, namely,— "Among brothers if any one die without issue &c." (§ 5) —be thus taken to be relative to the estate of a person unseparated or re-united, then there would be tautology, for the same thing is expressed in the above text, viz. "The sages hold that among unseparated brethren &c." Because in the first text are laid down the impartibility of woman's separate property, and their maintenance which are not ordained in any other text, and the subject is introduced by that part of the text (which conveys the same meaning as the other text). As for the text of Yogisvara, namely,—"Their childless widows conducting themselves aright &c.;"—that, however, will be shewn in the chapter dealing with those that are excluded from inheritance, to refer to the wives of the impotent and the like, since the pronoun 'their' relates to those mentioned in the previous text.

As also for the argument that the property of a twiceborn has for its object the performance of sacrifices, and



that consequently it is improper that the property should be taken by a widow who is incompetent to perform sacrifices;—that too is unreasonable, because the term 'sacrifice' is illustrative, it includes gifts &c., and these the widow also is competent to make; for if the term were taken in its literal acceptance, then the property could not be used for gifts, burnt-offering and the like purposes other than sacrifices. But in reality the performance of religious rites is not the sole end of property; for in the text,-" Neglect not religious duty, wealth and pleasure according to ability,"—likewise in the text,—"Let not morning, noon or evening be fruitless as regards religion, wealth and pleasure,"—it is laid down that the pursuit of wealth and pleasure, that may be made by means of wealth, is necessary. Had wealth been designed solely for sacrificial purposes, then the wearing of gold (inculcated by the Vedas) would have had the sacrificial use for its object by reason of its intimate relation with sacrifices (as supposed); but this would be contrary to what is concluded (in the Mímánsá) viz., that it is intended for secular purposes. By reason of such texts as,—"A woman is not entitled to independence"—let there be only dependence of a woman, but there can be no objection whatever to her succession to the estate. And the text—" Property has come into existence for the purpose of sacrifices &c.,"-however, is laudatory of the application of property to the performance of sacrifices. Accordingly the latter part (of the other text) is-" to virtuous persons and not to women, to the ignorant or to the vicious." The author of the Mitákshará, however, says that these texts intend that the property which was acquired by the father for the purpose of performing a sacrifice, must, even by his sons or other heirs, be appropriated to that use alone and not to any other; for the following passage declaring it to be an offence (to act otherwise), is equally applicable to sons as well as to other heirs:-"He, who having received articles for sacrifice, disposes not of them for that purpose, shall become a kite or a crow."

8. Srikara and others, however, say that the conflicting texts relate to distinct cases: if the husband's



estate is only sufficient for the maintenance of the wife, she takes the whole of it; but if there be a surplus, the brothers and the like take: to the very same effect is the text,—"and take the entire share;" for maintenance must be allowed. And they assign the following reason for that conclusion, viz., that by this all the texts become reconciled.

This is not consistent with reason. Because the term 'estate' which is mentioned but once (in the texts) is to be interpreted, when construing it with 'the wife,' to mean so much property as is sufficient for maintenance; and when construing it with 'the brothers' or the like, to mean the unqualified estate: and this variableness in the meaning is not reasonable if uniformity is possible. And because the term 'entire' in Manu's text would be Besides it is very unreasonable to say meaningless. that, when there is no son, the wife gets no more than maintenance; for, on partition being made, whether during the lifetime of the husband or after his death, even when there are legitimate sons, the allotment to the wife of a share equal to theirs is ordained in the following texts. namely,—" If he makes the allotments equal, wives shall be made equal sharers,"—and—" The mother also, of those effecting partition after the demise of the father, shall get an equal share." Nor can it be argued that in these texts too, the term 'share' is intended to indicate no more than what is sufficient for maintenance. Because in that case the terms 'equal' and 'share' would become meaningless. And because, if it be held that what is sufficient for maintenance, is only intended, then in the latter part also (of the text), namely,—"If any have been assigned, let him allot the half,"—the meaning of the term 'half' would have to be altogether rejected. To say that what is intended is, that when the property is small a share equal to that of a son (should be given to her), and when the property is large, so much only as is sufficient for maintenance, is extremely unreasonable by reason of the variableness in the precept. Since the very same term 'equal share' would, having regard to some other text, signify, on one occasion when the estate is considerable, property sufficient for maintenance only; and on another occasion when the estate is small, its literal meaning: hence in the same precept the meaning of the sentence being different, there would be different sentences (couched in the same words):—and this is unreasonable. There would also be the error of admitting the simultaneous exercise of the twofold power of words, namely, that of

conveying a literal and a metaphorical meaning.

Just as in the topic (in the Mimánsa) of the Cháturmásya (i. e., a sacrifice which takes four months for its completion, and which consists of four distinct sacrifices called the Vaisvadeva, the Varunapraghása, the Sákamedha and the Sunásírya; with regard to which there is the following text of Sruti,—"Here they construct the holy fire-place, not in the Vaisvadeva nor in the Sunásírva: for the Varunapraghása and the Sákamedha are the principal ones of the sacrifice, as in these two they establish the sacred fire,") the adversary says that the injunction regarding the establishment of the holy fire (ordained for the sacrifice called Darsapaurnamásíya, whereof the Chaturmásya is a modification) is applicable also to the Cháturmásya, as indicated by the text,—"as in these two they establish the holy fire,"—and this, he assigns, to be the reason for the prohibition of the construction of the sacred fire-place, as contained in the text,—" not in the Vaisvadeva nor in the Sunásirya,"—for otherwise the prohibition of what cannot take place would be unreasonable: thereupon it is argued on the opposite side that this is not the prohibition of the construction of the holy fireplace which is rendered applicable to the Chaturmasya sacrifice by reason of the extension of the injunction to that effect, declared with regard to the Darsapaurnamásíva; bút this is the prohibition of the construction of the holy fire-place, as enjoined in the text in this topic, viz.,—"Here they construct the holy fire-place": whereupon the adversary finds fault with the above opinion on the ground of variableness in the precept, for the text in the topic, taken together with the prohibition (in that very text) renders the construction of the holy fire-place optional, in the first and the last sacrifices, but it does independently of any other precept, render the construction of the holy fire-place obligatory in the two intermediate sacrifices: for fear of this variableness in the precept it is established in the conclusion that the precept, —"not in the Vaisvadeva &c."—is absolutely a superfluous precept, for prohibition is unreasonable, of what cannot take place in the first and the last sacrifices; but the precept—"Here they construct the holy fire-place,"—together with the laudatory precept—"in these two they establish the holy fire"—enjoins the construction of the sacred fire-place in the two intermediate sacrifices, namely, Varunaspraghása and Sákamedha; but this is not in consequence of the extension to this sacrifice of an injunction declared with respect to the Darsapaurnamásíya sacrifice.

9. On this some one says:—It is declared that the brothers shall take the estate of a sonless person, and that they shall give to his wives property sufficent for their maintenance, as in the text,—"and shall allow maintenance to his wives till the end of their lives:" but when the estate is not more than what is sufficient for maintenance, or even less than that, then the question occurs whether in such a case the brothers shall take the estate or the wife? And the text,—"The wife and the daughters also &c."—by showing the priority of the wife's right, indicates that in such a case, the wife alone shall take the estate.

This too is wrong; since in this view too, there would be the very same variableness in the precept as has previously been mentioned; for the phrase "shall take the estate," taken together with other texts in case the estate is small, would signify when construed with "the wife," shall take so much property as is sufficient for maintenance; but when construed with "the parents &c.," shall take the entire estate.

10. If you ask, how then is the conflict to be reconciled? Listen:—Since there is no indication of order (of succession) in the texts such as,—"The father or the brothers shall take &c."—therefore these texts are intended only to enumerate the heirs to the estate of a sonless person: but the text of Yogísvara which lays down,—"In the absence of the preceding one, every succeeding one is heir to the estate"—is relative to the order of succession:

*therefore although in the other texts there is no mention of the wife and the rest in a settled order, still there being no conflict in meaning (between these two sets of texts), the father and the rest become heirs to the estate of a son-

less person in default of the wife and the like.

The succession, however, of a wife that is suspected of adultery, is forbidden by Harita,—" If a woman becoming widow in her youth be headstrong, a maintenance must in that case be allowed to her for the support of life." From this very text it appears that the widow who is not suspected of unchastity, is entitled to take the entire estate of the husband. Accordingly it is said in the text of Sankha,-" or the senior wife:" 'senior' means praiseworthy for good qualities, but not the eldest in age. also declares seniority in the order of the classes,—"When regenerate men espouse wives of the same class as well as of a different class, the seniority, honor and habitation of those wives must be settled according to the order of the classes." Hence a wife of the same class, although youngest in age and in respect of the date of marriage, is senior to one of a different class; also among those of the same class, the senior is one possessed of good qualities. cordingly Manu says,—"To all such married men, the wives of the same class, and not the wives of a different class on any account, shall perform the duty of personal attendance, and the daily business relating to acts of religion: for he who foolishly causes those duties to be performed by any other than his wife of the same class when she is near at hand, has been immemorially considered as a Chandálá though by birth a Bráhmana." Also Yogísvara says,—"Among wives of the same class, one other than the eldest should not be employed in the performance of religious duties." Also, a wife of the same class is indicated by the term patni itself, which signifies union through a sacrifice. But in the absence of a wife of the same class, a wife belonging to the class next in order, (may be employed in the performance of such duties): accordingly Vishnu says,—"If there be no wife belonging to the same class, then under the exceptional circumstance, a wife belonging to the class next in order (may be employed); but never (should) a regenerate man (perform)

religious duties, with a wife of the Súdra class:"—the term "should perform" occurring in the previous text is to be construed with this text. Hence in default of a Bráhmani wife, a Kshatriya wife may be the companion of a Bráhmana under that unavoidable circumstance; but neither a Vaisya nor a Súdra woman though espoused: a Vaisya wife alone may become the associate of the Kshatriya husband in default of a Kshatriya wife: a Vaisya may not have a Súdra wife (for his companion in the performance of religious duties) but must have one of the same class; for a Súdra wife is altogether excluded.

Accordingly a wife who is not suspected of unchastity, and who is of the superior class, shall take the husband's estate, and maintain her co-wives of the inferior classes. But the wives of the same class with the husband shall take the estate dividing it amongst themselves. Hence the singular number in the term 'wife' is to be taken to be

used with the intention of designating the class.

Hence the chaste wife of a sonless deceased person who was separated and not re-united, is entitled to take the entire estate: but of a sonless person who was unseparated or re-united, even the chaste wife is entitled to mere subsistence, by reason of the texts of Nárada and others, such as,—"If any one among brothers die without issue &c." An unchaste widow, however, is not entitled even to maintenance, for it is declared,—"But if she behave otherwise, they may resume the allowance."

As for the allowance of food and raiment even to the unchaste wives, as is declared in the following text, namely,—"Also let one act in the same manner towards even the fallen wives; food and raiment, however, should be allowed to them, if they reside in the vicinity of the dwelling house:"—that however is to be explained as referring to the husband, consistently with what is ordained by Yogisvara after having premised the husband, as in the text,—"Deprived of her position in the family, clad in dirty clothes, living upon morsels barely sufficient for life, and humiliated, an unchaste wife shall be made to lie down upon the bare earth." This too is to continue till the penance be performed. The banishment by also the husband, and the like mode of expiation for those women

Digitized by Google

that do not out of perverseness perform the penance, will

subsequently be considered by us.

The text, namely,—"The wife and the daughters also &c."—is relative to the estate of one who was separated and not re-united; for partition (of a joint family) has previously been treated, and partition after re-union, has by way of an exception to all other cases, been subsequently dealt with, (by Yájnavalkya), consequently this is the only case which remains to be discussed. This is the opinion of most commentators, namely, Vijnánesvara, Lakshmídhara, the author of the Smritichandriká, Visvarúpa, Medhátithi, the author of the Madanaratna, &c.

The term 'sonless' used in the texts (on succession) such as,—"The wife and the daughters also &c." indicates the default of the grandson and the great-grandson also. The succession of the wife is proper only in default of male issue down to the great-grandson. For the duty of the grandsons too, to pay off the debts is declared in the text,—"The debts ought to be liquidated by the sons and grandsons (puttra-pauttrais);" but if any one else were to take the estate in spite of the grandson, then the declaration of the grandson's liability to discharge the debts would be unreasonable; since by reason of the text, -"The heir to the estate of a person shall be compelled to liquidate his debts,"—he alone who takes the estate is declared liable to discharge the debts. If it be argued that the grandson is included under the term 'gentiles,' and as such may take the estate: then, in that case, there would be no use for the special provision regarding the grandson's liability to discharge the debts; since it would follow from the text alone, viz.—"The heir to the estate of a person shall be compelled to liquidate his debts." it be said that the grandsons are liable, in the same way as sons, to liquidate the debts, although they do not get the grandfather's estate. Then a fortiori it follows that when property is left by the grandfather, the right of any other than the grandson ought not to take place. The very same reason applies to the great-grandson also. Hence it is that the compound term puttra-pauttrais (rendered above into, by the sons and grandsons) bears the

plural number: otherwise the dual number would have been used, or it would have to be assumed that the plural number is used in order to denote individuals. the meaning is this:—the term puttra-pauttra may be taken to be a compound of puttra and pauttra and puttra's pauttra; and the plural number is accounted for by taking the term puttra-pauttrais to be the result of the uni-residual conjunctive compound of two similar terms, namely, puttra-pauttrau (bearing a dual number and signifying the sons and the grandsons) and puttra-pauttra (bearing a singular number and signifying the great-grandson); that is to say, by the sons, grandsons and great-grandsons: or the term grandson may include the great-grandson. Accordingly the different sorts of provisions for the liquidation of the debts by the great-grandsons as distinguished from the same by the grandsons, and by the grandsons as distinguished from the same by the sons,—become consistent with reason. Otherwise there would arise the objection of assuming a peculiar provision so far as regards the greatgrandsons.

Again, it is clear that the three descendants equally confer spiritual benefit by offering oblations in the parva occasions. Accordingly Manu says,-"To three (ancestors) must libations of water be given; for three, is the funeral oblation of food ordained: the fourth is the giver of these; the fifth has no concern in them." Also Baudhayana having premised son, grandson and great-grandson, says,—"The great-grandfather, the grandfather, the father, the man himself, the uterine brothers, the son begotten by a wife of the same class, the grandson and the great-grandson: these, partaking of undivided oblations, are called sapindas. Those who partake of divided oblations are called sakulyas. When there is male issue of the body, the estate must go to him."—The meaning of this text is as follows:—Since a person (when deceased) partakes of the oblations presented to the three paternal ancestors beginning with the father, by reason of the union of oblations (effected through the ceremony called sapindikarana); and since the three descendants in the male line beginning with the son present oblations to that person himself; and since he, who while living offered oblations to an ancestor in the male line, partakes when dead, of the oblations presented to that ancestor, by reason of the union of oblations: thus the middlemost person who while living offered oblations to his ancestors, and when dead partakes of the oblations presented to them, becomes the object to whom oblations are presented by others that are living, and partakes with these latter while they are dead, of oblations presented (to him) by the daughter's son and the like. Therefore those to whom that person offers oblations, as well as those who partake of the oblations presented by him, as also those who present oblations to him, are, as partaking of undivided oblations consisting of the pinda, the sapindas of that person by reason of connection through the same pinda. To an ancestor who is fifth in ascent, the middlemost person who is fifth in descent, does not present oblations, nor does he partake of oblations presented to that ancestor; similarly the fifth descendant does not confer oblations on the middlemost person, nor partakes of oblations presented to him. Consequently the three ancestors beginning with the great-great-grandfather and the three descendants beginning with the great-great-grandson, that is, the three beginning with the fifth on both sides, who partake of divided oblations, and are not connected through the same pinda, are by the sage called sakulyas, inasmuch as they are only connected through the *kula* or family.

This sapinda and sakulya relationship is declared with reference to succession, as it is mentioned in the chapter relating to that subject. But with reference to impurity, marriage &c., those also that partake of the divided oblations (i. e. the sakulyas) are considered as sapindas, by reason of the text,—"The fourth and the other ancestors who partake of the lepa or divided oblations, and the father and the like to whom the pinda or oblation is offered (are sapindas); to these the seventh offers oblations, hence sapinda relationship extends to seven generations." And the text,—"The sapinda relationship, however, ceases in the seventh generation"—is to be explained consistently with the text of Yájnavalkya, namely,—"After the fifth and the seventh from the mother and the father (respectively)"—to mean that it remains in the seventh but ceases

in the eighth generation. Hence as in the case of the unmarried females, the *sapinda* relationship extending over three generations, as is declared in the chapter on impurity (occasioned by death &c),—is considered to be with reference to that alone; so it is to be deemed that this *sapinda* relationship (extending to the fourth degree) is relative to succession alone.

Kátyáyana, however, distinctly declares the succession of the son, grandson and great-grandson, as in the text,—"When a son dies unseparated, his son who has not received maintenance from the grandfather, shall be made participator of the heritage; he is to get, however, the paternal share from the uncle or uncle's son: the very same share shall equitably belong to all the brothers: or his son also shall get: afterwards cessation (of succession) takes place." But it is to be borne in mind that the cessation of the right of the great-grandson and the like who are further removed than the great-grandson,—as mentioned in this text, refers to them as sapindas; for as sakulyas they are certainly entitled to succeed according to proximity.

As for the text, namely,—"If among uterine brothers, one becomes father of a son &c."—that, however, refers to the performance of a son's duties such as the sráddha but not to the taking of heritage, and that lays down the restriction, namely, that when a brother's son is available for taking in adoption none else should be made a subsidiary son: otherwise the mention of the brother's son after the brother, in the text enumerating the heirs to the estate of a sonless person and laying down the order of succession, would become inconsistent.

The three descendants beginning with the son confer the greatest amount of spiritual benefit on the three ancestors beginning with the father, consequently the estate conducing as it does to the benefit of the owner himself when taken by the sons &c. continues, as it were, the owner's own by reason of the proximity of benefit. And the nearness on account of the spiritual benefit is consistent with reason: thus it is ordained,—"As soon as the eldest son is born, a man becomes father of male issue and is liberated from the debt he owes to his ancestors; therefore

he (the eldest son) is entitled to get."—Since, in the chapter on Partition of Heritage, the conferring of spiritual benefit is by the term 'therefore' set out as the reason; hence it is indicated that he alone is entitled to get the estate, on whom the estate being devolved conduces to the greatest amount of spiritual benefit of the deceased owner, and that proximity in this way is to be accepted as a general rule and reasonable.

That the son and other descendants confer the greatest amount of spiritual benefit is set forth in many passages of the Sruti, the Smriti, and the Puránas. On this subject there is the following Sruti:—In the anecdote of Harischandra in the Bahvrichabráhmana it is said that Nárada being asked by Harischandra thus,—" Explain to me, O Nárada! what is attained by a son, for those that are learned as well as those that are not, are solicitous for sons,"-enlightened him by ten verses delineating the importance of a son: he being asked in one verse answered in ten, thus,—"If the father sees the face of his living son after it is born, he transfers his debts to it and attains immortality &c." The following passages of the Smriti are to the same effect. Manu and Vishnu say,-" Since a son delivers the father from the infernal region called put, therefore he is named the put-tra (the deliverer from the put) by the self-existing himself." Sankha and Likhita say,—"Seeing the face of a son in his lifetime, the father becomes liberated from his debt to the ancestors, and becomes entitled to go to heaven by means of the son born, after transferring that debt to him. The sacred fire, the three Vedas, and all the sacrifices with fees to the priests, are not equivalent even to a sixteenth part of the eldest son born." Manu, Likhita, Vasishtha and Háríta say,—"By means of a son one attains the heavenly regions, by a grandson acquires immortality, and by a son's grandson attains the solar region." Yajnavalkya declares, -"As the blissful regions and the heaven are attained by means of sons, grandsons and great-grandsons, therefore wives should be taken and guarded well." In the Puranas, again, there are many anecdotes laudatory of the son &c.

Hence it is established that it is only in default of male issue down to the great-grandson that the wife takes the estate of the husband who was separated and not reunited.

Jímútaváhana maintains that the above recon-. ciliation is not tenable by reason of conflict with the text of Vrihaspati. Thus he says:—"In the text,—'When brothers who have been separated dwell together through affection, then in the re-distribution among these there is no specific deduction for seniority: if any one of them dies or anyhow retires, his share is not extinguished but belongs to his brother; if there be any sister, she is entitled to obtain a share of it: this is the law regarding the estate of a childless person who is destitute of the wife and the father: of the re-united, however, if any one acquires wealth by science, valour and the like; two shares are to be allotted to him, and the rest are equal sharers'—re-union is mentioned in the commencement as well as in the concluding portion; therefore it must be admitted that the intermediate portion, namely,—' his share is not extinguished but belongs to his brother'-refers to the case of re-union: also it is declared that, 'this is the law, regarding the estate of a childless person who is destitute of the wife and the father; hence it appears that the right of the reunited uterine brother takes effect in default of son, daughter, wife and father; how then can a brother debar the wife? Moreover the portion, namely, 'his share is not extinguished,' becomes reasonable, if the brother was unseparated or re-united, as there might be an apprehension of the extinction of his share by reason of the mixture; but if the brother was separated and not re-united then his estate being separate, there cannot be any apprehension of extinction: from this reason as also from indication it appears that the above text refers to a case of re-union.

"Moreover, is it by reason of any other clear text or by reason of any strong argument that the texts of Sankha and other sages, which indicate the right of the brothers to be preferable to that of the wife, are maintained to refer to the estate of one who was unseparated or re-united? The first is not tenable, by reason of the absence of any clear special text. The text, however, which will be cited hereafter, namely—'Of a re-united (co-heir), however, a reunited (co-heir)'—lays down a special rule when the succession opens to brothers; it does not convey the contended The text of Vrihaspati, however, indicating as it does the succession of a re-united uterine brother in default of those beginning with the son and ending in the father, rather shows that the texts in question are relative to the estate of one who was not re-united. Neither is the For argument (if any) must be said to second tenable. to be this: in a family joint or re-united, whatever property belongs to one member belongs also to others; therefore although the right therein of a deceased member is extinguished, the right of the survivors subsists therein; hence the devolution on them is reasonable, but not the supposition of any other heir. But this is not consistent with reason. For even when the family is joint or reunited, the right of each member extends to a fractional portion though unascertained; but neither an exclusive right of each nor a joint right of all the members together extends to the entire property, as in that case there would be multiplicity in assuming many times the accrual and extinction of right.

Moreover, from the previously cited texts of Gautama and others, such as,—"Union (of husband and wife) arises indeed from marriage,"—it appears that the wife's right to the property of the husband arises from marriage: but there is no authority for assuming that that right ceases on the death of the husband if he was unseparated or reunited, and that it does not cease in other cases. there are sons &c, then it is only on the authority of the texts propounding their right that the extinction of the wife's right is assumed. It cannot, however, be contended, that in this case too, the extinction of the wife's right is to be assumed by reason of the texts laying down the right of a re-united or unseparated brother. Because any text to that effect is not met with; and because it cannot be ascertained by reason of the fallacy of mutual dependence; for if it be established that the wife's right is extinguished on the death of the husband who was reunited or unseparated, then the texts laying down the right of the brother may be held to be relative to that case; again if it be established that the texts laying down the

right of the brother is relative to that case, then the extinction of the wife's right may be assumed. Hence it is that in the texts of Yogisvara, Vishnu and others, only the default of sons is mentioned, but not separation nor the absence of re-union. It cannot be argued that these are, by implication, enumerated, inasmuch as partition has previously been mentioned and re-union has subsequently been treated of; for if that were so, then the term 'sonless' also need not be set out, since when the primary and the secondary sons have been separately mentioned to be heirs, then also it may appear by implication that the text is relative to a different state of things. The term 'sonless' may become significant by interpreting it to indicate the following restriction, namely, that these alone are, in this very order, heirs to a sonless person: and this interpretation is equally applicable to the other two cases (namely, jointness, or re-union). But it does by no means follow that the text is relative to the case of separation. It has already been said that the text regarding re-union is intended for laying down a special rule when the right of the brother takes effect, and not for excluding the wife and the like.

"Besides, if the texts of Sankha, Likhita, and others related to a brother who was joint or re-united, then what is the meaning of this, viz., that the estate of such a sonless person devolves on a brother of that description, and in his default the parents shall take? Then again the question arises, whether the parents who have been separated and not re-united, or who are joint or re-united shall take? The first alternative is not tenable; for such parents are debarred by the wife, how then in default of brothers, can their right be signified in preference to the wife? is the second alternative tenable; for the text would be useless, since no one disputes that the parents who are joint or re-united are entitled to take. Moreover, as in the case of the estate of one who was separated and not re-united with the father or the brothers, the father succeeds in preference to the brothers,—by reason of his being the author of (the deceased son's) existence, by reason of the declaration of identity (of father and son) as in the text,—'A man himself indeed is born as the son, the son is the same as the father himself,' by reason of the authority of the father over the person and property of the son, by reason of the deceased son's participation, through the union of oblations effected by the ceremony of sapin-dikarana, in the two oblations presented by the father to the grandfather and the great-grandfather, and by reason of the incompetency of the sons to present oblations in the parva occasions while the father is alive;—so it is reasonable that he should succeed in other cases. Or there being no distinction between jointness and re-union, the co-equal right (of the father and the brothers) is reasonable, but it is not reasonable to say that the father's right takes effect on failure of the brothers.

"Moreover, the adjectives 'unseparated' and 'reunited' cannot properly be applied to (both) the parents, for there cannot be partition with the mother, and so the adjective 'unseparated' (as applied to the mother) would be meaningless. Hence it follows that there can neither be re-union (with the mother), for it must be preceded by partition. Accordingly Vrihaspati says,—'He who having been separated dwell together again through affection with the father, brother or the paternal uncle is called re-united with him.' From this text it appears that the father, brother and the paternal uncle who are from their birth likely to be united as regards the property acquired by the father and the grandfather, they alone may become re-united when having been once separated they annul through mutual affection the previous partition with an agreement to the effect that the wealth which is mine is thine and what is thine is mine, and remain as one householder as before in commensality and undivided (in any transaction). Those, however, who are unlike these are not to be considered re-united by reason of the mere union of property; for if that were so, then the term re-union would be applicable to a joint stock company of traders. cordingly the term re-union is not applied to brethren who manage their estates holding them joint for the sake of convenience, but are without the stipulation based upon Hence it becomes difficult (for the adversary) to maintain the mother's right of succession in spite of the brother.

"Hence it is perfectly consistent to hold that in de-

fault of descendants down to the great-grandson, the widow alone does without distinction succeed to the entire estate of her deceased sonless husband. But it is not reasonable to assume what is not specified in any text, namely, that the wife succeeds if the husband was separated and not re-united. Jitendriya and others also support the same view. In default of descendants down to the great grandson, she too confers a great amount of spiritual benefit upon the husband by performing the sráddha and the like. This appears from the following text of Manu, viz.,—'The wife alone shall offer oblations to him and take his entire estate.' Vyása also declares,— 'When the husband is dead, a chaste wife leading a life of austerities and performing daily oblations shall respectfully offer handfuls of water to her husband and shall day by day worship the gods and entertain the guests; also being devoted shall daily worship Vishnu, shall present gifts to worthiest Brahmanas for the purpose of augmenting religious merit; and shall, oh auspicious! observe the various kinds of fasting enjoined by the Sastras: oh sweetfaced! the wife who is constantly devoted to a religious life saves both herself and her husband abiding in the other world.'—Hence, because the wife also saves the husband from the infernal regions, and because by leading a vicious life through indigence (the wife who is) half the body of the husband by reason of the declaration to that effect, causes the husband also to fall, for the same is indicated in texts like the following,—'whose wife drinks wine &c.'—therefore the estate being taken by her becomes beneficial to the husband; consequently the wife's succession to the husband's estate in preference to all others is consistent with reason.

"The construction to be put upon the texts of Sankha and other sages is, however, far-fetched:—The estate of a person who is deceased and sonless, i. e., destitute of male issue down to the great-grandson, let the eldest wife, i. e., the wife that is preferable, take; in her default and in default of the daughter and the daughter's son, let the parents take; in their default it goes to the brothers: the term tadabháve (in his, her or their default) occurring in the middle (of the text of Sankha and others) may be con-

strued with what precedes or with what follows, for such a construction is not incorrect, and the reason for it has previously been mentioned. The text of Nárada, namely,—'If any one of the brothers die without issue &c.'—and other texts to the same effect are relative to a wedded wife other than a patni; since in these texts the term stri is used, whereas in the text of Sankha and others, the term patni is used And it has been previously shewn that all married women do not acquire the status of the patni. Accordingly in another text of Nárada himself, namely,—'But the king adhering to his duties shall (take the estate and) allow maintenance to his stris; this is pronounced the law of inheritance excepting in the case of Brahmanas,'—it appears from the use of the term stri that maintenance only is to be allowed to the wives of a person other than a Bráhmana, who do not hold the rank of the patni. But the wives of a person other than a Brahmana, who hold the rank of the patni are entitled to take the entire estate of the husband. Thus Vrihaspati says, - 'The estate of the Kshatriyas, Vaisyas and Súdras who are sonless and destitute of the patni and brothers, the king shall take, for he is the lord of all.'—The term 'destitute of the patni and brothers' indicates the failure of all the heirs down to the fellow-student; because the order of their succession being settled, the king cannot intervene between them, and because in the previously cited text, Vishnu having mentioned the heirs down to the fellowstudent, says,—' in their default it goes to the king excepting the property of a Bráhmana.'"

13. As to the above view (of Jímútaváhana) what is to be remarked is this. What is the objection to the reconciliation, namely, that the texts of Nárada Sankha and others are relative to jointness or re-union? Is it in conflict with any reason, or is it in conflict with any text? There is not, however, conflict with any reason, for there is not any reason against it. But rather there is a reason in support of it. Since when the husband dies unseparated, he had no (specific) share at all, then what will the wife take? And if re-united, then although his share had been specified, it was lost by reason of the accrual of a com-

mon right over again. Nor can it be argued that there is certainly his undefined share although it is the subject of a common right. For although this be admitted, still on the demise of one by whose relation the right became common, the succession of him alone whose right subsists is proper, but not the supposition of the accrual of another's right. If it be said that, by reason of the text of Gautama, viz.,—" From marriage indeed arises union as regards religious acts, their fruit and the acceptance of chattels"—the wife's right accrues to the husband's share though undefined, wherefore then is the extinction of that right assumed while she is alive? The answer is:—Her right is only fictional but not a real one: the wife's right to the husband's property, which to all appearance seems to be the same (as the husband's right) like a mixture of milk and water, is suitable to the performance of acts which are to be jointly performed, but it is not mutual like that of the brothers; hence it is that there may be separation of brothers, but not of the husband and wife; on this reason is founded the text, namely,—" Partition cannot take place between the husband and wife; therefore it cannot but be admitted that on the extinction of the husband's right the extinction of the wife's right is necessary: hence it is to be assumed (by you) either that the wife's right accrues to the property of the husband who was joint or re-united (on his demise), or that the existing right of a co-sharer who is joint or re-united is not common; the latter alternative alone cannot but be admitted (by you) by reason of simplicity. Nor can the wife herself be a party to partition, as there is no authority establishing the same. Nor can it be said that these very texts (which lay down the wife's succession) establish it. Because it is not settled as to what case these texts are applicable, and because these may as well be taken to refer to the estate of one who was separated and not re-united. Accordingly the fallacy of mutual dependence (mentioned by Jímútavahana, p. 160) is out of the question. Since the fallacy cannot interrupt the enquiry (into the subject to which the texts are applicable); and since when the enquiry is over, the subject to which the texts are applicable has already been determined.

As for what has been said in the passage, namely,— "For even when the family is joint or re-united &c." (p. 160); that is not capable of weakening our contention. For even if the right of each member be admitted to extend to a fractional portion though unascertained, still it is established by a different reason, that the texts (laying down the wife's succession) cannot refer to a case of re-union. Nor can it be argued that there is no authority for holding that the texts, such as,—"The wife and the daughters &c."-refer to the estate of one who was separated and not re-united, while there is nothing to that effect in the texts themselves. Because there being no other reasonable reconciliation of the conflicting texts of Nárada and others, the inference of a meaning, which is based upon the reason which has previously been set forth is itself the authority. And it will subsequently be stated that no other reconciliation is reasonable.

Nor can it be argued that just as (you say that) there are no terms used in the text itself to show that it is relative to the estate of a person separated and not re united, because it appears by implication that the text,—"The wife and the daughters &c."—refers to that case by reason of partition having previously been dealt with, and by reason of re-union having been subsequently treated of: that therefore for the same reason the term 'sonless' also ought not to have been mentioned (in the text), because the text,-"The wife and the daughters &c."—being set about after having discussed the subject of partition between the primary and subsidiary sons, it would have appeared. (by implication) that the text refers to the estate of a sonless person. Because the term ('sonless') is used for the purpose of indicating a meaning which has not been expressed by Yogisvara in any other text, but which meaning is mentioned in other Institutes by texts like-"The aurasa or legitimate son alone is the master of the paternal wealth,"-and-" Not brothers nor parents but the sons are entitled to the property of the father." Otherwise there might be a doubt that as on partition during the father's lifetime or after his demise, his wives are entitled to shares even when there are sons, so the same would be the case in this instance too. If it be said

that there is no occasion for such a doubt, the text being declared after the subject of partition amongst sons has been finished; then in other Institutes the declaration of separate texts, such as,—"The aurasa or legitimate son alone is the master of the paternal wealth,"—and—"Not brothers nor parents but sons are entitled to the paternal wealth,"—for establishing the absence of the right of the wife and the rest when there are the legitimate and subsidiary sons,—would be altogether useless. And the ground on which this objection may be removed (by you), namely,—that in the Institutes of law, a proposition though it may be deduced by means of the rules of interpretation is still for the purpose of clearness separately enunciated, -may with greater reason be applicable to a single term (viz. 'sonless'). If it be said that wherefore have not the terms 'separated' and 'not re-united' also been for the sake of clearness inserted (in the text of Yájnavalkya to qualify the 'sonless person')? The answer is, because the sages had their own independent will. Besides, agreeably to the maxim that when there is an effect (in the shape of erroneous knowledge) its reason is investigated,—where there is a separate text of law embodying a meaning which is deducible by the rules of interpretation (from other texts) then, because what is so deducible ought to be maintained, therefore it is said that the separate text is intended to elucidate the same so that the text may not be considered useless.

As for what has been said, namely, that the text,—
"Of a re-united (co-heir), however, a re-united (co-heir)"
—is intended to lay down a special rule when the succession opens to brothers, and not to exclude the wife &c.;—
that too is erroneous; for it is opposed to the term 'however;' and because in that part of the Institutes (of Yájnavalkya) each succeeding text is put by way of exception to what has previously been laid down; hence the term 'however' has been inserted in every text, and the text—"An impotent &c."—(which succeeds the above text) is declared embodying an exceptional rule for excluding, by reason of impotence and the like, from inheritance all the sons and the rest who have previously been declared to be heirs. Accordingly, in the Mitákshará these texts have been introduced and explained in this way by Vijnánesvara.

In the passage "Besides &c." (p. 161)—the right of the parents in default of brothers, as laid down in the text of Sankha and Likhita has been refuted (by Jímútavahana) having put his argument in an alternative form. That too is very weak; for our view cannot be questioned in that way, inasmuch as, like you, we can as well by reversing the order explain that text to be relative to parents who are separated and not re-united.

As for what has been said (p. 161) in the passage "Moreover &c."; that is to be passed by, as being of the

same kind with the preceding.

As also for what has been said (p. 162) in the passage "moreover &c.";—that too is not a valid objection, because although the adjectives (unseparated and re-united) be not applicable to the mother (included under the term 'parents') still they may properly be construed with the father (comprised by the same term). But in reality, though directly there can be no partition with the mother, still re-union (of the mother), preceded by the particular stipulation based upon affection, may take place with sons, since she too may get a share by the choice of the father at a partition during his lifetime, and since participation (of a share) by her at a partition after the demise of the father is distinctly declared. Nor can it be argued that this is contrary to the text of Vrihaspati, namely,— "He who having been separated &c."; that hence it is said by the author of the Mitákshará that re-union does not take place with any person indifferently, but with the father, brother or uncle, and the above text is cited by him in support of this view. Because, if that were so, then reunion with the daughter's son and the like, which is recognised by the practice of all people, would become improper. Therefore of those only amongst whom there may be mutual partition, the mutual union preceded by it (partition), and based upon the particular stipulation, is re-union, and not by the mere mixture of each other's property as in the case of traders. This is what is intended by the text of Vrihaspati, but not the exclusion of the mother and the like. For if the exclusion of the mother &c. were the purport of the text of Vrihaspati, then the objection would arise that the text embodies a prohibition

in the shape of an injunction, which is liable to three exceptions. It is for this reason that the particle 'or' is repeated in the text of Vrihaspati to show that no value is to be attached to the enumeration. So in the Ratnákara. Chandesvara says,—The particle 'or' shows that no importance is to be attached to the enumeration; hence we get what is recognised by all people, namely, the re-union of one dwelling together after partition with the paternal uncle's son who was a co-sharer (before partition). Also Váchaspati says to the same effect. As for what he (Váchaspati) says, namely, that re-union is, by reason of simplicity, defined to be only the union together of those who had separate properties; the fact of there having been previous partition is not the condition of it nor is mutual assent its foundation:—that is not tenable; because it is opposed to the term 'again'; and because the term reunion would be applicable even to partition, for if right by birth be not admitted, then on (the occasion of) partition there is union of those having distinct properties: otherwise, if it be said that both (the definitions) being deducible from the text, the one maintained by the other side is equally valid, then it would exclude the re-union with an ascendant such as the father, although such re-union is recognised by all people. Also the author of the Mitakshará by saying "not with any person indifferently," intends not to exclude the mother and the like, but only to lay down the restriction, that re-union must be preceded by partition and based upon the particular stipulation, and so to exclude the union consisting in the mixture of chattels in any way.

As for what you have said, namely, that the object of the text, viz.,—"Of the re-united (co-heir), however, a re-united (co-heir) &c."—is to provide for special rules governed by the circumstance of re-union, the fact of being uterine, and so forth,—(rules) which are to apply when the succession opens to the brothers:—that, however, is very unreasonable; since there is no reason why that text should not be applicable to other gentiles such as the father. And this will be discussed at length where that subject (re-union) itself is dealt with.

99

Hence there is no defect (attributable to the reconciliation made by us) in the shape of a conflict with any reason.

Nor can it be argued that there is a conflict with the text. on the ground that when he (Vrihaspati) has (in his text p. 159) qualified the re-united person also by the adjective "devoid of the wife and the father," then it follows that the right (of a brother) to the estate of re-united brothers takes effect only in default of the wife and the father, in the same way as in default of male issue. Because the succession of the wife to the estate of her re-united husband is expressly forbidden by Nárada in the text,—"The sages hold that amongst the re-united brethren, however, that share (which would go to the husband on partition) she is not entitled to." Also in the reading of this text, as adopted in the Kalpataru, namely,—" The share of one of the re-united brethren, however, is ordained to be theirs alone"—the exclusion of the wife and the like certainly follows from the term 'alone.' Nor can it be argued that if the text of Nárada, namely,—" Among brothers if any one die &c." (p. 142)—be, by virtue of the context, interpreted to refer to a case of re-union, then there would be tautology, since the same thing is expressed in the text,— "The sages hold &c."; hence, because the term 'stri' is used in this text (of Nárada) and the term 'patni' is used in other texts (which lay down the succession of the wife in preference to the brothers &c.), therefore the reconciliation which alone is preferable is that the latter texts refer to the paini or the lawfully wedded wife, (and the previous text of Nárada, to other wives). Because the objection of tautology is of no effect, for what are intended to be laid down (in the first text of Nárada) are only the impartibility of the wives' peculiar property and their maintenance, and this subject is introduced by repeating what has been previously ordained (in the second text); and because it would be unreasonable to prohibit the succession of the other wives to the estate of their husband, as their succession cannot follow from texts like,—"The wife and the daughters &c."—in which the term paini is used. agreeably to your opinion, the term 'through covetousness for the heritage' in Vasishtha's text, which qualifies

the term 'appointment' would become unaccountable: for if the wife be first of all entitled to take the estate of the husband, who is destitute of male issue, without distinction arising from jointness separation or re-union, then how can there be the acceptance by the wife of appointment through covetousness for heritage, that it is prohibited? Agreeably to our opinion, however, by virtue of the texts of Nárada and others, the wife has no concern with the estate of the sonless husband while there is a brother joint or re-united, but her right may arise through a son alone. hence the acceptance of appointment through covetousness of inheritance may take place, and so it is prohibited. Nor can it be argued that inasmuch as in your opinion a wife other than a patni is not entitled to the inheritance. her acceptance of the appointment, proceeding from covetousness of wealth is prohibited, and not what we say might have happened (but for the prohibition). Because the patni alone being premised there, it would be unreasonable to say that it refers to a wife other than the patni. Accordingly Dharesvara and others have set forth this very text of Vasishtha as an authority for holding that the text, -"The wife and the daughters &c."-refers to a patni willing to accept the appointment. Hence, there is the prohibition of the wife's succession to the estate of the re-united husband, by virtue of the texts of Nárada and Vasishtha; there is, again, the prohibition of even the uterine brother's succession to the estate of a re-united brother, when there is the wife, by reason of the declaration in the text of Vrihaspati namely,—"This is the law regarding the estate of a person who is childless and destitute of the wife and the father:" this conflict which necessarily arises, and ought to be any how got rid of by referring the texts to distinct cases, but which has not been got rid of by others, is thus reconciled, -Although it would follow, regard being had to the subject treated in the context, that the term 're-united person' is to be supplied as the substantive to which the adjective 'destitute of the wife and the father' relates, still it is opposed by the necessity of the adjective referring to one not re-united, by reason of the contradictory texts of Nárada and others; because the • context cannot lead to a conflict of precepts.

Nor can it be said that since the pronoun 'this' relates to the law of succession to the property of a reunited person, with regard to which a particular rule is laid down in this part of the text, (viz. "This is the law &c."), therefore the adjective 'destitute of the wife and the father,' like the adjective 'childless' qualifies the re-united deceased (co-sharer); that hence the conflict is not between the precept and the context, but between the two precepts. Because, though the pronoun relates to the succession to the estate of a re-united (co-sharer,) still (the meaning may be taken to be) 'this' same law of succession, which obtains with regard to the estate of a re-united co-sharer, is applicable even to the estate of one not reunited who is destitute of issue, and has not the wife or the father surviving him, (that is to say) let not a uterine brother, however, take the estate of a deceased childless brother, who was separated and not re-united, when there is the wife or the father, but let the wife or the father take: the proposition may be reasonably explained in this way. Thus the word cha also is to be explained as suggesting that the term 'not re-united' which is not expressed is understood. Hence also, if the subject be taken to be disjoined by this proposition relative to the estate of a brother not re-united, then also the use of the term 're-united' becomes significant, in the succeeding text, namely,—"Of the re-united, however, if any one &c."; otherwise it would be useless, for the same meaning would appear here too from the context. Accordingly in the third chapter (of the Mímánsá) it has been held while dealing with the topic of the nivids (or invocations of gods at the time of offering sacrifices to them) that the putting-on of the upper garment (which is subsequently enjoined) is not subservient to the chanting of the hymns for kindling the holy fire, by reason of the topic of these hymns, which is separated (from the topic in which the putting-on of the upper garment is enjoined) by the different topic of the nivids,—forming a minor topic; but is subservient to the whole sacrifice of Darsapaurņamása which is the comprehensive topic (and includes the minor ones): and it is maintained by Bhatta that the subsequent attributes (of the hymns,

called kámyas) are enjoined by repeating the hymns for kindling the holy fire, on account of their distance, in the same way as the twelve propitiating hymns. But in reality, the succession of the sister, in default of a uterine brother, to the estate of a re-united brother, is indicated by the text,—"if there be any sister &c.",—and this alone which immediately precedes is referred to by the pronoun 'this' occurring in the sentence "this is the law &c.": and in this interpretation there is no conflict whatever. It has been so explained in the Chandriká also.

The succession, however, of the widow to the entire estate belonging to her sonless husband who was unseparated is opposed to what is declared by Kátyáyana; for he says,—"But when the husband dies unseparated, the wife is entitled to food and raiment; or (tu) she gets a portion of the estate till her death."—The particle tu bears the sense of 'or'; hence the meaning is this:—Either she may directly receive food and raiment, or till her death, i. e. during her life, she may get so much share of the property as is sufficient for her maintenance and for the performance of necessary religious ceremonies which a woman is competent to perform. By reason of the declaration "a portion of the estate till her death," the position that the widow gets the entire estate of the unseparated husband, fails. Nor can it be argued from the use of the term stri (in the above text), that this text refers to a wife other than a paini. Because the adjective 'unseparated' would be meaningless; and because it is ordained that a sonless wife other than a patni is entitled only to maintenance, even when the husband was separated. Accordingly Vrihaspati having said (in the previous text, p. 135) "even when partition has been made,"-goes on to declare,—"Must allow (her) subsistence, or if she choose, a share of the field." This text has been explained in the Smritichandriká, thus:—The term 'subsistence' includes food and raiment; wealth sufficient for the same, or agreeably to her own choice a share of the field equal to that purpose, must be allowed to a widow other than a patni who is entitled to the estate of the husband, by the brother &c. taking the estate: the term 'must' shows the necessity of giving the allowance. To this very subject refers the

following text of Nárada,—" All the chaste widows should be maintained with food and raiment, by the eldest (brother of the husband), or by the father-in-law, or by any other gentile"—i. e., whoever takes the husband's estate: maintenance is to be allowed by reason of succession to the estate.

By the term 'chaste' (in the above text of Nárada) it is shewn that, in all (the texts), the maintenance of the chaste widows alone is intended. But that too, even the patnis that are unchaste, are not entitled to, by reason of what is ordained in the latter part of the text of Nárada, previously cited (p. 143), viz.—" but if they behave otherwise, the brothers may resume their allowance,"—and in other texts. Accordingly also Vrihaspati says that what has been given by the father-in-law &c. to the chaste for their maintenance should not be resumed even by other kinsmen, thus—"But such immoveable or other property, as has been given by the father-in-law to the wives (of his sons) can, on no account, be resumed by the kinsmen here."

But even what has been given to those that prove to be of a different character may be resumed. This is declared by Kátyáyana,—"(A woman) complying with the wishes of the venerable protector, is entitled to enjoy the allotted share: if she does not comply with their wishes, then she should be reduced to the livelihood of a slave. She who is bent upon injurious acts, is shameless or spendthrift or adulterous, is not entitled to even woman's property."—By the expression 'is not entitled,' two meanings are conveyed, namely, that even what is sufficient for maintenance should not be given, and that even what has been given should be resumed from one that proves to be such.

As for the text of Sruti, namely,—"Therefore women are devoid of the senses (anindriyás) and incompetent to inherit,"—and for the text of Manu based upon it, namely,—"Indeed the rule is that women are always devoid of the senses and incompetent to inherit;"—these are both to be interpreted to refer to those women whose right of inheritance has not been expressly declared. Haradatta also, has explained (these texts) in this very way, in his

commentary on the Institutes of Gautama, called Miták-But some (commentators) say that the term 'incompetent to inherit,' implies censure only, by reason of its association with the term 'devoid of the senses.' This is not tenable; because it cannot but be admitted that the portion, namely, 'incompetent to inherit' is prohibitory and not condemnatory, for it cannot reasonably be held to be an absolutely superfluous precept inasmuch as the taking of the heritage (by women) may take place under the desire (for property). But the portion 'devoid of the senses' is to be somehow explained as being a superfluous precept, and purporting the dependence (of women) on men; for the negation, what is contrary to the nature, meaning as it does of things, is objectionable. Hence what has been said above forms the best interpretation. The venerable Vidyáranya (i. e., a forest of learning), however, has, in his commentary on the Institutes of Parásara; explained the above text of Sruti in a different way:-The term 'incompetent to inherit' indicates that the wife is not entitled to a share in case of her retirement to a forest; the term anindriyás (rendered above into 'devoid of the senses') embodies the reason for the same; for it appears from the text viz.,—"The soma juice indeed is the indriya,"—that the term indriya signifies also the soma, hence those that are not entitled to it are anindriyás, i. e., not entitled to taste the soma juice: the text being laudatory of the retirement of the wife into a forest (on the death of the husband).

Thus ends the discussion of the wife's right.

PART IÍ.

- § 1.—The daughter's succession and the reason for the same. 2.—The reason as stated by Jimútaváhana excluding the barren and widow daughters noticed and criticized. 3.—The opinion that the appointed daughter alone succeeds, is criticized. 4.—The order of succession amongst daughters. 5.—A text of Vrihaspati explained by the author of the Smritichandriká. 6.—The plural number in 'daughters' in Yájnavalkya's text explained.
- In default of the wife, 'the daughters' are entitled to take the estate of a sonless person who was separated and not re-united. Accordingly Manu says,-" As a man is himself so is his son, a daughter is alike to a son; when there is himself in the shape of a daughter wherefore should any other take the estate?" Also Vrihaspati says, -"A daughter like a son springs from every limb of the father; therefore why should another person take the estate of the father?" Here it is to be observed that although a daughter is directly begotten by the father, still by the terms 'alike to a son' and 'like a son,' a daughter is declared to be similar to a son, inasmuch as the constituent elements of a son's body are derived mostly from the limbs of the father, and those of a daughter's body, mostly from the limbs of the mother; for it is so established in the Institutes of law as well as in Physiology by passages like the following,—"A male child is generated when the virile seed exceeds, and a female child when the uterine blood prevails." The term 'himself' (in the text,—'when there is himself in the shape of a daughter') signifies, similar to a son who is even as the father himself by reason of the text,—" Indeed a man is himself born as a son;" "when there is himself in the shape of a daughter," means, in preference to a daughter.

It may be asked that although the reason as set forth in the above texts indicates the daughter's succession to the estate on failure of the legitimate or aurasa son, still on what principle does the succession of the daughter take effect in default of the subsidiary sons and the wife? The answer is, that that too has clearly been set forth by

Nárada for the benefit of the dull; thus he says,—"In default of the sons, however, the daughter (succeeds) by reason of similar lineage;"—this text again has been explained by Nárada himself, thus,—"A son as well as a daughter are both perpetuators of the father's lineage." The intention is this: Both the son and the daughter are the parents of the father's descendants called (respectively) the pauttra or the son's son and the dauhitra or the daughter's son; hence their capacity for perpetuating the lineage being similar, the daughter too, like the son, has the right of succession. But a son's son and a daughter's son are not equal in themselves, hence the equality is intended to have reference to their acts. The acts again do not consist in liquidating the debts or taking the unobstructed heritage, for a daughter's son has no concern with these while there is a son's son, by reason of the texts, viz.—" The debts are to be liquidated by sons and son's sons,"—and—"Therein the ownership of both the father and the sons is equal,"—the latter text being relative to the grandfather's property. Hence the acts here are spiritual ones, namely, the performance of the srád. dhas, by reason of the text of Vishnu, namely,—" In the performance of the funeral obsequies of the ancestors a son's son and a daughter's son are alike." Thus a daughter that confers only spiritual benefits through the instrumentality of her son is inferior to a son that renders benefits by means of his sons and confers spiritual as well as temporal benefits. Nor can it be said that thus a daughter who is begotten by a man himself is nearer than the wife, and as such is entitled to take the estate in preference to the wife. Because the wife, who by her companionship assists the husband in the performance of the ceremonies enjoined in the Vedas such as the consecration of the sacred fire, and who renders both spiritual and temporal benefits by being the means of lineage, and by being the instrument of satisfying the human end called desire, and who is extolled as half the body of the husband, -is certainly superior to a daughter. Hence the term 'in default of the sons' is to be taken to indicate the failure of the wife also, by reason of the previously cited (Pt. I, § 4) text of Vishnu and this text of Yogisvara (Pt. I, § 1).

Although the father who is the object to whom funeral oblations are addressed by the son, and who as such conduces personally to the spiritual benefit of the son, is nearer than a daughter, and hence the text, viz.—"The father or the brother shall take the estate of a sonless person"—should properly be applied, previously to the daughter's succession; still she is preferable by reason of the proximity of body as ordained in the text,—"when there is himself in the shape of a daughter &c.",—and it is in her default that the above text is to be applied, because from the use of the particle or (in the above text), it appears that no stress is intended to be put on the order.

2. Jímútaváhana, however, while discussing the daughter's succession, says,—"Since the perpetuating of the lineage is set forth as the reason for her succession; and since, of the descendants he who offers oblations benefits the deceased, but he who presents no oblation does not confer any benefit, and there being no distinction between the failure of offspring and having offspring other than those that conduce to the spiritual benefit; hence a daughter who has or who is likely to have male issue is entitled to the inheritance; and consequently the opinion of Díkshita is to be accepted, viz, a daughter who is barren or who is widow or who is mother of daughters alone, and as such, is not likely to have male issue, is not entitled to succeed."

This too is open to criticism. Since he himself maintains the preferential right of the maiden daughter in the passage,—'First of all the maiden daughter alone succeeds to the estate of the father,'—upon the authority of the following text of Parásara, namely,—"Let the maiden daughter and in her default the married daughter take the property of a sonless deceased person,"—and of the following text of Devala, namely,—"And to the maiden daughter shall be given the father's wealth (and) nuptial property." But at that time there is no certainty that she will give birth to male issue; and since what has been set forth as the reason for her succession may reasonably be taken to be intended to indicate only the greater proximity. Moreover he himself shows exceptions to what

he holds to be the reason by laying down the succession of a daughter who has or who is likely to have male issue on failure of the maiden daughter. Therefore, agreeably to what we have said, the reason (as set forth in the texts) is to be explained to intend proximity.

3. Dháresvara, Devasvámin, Devasata and thers, however, in order to avoid a conflict of the texts ordaining the daughter's succession with the following text, viz.— "The father or the brothers shall take the estate of a sonless person,"—say, that the texts establishing the daughter's succession (in preference to the father &c.) refer to the appointed daughter (puttriká); in her default, however, the father and the rest are heirs agreeably to their order.

This is very unsound. Since the appointed daughter is placed in the category of subsidiary sons by the following text of Yogisvara, namely,—"The legitimate son is one born of a lawful wife: similar to him is the puttrikásuta (an appointed daughter or her son)"—and by the following text of Vasishtha, namely, -"The son of an appointed daughter is known as the third (subsidiary son);"—and since, by reason of the text of Manu, namely. -" Not brothers nor the father but the sons (primary and subsidiary) take the estate of the father,"—an appointed daughter, like the other subsidiary sons such as the wife's son, succeeds to the inheritance in spite of the wife; therefore, a fortiori it follows that she succeeds when there is no wife. Hence the above texts would be liable to objection on the ground of being unnecessary, if they be interpreted to refer to an appointed daughter; also it would be unreasonable to assume without any cause that the texts whereof the terms include all daughters without any qualification, are relative to a particular class (of daughters, viz., the appointed daughters). Moreover, the succession of the appointed daughter is declared (by Vrihaspati) in the text,—"A daughter, like a son, springs from every limb of the father &c."—which is, agreeably to your contention, relative to the appointed daughter; the very same thing is again ordained by the very same sage in the text,—"An equal (daughter), espoused by (a person of) an equal (class), chaste and following the wishes

of the husband, appointed or not (expressly) appointed, she takes the property of the sonless father:" hence it would have to be assumed in order to avoid tautology, that the one text is merely explanatory of the other: (in our opinion) however, there is clearly no tautology, the one text being general in its application and the other, particular. 'An equal daughter,' means, a daughter of the same class with the father: 'espoused by an equal' i. e., by a person of the same class; Jímútaváhana says that this excludes those espoused by a person of a superior or inferior class, for it is ordained that a son born of her cannot perform the sráddha of the maternal grandfather of a superior class; but this is not acceptable, since a damsel of a superior class cannot be married by a man of an inferior class; therefore the term 'by an equal' is to be taken to be intended to exclude one married to a person of a superior class.

Nor can it be argued that Nárada has laid down as a general rule that all the daughters including the maiden, who are destitute of the father and the brothers, are incompetent to inherit the estate of the father, for he says, -"If she has a daughter, the paternal share is ordained for (the latter's) maintenance; she shall enjoy the share till her marriage; afterwards the husband shall maintain her,"—'she' (in the first line) relates to a sonless widow, as the text is declared with reference to her; hence if such a widow has a daughter then her paternal property is ordained merely for the purpose of her maintenance, consequently until her marriage she obtains her paternal share solely for her maintenance, 'afterwards', i. e., subsequent to her marriage the husband shall maintain her; therefore also the residue of the property after defraying her maintenance during that time, may be resumed from her: the succession, however, of the daughter, to the father's property, with the power of disposing the same according to pleasure cannot at all be contended for. hence all the texts which establish the daughter's succession to the father's estate must be admitted to refer solely to the appointed daughter, as laying down an exception to what is declared in the above text; for otherwise if both the classes of texts referred generally to all daughters

it would be difficult to reconcile them by considering one as laying down a general rule, and the other an exception to it: therefore the opinion of Dháresvara and others

ought to be accepted as correct.

This contention would have been correct had the text of Nárada referred to the estate of a separated person. But having regard to what precedes and to what follows (the above text in the Institutes of Nárada) it clearly appears that this text refers to the property of one who was joint or re-united. Hence the texts which lay down the succession of the daughter without any qualification, to the estate of the father, in default of the wife, embody a rule not provided anywhere else which is applicable to the property of a separated person, but they do not provide an exception; consequently we do not see any reason whatsoever for considering these texts as referring to the appointed daughter alone.

Jímútaváhana sets forth the text of Devala, viz.—
"To the maiden daughters shall be given &c.",—as an authority for establishing the right of the maiden daughter to succeed to the entire estate of the father. But this is inconsistent with what is said by him in another place; for this very text is cited by him as an authority for allowing, on partition during life, to the maiden daughters, property sufficient for their marriage. That too has

been refuted by us before.

4. Amongst the daughters also, first let the unmarried daughters take the paternal property: in their default the married daughters; amongst these also, first the unprovided ones, and on failure of them the provided ones; all in the same predicament, however, take the property dividing it equally. This rule is settled. Accordingly Kátyáyana says,—"The wife who is not unchaste, gets the wealth of the husband; in her default, the daughter if she be then unmarried." Gautama ordains,—"Woman's property goes to daughters unmarried and unprovided."—'Unprovided' means indigent. Although 'woman's property' is here mentioned, still the reason being the same, the text is applicable to paternal property also. But it is not reasonable to say that the term "un-

provided" means, destitute of offspring by reason of barrenness and the like; for her succession (in that order?) is not proper, inasmuch as she cannot confer spiritual benefit by means of sons.

The author of the Smritichandriká explains in the following way the previously cited text of Vrihaspati, namely,—"An equal (daughter) espoused by (a person of) an equal (class), chaste, and following the wishes of the husband, appointed or not (expressly) appointed, she takes the property of the sonless father:"-The first four adjectives refer to a daughter who takes the wealth after the wife; the remaining two adjectives qualify a daughter succeeding in preference to the wife. The substantive puttriká or the appointed daughter is to be supplied to the adjectives 'appointed or not (expressly) appointed;' the substantive 'daughter' is to be supplied to the other adjec-The particle 'or' marks an alternative applicable to a determinate different state of things. meaning is as follows: The twofold appointed daughters are entitled, in preference to the wife, to take the property of the father destitute of legitimate sons; and the daughters who are qualified by the adjectives 'equal' &c. succeed on failure of the wife. Thus in default of the wife. when there are daughters provided as well as unprovided. married as well as maiden, then first, the maiden daughter alone succeeds, for the father was bound to maintain her; in her default, a married daughter who is unprovided (succeeds), for though the husband is bound to maintain her, still she is unprovided by reason of the husband's inability to maintain her; on failure of her, even a provided daughter qualified by the attributes 'equal,' &c. takes the property agreeably to the propinquity previously mentioned.

Others, however, having admitted that the term 'appointed' means the puttriká, and the term 'not appointed,' any other daughter, and that the particle 'or' indicates indifference, explains without supplying any substantive that the whole text refers to any daughter, because the pronoun 'she' relates to the daughter without any qualification,

(as used in the preceding text).

6. The plural number in the term 'daughters' (in Yajnavalkya's text p. 131) is used for the purpose of showing that the shares of the daughters of the same class are equal, but the shares of the daughters of different classes are distinct agreeably to the order of their classes.

Here ends the succession of the daughters.

PART III.

- § 1.—The daughter's son's succession.—2. The interpretation that the daughter's son means the appointed daughter's son, is rejected.—3. The daughter's son is not entitled to preference to the widow and the daughter.
- 1. On failure of daughters, the daughter's son (becomes heir); for the term 'also' (in Yajnavalkya's text,-'and the daughters also,'—p. 131), indicates the inclusion of what is not expressed. Accordingly Vishnu says,—"On failure of descendants such as the son and the son's son, the daughter's sons obtain the property; for, in the performance of the funeral obsequies, the son's son and the daughter's son are alike." The term 'on failure of the descendants such as the son and son's son,' indicates the failure of heirs down to the daughters. Also Manu says, -" (If a daughter) whether appointed or not appointed brings forth a son by her marriage with a person of equal class; in him, the maternal grandfather has a son's son: he shall offer the funeral oblations and inherit the wealth."-By the term 'has a son's son,' it is shown that as a son's son succeeds to his paternal grandfather's estate in default of sons, so the daughter's son in default of daughters. Also Vrihas. pati says,—" As her ownership arises in the father's wealth, although kindred exist; in the very same way, her son also obtains the estate of the mother's father." The meaning is:- 'As', i. e. through the funeral oblations offered by the daughter's son, the daughter becomes heiress of her father's estate; 'in the very same way,' i. e. through

the selfsame offering of oblations, the daughter's sons also become the owners of the maternal grandfather's wealth; 'although kindred,' i. e. the father and the like 'exist.'

- It cannot be said that this text (of Vrihaspati) refers to the son of an appointed daughter; because the pronouns 'her' and 'her son' relate to the unqualified daughter mentioned before. Accordingly Manu also has declared the right of succession to the maternal grandfather's estate, of the son of a daughter without any qualifications, thus,—"The daughter's son indeed, shall take the entire estate of the (mother's) sonless father; he alone shall offer two oblations to the father and the maternal Between a son's son and a daughter's son, grandfather. in this world, there is no difference in law; since their mother and father are sprung from his body."—The term 'father' is to be interpreted as the mother's father, accordingly the term 'maternal grandfather' is subsequently stated: or (it may mean) as he takes the entire estate of his own father so also of the mother's father who leaves no male issue, by reason of his personally performing the duties of his son; this is expressed in the passage, 'he alone &c." the meaning is, to his own father and the mother's father: the terms 'mother and father' are not to be construed respectively, but the proper construction is that the son's son's father and the daughter's son's mother are sprung from the body of the proprietor.
- 3. Some commentators, however, taking the text of Vishnu, viz.—" On failure of descendants such as the son and the son's son &c."—in its literal acceptance, say that the daughter's son succeeds in preference to the widow and the daughter. This is to be rejected, because it would be in conflict with the text of Yogísvara, and because the inferiority of the daughter's son to the daughter is indicated also in the text of Vrihaspati, namely,—" in the very same way her son also."

Thus ends the succession of the daughter's son.

PART IV.

- §1.—Succession of the parents. 2.—A passage of the Mitákshará, cited, where the order of succession between parents is determined. 3.—A passage of the Smritichandriká cited, criticizing the Mitákshará. 4.— The Dáyabhága cited. 5.—Of the priority of the father. 6.—Objections against the Mitákshará, removed. 7.—The author's conclusion.
- 1. On failure of the daughter's son, 'the parents' (pitarau) take the estate, (vide Yajnavalkya's text, p. 131).
- 2. On this subject it is said in the Mitakshara:— Although the order in which the mother and the father succeed to the estate does not clearly appear (from the term pitarau in Yájnavalkya's text, p. 131,) since a conjunctive compound is declared to signify simultaneously the sense of the component words, and the uni-residual compound (in which one of the words is retained and the other is suppressed) is an exceptional form of the same; yet, as the word 'mother' stands first in the phrase whereof the uni-residual compound is the result, and is read first in the form other than the uni-residual, viz., mátapitarau or 'the mother and the father;' therefore the order of the sense, as deducible from the order of reading, should not be rejected, when there is an inquiry concerning the order of succession; hence the mother takes the estate of her sonless son, in the first instance; and, on failure of her, the father. Besides, the father is a common parent to other sons, but the mother is not so; hence her propinquity is the greatest. And Manu has, in the text,—"To the nearest sapinda the inheritance next belongs"—laid down the rule that even amongst the sapindas the samanodakas and the like, the greatness of propinquity determines the right of succession. Consequently when there is this question for determination, there is nothing to prevent the application of this text (of Manu) to the present case also.

Thereupon, the author of the Smritichandriká makes the following refined observations: There being no indication of order in the text,-" There are two sárasvata sacrifices," (or sárasvatau, one in honor of the goddess Sarasvatí, the other in honor of the god Sarasván)—it is established in the fifth chapter (of the Mímánsá) that the order of performing the sacrifices is regulated by the order of the hymns (called yá)yas); but it is not established that any indication of the order arises from the uni-residual compound itself, (viz. sárasvatau). Similarly, in this instance too, other authority ought to be searched for establishing the order of succession; if there be no other authority, then it is reasonable to say that both the parents take the estate, dividing it in equal shares, for, as in the conjunctive compound so in the uni-residual form, the conjunction of the two words is expressed. As for what has been said (in the Mitákshará), namely, 'that it is proper that the mother should succeed in preference to the father, by reason of her greater propinquity, inasmuch as the father is common to even the sons of the step-mother but the mother is not so':—that too is not consistent with reason. Since there cannot be greater or lesser propinguity of the mother and the father to their offspring; for although the father may beget other sons, still he is equally with the mother, the parent of an offspring; since causality (of the parents in begetting a child) cannot be considered to exist separately in each parent (but exists jointly in both.) Nor can it be argued that the estate if taken by the father may descend even to stepbrothers, but if obtained by the mother, it will go only to the whole brothers; therefore the mother succeeds (in preference to the father). Because such propinquity being the standard whereby the succession of the brothers and sisters is determined, cannot reasonably be taken to be the criterion for determining the succession of the mother in preference to the father; and because propinquity is of no consequence in this case, where co-equality is expressed by the uni-residual compound which is an exceptional form of the conjunctive com-Indeed where the question concerning the order (of succession) arises, there propinquity determines the order, and not otherwise. Hence the right of the parents

being co-equal they shall take in equal shares the estate of a son without issue. This is maintained by Sríkara. But it is not reasonable. For the joint succession of the father and the mother cannot take effect, inasmuch as the independent right of each of them appears from the texts-"The father shall take the estate of a sonless person," and—"Indeed the mother shall take the estate of a person who departs for heaven without leaving male issue;" just as when it appears that rice or barley is a means (of something) independently of each other, it does not follow that their mixture has the same effect. Some (commentators) say that the mother is entitled to succeed first, because she confers a greater amount of benefit by bearing the child by nursing it and by the like acts, and because it it is laid down that,-" The mother is entitled to reverence a thousand times more than the father." This too is nothing; since the father also confers benefits in various ways, by performing the initiations, by furnishing the means of maintenance, &c., and since it is contrarily laid down that—"Of these again the father is superior, because the seed is declared to be superior." If the reverence alone due to a person had had any effect in determining the succession, then the spiritual preceptor would have succeeded even in preference to the father, inasmuch as it is declared that—"Of the parent and the preceptor of the Vedas, the father preceptor is superior;" and the paternal grandfather, the paternal uncle and the like would have succeeded in spite of the brother and the brother's son.

4. Jimútaváhana, however, says: "From the term 'the parents' or pitarau (pt. 1, sect. 1) it appears that the father is first in the order; since by the radical word pitri (whereof the dual number in the nominative case, is pitarau) the father is first suggested; and the dual number suggests that the term pitarau is the result of the uniresidual compound in which one word has been suppressed, but as this compound cannot reasonably be taken to be one of two similar words, (meaning two fathers) therefore in conformity with what has been declared by Vishnu, Manu and others, it is ascertained to be one of two dissimilar words; and then the mother is suggested. Hence

what is said by Sríkara, namely, that 'the mental apprehension of an order (of succession) can take place only when there is an expression of such order, hence the expression of order being wanting, the apprehension (of the same) cannot take place'; and the reverse order as maintained by Vijnánesvara—are not consistent with reason."

Hence when there is difference as to the order to be reasonably deduced from the term pitarau or 'the parents,' the order as declared in the text of Brihadvishnu ought to be accepted. And in that text it is first said that 'it devolves on daughters,' and it is then stated that 'if there be none, it belongs to the father; if he be dead, it goes to the mother.' The author of the Mitakshara, however, certainly manifests a great deal of thoughtlessness when he first of all cites this text of Brihadvishnu, adopting the above reading, and then relying upon mere reason contrary to it, concludes that among the parents the mother succeeds in preference to the father. The daughter's son again being included in the category of 'daughters' has not separately been mentioned by Brihadvishnu, therefore it is to be observed that the default of daughters indicates the default of the daughter's son also. Hence the conclusion arrived at by many commentators such as the authors of the Smritichandrika, the Madanaratna, the Kalpataru, the Ratnákara and the Párijáta, is that it is only in default of the father that the mother succeeds to the estate of a son without male issue.

Váchaspati, however, reads the text of Brihadvishnu in the following way, namely,—'if there be none, it goes to the mother; if she be dead it belongs to the father'—and thus comes to the same conclusion as in the Mitákshará. But this is undoubtedly erroneous, as this reading is not met with in any other work.

6. Also the argument in the Mitákshará, namely, "as the word 'mother' stands first in the phrase whereof the uni-residual compound is the result"—is said to be erroneous; for the rule that the term 'mother' must stand first, is not applicable to the phrase which is reduced to

the compound, since that rule is laid down by grammarians with regard to the compound, but not in respect of the phrase to which the compound is resolvable. We now proceed to remove this and other objections raised by others against the reason assigned by Vijnánesvara. proposition, however, that a conjunctive compound signifies simultaneously the sense of the component words, has been refuted at great length in the Bartika and the Tantraratna while dealing with the subject of the construction of sentences. But as regards the construction with any other word in the sentence, the conjunction of the component words is grammatically conveyed by the conjunctive compound; hence in the passage, "the parents (pitarau) are heirs," although the grammatical construction (of 'the parents' with the other words) is simultaneous. still there can be no defect in the sentence even if there be in reality an order between the two parents. being admitted by Sríkara and all others, all this may be solved. Now since in the forms (of the compound) other than the uni-residual one, namely, mátápitarau and mátaranitarau or 'the mother and the father,' the term mother takes its place first; and since, if the complete and the uni-residual forms of the conjunctive compound had not been capable of conveying the same idea, the optional use of either form would not have been directed; therefore it should be admitted that by the uni-residual form also, the same idea is conveyed in the same order. And although the rule is not authoritatively laid down that the term 'mother' must stand first in the phrase into which the compound is resolvable, yet it is certainly established by the uniform practice of all commentators; since nowhere is the compound pitarau found resolved into the phrase 'the father as well as the mother,' but always into the phrase 'the mother as well as the father.' Hence by reason of the maxim that 'even a minute distinction may lead to a conclusion,' this too may effect the determination (of the order of succession). It may be that what has been said by the author of the Mitakshara is with this intention.

Although the causality of the parents in the production of a child does not separately exist in each parent, still the greater propinquity of the mother, deduced from the consideration that the father may be a common parent to other sons but the mother is not so,—has been said (by Vijnánesvara) with reference to that consideration alone. There are certainly the attributes of (the one's) being common and (the other's) being not common, arising from relationship and consisting (respectively) in the tardiness and the facility of realizing the notions conveyed by the (correlative) terms (father and mother); for it is so felt.

- 'When no order is indicated by the grammatical meaning of the passage, wherefore then is an order in fact assumed?'—This argument of Sríkara, however, which the authors of the Smritichandriká, &c. also had to meet, is refuted on the ground that an enquiry into the order arises, inasmuch as the independent right (of each of the parents) is laid down in other texts.
- All that remains is the conflict with the text of Brihadvishnu, which it is difficult to answer. That also we proceed to reconcile as far as we are able to do. we find that there are conflicting texts establishing the comparative reverence due to the father and to the mother. These must be reconciled by referring them to different Thus, the following texts and others to the same effect establish that higher reverence is due to the mother; viz.—"The preceptor of the Vedas ten times more than the tutor, the father hundred times more than the preceptor, but the mother a thousand times more than the father, is entitled to reverence,"-and-" The mother is entitled to a greater degree of piety by reason of her bearing the child and nursing it": while texts of Smriti, such as—" Of these two, again, the father is superior, because the seed is declared to be superior,"—and facts like the following related in the Puránas, namely—that Parasuráma, in compliance with the order of his father, beheaded his mother, and that Ráma, although prevented by Kausalyá (his mother) did, in obedience to the command of his father, renounce the throne and retire to the forest,—show that higher reverence is due to the father.

And the way in which these may be reconciled is this: When the father is endowed with all the qualities entitling

him to the greatest veneration, as is described in texts like the following one of Yogisvara, namely,-" A father is entitled to the highest veneration, who having performed the initiatory ceremonies, instructs the son in the Vedas;" and when the mother is devoid of all those virtues which constitute chastity, such as obedience to the husband: then, of these the father is entitled to higher respect than the mother. If, however, the mother is like Arundhati, endowed with all the virtues of chastity, and the father is merely the progenitor; then in such a case the mother is indeed entitled to greater respect than the father. Likewise, from the story of Chirakarika in the Mahabharata also, this distinction appears as the purport of that story. Hence in this instance also, the succession to the estate of a son without male issue, which, as laid down in the texts of Manu and other sages, appears to devolve in the first instance to the mother according to some (texts), and to the father agreeably to others,—ought properly to be reconciled in this way alone. Thus, Manu says,—"The mother shall obtain the property of a son without male issue, and if the mother be dead, then the father's mother shall take the estate:" Vrihaspati says,-" The mother shall take the estate of a deceased son who leaves neither widow nor son, or a brother (shall take) by her permission:" again Manu says,—"The father or the brothers alone shall take the estate of one leaving no male issue:" the text of Brihadvishnu, cited before, lays down that "if there be none, it belongs to the father; if he be dead, it goes to the mother:" and in the text of Yogisvara is used the term "parents," which, according to Vijnánesvara, signifies 'first the mother and after her the father,' and according to others, the joint succession of both the parents, or the priority of the father. There being this diversity, (the reconciliation is, that) the mother succeeds in preference to the father, if she be entitled to greater reverence than the father; but she is postponed to the father, if she be entitled to lesser reverence than the father. And it is reasonable that a mother who confers greater benefits than a father who does not provide with the means of maintenance and the like, should take the estate; and that a father who furnishes with the means of maintenance

and the like, and consequently renders the greatest benefit by rearing and by providing with the means of subsistence for life, should take the estate (in preference to the mother). It should be particularly noticed by the learned, that it is thus that all the texts and all the commentaries become reconciled.

PART V.

§ 1.—Succession of brothers. 2.—Of whole brothers and half brothers.

On failure of the parents the brothers take the estate. Although it appears from the text of Sankha and Paithinasi, namely,-" The wealth of a sonless person who departs for heaven goes to the brothers; if there be none, let the parents take &c."—and from the text of Manu, namely,—"Or the brothers alone"—that the brothers succeed in preference to the father; and it appears from the text of Manu, namely,—"And if the mother too be dead, the father's mother shall take the estate"—that the paternal grandmother is entitled to succeed in preference to the brothers: still in order to avoid a conflict with the texts of Yogisvara and Brihad Vishnu which lay down the order of succession, it is to be held that the above texts lay down merely their right of inheritance; and that with a view to intimate that there is no conflict with the above order, Manu and Paithinasi employ the term 'or' thus, "or the brothers alone" and "or let the senior wife take;" otherwise, if they were heirs of equal position the use of the particle 'or' would be extremely unreasonable. This is the opinion of the author of the Mitákshará and of many others.

But the author of the Kalpataru says:—When there are the widow and a brother, then the chaste widow who is competent to perform the funeral obsequies and the like, succeeds first; but one who is not so, succeeds after a brother and the father: but when there are the father and a brother, then the property which was acquired by

the father, grandfather &c., and which on partition was allotted to the son, goes to the parents if the son dies without male issue; but the property which was acquired by him without using paternal property devolves on the brother notwithstanding the parents.

But it appears to me that in the text of Manu, namely,—"if the mother too be dead, the father's mother shall take the estate"—and in the text of Sankha and Paithinasi, namely,—"if there be none, let the parents take"—and in the text of Devala, namely,—"Then the uterine brothers shall divide (amongst themselves) the heritage of one leaving no male issue; or else the equal daughters; or else the surviving father; the brothers of the same class, the mother or the widow, agreeably to their order: in default of all these, those kinsmen (kulyas) who dwell together shall take"-order is expressed by the terms 'dead' 'in his default' and 'agreeably to their order.' Hence it is not at all a perfect reconciliation to say that the texts of Yogisvara and Vishnu being alone declaratory of the order of succession, and the other texts being intended to show merely the right of inheritance, no objection can arise from the assignment of positions (to these heirs) in the latter texts, contrary to those in the previous ones. But as in the instance of the wife's son and others, the conflicting order expressed in the texts of law has been reconciled with reference to their possession or want of good qualities and to their friendliness or animosity towards the legitimate (aurasa) son; so here too in the chapter on Partition of Heritage, the description of the sons &c. conferring benefits upon the father &c., or the description of the possession or want of good qualities, can have no other object, like the description of comparative propinquity. Hence any conflict of texts with regard to the order of succession is to be reconciled with reference to the possession or want of good qualities, and to the greatness or smallness of benefits conferred upon the proprietor. Any other reconciliation is not acceptable as being imperfect. Similarly in any instance in the sequel. Thus every thing is consistent.

• 2. Amongst the brothers also, first the uterine bro25



thers (succeed). Because it is laid down by Manu in the text,—"To the nearest sapinda the inheritance next belongs"—and by Vrihaspati in the text—"When one has many jnatis (or kinsmen,) sakulyas as well as bandhavas; he who is nearest among these shall take the estate of one leaving no male issue"—that the greatness of propinquity is alone the criterion (of succession) in the absence of special provision; and the remoteness of half brothers is caused by their mother. But the term 'brothers' being used without any qualification, the half brothers succeed in default of uterine brothers. This is clearly stated by the author of the Sangraha, thus,—"If there be two classes of brothers, namely, whole brothers and half brothers; then the whole brothers take the estate not-withstanding the half brothers."

Thus ends the succession of brothers.

PART VI.

- § 1.—Succession of the brother's son. 2.—Uterine brother's son succeeds in preference to a half brother's son.
- In default of brothers, 'their sons', i. e., the brothers' sons are heirs. Nor can it be said that since by the term 'likewise' in the passage 'likewise, their sons,' similarity between the brothers and the brothers' sons is indicated; and since it has been declared that -" Among those, however, whose fathers are different, the allotment of shares is according to the fathers;"—therefore on failure of the parents, let them both jointly take the estate. Because, for fear of a conflict with the text of Vishnu, the term 'likewise' is to be taken to convey the same meaning as the term 'and.' Oherwise, as the term 'likewise' might as well be construed with what precedes, wherefore could not the joint succession of the parents and brothers take place? If it be said that it does not take place by reason of its conflict with the text of Vishnu—the same may be said in this instance as well. And the meaning

of the text, "Among those, however, whose fathers are different &c."—is this: when on the death of a brother their right takes effect, i. e. when any brother dies without leaving male issue and the right of all the surviving brothers accrues to the estate left by him, but if prior to the partition of the estate any one amongst these also die, then his sons would have become entitled to equal shares with their uncles, but (agreeably to the above text) they are all to take that share only which their father would have taken on partition, and not each a share equal to that of an uncle. Because, while a brother is alive, his sons have no right to the estate of their uncle; since it is declared in the text of Yogísvara that "in the absence of the preceding one, every succeeding one is heir;" and since in the text of Vishnu, namely,—"On their default it goes to the brothers' sons,"—the failure of brothers is expressed. as the pronoun 'their' relates to the term 'brothers.'

Amongst the brothers' sons also, the sons of the uterine brothers, by reason of their greater propinquity, succeed in the first instance; in their default, the sons of half brothers. And this is reasonable; because a son of a half brother presents the pinda to the (deceased) proprietor's father and to his own paternal grandmother, omitting the proprietor's mother, therefore he being inferior to a uterine brother's son succeeds after him. Nor can it be argued that inasmuch as the three ancestors together with their wives are the objects to whom the funeral oblations are addressed, therefore the rival mother and the like also are included. Because the terms 'mother' and the like signify primarily one's own parent, the father's parent, and the grandfather's parent; and these as such are declared to be the objects to whom oblations are offered: thus, it is ordained,—"The mother partakes of the funeral oblations consisting of food with her own husband; also the paternal grandmother with her own, and with her own the paternal great-grandmother." The offering of oblations to the rival mother and the like, rather follows from what is declared in the text, viz.—"Those men as also women who die without male issue; to them also should be offered oblations addressed to a single indivi-



dual, but not such oblations as are presented on parva occasions." Besides, all persons beginning with the son are competent to perform the ceremony of the sráddha in honor of the forefathers with their wives, and there are not always the rival mother and the like, therefore it is reasonable to hold that the rule of presenting oblations to the ancestors with their wives includes only the mother and the like, so that there might not be the objection of uniting what is constant with what is accidental.

Thus ends the succession of brothers' sons.

PART VII.

- § 1.—Of the gentiles; its meaning as in the Mitákshara. 2.—The same as in the Smritichandriká and Dáyabhága. 3.—Criticized. 4.—Gentiles consist of the sapindas and samánodakas; these terms explained. 5.—Cognates; three descriptions; maternal uncle &c. 6.—Preceptor and pupil. 7.—Fellow-student. 8.—The king. 9.—The Bráhmanas.
- 1. On failure of the brothers' sons, (the heirs are) the 'gentiles' (gotrajas) who are to be taken to be other than the father, the brother and his son that have been previously set forth, by reason of the rule of 'the bulls and the beeves.'

Vijnánesvara says:—The gentiles are the paternal grandmother, the sapindas (or persons of the same family or gotra connected through the pinda or body), and the samánodakas, (or persons of the same family other than the sapindas). Of these the paternal grandmother succeeds in the first instance. Although it would appear from the text of Manu, namely,—"when the mother too is dead, the father's mother shall take the estate,"—that the succession of the paternal grandmother takes place immediately after the mother; still she cannot reasonably be placed between the settled series of heirs from the parents to the nephew: and there is no reason for postponing her further, in spite of her superiority (as set forth in the text

of Manu): hence it is only after her that the paternal grandfather and other gentiles succeed.

2. On this subject the author of the Smritichandrika says:—The term gentiles or gotrajás (or those descended from the gotra or family), being a uni-residual compound of similar terms, denotes males only, but not females. For a term is taken to be an uni-residual compound of dissimilar terms, when it is shewn to be so by the purport as understood from other evidence such as the association with another sentence, just as in the passage, "Bring two chickens, which will make a pair;" but there is no such evidence in the present instance. On the contrary, the association with the terms brother's sons &c. shows that the male gentiles alone are intended. Besides, the succession of the widow, the daughters and the like being specially laid down, the text of Sruti, namely,—"Therefore women are devoid of the senses, and incompetent to inherit"—may be explained to refer to other women than these (with regard to whose succession there are special provisions); but in the case of the gentiles and so forth, the supposition of the term being a uni-residual compound of dissimilar terms ought rather to be rejected, in order to avoid a conflict with that text. Accordingly, while explaining the text of A'pastamba, namely,—"The father during his life may divide the heritage among the sons,"—the commentator says, 'may divide the heritage among the sons only, not among the daughters, they being females'; and then goes on to say,-Although here the term 'sons' may be made to include daughters, by considering the term 'sons' to be a uniresidual compound of sons and daughters, upon the authority of the Aphorism of Panini, namely,—"The terms brother and son (may be compounded in the uni-residual form) with the terms sister and daughter" (respectively); yet the males are heirs and not the females, by reason of the following text of Sruti,-" Therefore women are devoid of the senses, and incompetent to inherit." The intention of the commentator is, that although there is authority for taking the term 'sons' to be a uni-residual compound of dissimilar terms, still in the instance under consideration, it is not taken to be so, by reason of conflict



with the text of Sruti and by reason of the absence of any-

thing suggesting that purport.

Also Jímútaváhana says:—And Yájnavalkya makes use of the term gotrajas or gentiles for the purpose of showing that the daughters' sons of the father &c., who are descended from the same gotra, become heirs in the order of their nearness with reference to the offering of oblations; also for the purpose of excluding the wives of sapindas, they being not sprung from the same gotra. Accordingly Baudháyana, having in the previous text, said, "a woman is entitled to," declares,—"Not to the heritage, since a text of the Sruti ordains, 'women are devoid of the senses, and incompetent to inherit.'" The construction is that a woman is not entitled to the heritage. The succession of the widow and the like is not opposed (to the above interpretation) inasmuch as that is expressly declared.

3. That is not good. Since in the texts of Manu and others, cited before, the succession of the paternal grandmother has expressly been laid down; therefore even if the text of Yogísvara be, consistently with those texts, considered to include her by taking the term gentiles or grotajás to be a uni-residual compound of dissimilar terms, there would be no conflict with the (above mentioned) Sruti which may be held to refer to women other than the

paternal grandmother.

Jímútaváhana, however, does, in that part of his work where he deals with the mother's succession, say,—"The paternal gradmother's succession takes place after the paternal grandfather and before the grandfather's descendants, like the mother's succession after the father. The succession of the paternal grandfather and grandmother has not been separately propounded by Yájnavalkya, inasmuch as the same is virtually declared by showing the mother's succession." But in this part of his work, he says,—"The term gotraja has been used for the purpose of excluding the wives of the sapindas." Thus he fails to observe that he contradicts himself. For in the text of Yogísvara, the absence of express mention of the paternal grandmother is the same as that of the wives of the paternal uncle

&c.; so the text of Sruti, declaring incompetency to inherit is as well applicable to the paternal grandmother as to the

wives of the paternal uncle.

Agreeably, however, to the interpretation put upon the text of Sruti, viz.—"Therefore women are devoid of the senses &c.—by the venerable Vidyáranya, which has previously been cited (p. 175), this text does not at all prohibit women's right of succession: so there can neither be a doubt (as to their competency to inherit) nor an answer (to such doubt). But it should be remarked that how can that interpretation be accepted when it is in conflict with the text of Baudhayana? For although the term indriva may be taken in any of its acceptations, still there is nothing else (in the text of Sruti) to support women's incompetency to inherit, and it cannot be held that the text of Sruti has nothing in it to support the position that women are not entitled to inherit; hence it cannot but be held that the text of Sruti does prohibit women's right of succession, inasmuch as otherwise the quotation (by Baudháyana) of that text as establishing the position would be unreasonable: just as in the instance. "Therefore an unknown embryo being killed (a man becomes) murderer of a Brahmana."

4. On failure of the paternal grandmother, the paternal grandfather and the other sapindas of the same gotra are heirs; since the sapindas (or persons connected through the pinda or body) of a different gotra are included under the term bandhu or 'cognates.'

Among these also, in default of the father's descendants, the paternal grandmother, the paternal grandfather, the paternal uncles and their sons become heirs in their order; in default of the paternal grandfather's descendants, the paternal great-grandmother, the paternal great-grandfather, his (paternal grandfather's?) brothers and their sons; similarly to the seventh (degree) the sapindas of the same gotra take the estate of a person without male issue.

On failure of the sapindas, the saminodakas (succeed). They comprise seven (degrees) above the sapindas, or all whose birth (from the same gotra) and (family) name are known. Thus Manu says,—"The sapinda (or consan-

guine) relationship, however, ceases in the seventh generation, but the samánodaka relationship extends up to the fourteenth (generation), or as some affirm to those whose birth and name are known. The term gotra signifies these (i. e., the sapindas and the samánodakas)." It has already been shown that, in the text of Vishnu (p. 142) the term bandhu signifies a sapinda, and the term sakulya means a sagotra. The samánodakas also become heirs in the order of propinquity.

5. On failure of the samánodakas the 'cognates' or bandhus are heirs. The cognates are of three descriptions; the cognates of a man himself, the cognates of the father, and the cognates of the mother. To this effect is the following passage of the Smriti,—"One's father's sister's sons, one's mother's sister's sons and one's maternal uncle's sons are to be known one's own cognates; the father's father's sister's sons, the father's mother's sister's sons and the father's maternal uncle's son are to be known the father's mother's sister's sons, the mother's mother's sister's sons, the mother's mother's sister's sons and the mother's maternal uncle's sons are to be known the mother's cognates."

Amongst these also the order is, that, by reason of greater propinquity, first one's own cognates, after them the father's cognates, and after them the mother's cognates.

In the text of Manu, namely,—"In their default, a sakulya, or the preceptor, or a pupil (becomes heir),"—the term sakulya includes the sagotras (sapindas?) and samánodakas, the maternal uncle and the like, and the three classes of cognates. Also in the text of Yogísvara the term 'cognates' or bandhu comprises also the maternal uncle. Otherwise, the exclusion of the maternal uncle and the like would be the result. And it would be extremely improper that their sons are heirs, but they themselves though nearer are not heirs.

6. In default of the cognates, the preceptor is heir. Although the preceptor is not mentioned in the text of Yogísvara, still the pupil has been mentioned; and it ought, by reason of propriety, to be held that the precep-

tor who is superior to him and nearer, is implied. Because the succession of a pupil on failure of the preceptor is expressly declared by Manu in the text,—" or the preceptor or a pupil," and by A'pastamba in the text,—" If there be no male issue, the nearest sapinda inherits; in their default, the preceptor; failing him, a pupil."

- 7. On failure of a pupil, the fellow student takes the estate; that is, he who received his investiture and education from the same preceptor.
- 8. If there be no fellow students, the king shall take excepting the estate of a Bráhmaṇa, by reason of the text of Vasishtha, cited before, which, after declaring the succession of all down to the pupil, says,—"in his default, it goes to the king excepting the property of a Bráhmaṇa,"—and by reason of the text of Manu, namely,—"In default of all those, however, the property shall go to such Bráhmaṇas, as are versed in the three Vedas, as are pure in body and mind and as have subdued their passions: thus, religious merit is not lost. The property of a Bráhmaṇa shall never be taken by the king: this is the settled law. But the wealth of the other classes, on failure of all (heirs,) the king may take."
- 9. In default of all down to the fellow student, the wealth of a Brahmaṇa is taken first by a srôtriya or such a Brahmaṇa as is versed in the Vedas; failing him, by any Bráhmaṇa. Thus Gautama says,—"The srôtriyas shall take the estate of a Bráhmaṇa leaving no male issue." But any Bráhmaṇa succeeds, as in the text of Manu the term Bráhmaṇa is used without any qualification. It is also declared by Nárada,—"If there be no heir of a Bráhmaṇa's wealth, on his demise, it must be given to a Bráhmaṇa. Otherwise the king is tainted with sin."

PART VIII.

§ 1.—Succession to the property of a hermit, &c.; the text of Yajnavalkya explained. 2.—An objection stated and answered.

1. With reference to the estate left by a hermit, &c., an exceptional rule, excluding the (ordinary) heirs such as the son and the rest also the wife and the like, is propounded by Yogisvara, thus,—"The heirs of a hermit (vánaprastha or one who has entered the third order of life), or an ascetic (yati or one desirous of moksha or liberation from transmigration) and of a student (brahmachári), are, in their order, the preceptor, the virtuous pupil and the spiritual brother resident in the same holy place."

The term 'student' here, by reason of its association with the term 'ascetic,' means a lifelong student (i. e. one who has taken a vow to remain a student for life and not to enter into a married life): hence the estate of a person who has been leading the temporary life of a student (which every twice-born is enjoined to lead before becoming a householder) devolves on the parents and the like in the specified order, for such a person cannot have heirs from a son down to a daughter's son.

The order mentioned in the above text is to be understood to be the inverse one. Accordingly the wealth of a deceased student goes to the preceptor; of an ascetic, to the virtuous pupil; of a hermit, to the spiritual brother resident in the same holy place.

The spiritual brother is one adopted as a brother; the term holy place signifies a hermitage, hence resident in the same holy place, means, resident in the same hermitage; the meaning is, one who is a spiritual brother as well as is resident in the same holy place.

The virtuousness of a pupil, however, does not mean good conduct. For the exclusion from inheritance, of even the son and the rest, whose conduct is bad, is established by other authority. And that will be mentioned.

But it is to be taken to consist in the capacity for understanding lectures on psychology, digesting the same and

following its doctrines in practice.

The author of the Madanaratna, however, having cited the text of Vishnu, namely,—"The preceptor shall take the wealth of a hermit (vánaprastha), or the pupil,"—and thinking the order (mentioned in Yájnavalkya's text) to be direct and not inverse, says that in default of the preceptor the pupil takes the wealth of a hermit.

If it be said:—It being established that the lifelong student and others have no concern with property, in texts like the following one of Vasishtha, namely,-"They who have entered into another order, are debarred from shares,"—the declaration, in the above text of Yajnavalkya, of the succession to their estate is not proper. Nor can it be argued that although their right of taking the heritage is forbidden by Vasishtha and others, still the above text establishes the right of succession to their property acquired by other means. Since it is ordained that, "A student and an ascetic both are owners of the prepared food (and of nothing else)," and since acceptance and the like (means of acquisition) are prohibited to students, and since the saving of property by an ascetic is prohibited in the text (of Gautama), namely,—"A mendicant shall have no hoard."

The answer is, that it is not tenable. Since, by reason of the text, namely,—"(The hermit) may make a hoard of things sufficient for a day, a month, six months or a year; and in the month of A'svina he should give away what has been collected,"—a hermit has certainly some property sufficient for food, &c.; the ascetic too has something such as clothes, books, &c., by reason of the text,—"An ascetic should wear clothes to cover his privy parts, and take the requisites for austerities (yoga) and the sandals;" the lifelong student also must have clothes and the like for the protection of his body. Hence the question occurring, who is to take these things belonging to them, after their death? the above heirs are declared to the exclusion of other heirs.

CHAPTER IV.

RE-UNION.

- § 1.—Equal distribution. 2.—Self-acquired property. 3.—With whom re-union may be formed. 4.—Succession to re-united property; two couplets of Yájnavalkya explained; Manu cited. 5.—Interpretation by Sríkara. 6.—Same as in the Smritichandriká. 7.—Same by Súlapáni. 8.—Same as in the Dáyatattva. 9.—The wife's succession. 10.—The Sister. 11.—The Sapindas, &c. 12.—Sons re-united or not, equally succeed; an exception regarding a son born after partition. 13.—Maintenance of the wife and daughters; the marriage of the latter.
- 1. Now the partition of re-united property is considered.

On that subject, Manu says,—"Should those, who dwell together after having been separated, again divide their property; in that case the distribution shall be equal; there is no deduction for seniority." Here, although it follows from the very restriction laying down equal distribution, that the mode of unequal division is to be rejected; still the passage "there is no deduction for seniority," is added in order to show that only the unequal distribution caused by seniority, &c., does not take place, but that there is certainly unequal division on account of the union of greater and less property.

Some, however, say that the unequal distribution owing to seniority, &c., must be made of the augmented portion (if any) of the re-united property; but the division of the re-united property must be equal: with a view to indicate this the portion "there is no deduction for seniority"—has been added.

This is not tenable. For a distinction like this does not appear from the above text, since, from the passage "in that case the distribution shall be equal,"—it appears that the restriction as to equality is applicable to the accession also.

- 2. Just as in the partition of undivided property, so also in the partition of re-united property, the impartibility of what has been acquired by science, &c., without using re-united property, would equally have been the rule; but an exceptional rule has been laid down by Vrihaspati, thus,—"But if any one of the re-united coheirs acquire property by science, heroism, &c., two shares shall be allotted to him, the rest shall be equal sharers."
- 3. Many are of opinion that re-union may be formed only with the father, &c., but not with any other, by reason of the text of Vrihaspati cited before, namely,—"He, who being once separated dwells again through affection together with the father, brother or paternal uncle is called re-united."

But we have shown at great length that the enumeration of the father, &c., is illustrative (not exhaustive).

4. Just as in the case of partition among undivided co-heirs, so also among those that are re-united, if any one die before partition is made, his sons shall take and divide amongst themselves their paternal share, by reason of the text,—" Among those whose fathers are dead (different?) the allotment of shares is according to their fathers."

But if any one of the re-united co-heirs die without leaving male issue, then the succession to his estate would have devolved on the wife, &c., by reason of the text,— "The wife and the daughters also, &c.;" but in continuation of the passage "of a sonless deceased person," (occurring in that text) an exceptional rule is laid down by Yogisvara in the following text, namely,-" But of a re-united (co-heir,) a re-united (coparcener shall keep the share, when he is deceased or deliver it if born)." The term 'but' shows that it forms an exception to what precedes. Thus the meaning is, that the estate of a re-united co-heir dying without male issue shall be taken by a re-united coheir alone, and not by the wife or the like. Hence, Jímútaváhana must be considered to have erred, who interprets the text to be applicable when, among the series of heirs to the estate of a sonless person beginning with the wife, the brothers' right takes effect.

To this rule again, an exception is propounded (in the latter part of the above text),—"But of a uterine brother, a uterine brother, shall keep the share when he is deceased, or deliver it if born." This is to be construed with the preceding portion, namely,—"Of a re-united. a re-united." Accordingly the meaning is as follows: A re-united uterine brother shall deliver the share of a re-united uterine brother, if born, i. e., if he is born in the shape of a son, that is to say, shall deliver it to his son; or shall keep, i. e., shall himself take the share (of a reunited uterine brother) when he is deceased, i. e., not living even in the shape of the son, grandson, or greatgrandson. If this text were interpreted without construing it with the two terms that precede, then it would be opposed to the fact of this text forming an exception to what precedes, which follows by force of the term 'but.' And it forms an exception to what precedes, in this way: when there are a uterine brother and a half brother both re-united, in that case the re-united whole brother alone is entitled to the property of a re-united uterine brother. and not the half brother.

When, however, a half brother alone is re-united, and a whole brother is not so, then they take in equal shares the property of a brother without male issue. This is declared (by Yogísvara) in the text,—"But a re-united half brother may take the property, not a half brother (not re-united); also the (brother) united (through uterus) though not re-united may take, not the (united) son of a different mother (exclusively.)"-Here the term 'not re-united' is, like the eye of a crow, connected both with the preceding and with the latter part. So the term 'united;' and this term signifies, in the first part, united through the uterus, i. e., a uterine brother; but in the latter part, re-united. The term 'exclusively' is to be supplied immediately after the term 'son of a different mother.' Hence the meaning of the text is this: A stepbrother, though not sprung from the same mother, takes the property if re-united; but a step-brother does not take, if not re-united: therefore, by showing the existence and absence of re-union to be the cause respectively of the succession and non-succession of a half brother, what is

affirmed is, that the re-union of a half brother is the sole cause of his succession, and not his fraternity alone: likewise 'the united,' i. e., the uterine brother although not reunited succeeds, and a fortiori when re-united: and the son of a different mother, although united, i. e., re-united shall not exclusively take the property, but shall take together with a uterine brother though not re-united. The purport of the text is this: when the uterine brother is not reunited but the half brother is re-united, then because of the two attributes, namely, being a uterine brother and being re-united, each of which constitutes a cause of the right of succession, one is present in each, therefore both of them take in equal shares the property of a brother without male issue: should the uterine brother be reunited, then by reason of the combination of both the causes he becomes the preferrable claimant, therefore he alone takes the entire estate.

Although by each of the restrictive rules laid down in the above texts of Yogisvara, the inefficacy of the other cause of succession is established, still for the sake of emphasis the same is expressed over again; for in both

ways the same meaning may be expressed.

The masculine gender in the terms 're-united &c.' (in the above texts of Yogisvara) is not intended to be significant. Accordingly Manu declares the right of the uterine sisters also to succeed to the property of a reunited brother. Thus he, having premised partition among the re-united kinsmen, in the text,-" If those who are associated after separation make a partition again"-goes on to say,-"Of these, if the eldest or the youngest or any other be deprived of his share at the distribution, or any one of them die, his share shall not be lost; but his uterine brothers being assembled and united shall divide that equally; also brothers that are united and sisters born of the same mother." The meaning is:-Among re-united brothers, if the eldest, the youngest or the middle-most, at the distribution, i. e., at the time of making a partition,—the termination of the word (ansapradánatas,) which denotes any case, denotes here the locative case. be deprived, i. e., become disentitled by reason of degradation or adoption of an order other than that of the house-



holder, or dies before partition; his share shall not be lost, i. e., shall be set apart: but it shall be delivered to his male issue in the first instance: failing them, the uterine brothers though not re-united, being assembled, i. e., if gone to a different country returning thence, united, i. e., assembled together; also brothers, i. e., half brothers that are united, i. e., re-united, and the uterine sisters of the deceased shall divide, i. e., take it after division, equally, i. e., without inequality. Here Manu by declaring the succession of the uterine brothers and sisters, even if they are not reunited, and of the half brothers in case they are re-united, clearly expresses the very same meaning as is declared by Yogisvara.

On this Sríkara says: When there are only reunited half brothers, then the precept, "But of a reunited (co-heir), a re-united (co-heir) shall keep the share, when he is deceased, or deliver it if born"—is independent of any other precept; so is the precept, "But of a uterine brother, a uterine brother, &c.,"-when there are only uterine brothers not re-united: but, when there are both a re-united half brother and a whole brother not re-united, if the two precepts be applicable, then both precepts take effect dependently upon each other. it is not right that the same precept be operative independently of, and dependently upon, another precept; for in that case there would be variableness in the precept. Just as in the seventh chapter (of the Mímánsá) a different conclusion is made for fear of variableness in the precept, which would have been the consequence, had the operativeness of the precept, "in these two the holy fire is kindled"—been taken, in respect of the two of the four sacrifices, to be dependent on the option created by the prohibition embodied in the precept, "the holy fire-place is not made in the vaisvadeva, &c."; but independent, in respect of the other two sacrifices. Accordingly, when there are a half brother re-united and a whole brother not re-united, neither of the precepts is applicable; and it would follow that no one could take the estate (there being no provision for this case). Hence it is to be held that the right of a re-united co-heir to succeed to the

property of a re-united coparcener, being declared in the text,—"But of a re-united (co-heir), &c.,"—the latter part, viz.,—"But of a uterine brother, a uterine brother, &c.,"—is set forth as forming an exception to that. Hence it follows that a half brother though re-united has no right, when there is a whole brother although not re-united.

This assertion is the consequence of not studying the principles of the topics of construction contained in the For it is not correct, that there is variableness in precept, merely because two precepts, which are independently applicable to some cases, become both applicable to some other case where the subjects of both (the precepts) are combined. Since, if it were so, then the precepts enjoining the bestowal of the whole wealth as gratuity to the priest in the one instance, and no gratuity in the other, which are respectively applicable independently of each other, if either the priest called udgátri, or the one called pratistotri, singly stumble (in passing from one apartment to the other, at the celebration of the sacrifice called jyotistoma),—would not be applicable (by reason of variableness, such as is maintained by you,) if both those priests should stumble at the same time; so there would be no conflict, there being no two propositions opposed to each other; hence the discussion in the topic of stumbling (in the Mímánsá), must be held to be uncalled for. Therefore the variableness in precept is, when a precept becomes operative in one instance, independently of any opposition of a different precept, and in another instance dependently of such opposition: as has previously (p.150) been illustrated by the instance of the precept,—"Here they construct the holy fire-place, &c." Otherwise, neither of the two precepts, viz., "Shall touch with the hymn called chaturhotrá at the full moon," and "Shall touch with the hymn termed panchahotrá at the new moon"—(in which the burnt-offering is meant to be the object of touch),—which are severally applicable to the sacrifices called upansu (which takes place at the full moon) and agnisomiya (which takes place at the new moon) in the first of which the burnt-offering is curd consecrated to Indra, and in the second, milk consecrated to Indra,would be applicable to a sacrifice which takes place both

27

at the full moon and at the new moon, although the

burnt-offerings are combined.

As for his own interpretation, namely, that the rule,—"But of a uterine brother, &c.",—is an exception to the rule,—"But of a re-united, &c.":—that is extremely incongruous. For the converse (of the proposition that one is an exception to the other) may as well be asserted, there being no criterion for determination; and the mere fact of the one being placed after the other cannot lead to that conclusion. Again, the text,-"But a re-united half brother, &c.,"—has been said (by Sríkara) to be explanatory of the text,—"But of a re-united (co-heir), &c." But to say this, is to say that that text is useless. Besides. the text—"But of a uterine brother, &c.,"—being explained (by Sríkara) to exclude a re-united half brother when there is a whole brother although not re-united, it is not applicable to the case where both a whole brother and a half brother are not re-united; consequently neither of them would be heir, or both of them would be equally entitled. If it be said that the very text,—"But of a uterine brother, &c.,"—is applicable to this case also, then the objection of variableness in the precept may be retorted on you; for, in one instance it becomes operative dependently of opposition of the text,—"But of a re-united (co-heir), &c.,"—and in another instance, independently of such opposition. Just as, if the precept directing the construction of the altar at a sacrifice with the soma plant, were applicable to the dikshaniya and the like sacrifices (which are performed at the full moon and the new moon and in which soma is employed), in opposition to the precept which generally directs the construction of an altar in the darsapaurnamása sacrifice performed at the new and the full moons, and which extends to the above mentioned sacrifices, which are parts of that sacrifice; then that precept would be operative in those sacrifices dependently of opposition of the extending precept, and in others independently thereof: so there would be variableness in the precept; hence it has been concluded that the precept applies to those sacrifices with reference to which there is no other precept directing the construction of an altar.

But agreeably to the mode of interpretation adopted by us, the subjects of the two rules (of Yogisvara) being different, the objections of uselessness and of variableness in precept cannot arise. There is no use in spinning out the matter.

The author of the Smritichandriká, however, says:—It appears from the terms 'also', 'being assembled' and 'united' in the text of Manu, viz.,—"Of these, if the eldest or the youngest &c."—that the uterine brother and sister and the re-united half brother are jointly entitled to succeed: but it appears from the text of Yogisvara, that a half brother is not entitled to succeed when there is a re-united whole brother: hence there is a conflict between these two texts. With a view to avoid this conflict, some explain the text of Manu in the following way: That unlost share shall be taken by those uterine brothers alone that are re-united, and not also by such uterine brothers as are not re-united; failing a re-united whole brother, all the uterine brothers, 'being assembled', i. e., meeting together, and 'united', i. e., with equal prominence, shall divide it 'equally', i. e., in equal shares; in default of the uterine brothers, the uterine sisters; and in their default, the half brothers. This interpretation is to be rejected, as in it many terms are to be supplied (which are not in the text) and as it is far-fetched. Vijnánesvara has, in order to make the two texts consistent with each other, adopted a different reading of the text of Yogisvara, namely,—"But a re-united half brother may take the property, not a half brother (not re-united)"; but nevertheless, the interpretation put by him is evolved out of his inner consciousness, for it is a forced one, by reason of the supply (of a term not in the text) and of the construction of the same term with different sentences, and is very Hence a reconciliation of the texts of Manu and Yogísvara, as bearing only the plain meanings, is to be effected only by referring them to different cases, and not by ringing changes upon the words (of the one text) to give out the same meaning (as the other). The same we proceed to show. The text of Manu shows the joint succession of brothers, whether re-united or not, and of sisters.

when the estate consists of both moveables and immoveables: but the text of Yogisvara refers to a case when the estate consists of immoveables only, or of moveables only. This follows from the text of Prajapati, viz.—"But when the estate consists of chattels and other property it goes, however, to the re-united; but the land and house shall be taken by the unassociated (whole brothers?) according to the share."—The term 'chattels,' by the rule of 'the bulls and the beeves,' signifies bipeds, quadrupeds and the like; 'the re-united' means, the re-united half brothers. The correct reading of the text of Yogisvara is, "A half brother though re-united does not take the estate of a half brother." Hence, when there is only immoveable property or only moveable property, then, by reason of the text of Yogisvara, a uterine brother though not re-united takes, but not a half brother though re-united: when, however, there are both kinds of property, then agreeably to what is laid down in the text of Prajapati, the unassociated uterine brother and sister as well as the re-This also is the united half brother take in equal shares.

meaning of the text of Manu. This is not good. Since the defects of insertion (of terms not used in the text), forced construction &c., are not wanting in the interpretation put by you; and what is declared in the text of Prajapati is not in conflict with the the interpretation put by Vijnánesvara (on the text of Yogisvara). Accordingly the author of the Madanaratna, adopting this interpretation, cites this very text of Prajápati in support of it. But agreeably to your interpretation, there is rather the defect of tautology unavoidable in the text of Yogísvara, for (agreeably to your reading) it is in the first part said—"A half brother though re-united does not take the estate of a half brother,"—and the very same thing, neither more nor less, is expressed in the last part, namely,—"not the re-united son of a different mother." And although an interpretation involving the defect of tautology, might even reluctantly be accepted for the purpose of making the text consistent with the text of Manu; still it would be improper to adopt a meaning which is liable to the objection of multiplicity for assuming another radical revelation.

Digitized by Google

7. Sálapáni, in his commentary on the Institutes of Yájnavalkya, says (while interpreting the above texts which are read by him in a different way):—A half brother though re-united shall not take the property of a half brother; the uterine brother alone though not reunited shall take, but not a re-united half brother. If the reading be, "But a re-united half brother may take the property, not a half brother," then the meaning is that a half brother being a half brother, may not take the property though re-united. This text shows the succession of an unassociated whole brother, hence there is no defect of tautology.

This, however, is of the same nature with what is said by Sríkara. The author of the Ratnákara, however, says that the reading (of the text of Yájnavalkya), as found in the Kalpataru, is "shall not take the property of a half brother," but this must be a copying mistake, inasmuch as the reading found in the copies of the Institutes of Yájnavalkya, and in the commentaries such as the Mitákshará, the Párijáta and the Haláyudha, is—"not a half brother, may take the property;" and the interpretation of that text, (in these commentaries), are in accor-

dance with that reading.

8. The author of the Dayatattva, however, says:—
"But when there are a half brother re-united, and a uterine brother not re-united, and when there are a whole brother and a half brother both re-united: then two questions arise, which of the two is to succeed in each case.

"As to the first, it is said 'A half brother &c.,' which signifies; let a half brother, if re-united, take, but not a half brother merely as such: but a uterine brother though not re-united may take; for the term, 'uterine brother,' which occurs in the preceding text is also to be construed with the latter proposition. Therefore when there are an unassociated uterine brother and a re-united half brother, they both succeed; because the equality of the relation of re-union, and of the status of a whole brother, is expressed by the first part of the text.

"As to the second, it is ordained and not the son of a different mother who is re-united, the meaning is that

when there is a whole brother re-united, the son of a different mother, though re-united shall not take, i. e., the re-united whole brother alone shall succeed; since though they are equally re-united, still the whole brother as such is preferred."

This is in conformity with what is said in the Miták-shará and the like, but it discloses great want of skill in

interpretation.

9. The authors of the Smritichandriká and the Madanaratna say:—When, however, the father or the uncle is not re-united, then the unassociated half brother succeeds; in his default, however, the unassociated father; failing him, the wife. Accordingly Sankha says—'The wealth of a sonless person who departs for heaven, goes to the brothers; in their default, let the parents take, or the senior wife." The meaning is,—The property of a deceased sonless re-united (person) goes, in default of a re-united (coparcener) to an unassociated half brother. Hence this text may also, as it is, be relative to the estate of a re-united person.

The author of the Mitákshará and others say that this text refers only to re-union, consequently there is no inconsistency in the succession of the parents and the wife

on failure of the brothers.

It is stated in the Smritichandriká:—The term 'senior has been employed in the text of Sankha for the purpose of indicating the possession of virtues such as the control of passions, not for the purpose of excluding the middlemost or any other junior wife. The term 'in their default' should have been used over again, but in its stead, the particle 'or' has been used, for the effect is the same. Since, the term 'or' marks an alternative; but in the present instance there cannot reasonably be an alternative with reference to the ownership which is a determinate thing; for it is a rule laid down by the Sastras, also established by reason, that 'An indeterminate affirmation is not made with reference to a determinate thing'; therefore, here the term 'or' indicates an alternative with reference to 'default'; hence the result is the same. cordingly the order is this: in default of the brothers, the father; in his default, the mother; in her default, the senior wife.

In the Madanaratna, however, it is said that the mother succeeds in the first instance; and then the father. The intention being, that it follows from the principle set forth in the Mitákshará, there being no text against the application of that principle to the present case, like the text of Vishnu relative to the estate of a person separated and not re-united. Accordingly, on account of the text of Vishnu it has been held in that treatise, in the same way as in the Smritichandriká, that the term 'parents' in the text,—"The wife and the daughters also &c.,"—means that the father succeeds in the first instance, in his default the mother. We have already dealt with this at great length.

Hence it appears that the above text of Sankha being in conflict with the text,—"The wife and the daughters also &c.,"—is taken to be relative to partition after re-union, in order to avoid the conflict. The order of the heirs, which is laid down in the text, "The wife and the daughters also &c.,"—and which is founded upon a principle and is relative to separate property, -is opposed by the order laid down by texts of law with reference to the present In this order, there is no principle; hence this order rests entirely upon the authority of the texts of law. Also. Nárada says,—" But when the husband is dead, the wives, who are destitute however of (the husband's) brother, father and mother, and all the sapindas shall divide the (whole re-united) property agreeably to shares."—The meaning of this text is:—'The wives' (bháryás) i. e., the patnis; 'who are destitute of brother, father and mother,' means. in case the brother father and mother of the husband do By deviating from the rule regarding the conjunctive compound, agreeably to which the father and mother who are entitled to greater respect than a brother, ought to have been placed first in the compound abhrátripitri-mátrikás (rendered above into 'destitute of brother, father and mother,') and by combining the words in the reverse order, Nárada intended to show that the estate of a re-united sonless person goes to the brother in the first instance, in their default to the father, in his default to

the mother, and in her default to the virtuous wife. Thus it is to be observed that the wife of a re-united person succeeds first, not in default of the legitimate and the subsidiary sons (only) but on failure also of re-united (coparceners,) whole and half brothers, father and mother. The meaning of 'all the sapindas &c.,' is this; those other than the brothers, father and mother, who are sapindas of a re-united person destitute of male issue,—such as the brother's sons &c.,—shall, on his death, divide their own property which was re-united by their father and the like with the property of that sonless person, with his wives, 'agreeably to shares', i. e., allotting the brother's share to the nephews and the husband's share to the wives, and so not modifying the shares.

- 10. On failure of the wife, the sister gets the share of a sonless re-united person. Thus it is ordained by Vríhaspati,—" But if there be a sister, she is entitled to get a share of it, this is the law regarding the estate of a person destitute of issue, also destitute of the wife and the father,"—the term 'also' (cha) suggests, "also destitute of the mother."
- ciated) sapindas, that is, the nearest sapindas shall divide the estate left by a re-united person, agreeably to shares, i. e., shall get the estate in the order of propinquity as declared by Manu in the text,—"To the nearest sapinda, the inheritance next belongs;" since the order of succession among these has not been expressly declared. Thus the same sage (Vrihaspati) declares,—"If the deceased have no issue, nor wife, nor brother, nor father nor mother, then all the sapindas shall divide his property agreeably to shares." "His property" signifies the property of a reunited person; "If the deceased leave no issue &c.," means, if the deceased be destitute of those (heirs) the order of whose succession to the re-united estate has expressly been declared.

But it is to be observed that in default of the sapindas the estate of a re-united person, like the estate of a person separated, goes on his death to the samánodakas and the like in the order previously mentioned agreeably to the degree of propinquity. For there is no special text of law relative to the re-united estate, declaring the order of succession on failure of the *sapindas*.

If it be argued that as by reason of the text a reunited brother and the like succeed to the estate of a re-united person in spite of the wife and the like, so by virtue of the same text the re-united sons alone should inherit the estate of the father when there are both re-united and unassociated sons. The answer is that the argument is not tenable: since the term 'sonless' occurring in the previous text, is to be construed with this text; hence the death of a re-united person without male issue, is the cause of the succession (of a re-united co-heir); therefore when a re-united person leaves male issue, then the text,-" But of a re-united (co-heir) &c.,"—cannot apply, since the circumstance of his being without male issue is wanting: consequently, in this instance too, both descriptions of sons are equally entitled to take the father's share by reason of the text,—" The sons shall on the demise of the parents, divide their estate and debts in equal shares." But only whatever remains after the enjoyment by a person re-united with his son, of that share which was previously allotted to him (on partition,) shall be separately adjusted; i. e., whatever share would belong to the father at the time, shall be taken by the sons, dividing Nor can it be contended that let not the term 'sonless' occurring in the previous text be construed with the text,—"But of a re-united (co-heir) &c." Because it would follow that even as regards the property of a re-united brother or the like who is not without male issue, his brother or the like will take his share to the exclusion of the male issue; and this would be opposed to the immemorial custom of all countries. And because if the text "But of a re-united &c.," were relative without distinction to a person who has male issue as well as to one who is destitute of male issue, then this text could not reasonably be said to form an exception to the text,-" The wife and the daughters also &c.,"—which is relative only to a person destitute of male issue; consequently the above contention is contrary to the term "but" which marks an exception. Nor can it be argued (admitting the construction of the term 'sonless' with the text regarding re-union) that agreeably to the rule laid down by the learned, namely, "An adjective becomes significant if it may reasonably be applied, and if without it there would be inclusion of things not intended to be included,"—this adjective (properly) refers only to one who is re-united with a brother or the like, for it becomes exclusive; and not to one who is reunited with his son, for as that which is to be excluded is wanting, its application would be unreasonable. Because in the absence of two separate propositions if the precept embodied in one proposition be operative sometimes in connection with the adjective and sometimes without it, then in consequence of the two-fold meaning of the same proposition caused by its construction and nonconstruction with the adjective, there would be variableness in the proposition consisting in the variableness in the precept. Besides, ownership in the property of the father or other ancestor is to be held to be caused by sonship &c., alone, if not attended with degradation and the like disqualification, but not also if attended with re-union; by reason of multiplicity: and as the sonship &c., belong equally to all (the male issue,) whether re-united or not, therefore the succession, to their property, of all the sons and the like without distinction is proper. Nor can it be said, that right (of the sons &c., as such) to the property of the father and other ancestors, ceases by partition. Because (if that were so) then it would follow that when all the sons are separated and not re-united, then the wife &c., will become heirs as in default of male issue; and because the right of the father and son to each other's property is on the contrary laid down by A'pastamba and Háríta, thus they say,—" (The father) may, in his lifetime divide the property and retire to a forest or adopt the order befitting an old man or may divide a small portion and retain the greater portion himself; and if he be pinched, may resume from them."—"The order befitting on old man," means mendicancy (or the fourth order of 'be pinched,' means, be reduced for want of food.

But if a son be born after partition, then (agreeably to what is said above, also) the sons who have been previously separated would have been entitled to the father's property, but they are debarred by the text of Vrihaspati, namely,—"Those born before partition are not entitled to the share of the parents; nor one born after it, to the share of a brother. Whatever is acquired by a father separated from the son, belongs entirely to one born after partition; those born before partition are declared to be not entitled. As in the property so in debts also, in gifts, pledges and purchases, they have no claim on each other, except for acts of mourning and libations of water."

The heir to the estate of a re-united person must maintain his wives and support his daughters till they are married as well as perform the ceremony of their This is declared by Sankha and Nárada after marriage. premising re-union,—" If any one of the brothers without issue die or enter a religious order, let the rest divide his wealth, excepting the wife's separate property. Let them allow a maintenance to his wives until the end of their lives. provided they preserve unsullied the bed of their husband; but if they behave otherwise, the brothers may resume their allowance. If he leaves a daughter, her paternal share is ordained for maintenance, she shall get her portion till marriage; afterwards the husband shall maintain her."-"If they behave otherwise" means, if they do not preserve unsullied the bed of their husband, i. e., if they be of bad character; the prefix á in ásanskárát, (rendered into 'till marriage',) signifies inclusion, hence the celebration of marriage also is included.

Thus ends the partition of re-united estate.



CHAPTER V.

WOMAN'S PROPERTY.

PART I.

§1.—Woman's property enumerated. 2.—The term stridhanam bears no technical meaning. 3.—The terms 'gift before the fire' &c., explained, 4.—The amount of maintenance allowed to females. 5.—The power of females over their property. 6.—Males have no power over woman's property; maintenance may be exacted by the wife, if not wicked. 7.—Husband's power over the wife's property in the event of distress. 8.—What was promised by the husband to his wife must be given by his sons; sons cannot divide the mother's property during her life.

1. Now, with a view to explain the partition of stridhanam or woman's property, its nature is first determined.

On this Manu says,—"What is given before the (nuptial) fire, what is presented in the bridal procession, what is bestowed in token of affection, and what is received from the brother, the mother or the father; these six-fold are declared to be stridhanam."—The term 'sixfold' is intended, not as a restriction of a greater number, but as a denial of a less. Accordingly Yogisvara uses the term 'the like' in the text,—"What is given by the father, the mother, the husband or the brother, what is received before the (nuptial) fire, what is presented on the husband's marriage to another wife, or the like, is pronounced to be stridhanam." Also, Vishnu declares more than six sorts of woman's property; thus he says,—"What is given by the father, the mother, the son or the brother, what is received before the (nuptial) fire, what is presented on the husband's marriage with another wife, what is given by the bandhus or relations, and anvådheyakam or a gift subsequent to marriage; these are denominated woman's property." Nárada says,—"What is received before the (nuptial) fire,

what is presented in the bridal procession, likewise a gift by the husband, what is given by the brother and the parents; these six-fold are declared to be *stridhanam*."— The term 'six-fold' is to be explained in the same way as in the text of Manu.

2. The term stridhanam or woman's property has been used (in the above texts) in its ordinary meaning, viz., property whereof a woman is the owner, and not in a technical sense (as including only the enumerated items of property;) for when the ordinary meaning is acceptable, it is not proper to adopt a technical meaning. Accordingly Yogísvara has employed the term 'the like' on purpose to include what is acquired by the common means of acquisition, such as inheritance, purchase &c.

If it be said:—If it were so, then the exclusion of certain kinds of property from the category of woman's property would be unreasonable; for, a woman's ownership therein cannot be denied by reason of contradiction (with the above exposition;) thus, Kátyáyana says,—"Among these, what is given conditionally or what is given under collusion by the father, brother or husband; that is not denominated woman's property." 'Condition' is the restriction that this ornament or the like, which is given to you, is to be put on by you only on days of festivity &c., and not at any other time; what is given with such a restriction is "given conditionally:" "under collusion" means, with the intention of defrauding the co-heirs,—(as if saying)—'This has been given to a maiden daughter, how can such property be partible?' It is also said by the same sage that what is acquired by means of mechanical arts, also what is presented out of affection by a friend or the like does not become woman's property, thus,—"But whatever is acquired by means of mechanical arts, also what is received through affection from any other; therein the husband's ownership arises at that time; the rest, however, is pronounced woman's property." It is upon the assumption that the term stridhanam is technical in its meaning, that what would, by reason of being given by a brother &c., be included by the term stridhanam is excepted (in the first of the above texts;) hence a technical meaning is intended

(by the above two texts) to be attached to the term woman's property, viz. that stridhanam means what is given by the father or the like excepting that (which is mentioned in the first of the above texts) or excepting what is gained by mechanical arts and the like (men-

tioned in the second text.)

The answer is: In the above texts the denial is, not of their being woman's property, but of its consequences, such as distribution (by her choice amongst her heirs,) &c. Accordingly in the latter text it is said, "therein the husband's ownership arises." The meaning is that the husband and not the woman has independence in dealing with such property. In the first text, however, the denial also of the woman's right is possible, by reason of the employment of the terms 'condition' and 'collusion'; and it is universally known that no right accrues to such gifts, by reason of the text of Manu, namely,-" Collusive mortgage and sale, collusive gift and acceptance, and wherever a condition (or fraud) is found; all these shall be prevented." The following text (of Manu,) namely,-"A wife and a son, also a slave; these three are incapable of holding property: whatever they acquire belongs to him whose they are,"—is to be taken to refer, in the case of a wife, only to what is acquired by mechanical arts &c., by reason of the simplicity of the supposition that both the precepts are founded on the same radical revelation.

The terms 'gift before the nuptial fire,' and the like are explained by Kátyáyana, thus,—" What is given to women at the time of their marriage, near the nuptial fire, is proclaimed by the wise as the woman's property given before the nuptial fire. That again, which a woman receives while she is conducted from her father's house (to her husband's dwelling) is declared as woman's property under the name of gift presented in the bridal procession. Whatever, however, is given through affection by the mother-in-law or the father-in-law, or what is given on obeisance by touching the feet (of a woman,) is called an affectionate gift. Subsequent to marriage, however, what is received by a woman from her husband's family is called a gift subsequent, and so is what is like-

wise received from her own family. Whatever, however, is received as a price of household furniture, conveyance, milch-cattle and ornaments, is denominated fee or sulka. That which is received by a married woman or by a maiden in the house of her husband or of her father, from her brother or from her parents, is termed a kind gift."--'I'he reading (of the text defining a kind gift) as adopted in the Kalpataru and other "from her husband" (instead of 'from her brother.') The terms 'presents before fire,' &c. although they convey their derivative meaning, are still technical, inasmuch as they are applied only to the above descriptions of woman's property. It has been explained in the Madanaratna, that the price of household furniture &c., which is taken from the bridegroom or the like for giving (in marriage) the bride, in the shape of the bride's ornaments, is the fee or sulka. In the Mitakshara, however, it is said, that the fee or sulka is that which having been taken, the bride is given in marriage. in both (the books), it is intended that the father or the like takes it on the understanding that it is to belong to the bride; because, otherwise, in the absence of her right thereto, the application of the denomination of woman's property to it, would be unreasonable. But Jimutavahana having adopted a reading (of the above text of Kátyáyana, defining the fee or sulka) in which there is the word karminám, workmen, instead of karmanám, acts, has explained the text in this way: "In order to have a work done by workmen on houses &c., i. e., by artizans, what is given as a bribe to a woman for inducing her husband or others (of her family who are the artizans), to do the work, is the fee or sulka. This itself is the price, as it is paid for her inducement." He has further said, - "Or the fee is what is described by Vyása in the text,—'What is given to bring her to her husband's house is called the fee or sulka.'—The meaning is, that what is given by way of bribe or the like, to induce her to go to her husband's house is the fee or sulka." Both these descriptions of property belong to the woman, for to her alone they are given; hence it is easy to understand the application of the name 'woman's property' to these, in the same way as to other kinds of woman's property.

- A gift on supersession (adhivedanikam) is what is bestowed on the first wife on the occasion of espousing another wife. This is described by Yajnavalkya, thus—"To a woman whose husband marries a second wife, let him give an equal sum as a compensation for supersession, if woman's property have not been given to her; but if any have been assigned, let him allot half."
- 4. Kátyáyana lays down a special rule regarding the grant of property by the father or the like, to females for their maintenance:-"The father, the mother, the husband, the brother or the jnatis or kinsmen of the same family, shall agreeably to their means, give to women stridhanam, not exceeding two thousand, excepting immoveable property."-The meaning is, that property other than immoveables, extending to two thousand karshapanas shall be given according to the means. So also Vyása declares,-"But an allowance of property amounting to two thousand at the most shall be given to a female." Kátyávana by the term 'not exceeding two thousand,' and Vyása by the term 'at the most,' show that even a rich man is not to give more to women (whom he is bound to maintain). This restriction, however, is to be understood to apply to what is given every year, and not to an allowance once for all. Hence there is no incongruity, if the property given for maintenance for many years exceed this amount; for it is for maintenance that the gift is made, but it is not possible that that for the whole life can be covered by merely two thousand (kárshápaṇas).
- 5. In the disposal of woman's property, however, females have not independence without the permission of their husband. This is declared by Manu thus,—"Women shall not make any disbursement out of family property which is common to many, or even out of their own property without the permission of their husband."—Disbursement (nirhára) means, expenditure.

But in the disposal of some kinds of woman's property, females have independence; this, Katyayana having described a kind gift, declares thus,—"The independence of women who have received a kind gift, is admitted (in

respect of it,) for it was given by them out of kindness, for their maintenance. With respect to a kind gift, the independence, at all times, of women is proclaimed in making sale or gift according to pleasure, even when it consists of immoveable property."

But as regards property given by the husband, they have independence in dealing only with property other than immoveables. This is declared by Nárada, thus,-"What has been given by an affectionate husband to his wife, she may, even when he is dead, consume it or give it away as she pleases, excepting immoveable property." The meaning is, that the wife can only enjoy the immoveable property given by the husband by dwelling on it, &c., but cannot make a gift, sale, or the like. of opinion that the text of Katyayana also, viz.—" Let the sonless wife, preserving unsulfied the bed of her husband &c."-refers only to immoveable property given by the husband, since (if interpreted in this way) it embodies the same precept as the text of Nárada. But what it refers to, has been discussed by us while explaining the text,— "The wife and the daughters also, &c." (p. 136 et sequel).

The males (of the family), however, have no power of disposal over any kind of stridhanam, inasmuch as they have no ownership in it: this is declared by Kátyáyana,—" Neither the husband nor the son nor the father nor the brothers can assume the power over a woman's property to take it or give it away. If any of these persons forcibly consume a woman's property, he shall be compelled to make it good with interest, and shall also incur a fine. If such a person having obtained her consent amicably, consume her property, he shall be required to pay the principal, when he becomes rich (enough to pay it). But if the husband have a second wife and do not show honor to his first wife, he shall be compelled by force to restore her property though amicably lent to him. raiment and dwelling be withheld from the woman, she may exact her due supply and take a share (of the estate) with the co-heirs."

The meaning of the two couplets beginning with "But if the husband," is this: if the husband having taken the

wealth of one wife lives with another wife and neglects the first, the king shall forcibly compel him to restore that wealth; and if the husband does not supply her with food, raiment and dwelling, then these also or property sufficient for these, may be forcibly exacted by the wife. This also is to be understood to take effect when she is blameless: for a wicked woman is not entitled to obtain any sort of woman's property whatsoever, as is declared by the same sage,—"But a woman who is inimical, shameless, dissipator of wealth, or adulterous is not worthy of woman's property."—By the expression 'is not worthy', it is indicated that what has been received by her may be forcibly taken from her: 'inimical' is one who is always engaged in committing acts against the will of the husband,—another reading is 'impudent' (nirmaryádá instead of shameless).

Devala says,—"Her subsistence, her ornaments, her fee or sulka, and her gains are the separate property of She herself exclusively has the right to enjoy it, her husband has no right to use it, except in distress. In case of consumption or disbursement without cause, he must refund it to the wife with interest." 'Subsistence' or vriddhi, means, according to the Smritichandrika, what is given by the father or the like (relation) towards her advancement. In the Madanaratna, however, this is read as vritti, and is explained to mean what is given by the father or the like for subsistence. 'Gains' signifies what is received from any person, who makes the present for the purpose of pleasing Gauri or some other goddess: 'without cause' means, otherwise than in distress: 'disbursement,' means abandonment, i. e., giving away; this is relative to gift and enjoyment that are not permitted by the wife, but if she permits, there is no fault even when there is no distress: the term 'exclusively' in the passage 'she herself exclusively' is intended to exclude her children; because the husband's exclusion is laid down by the passage 'her husband has no right to use it,' and because the husband being excluded, the exclusion of the brother and other relations who are more distant than the husband is, by the rule of the staff and the cake, established. From the

phrase 'except in distress,' it appears that there is no fault (if the wife's property be used) in distress; hence the same sage declares in the concluding text,—"Is entitled to use woman's property, also for the relief of the distress of the son."—The term husband (occurring in the preceding text) is to be construed with this text. The term 'son' is intended to indicate the family; the meaning is, for the relief of the distress, i. e., the pain caused by the want of food &c., of the family. The term 'also,' shows that the husband is entitled to give away or consume the wife's property without her consent, in any other difficulty caused by the want of money.

If it be said: How can it be shown by this text that a person is entitled to give away or consume another person's property without the consent of the owner; for it would be a contradiction in terms: in the case of consent, however, there is no difficulty although there be no distress. The answer is, that by virtue of the texts (to that effect it is to be admitted that) he has ownership itself over such property to use it for such purposes; so there is no defect. Accordingly Yogisvara says,-"A husband, if unwilling, is not liable to make good the property of his wife, taken by him in a famine or for the performance of some religious duty or during illness or while under restraint."—' For the performance of some religious duty,' means, for the performance of necessary, daily or occasional, ceremonies; 'while under restraint' means, while arrested by the king for the levy of a fine or the like: but Vachaspati says that the term sampratirodhake (rendered into 'while under restraint') is an adjective qualifying 'illness,' and that it means preventing the pursuit of avo-Also, the proposition, "if unwilling, is not liable to make good"-is to be understood to refer to the case of inability to refund on account of poverty and the like; but if he is able to repay, then even what is taken in a famine and the like, must be refunded: when this text may reasonably be interpreted in this very way, it would be improper to maintain that he may choose not to refund even if he is able to do so. As the term 'husband' is used in the text, therefore it is to be known that even in the event of distress the husband alone but no other (relative) has the right to take a woman's property and to repay it at his desire.

8. What the husband promised to give to his wife must, when he is dead, be given to her by the son and the like. This too is declared by the same sage,—" Property promised by the husband to his wife must be paid by his sons, just as his debts."—The term 'sons' includes grandsons and great-grandsons, by reason of the expression 'just as his debts.' By this it is shewn that although the right of the sons accrues their mother's property by birth, still there can be no partition, while she is alive.

Thus woman's property has been described.

PART II.

§ 1.—Joint succession of sons and daughters to gift subsequent and affectionate gift of husband. 2.—Maiden daughters succeed to yautaka. 3.—Daughter's succession to other kinds of property in preference to sons. 4.—According to Jimútaváhana this refers to yautaka only. 5.—But according to Vijnánesvara, this refers to every description of property. 6.—Latter's argument criticized by Jimútaváhana. 7.—Criticism by the author. 8.—The daughter's daughters and sons. 9—15.—Succession to property of a childless woman. 9.—Succession of husband and parents according to form of marriage. 10.—Jimútaváhana's opinion criticized. 11.—Brothers' succession to gift of parents. 12.—Sulka goes to uterine brothers. 13.—Gift of bandhus goes to bandhus. 14.—Of other heirs. 15.—Females not pressly mentioned, cannot succeed.

1. Now, the partition of woman's property is explained.

On this Manu says,—"But when the mother is dead, all the uterine brothers and the uterine sisters shall equally divide the maternal estate." Since in this text the term 'and' is used which conveys the same meaning as the conjunctive compound, therefore it is shewn that the uterine brothers and sisters are jointly entitled to take the mother's estate. The term 'uterine' is used to debar the children of a different mother.

Devala says,—"A woman's property is common to sons and maiden daughters, when she is dead; but if without leaving issue, let her husband, mother, brother or father take it."—In this text, however, the conjunctive compound itself (of sons and daughters, viz., puttra-kanyánám) is used, hence the joint succession of sons as well as daughters is clear.

But this (joint succession of the son and daughter) is relative to two descriptions of woman's property, namely, the gift subsequent and what is through affection given by the husband. Accordingly Manu himself says,—" The gift subsequent and what has been given by the affectionate husband; these become the property of the children of the deceased woman though the husband is alive."—'The gift subsequent' as defined before, also what has through affection been given by the husband; 'these' descriptions of a woman's property belong to 'children,' i. e., sons and daughters of the deceased woman. 'Although the husband is alive' means, in spite of the surviving husband: since the locative case in 'patyau' (husband) is indicative of disregard. The term 'children' in this text being used without any qualification, the co-equal ownership of the male and female children is expressed; hence they are to take the maternal estate in equal shares: not, however, the sisters in the first instance; in their default the brothers.

'The sisters' in the text of Manu (para. 1) are to be taken to be unmarried. Accordingly Vrihaspati says,—
"A woman's property appertains to her issue, the daughter also is a sharer of it; but when there is an unmarried daughter, the married one obtains a mere token of respect."—The term 'issue' means, sons; since 'the daughter' is separately mentioned: 'sharer of it' means, an equal sharer with a son: 'a mere token of respect' means that she obtains something, as a token of respect (due to her), in proportion to it, but not an equal share with a son.

In default of the unmarried daughters, the married ones also, whose husbands are alive, participate with their brothers. This is declared by Kátyáyana,—"The sisters whose husbands are alive shall succeed together with their brothers."

At the time of partition something should be given also to the daughter's daughters. Accordingly Manu says, —"If there be daughters of the daughters, to them also, according as they deserve, should be given through affection, something out of their grandmother's property,"-'according as they deserve,' means, regard being had to propriety and to poverty and the like. Nor can it be argued that as the daughter's daughters have not then any right, wherefore is anything to be given to them? Since, just as in the case of paternal property, although the daughters have no right of inheritance when there are sons, still a quarter share is to be allotted to them by virtue of texts; the same reason holds good in this instance also. dingly the term 'through affection' is used. The distinction is, that in the present instance it being declared that the gift is to be made through affection, it is also indicated that it is optional; but in the other instance, the allotment is compulsory by reason of the expression of censure in the text,—"those that are unwilling to give become degraded."

2. But the yautaka property (the nuptial presents) of the mother belongs to the maiden daughters alone; not to sons nor to married daughters. This is declared by Manu himself,—"But the yautaka or the nuptial present of the mother is the share of the unmarried daughters alone."

According to the root yu to unite, whatever is, at the time of marriage, given to the bride and the bridegroom sitting upon the same seat, is called yautaka through the derivation, 'what belongs to the yutau (or the two united) is yautaka.' But some (commentators, among whom the author of the Dáyabhága is one) maintain that on marriage the corporeal union of the man and wife takes place, by reason of the Sruti, namely,—"(His) bone (becomes identical) with (her) bone, flesh with flesh, skin with skin,"—the meaning of which is, that the bones and other parts of the husband and wife become one. Others (among whom the author of the Dáyatattva is one) say that on marriage the union (of the husband and wife) arises, since it is indicated in the text (which the bride and the bridegroom are made to recite at the time of the marriage,) namely,—

"What is thy heart, let that become mine, what is my heart let that become thine." In the Nighantu it is said 'What belongs to the two united or yuta is yautaka.' The term is also read as yautuka, since it is stated in the Kosa (or authoritative vocabulary,)—"What is yautaka is also yautuka." Devasvámin says: The property of the mother which was received by her in the house of her father is called yautaka, such property being distinct from what was received in the house of her husband; since the term yauta signifies also disunion; as it is said in the Dhátupatha that 'The root yu means, to unite or to disunite,' and it is used in this sense, thus, 'on completion of the yuta or disunion.' This, (i. e., what is said by Devasvámin) is not good. For it is merely an assumption, inasmuch as there being no criterion for determination, it may equally be said that the term yautaka means the property received in the husband's house, such property being distinct from what is obtained in the father's house.

When there are more than one maiden daughter, then agreeably to the maxim, 'Equality is the rule where no distinction is expressed,' their shares must be equal, no distinction being expressed.

The property of the mother excepting these three kinds, (viz., gift subsequent, affectionate gift of the husband and yautaka) devolves on her daughters (in the first instance and not on her sons.) Amongst them also, first on the unmarried daughters; in their default, on those that are married: amongst these also, first on those that are unprovided; on failure of them, on those who are provided, and whose husbands are living; failing them, on the widowed ones. Accordingly Gautama declares,—"A woman's property goes to her daughters, unmarried and unprovided."—It is explained by Apararka and the author of the Kalpataru that 'unprovided' means childless, indigent, neglected (by the husband) or widowed. Vijnánesvara and others attach to the term the first two of the above meanings. In this text also although the general term 'woman's property' is employed, still it is to be taken to refer to property other than the three descriptions mentioned above. This is said also in the Smritichandriká and the Madanaratna.



But Jímútaváhana and Raghunandana maintain that the text of Gautama cited above, (§3,) the text of namely,-"The daughters (shall take) their mother's (property;) in default of daughters, her (or their) offspring,"—the text of Kátyáyana, namely,—"But in default of the daughter, that property devolves on the son,"—the text of Yogisvara, namely—"Daughters share the residue of their mother's property after payment of her debts; in their default, the issue,"-and other texts of law. declaring the succession of daughters to woman's property, refer to yautaka or nuptial presents only, in conformity with the text of Manu, namely—"The yautaka is the share of the unmarried daughters alone,"—and with the text of Vasishtha,—"Let the females divide the nuptial present of their mother": otherwise there would be a conflict with the text of Manu cited before (§ 1.) The term párinayya (in Vasishtha's text, rendered into 'nuptial present') has been explained by them to mean what is received at marriage (parinaya,) that is to say, yautaka. But in the Kalpataru and the Vivadachintamani, the reading is párináyýa which is explained to mean the paraphernalia of a woman, such as the mirror, comb and the like.

5. But Vijnánesvara says:—

Every description of woman's property goes first, even when there are the sons and the rest, to the daughters, the daughter's daughters and the daughter's sons; and in their default to the sons and the rest. The succession to the estate of a childless woman will be explained hereafter. In the text of Yogísvara, namely,—"Daughters share the residue of their mother's property after payment of her debts; in their default the issue"—the term 'their' relates not to daughters alone, but also to daughter's daughters and daughter's sons, by reason of the text of Nárada, namely,—"The daughters (shall take) their mother's (property); in default of the daughters, their (or her) offspring." In this text (of Nárada) the term tat (their or her) in the compound tadanvayas (their or her offspring) refers to the contiguous term daughters (and not to the term 'mother's' which is more remote). Accor-

dingly the daughters' offspring including the daughters' daughters and the daughters' sons (is meant by the term tadanvayas). Amongst them also first the daughter's daughter (succeeds;) in her default, the daughter's son. In the text of Yogisvara, which will be cited below, the term 'daughters' in the passage "but if she leave progeny, it will go to the (daughter's) daughters,"—means the daughter's daughters; for, otherwise, there would be tautology, as he himself has clearly declared the succession of daughters in the text,—"The daughters share the residue of their mother's property &c." The succession of the daughter's son follows from the general expression "the daughters' offspring" (Naradá's text).

But the right of the sons follows from the uni-residual conjunctive compound pitros (' of the parents') in the text (of Yajnavalkya,)—"After the demise of the parents the sons shall equally divide the heritage and the debts": and this has been already explained before. Also in the text, -" The daughters (shall take) the mother's (property); their default, the issue,"—the son and the like in are intended by the term 'issue,' since it is proper to construe it with the term 'mother's,' and since 'the daughters' are separately mentioned. But there can be no defect of tautology (attributable to this interpretation of the above two texts of Yajnavalkya) since this (latter) text is intended to establish the succession of the sons in default of the daughters, (while in the first text the mere right of the sons to inherit, is mentioned).

But the meaning of the text of Manu, namely,—"But when the mother is dead, &c." (§1)—is this: 'All the uterine brothers shall equally divide their maternal property,' when their succession opens, 'and the uterine sisters' when their right takes effect. But the meaning is not that both (brothers and sisters) shall together divide; for, in the absence of the conjunctive compound or the uni-residual conjunctive compound, the mutual union (of brothers and sisters) does not appear; but the term 'and' (which it may be contended, bears the same meaning as a conjunctive compound) may reasonably be explained to express the union (of 'brothers and sisters') merely so far as regards their grammatical construction, both being

Digitized by Google

nominative to the verb 'divide.' As for example, if it is said, 'Devadatta and Yajnadatta shall pursue agriculture,' it does not (necessarily) appear that they must jointly do the same. Although, the right of both (sons and daughters) to succeed to their mother's estate has been declared in other texts, still this text is intended to prohibit, by the employment of the term 'equally,' the mode of unequal distribution on account of specific deductions and the like.

The term 'uterine' is used (in the above text of Manu) for the purpose of excluding the brothers and sisters sprung from a different mother. Hence it is that Manu (in another text) declares that the property of a low caste woman is taken by the daughter of her co-wife of a superior class, though not begotten by herself, and in her default by her progeny; thus,-" The wealth of a woman, which has been in any manner given to her by her father, let the Brahmani (step) daughter take; or let it belong to her offspring." Here by the term 'woman' is intended a woman of the Kshatriya or the like (inferior) class, having no issue; and the term 'Brahmani' is illustrative, meaning, belonging to a superior class. This (text) forms an exception to the rule that 'the property of a childless woman, appertains to the husband.' Hence the daughter of a Kshatriya co-wife takes the property of her childless step-mother of the Vajsya class, and the daughter of a rival wife of the Vaisya class takes the property of her Súdra step-mother without issue; and in her default her children; and in their default, the text,—"The property of a childless woman appertains to the husband,"—is applicable to such property.

Hence the daughters and the rest are entitled to take the property of a woman leaving issue, in the first in-

stance; and after them the sons and the like.

6. On this Jimutavahana says: Since, although a conjunctive compound (of the terms 'brothers' and 'sisters') is not employed in the texts of Manu, Vrihaspati, Sankha and Likhita, yet the same meaning (that is expressed by a conjunctive compound) is conveyed by the term 'and' which signifies conjunction; since in the text

of Devala the conjunctive compound itself of 'sons and daughters,' viz., puttra-kanyánám is used; and since, for the sake of consistency (of this text of Devala with the texts of Manu and the rest), it is proper that the term 'and' in those texts (of Manu and the rest) also, should denote the mutual union (of brothers and sisters connected by it), therefore it is reasonable to say that brothers and sisters shall together take the property, dividing the same. Besides if the daughters alone were entitled to take the entire property of their mother, then the special text with respect to the yautaka or nuptial presents would be mean-And it is not reasonable to say that this text (regarding yautaka) is intended to exclude the married daughters, as in it the term "unmarried daughters" is employed; because their exclusion, as gards all kinds of stridhanam, is declared in the texts of Gautama and the rest, and because it cannot but be admitted that on failure of the unmarried daughters, the married ones are entitled to take even the yautaka. Hence the distinction is, that joint succession alone of sons and daughters, is intended by Manu and the rest, to be relative to the presents before the fire, and other kinds of woman's property; but the succession of the daughters alone, to be relative to yautaka or nuptial presents. But the terms 'gift subsequent' and 'affectionate gift of the husband' used by Manu in another text are intended to include other descriptions of woman's property such as 'presents before the nuptial fire,' &c.; for, otherwise, the separate text regarding the yautaka would be useless.

This is the opinion also of the author of the Dáya-

tattva and of others.

7. As regards this (contention) it appears that, as there is no authority to support the view that the terms 'gift subsequent,' &c., mentioned (in the text of Manu) are intended to be illustrative, therefore to all kinds of the mother's estate excepting these two (viz., the gift subsequent and the affectionate gift of the husband), the succession of the daughters takes place in the first instance; and on failure of them, the succession of the sons. The special provision, however, concerning the yautaka is

intended to indicate the exclusion of the married daughters and the like. If it be said that their exclusion is common to other kinds of woman's property (and not peculiar to the yautaka, consequently the special provision is useless). The answer is, true; but (the distinction is that) the exclusion is not unconditional (as regards other kinds of woman's property), whereas in the case of yautaka it is unconditional. Accordingly it is held by the author of the Smritichandrika, and others that on failure of the maiden daughter the yautaka appertains to the husband or the like, alone, according to the form of marriage, and not to the married daughters and the like.

But what is intended by Professor Vijnánesvara is this: The text (of Yajnavalkya) which generally lays down that woman's property is to be inherited by the daughters, can only be restricted in its application, if there be another text which admits of no other interpretation excepting the one that restricts the first text. But it cannot be contended that the texts of Manu and others, establish the joint succession of sons and daughters, and admit of no other explanation. For these texts may be explained to establish the son's right of inheritance. Nor can it be contended that the joint succession of the sons and daughters is indicated by the term 'and' (in some texts) and by the conjunctive compound (in the text of Devala, §1). Because these may as well be explained to express the construction (of both the brother and sister or the son and daughter) as the persons who are to effect the division. Otherwise, when the uni-residual conjunctive compound is used in the text,—"The wife and the daughters also, the parents (pitarau), &c.,"—and the conjunctive compound is used in the text, -" it appertains to the mother and the father (mátá-pitros),"—the succession of the mother and the father, one after the other, which is maintained in all the commentaries (on law), would be unreasonable. In that instance it is said that, consistently with the text of Vishnu and the like, the compounds may be explained to express no more than the association (of the component words) as regards grammatical construction, but that the order of succession, one after the other, of the persons expressed by the words,

though at variance (with the grammatical construction) is not incompatible (with it). Similarly, in this instance also, the order of succession, one after the other, (of the sons and the daughters,) is expressed by the text of Yogisvara, namely,—"On failure of them, the issue," -and by the text of Katyayana, namely,-" But in default of the daughters, the inheritance devolves on the sons;" and in conformity with these texts, it is proper to explain the conjunctive compound and the term 'and' (used in other texts) to mean no more than the association (of the terms sons and daughters) for grammatical construction: but it is not proper to say that agreeably to the conjunctive compound and the term 'and' (occurring in other texts) these texts are to be interpreted to bear a different meaning (from what appears on the face of them). Besides, there would be the fallacy of mutual dependence: since, if the joint succession (of sons and daughters) be established, then the texts (declaring the succession of daughters alone) are to be restricted in their application; but if these texts be restricted in their application. then it can be ascertained that the texts (in which the conjunctive compound or the term 'and' is used) intend joint succession (of sons and daughters).

It cannot be argued that (agreeably to the above view) the special text (of Manu §1) regarding the gift subsequent and the like would be meaningless. Since this text may have a meaning, if it be interpreted in the same way in which the text regarding the yautaka has been explained in the Smritichandriká. Or all the texts may have a meaning if interpreted in this way: the mere right of inheritance of the children being established by the text (of Manu regarding the gift subsequent and the like) in which the term 'gift subsequent' is intended to be illustrative, the equality (of shares) and the like are laid down by the texts like—"But when the mother is dead, &c." (§ 1). Thus there is no difficulty.

The venerable Vidyaranya, however, has given both (the above interpretations, the first of which is) according to the Smritichandrika and (the second according to) the

Mitákshará, but he has not passed any opinion.



8. But the succession, before the sons and the like, of the daughter's daughter, and after her, of the daughter's son is unanimously admitted by the authors of the Mitákshará, the (Smriti) Chandriká and the Madanaratna as

well as by the venerable Vidyaranya.

· But Jimútaváhana and the author of the Dáyatattva say:—In default of the daughters, the succession of sons alone takes place, but not the succession of the daughter's daughter and the like, and afterwards that of the sons. Since, in the text of Nárada, namely,—"The mother's (property), the daughters (shall take); in default of daughters, her (or their) issue"-the term 'issue' which signifies, the issue in the shape of the son and the like, cannot properly be construed with 'daughters.' For the term daughter which signifies a particular sort of progeny cannot possibly be construed with another (word 'issue' signifying) progeny, as there is no mutual requirement (of the words) both being alike. Nor is the want of mutual requirement affected by the construction (of the term 'issue') with the pronoun tat (her or their), for this pronoun (relating as it does agreeably to the opposite view, to the term daughters) must present the idea of daughters as such. Besides, as in the text of Yajnavalkya (§ 4), the term 'daughters' has the termination of the first or nominative case, and the pronoun 'of them' (tabhyas), has that of the fifth or ablative case, they cannot be construed with the term 'issue' which requires a word in the genitive case to be construed therewith; hence it is to be construed with the term 'mother's' though it is separated by the intervention of other terms. Therefore consistently with the text of Yajnavalkya the meaning of the term in the text of Nárada also, is, mother's issue such as sons and the like, but not the daughters' issue. Moreover, conformably with the text of Baudháyana, namely—" Male issue of the body (angaja) being left, the property must go to them,"—the succession of the son alone as an immediate issue of the body is proper by reason of propinquity, but not of the daughter's son and the like who are mediate descendants not born of her person.

This is erroneous. For if a word signifying progeny could not be construed with another word denoting progeny,

then there could be no such construction in the case of the son and the like also. If this argument be met by saying that there can be no objection to the construction of two words signifying progeny when one is expressed to be the progeny of the other, then the same may be said in this instance too. (And it must be so said,) for otherwise there could be no construction even in such a case, as 'the daughter's son.' Therefore this (objection of Jimútaváhana) proceeds only from ignorance of grammatical construction. In the text of Yajnavalkya, however, although the son and the like alone are expressed by 'the mother's issue,' still this text merely recites the right of the sons which has already been laid down in the text,— "On the demise, of the parents, the sons shall equally divide the heritage and the debts,"—for the purpose of showing that the liquidation of the debts and the default of the daughters are the conditions of their right: and there can be no inconsistency if their right takes effect even after the daughter's sons. But the text of Baudháyana, namely-"male issue of the body being left &c." -which may be taken to establish by its generality the son's right of succession to the estate of the mother, or to establish generally the right of sons and daughters as the term angaja (rendered into male issue) signifies any child, ought to be interpreted with reference to a propinguity which is not inconsistent with any other text. So this (i. e. the argument drawn from this text) is nothing.

9. (The heir to woman's property) on failure of issue is declared by Yogísvara,—"If she be gone (to rest) without issue, her kinsmen shall take it."—'If she be gone,' i. e., if she die 'without issue,' i. e., without leaving descendants from the daughter to the great-grandson, 'her kinsmen,' i. e., such as are mentioned in the following couplet, 'shall take it,' i. e. the woman's property.

The same sage declares the succession of the kinsmen in different ways according to the different forms of marriage, thus,—"The property of a childless woman, (married,) also in the four forms of marriage, of which (series of four) the Bráhma stands in the beginning, goes to her husband; but if she is a mother, it belongs to her (daugh-

ter's) daughters; and in other forms of marriage, it goes to the father,"—'The four forms of marriage are, the Brahma, the Daiva, the A'rsa and the Prájápatva: the Gándharva also is included, by force of the term 'also.' Or 'the four forms' may be taken to be exclusive of the Brahma. and to include the Daiva, the A'rsa, the Prajapatya and the Gándharva; for the compound bráhmádishu (rendered into. of which the Brahma stands in the beginning,')—being a bahuvrihi or a descriptive adjective, the attribute expressed by it may be taken to have no reference to the predication. By this (interpretation) is removed the disagreement (of this text of Yajnavalkya) with the following text of Manu, namely,—"It is ordained that the property (of a woman married) in (the forms of marriage called) the Bráhma, Daiva, A'rsa, Gándharva or Prájápatya, shall belong to the husband alone, if she die without issue."

The property of a childless woman married in the Bráhma or the like form of marriage belongs to her husband, and on failure of him to the husband's nearest relations. For the nearness to the owner being debarred by the husband, preference ought to be given to the near-

ness to the husband.

But if a woman be married in other forms of marriage,' i. e., in the A'sura or the like, 'it goes to her father.' i. e., to the mother and the father, since the term 'father' (pitri) is the result of the uni-residual conjunctive compound (of mother and father). Amongst them also, it goes to the mother in the first instance, and after her to the father. according to the principle set forth while explaining the term 'parents', (pitarau in the text,-" The wife and the daughter also, the parents &c.") there being no other text against the application of that principle to the present Accordingly, in the text,—"But the property given to a woman (married) in the A'sura or the like forms of marriage, is ordained for the mother and the father, if she die without leaving issue,"-Manu shows the priority of the mother, by placing first the term mother in the conjunctive compound mátá-pitros.

Besides, as it is expressly declared that the father inherits the property of a maiden on failure of the mother, so the same order is proper in this case also. Thus Bau-

dháyana declares,—"The wealth of a deceased maiden, let the uterine brothers themselves take; on failure of them, it shall belong to the mother; in her default, to the father." On failure of the mother and the father, it goes to their nearest relations.

In all the above-mentioned forms of marriage without distinction, if the woman be 'a mother,' i. e., have issue, her property belongs to her 'daughters.' It has already been mentioned that by the term 'daughters' in this text (para. 2) the daughter's daughters are intended. The daughter's daughters also, inherit in the order of the unmarried ones. &c., by reason of the text of Gautama and others. And it has previously been stated that when the daughters take the property, something should through affection be given to the daughter's daughters. When the daughter's daughters have their mothers different, and those sprung from one mother are unequal in number to those sprung from another, they shall divide their grandmother's property according to their mothers, just as grandsons do according to their fathers; for Gautama declares,—"Or let the share of each class be according to the mother."

10. But Jimutavahana says:—This text lays down a rule regarding only that wealth which is received at the time of the celebration of marriage in the Brahma or the like forms, but not regarding the entire property of a woman married in any of those forms. Because the connection (of the words) being, "the property, in (the forms of marriage called) the Brahma, &c.,"—if the time of the celebration of marriage be indicated, the term (in the Brahma &c.',) has a metaphorical meaning, in relation to time present; but, if a woman married in those forms be intended, it has a metaphorical meaning in relation to the past ceremony of marriage: hence the latter meaning is less approved than the former.

The same is the opinion of his follower, the author of

the Dáyatattva.

This is not right. For it being generally laid down in the preceding text that the kinsmen shall take the property of a childless woman, the question arises, what sort of kinsmen shall take the property of what description of

a childless woman? Therefore it is proper to say that the terms Bráhma, &c., are intended to qualify her, (i. e., the childless woman). As for the argument founded upon a consideration of the relation to the present and past time;—that is worthless. Because in both (the meanings) the quality of being past is the same when the partition is made, (gift and marriage being then both past); and because the quality of being present at the time of marriage is of no importance; also because the connubial relation (of the woman) effected by the marriage, is of greater importance.

11. But whatever may be the form of marriage, the property received by a woman from her parents subsequent to the marriage, belongs to her brothers alone. This is declared by Kátyáyana,—"But whatever immoveable property has been given by the parents to their daughter, goes always to her brothers, if she die without issue."

But Visvarupa and Jimutavahana says:—What had been given to her by the parents before her marriage, goes to the brothers; because what is received after marriage bocomes 'gift subsequent,' and what is received at the time of marriage goes, according to the form of marriage,

either to the husband or to the parents.

This is not tenable. For there is no conflict (of this text with any other text,) as this text is relative to immoveable property. Nor can it be argued that when the brother succeeds to immoveable property, his succession to moveable property follows from the rule of 'the staff and the cake' (a fortiori). For that rule is not applicable to what forms an exception.

- 12. But the fee or sulka belongs to uterine brothers alone, by reason of the text of Gautama, namely,—"The sister's fee or sulka belongs to the uterine brother." On failure of the uterine brother, it goes to the mother; for the same sage says,—"After them, it belongs to the mother: but some say, (the mother inherits) before them."—The latter is the opinion of others.
- 13. What was given to a woman by her bandhus (or consanguine relations) belongs, if she die without issue, to her

bandhus, in the first instance, failing them, to her husband, by reason of the text of Kátyáyana, namely,—"What was given by the bandhus appertains to the bandhus; on failure of them, it goes to the husband."

But when there is a failure of the above-mentioned heirs to a childless woman's property, Vrihaspati ordains,-" The mother's sister, the maternal uncle's wife, the paternal uncle's wife, the father's sister, the mother-inlaw and the wife of an elder brother are pronounced similar to mothers: if they leave no issue of the body, nor son (of a rival wife,) nor daughter's son, nor their son, the sister's son and the rest shall take their property."—Here by the term aurasa or 'issue of the body,' both sons and daughters are included; for they debar all (other heirs.) and the order in which they debar others has previously And by the term 'son,' is intended the been mentioned. son of a co-wife; for Manu declares, -" If among all the wives of the same person, one be a mother of a son, then all of them become by that son mothers of male issue: this is ordained by Manu." But the term 'son' is not intended to be in apposition with the term aurasa or issue of the body; because in that case it would be useless, and because the sister's son and the rest would be heirs although the son of a co-wife be living; and that would be contrary to immemorial custom. The pronoun 'their' or tat in the phrase 'their son' relates to the terms 'issue of the body' and 'son of a co-wife,' though they are separated (by other words,) and not to the term 'daughter's son' though it immediately precedes; because the son of a daughter's son is not competent to offer oblations. Hence on failure of heirs down to the daughter's son, first the aurasa inherits, after him his sons and grandsons. For it is proper that the succession should devolve on them, inasmuch as they are competent to present the pinda and are liable to discharge the debts, by reason of the text,—"Debts are to be liquidated by sons and son's sons." In their default. the son of a rival wife, his son and grandson (become heirs in their order); by reason of their being, under the circumstances, the giver of the pinda, and the liquidator of debts, and by reason of the text of Manu, cited above.

Hence on failure of these, the sister's son and the rest alone, in spite of the *sapindas* such as the father in-law, are, by virtue of this text (of Vrihaspati) which is not reconcileable in any other way, entitled to succeed, according to their comparative propinquity, to the property of their mother's sister and the rest.

But the daughter-in-law and others (of the same sex) are entitled to food and raiment only; for the nearness as a sapinda is of no force when it is opposed by express texts: since a text of the Sruti declares,—"Therefore women are devoid of the senses and incompetent to inherit,"—and a text of Manu, founded upon it, says,— "Indeed the rule is that, devoid of the senses, and incompetent to inherit, women are useless." The conclusion arrived at by the author of the Smritichandriká, Haradatta and other southern commentators as well as by all the oriental commentators such as Jímútaváhana, is, that those women only are entitled to inherit, whose right of succession has been expressly mentioned in texts such as,-" The wife and the daughters also &c.,"-but that others are certainly prohibited from taking heritage by the texts of the Sruti and of Manu.

Thus ends the partition of a woman's property.

CHAPTER VI.

PARTITION OF CONCEALED PROPERTY.

- § 1.—Partition of concealed property. 2.—Concealment of joint property is theft. 3.—Restoration to be caused by gentle means.
- 1. Now is explained the mode of distribution of that which was at the time of partition, concealed by any one (of the co-heirs), but is subsequently discovered. On that (subject) Manu says,—"When all the debts and wealth have been justly distributed according to law, if anything be afterwards discovered; the whole of it shall be equally distributed." Yogisvara declares,—"Effects which have been stolen by any one of the co-heirs, and which are discovered after the separation, let them again divide in equal shares: this is a settled rule."—Here, from the use of the term 'equal' it appears that the (mode of unequal) distribution with specific deductions is prohibited: by the term 'divide' it is indicated that the property shall not be taken by him alone who discovers it, and that a smaller share shall not be allotted to him who concealed it.
- 2. Some (commentators) assert that, when the (above) texts may have a meaning (if interpreted) in this way, the concealment (by a co-heir) of joint property does not constitute the offence of theft, inasmuch as it was taken under the belief of its being (his) own. This is foolish. For in joint property there being also the right of other (co-heirs), it cannot be denied that there is 'the wrongful taking of another's property,'—which is the meaning of the term theft. If it be said that there is no theft as it was not taken with the belief of its being another's. (The answer is:) it is not so, since concealment necessarily involves the belief of its being another's; accordingly

the term 'stolen' is employed (in the above text of Yajnavalkya). (If it be asked) has not Manu in the text— "The eldest (brother) who out of covetousness defrauds his younger ones, shall forfeit the right of the eldest and his share, and shall be punished by the king"—condemned the eldest alone and not the younger ones in case of misappropriation of common property? answer is) true: but when an act which may be committed, is affirmed to be an offence if committed even by the eldest (brother) who holds the position of a father (to his younger brothers), then it becomes necessarily affirmed by reason of the rule of 'the staff and the cake,' that the same is an offence if committed by those (younger brothers) that are dependent on him and hold the position of a son (to him). Hence those who maintain that the texts declaring equal distribution in a case of concealment of joint property, intend that there is no offence of theft,—are silenced by this text of Manu, as well as by the following text of Sruti which declares it to be an offence without any distinction, namely,—"If any one dispossesses a sharer of his share, he may molest him; or if he does not molest him, he may molest his son or son's son."—The meaning of this text of Sruti is: 'If any one dispossesses,' i. e., deprives 'a sharer,' i. e., one entitled to a share, 'of his share,' that is, anyhow by force or fraud does not give him a share; 'he,' i. e., who is dispossessed of his share 'may molest, i. e., injure 'him,' i. e., the dispossessor by reason of his offence; if he does not injure him, he may injure his son or grandson. Those, however, who are ignorant of the Sruti may indeed talk irrationally. But we have already said that even in the case of joint property, there being another's right, the definition of theft is not inapplicable.

Just as (in an instance discussed in the Mímánsá) the adverse argument is set forth thus,—If, when the sacrificial food consisting of green kidney-beans is not procurable, black kidney-beans be used as a substitute by reason of the similarity (of these two kinds of beans in many respects), then the prohibition laid down in the passage. "Black kidney-beans are not fit for sacrifices," does not apply; because they are used under the impression that

they contain the constituent elements of the green kidney-beans: but the conclusion arrived at is, that they cannot be used even as a substitute, upon the ground that all that is necessary for the validity of a prohibition, being, that what is prohibited might take place (but for the prohibition), the prohibition (of the use of black kidney-beans for sacrificial purposes), is not unreasonable, since (some of) the constituent elements of black kidney-beans are used, (because the two sorts of beans must have some of their constituent elements common, which make them appear similar), and hence those elements would have been fit for sacrifices.

No complaint, however, should be made by the co-sharers before the king, and even if it be made the king shall cause the restoration by gentle means: this, of which the only visible object is the maintenance of good feelings (of the co-heirs towards each other), is declared by Katyayana, thus,—"Property misappropriated by a bandhu or kinsman shall not be caused to be restored by force." Nor should it be complained that the consumption by a co-heir during coparcenary was over and above his due proportion; and even when there was such consumption, it is not to be taken into account by the king. effect the same sage declares,—"The (unequal) consumption of unseparated bandhus or kinsmen shall not be removed" (by an adjustment of accounts). The purport is that unequal consumption cannot be prevented, as it is unavoidable.

It is to be observed that while these texts (of Kát-yáyana) may in this way be reasonably explained to mean no more than what they plainly signify; it cannot be held that these texts also intend that there is no offence of theft, for then they would have a meaning not expressed: hence in the above cases also, the penance for theft, and legal punishment must take place.

CHAPTER VII.

OF IMPARTIBLE THINGS.

§ 1.—Self-acquired property. 2.—Of other things not liable to partition.

1. Now, what is not liable to partition, is explained. On this Yogísvara declares,—"Whatever else is, without detriment to the paternal property, acquired by a man himself, or received from a friend or obtained at nuptials, does not belong to his co-heirs (diyádas); nor shall he, who recovers hereditary property which had been taken away, give it up to his co-heirs; nor what has been gained by

learning."

The term 'without detriment to the paternal property' is to be construed with all (the items of property described); for, were it isolated in construction, then the items such as what is received from a friend, although they involve the expense of the paternal property, would not be liable to partition; but this would be opposed to the practice of persons following the precepts of the Vedas, and, with respect to what is gained by learning, to the text of Nárada, namely,—"He who maintains the family of a brother engaged in the pursuit of knowledge, shall take, though he may be ignorant, a share of the wealth gained by that knowledge."

Katyayana also confirms this view by the definition he gives of the gains of learning that are impartible, thus,—"Wealth gained through learning acquired from a stranger while receiving a foreign maintenance is termed gains

of learning."

Manu also clearly says,—"Whatever a man has acquired through his own exertion without relying on the paternal property, he shall not give it up to his coparceners (dáyádas); nor what has been acquired through learning."— Exertion' signifies service and the like.

A special rule has been laid down by Sankha, with regard to hereditary immoveable property, though recovered without detriment to the paternal estate, as in the text,—"When one parcener alone has by his own exertion recovered land which had been lost before; the others shall get in proportion to their shares, but after setting apart a quarter share for him."—The meaning is: after having allotted to the recoverer a fourth part (of the land) as a price of the recovery, all the co-sharers (including the recoverer) shall equally divide the remaining three parts.

Although this sort of impartibility follows from the very (plain) principle that 'what is acquired by a man belongs to him,' (and so no authority of the Sastras is necessary for establishing it); still there is no defect, inasmuch as generally the Institutes on Positive law do, as we have already stated in the introductory chapter, lay down

rules which are as well deducible from reason.

2. Other kinds of property not liable to partition are mentioned by Manu, thus,—"Clothes, vehicles, ornaments, prepared food, water, women, religious fund and charitaable work (yoga-kshemam), as well as a passage are declared to be not liable to partition."

Patram ('vehicle') means, conveyance.

- 'Clothes and the like' (i. e. ornaments) belong to him alone by whom they have been worn: but those that are not worn but are intended for sale, are certainly liable to distribution.
- 'Prepared food,' i. e., cooked food, shall be partaken by all as much as they can, but shall not be weighed and divided.

'Water,' i. e., a reservoir of water, such as a well, shall be used by all accordingly as they require.

'Women,' i. e., female slaves being unequal (in number to the shares) shall not be divided, but shall be employed in work by turns. But women kept in concubinage by the father shall not be divided, though equal in number, by reason of the text of Gautama, namely,—"No partition is allowed in the case of concubines."

The term 'religious fund' (yoga) means a fund for the performance of religious ceremonies; and 'charitable 32

work' (kshemam) signifies a reservoir of water, or the like, constructed for public benefit. The impartibility of these two, though raised or made at the charge of the paternal property, are set forth as examples: since, directly or indirectly, a partition of these is not possible, far less when these are hereditary. Accordingly Laugakshi declares,—"The sages declare that charitable work is a reservoir of water or the like constructed for public good, and that religious fund is property set apart for the performance of religious rites: these two are pronounced impartible: so are the bed and the seat." Some hold, that the term yoga-kshema intend those who perform sacrifices and charitable works, as the king's minister (of charitable works,) the (family) priest, and the like. Others say that it signifies weapons, cow-tails, shoes and similar things.

'A passage' is a way for ingress and egress to and from a house, garden or the like; this also is impartible.

- 3. Clothes and the like worn by the father shall be given to the person who partakes of food at his obsequies: as directed by Vrihaspati,—" The clothes and ornaments, the bed and similar furniture, appertaining to the father, as well as his vehicle and the like, shall be given, after perfuming them with fragrant drugs and wreaths of flowers, to the person who partakes of the funeral repast."
- 4. Also ornaments that are worn by the females are not partible: thus it is declared,—"The dáyádas or coheirs shall not divide such ornaments as are worn by the females during the life of their husband: they, who do so, become degraded."—From the term 'worn' it appears that those that are not worn are liable to partition. By the phrase 'during the life of their husband,' it is indicated that whatever is worn in any part of the body as a badge of the husband's life, is not liable to partition.
- 5. Also what has been received from the father as a token of affection, cannot be divided: thus it is declared, —"By favor of the father, clothes and ornaments are used."—By the term 'are used,' their impartibility is indicated.



Likewise, what has been given by the parents (is not divisible) by reason of the text of law,—"Whatever has been given by the parents to any one, becomes exclusively his property."

But it is to be observed that gifts by the parents out of favor or affection should be guided by propriety but not by caprice; for that would be contrary to the practice

of the learned.

6. The details of what has been acquired by the use of paternal property are found in many texts of law concerning what is gained by heroism, and the like; but these are not written here for fear of increasing the bulk of the book.



CHAPTER VIII.

EXCLUSION FROM INHERITANCE.

§ 1.—Those incompetent to inherit. 2.—Maintenance. 3.—Penance. 4.—Right cannot be divested by subsequent disqualification; right revives on subsequent cure. 5.—Females disqualified. 6.—Their sons entitled. 7.—Outcast and his son, not to be maintained. 8.—Son by a woman of superior class. 9.—Impotent &c. can marry. 10.—The daughters and wives. 11.—The vicious are excluded.

1. Now those that are not entitled to shares on par-

tition (or succession) are described.

On this subject Yogísvara,—" An impotent person, an outcast and his issue, one lame, a madman, an idiot, a blind man, a person afflicted with an incurable disease, as well as others (similarly disqualified) shall not, get shares, but shall be maintained."

"His issue" means, the issue of an outcast.

It is to be observed that "an impotent person" and "a blind man," if so from their birth, are certainly not entitled to shares on partition, but if they become so in the interim, are certainly entitled to shares on a partition agreeably to the mode faid down in the text,—"Or his allotment must be made out of the visible estate corrected for income and expenditure," (p. 94,)—provided their cure be effected by medication or the like.

By the term "others" are included those that have adopted an order other than that of the householder, that are inimical to their father, that are addicted to vice (upa-pátaki,) that are deaf or dumb, and that are destitute of an organ of sense (or action). Thus Vasishtha declares,—"But those who have adopted an order other than that of the householder are not entitled to shares." So also Nárada says,—"An enemy to his father, an outcast, an impotent person, and one who is addicted to vice take no share (of the inheritance), though they be aurasa or real sons, much less if they be sons of the wife." Also Manu

says,—"An impotent person and an outcast are excluded from a share of the heritage; and so are persons deaf and blind from birth as well as madmen, idiots, the dumb and whoever are destitute of an organ (of sense or action):" nirindriya or "destitute of an organ" is one who has lost an organ of sense by disease; hence an impotent person does not come under it. But some say that "destitute of an organ" means those that are devoid of hands, feet or the like (organ of action).

- 2. The impotent and the others do not obtain any share but "shall be maintained" (§ 1 Yogisvara's text) i. e. supported by giving food, raiment or by the like. But if they be not maintained, a grave offence is committed; so Manu declares,—"To all of them food and raiment ought to be given by a wise man; he who does not give, becomes deeply degraded."—"Deeply" means for life.
- 3. Amongst them, however, an outcast (patita) and one addicted to vice (upa-pátaki) are excluded from inheritance, if they do not perform the penance. But of one who does not, out of perverseness, perform the penance, the exclusion is certain.
- 4. The exclusion, again, of these, takes place, if their disqualification occur previously to partition (or succession;) but not also if subsequently to partition (or succession;) for there is no authority for the resumption of allotted shares.

Professor Vijnánesvara says that if subsequently (to partition or succession) their defects are cured by medication or the like, they become entitled to obtain their shares. And this is reasonable; because it is by reason of the defects that they were disqualified to share; and because the same principle is applicable (to such a case) as is laid down in the text,—" One who is begotten by one of equal class, after the co-parceners have been separated, is taker of the share." (p. 92.)

5. The (masculine) gender in the words 'an outcast,' &c., is not intended to be expressive (of restriction,) for it

cannot reasonably be accepted (in that sense); in the same way as in the text,—"A Bráhmana (in the masculine gender) shall not drink spirituous liquors." Hence, so far as is applicable, this (law of exclusion based upon defects) excludes the wife, the daughters or the like (female heirs) as well.

- 6. Though the impotent and the rest are excluded from inheritance, still their sons are entitled to the shares (which would have been allotted to them). This is declared by Yogísvara,—"But of these, the aurasa or true son and the kshetraja or son of the wife, if free from defect, take the shares."—"Free from defect" means, having no defect such as is mentioned above which causes the exclusion from inheritance. Among those (that are excluded from inheritance,) an impotent person may have a kshetraja or son of the wife; the rest, an aurasa or a real son as well. The mention of these two kinds of sons is intended to exclude the other descriptions of sons.
- An outcast and his son are not entitled to maintenance. Accordingly Devala says, -- "When the father is dead, an impotent person, a leper, a madman, an idiot, a blind man, an outcast, the offspring of an outcast and a person wearing the token (of religious mendicancy) do not obtain a share of the heritage. Food and raiment should be given to them excepting the outcast: but the sons of such persons being free from similar defects, shall obtain their father's share of the inheritance."- 'A person wearing the token' means one who has become a religious wanderer or the like. Here (i. e., in the second verse) the term 'outcast' includes also the son of an outcast, for being begotten by an outcast he too becomes an outcast; by reason of the text of law, namely,—"The issue of an outcast becomes certainly outcast excepting a female, for she goes to another (family)." The term 'dead' indicates (only) the time for partition, because they are not entitled even if partition be made during the lifetime of the father.
- 8. Also Kátyáyana says,—"The son of a woman married in an irregular order, and he who is begotten by



a kinsman of the same family are unworthy of inheritance; and so is an apostate from a religious order." If a woman of a superior tribe be espoused after marrying one of an inferior tribe, then both of them are married in irregular order. A kshetraja or son of the wife, procreated by a kinsman of the same family without being authorized to raise up issue, is unworthy of inheritance.

"But the son of a woman married in irregular order, may be heir, provided he belong to the same class with his father; and so may the son of a man belonging to a different (but superior) tribe, but begotten by a woman espoused in the regular order. The son of a woman married by a man of inferior tribe does not take the (riktha or unobstructed) heritage. But bare food and raiment only should be given by his bandhus. But in default of the bandhus he may take his paternal property. The bandavas (being step-brothers?) shall not be compelled to give up (to him a share of) that property received (by them, and) belonging to (their or his?) own father." (Vide Dayabhága, ch. V. para. 16 and notes.)

9. It is declared by Manu that an impotent person and the rest may espouse wives and have sons, thus,—"If an impotent person and the rest should at any time desire to marry, the offspring of such as have issue shall be capable of inheriting." Tantu (rendered into issue) means offspring.

It cannot be argued, how can an impotent person and the rest contract marriages, since they are degraded for want of investiture with the sacred thread? Because, for want of investiture owing to unfitness for investiture, a person is not degraded, any more than a Súdra.

10. Their daughters must be maintained till their marriage, and must be married. Their wives, however, that are childless and chaste must be maintained, provided they are not perverse; if otherwise, shall be expelled. This is declared by Yogisvara,—"Their daughters also must be maintained until provided with husbands. Their childless wives, conducting themselves aright, must be supported: but such as are unchaste should be expelled; and so indeed should those that are perverse."

11. A'pastamba ordains,—" Of an excommunicated person, the inheritance, oblations of food and libations of water cease."—'An excommunicated person' is one in whose company water is not drunk (by his caste men). Likewise Vrihaspati says,—"Though born of a woman of equal class, a son destitute of virtue is unworthy of the paternal wealth: it is declared to belong to such kinsmen offering funeral oblations to him as are versed in the Vedas. A son redeems his father from debt to superior and inferior beings: hence there is no use for one who acts otherwise. What can be done with a cow which neither gives milk nor bears calves? For what purpose was that son born who is neither learned nor virtuous? A son who is ignorant of the Sastras and devoid of courage and good purposes, who is destitute of the practice of devotion, and who is wanting in good conduct, is similar to urine and excrement."

The meaning is this: A son who performs the obsequies of his father and other ancestors, is of approved excellence, though he be uninitiated; not a son who acts otherwise, be he the eldest and conversant with the whole Veda.

The purport is, that the very ownership of the paternal property forms the remuneration of one who performs the duties of a son: wherefore should one that neglects them have a right to that remuneration? To this effect is the text of law, namely,—"Since a son delivers his father from the hell called put, therefore he is named put-tra by the self-existent himself."

Also Manu says,—"All the brothers who are addicted to vice lose their title to inheritance."—The purport is, that those who are incapable of performing the rites enjoined by the Sruti and the Smriti, as well as those that are addicted to vice, are not entitled to get shares.

Thus (are described) those that are not entitled to shares on partition (or succession).

CHAPTER IX.

RIGHTS OF SEPARATED CO-SHARERS.

- § 1.—Power of a separated co-sharer to dispose of his share. 2.—Immoveables. 3.—Partition cannot be re-opened.
- 1. Now the rights of separated kinsmen (are considered). On that subject Nárada says,—"When there are many sprung from one man, whose duties are separate, whose transactions are separate, and whose instruments of (household) work are separate; if they be not accordant in affairs, should they give or sell their own shares, they may do all that as they please; for they are masters of their own wealth."

The meaning of this is: "Many sprung from one man," i. e., many brothers,—some say that the term "being separated" is understood, but in our opinion, the terms "whose duties are separate," &c., signify that they are separated, for it does not appear that these terms form the predicate, (and the construction of the text is not that " many sprung from one man, shall have separate duties &c.,") since such an injunction would be useless;— "whose duties" such as the worship of gods, ancestors and the twice born, "are separate," i. e., apart from those of the other co-sharers;—it does not mean that duties consisting in the preservation of the sacred fire, &c., are separate, for although the performance of these duties depend upon wealth, still they are separate even in a joint family; accordingly, Vrihaspati says, "The worship of gods, ancestors, and the twice-born is joint among those who live in commensality: but the same takes place in every house of the separated kinsmen;" and this (text) has been already considered (by us;)-"whose transactions." i. e., agriculture and similar temporal business, "are separate; if they be not accordant in affairs," i. e., if they do not give permission to each other, still "should they give or sell their own shares, they may do, as they please, all 33

that" also any other transaction such as mortgaging, bor-

rowing or lending.

If the separated co-sharers accord their assent then only the determination of any dispute becomes facilitated; but if they do not, then gift &c., do not become invalid. The reason for this is, "for they are masters of their own wealth," i. e., of the property which has become the subject of their exclusive right. The purport being, that mutual assent is requisite when the property is common, but not also when it is separate.

2. As for what has been ordained by Vrihaspati, namely,-" Separated kinsmen, as those that are unseparated, are equal in respect of immoveable property; for one has not power over the whole to give, mortgage or sell it:"—that also is to be taken to lay down that the permission of the separated kinsmen is desirable simply for the purpose of the facility of determining any dispute, in the same way as the permission of the headman of the village. For in the case of immoveable property the determination in a different time, of the question whether the family was separated or joint, may become difficult if in the long interval the attesting witnesses and the like cease to exist. But should the permission be granted, then any dispute (regarding the disposition of property) may be decided, without determining the question as to partition. This is the opinion of Vijnanesvara and many But the author of the Smritichandriká says:—If the co-sharers though separated consider the partition of immoveable property to be inconvenient, and so divide the other kinds of property and take their shares separately, but keep the immoveable property joint, with the stipulation that 'we shall enjoy its profits by dividing the same at the time of realization: this text (of Vrihaspati) refers to such immoveable preperty.

This (assertion of the author of the Smritichandriká) is merely an assumption; for in that case permission is necessary by reason of the very fact of the property being

joint.

3. The same sage declares,—"Whatever share has been allotted to any one, he shall not complain after receiving the same."—'Receiving' means, accepting. Any one who gives his assent at the time of partition and afterwards disputes, shall be restrained by the king, and punished should he persist. This is declared by the same sage, thus,—"If any one who has received an allotment by his own choice, disputes again; he shall be confined to his own share, by the king, and shall be punished if he perseveres."—'Perseveres' means persists.

CHAPTER X.

· ASCERTAINMENT OF A CONTESTED PARTITION.

§ 1.—Evidence of partition. 2.—Circumstantial evidence. 3.—Ordeals and oaths. 4.—Partition over again.

1. The mode of partition having been described, now is stated the mode of determining a doubt regarding

the fact of a partition having been made.

On that subject Yájnavalkya says,—"It is to be known that in case of concealment of partition, the ascertainment of the fact of partition may be made by the evidence of kinsmen (jnátis,) relations and witnesses, and by documentary evidence, as well as by disconnected houses and fields."

(The meaning is:) "It is to be known that in case of concealment," i. e., denial, "of partition," made by any one of the separated co-sharers, "the ascertainment," i. e., the determination "of the fact of partition may be made by the evidence of kinsmen," i. e., the father's relations, "relations," i. e., the maternal uncle and the like, -- " and witnesses," i. e., strangers falling under the definition of a witness: although kinsmen and relations also come under the category of witnesses, still by the rule of 'the bulls and the beaves' they are separately mentioned, since they being nearer than outside witnesses, are aware of facts that are incidents of partition, such as separate performance of the sráddha and the like (rites,) and are appointed arbitrators to carry out a partition: and "by documentary evidence," i. e., the instrument of partition: "as well as by disconnected (yautaka)," i. e., separated by metes and bounds,—agreeably to the root yu which means 'to unite' or 'to disunite'—"houses and fields."

Nárada says,—"If a question arise among co-heirs in regard to the fact of partition, it must be ascertained by the evidence of agnatic relations, by the deed of partition or by the separate transaction of affairs."—The term 'agnatic relations' is used in order to show that if such (witnesses) be forthcoming, other persons should not be

preferred as witnesses: 'affairs' are such as agriculture and the like.

Sankha declares,—"Should a doubt arise on the subject of partition of the wealth of kinsmen, the family may give evidence, if the matter be not known to the agnatic relations." 'Family' means the cognates, such as the maternal uncle; hence it is, that the agnatic relations are prominently set forth by Nárada. The reading, *jnátribhis* or 'if the eye-witnesses be not known' (instead of 'if the matter be not known to agnatic relations') is not genuine, since it is not found in old manuscripts nor in the commentaries.

The documentary evidence is of greater weight than the testimony of witnesses. This has been dealt with (by us) in the Paribháshá (or that part of this commentary, where the adjective law has been treated).

2. Nárada ordains,—"Gift and acceptance of gift, cattle, food, house, land and attendants, must be considered as distinct among separated brethren, as also cooking, religious ceremony, income and expenditure. Separated, and not unseparated kinsmen may reciprocally bear testimony, become sureties, bestow gifts and accept presents. Those by whom such matters are publicly transacted with their co-heirs, are to be known separate even without written evidence."—"Religious ceremony' means, the worship of gods and the like, by reason of the text cited before (ch. IX, § 1, para. 2) namely,—"The worship of gods &c.",—and by reason of the text of Nárada, namely—"Of undivided brethren, the religious duties are common; after partition, the religious duties also of each of them become separate."

Vrihaspati says,— "A violent crime, a pledge of immoveable property, and a previous partition among cosharers may be ascertained by presumptive proof, (if) there are neither writing nor witnesses."—The particle 'if' is understood.—"They who have their income, expenditure and wealth distinct, and have mutual transaction of money-lending and traffic, are undoubtedly separate."—'Money-lending' is, the investment of money for interest; 'traffic' is trade; 'mutual transaction' means,

when one brother is creditor and another is debtor, one sells and another buys from him: from these and similar facts which cannot be accounted for except by separation, partition is to be inferred.

From the plural number in "such matters" it is not to be supposed that the inference arises only when all these jointly exist; because the intention is, that the inference arises from all or some of them, and because the text is (not arbitrary but) based upon reason.

- 3. Where the fact of partition cannot be ascertained by circumstantial evidence, it is to be determined by ordeals or oaths, according as the estate is small or large. It has been set forth in the introductory chapter, that "When the circumstances also fail, it is to be determined by oaths."
- 4. When, however, no oral evidence is forthcoming, the circumstances are meagre, and neither party wishes to have recourse to ordeals and oaths; in such a case, Manu says that partition is to be made again, thus,—"When a doubt arises as to the mutual separation of the co-heirs, then re-distribution is to be made by them although residing in different places."

It is to be observed that this is to be done in the same way as in the partition by the re-united co-heirs,

after liquidating the debts of all.

As for what Manu says, namely, "Only once may the distribution of shares take place, only once may a maiden be given (in marriage), only once may the same article be gifted (by an owner): these three may occur but once:"—this applies in the absence of any reason for repetition. The same is true also in the gift of a daughter in marriage, as well as in any other gift.

Thus is finished the determination of the fact of parti-

tion in a case of doubt.

And thus is finished the topic of litigation called Partition of Heritage.



INDEX.

A.

ABANDONMENT by husband, of adulterous wife, when allowed, 153 ACCEPTANCE by donee necessary to complete gift, 33 not so according to Dáyabhága, 31
by husband, of adulterous wife, when allowed, 153 ACCEPTANCE by donee necessary to complete gift, 33
by donee necessary to complete gift, 33
J
ACCOUNT,
co-heir not liable to, for excess of consumption, 247
ACHARYA, or preceptor,
succession of, 200
ACQUIRER'S DOUBLE SHARE, 63—70, 205
ACQUISITION,
means of —— common and special, 8
not a matter of divine authority, 17
father's double share in his own, 63
father not entitled to two shares of son's, 64-70
without detriment to joint stock, not partible, 248
by a re-united co-heir, partible, 205
re-united co-heir entitled to two shares of his, ib.
ADDICTED TO VICE, excluded from inheritance, 256
ADHIVEDANIKA, or gift on supersession, 224
ADHYAGNI, or presents before fire, 222
ADHYAVAHANIKA, or present at bridal procession, ib.
ADOPTED SON, or the dattaka or given son, 100
described 115
an only son shall not be given or taken as, ib.
the eldest son, 117
cannot be taken by woman without husband's assent, 115
one having a son cannot authorize his wife to take an, ib.
a step-son is an, to a woman, 116
may be taken by a woman for her own sake with the assent of
husband, ib.
may be taken by a widow with the assent of husband's kinsmen, ib.
mode of taking an,
is entitled to a quarter share, if an aurasa son be subsequently
hom
94

ADOPTED SON,—(continued).					I	Page
may inherit from sapindas and samana	dakas (of ador	tive	fathe	r in	
default of near heirs		•••		•••		126
may do so if endued with good qualities	or accor	ding to	loca	ıl cust	юm,	127
a child of inferior caste may be,		•••		•••	•••	117
ADOPTION,						
sons by,				1	.00-	-130
involves the idea of father's proprietar	y right	over v	vife	and s	on,	ib.
ADULTEROUS WIFE	• •				•	
not entitled to succeed to husband,					133,	152
not entitled to maintenance from he	eirs to	undivi	ded	husb	and.	174
not entitled to maintenance, when hus	band e	rcluded	fro	m inl	neri-	
tance,	•••					255
if disposed to perform penance, is ent	itled to	main	tena	nce f	rom	
husband,						153
may be abandoned by husband, if perv	zerse.					ib.
ADULTERY,						
does not disqualify mother for inherit	ino.					191
subsequent, does not divest right,	٠	•••		•••		253
See Adulterous Wife.	•••		•••		•••	
•						200
AGNATES, preferred to cognates as heirs		•••		•••	•••	200
AFFECTIONATE GIFT BY HUSBAN						000
joint succession of son and daughter t	ю,		•••			2 29
AFFIANCED, meaning of,	•••		• • •		•••	106
ALIENATION,						
father may make, of moveables,		•••		•••		16
father cannot make, of immoveables a	ncestral	l or sel	f-acq	uired	l,	17
father may do so with son's consent,		egal ne	cessi	ty,	•••	87
any member may make, for legal nece	essity,	•••		•••		ib.
by widow, of husband's estate, for leg						141
by wife, of stridban, independently of	: husbar	nd, not	allo	wed	as a	
general rule,			•••			224
by wife, of some kinds of stridhan,	indeper	ndently	of	husl	and,	
allowed,		•••		•••	•••	ib.
by wife, of property given by husban	d, allov	ved in	case	of n	10ve-	
ables,			•••		• • •	225
by husband, of wife's property, valid	in distr	ess,		• • •	•••	226
ANCESTOR WORSHIP.						
should be performed by descendants a	ind heir	·s,		•••	90,	256
ANCESTRAL PROPERTY.						
right of father and son, co-equal in,	•••		•••	16, 6	5 et	seq.
partition of, may take place by son's	choice,		•••	, -	•••	49
immoveable, cannot be alienated by fa		•••			•••	17
except with son's consent, or for lega		sity.	•••		•••	87
son's share in, not legally liable for f						154
ANVADHEYA, or gift subsequent, description		,	•••			222
joint succession of sons and daughter			•••			228
APAVIDDHA, or deserted son,	,			•••		. 101
dogorihod	•••		•••		••	118
described,					-	

				1	Page
APPARELS, not partible,	•••	•••	•••	249,	
APPOINTMENT, to raise issue,				•	,
an ancient custom appears to be	based upon	the notion	of ·	wife's	
being an article of property	',	•••	•••	104—	
disapproved,	•••	•••	•••	143,	
prohibited in this Kali age,	•••	•••	•••		61
APPOINTED DAUGHTER'S SON	Γ,	•••	•••	100,	102
described,	***	•••			102
may mean, appointed daughter h		•••	•••		103
agreement with husband, not nec	essary to be	e express,			ib.
succession of,	•••	•••	1	l21 <i>et</i>	_
KRSHA, an approved form of marris	ige,	•••			240
ASCERTAINMENT of contested pa	irtition,	•••	•••	260-	
by direct evidence,	•••	•••		•••	260
by circumstantial evidence,	•••	•••	•••		261
by ordeals and oaths,	•••	•••			262
ASCETIC, or Yati, succession to the	estate of,	•••	•••		202
ASURA, a disapproved form of marr		•••	•••	132,	
AURASA, or real legitimate son, des	cribed,	•••			101
the principal son,	•••	•••	•••		120
partition by, and subsidiary sons,	•••	•••		121 et	seq.
AUTHORITY.	• ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••	1			
profane, means sensation, percept divine or sacred, means the author	ion and ini	erence,		. •••	8
of husband, necessary for adoptic		Sasuras,	•••	•••	
of husband's kinsmen, necessary	for adoption	hva wido	œ	•••	
The state of the s	ioi maopuioi	a by w wado	,	•••	110
	i.				
BANDHU,					
or kinsman (sec. 19), means a me	ember of the	e <i>gotra</i> ,	•••	126,	
means a cognate (Yájnavalkya's	text,	•	1		131
in the sense of a cognate mean belonging to a different gots			Tela	156,	100
succession and classification of,		•••	•••		200
	•••	•••		•••	<i>ib</i> .
of woman, means blood relation,		•••	•••		242
succession of, to woman's propert		•	•••		ib.
BARREN DAUGHTER,	• •				
is not disqualified to inherit,	•••	***			178
as such, not entitled to preferenc	е,	•••			181
BASTARD SON by a female slave,	• •				
of a Sudra is entitled to half sha	re	•			130
when to whole estate,	•••	•••			ib.
of a twice-born, entitled to main	enance only	у,		•••	ib.
BLIND, excluded from inheritance,	-	• • • •			252
BRAHMA, an approved form of marr			. • •		240
BRAHMANAS,		•••		•••	~ =0
inherit from a Bráhmana in defa	ult of all he	ire not the	kina		901
mucito mom e Diammente in acie	MIN OI WIT IIG	.m., not one	Ting	,	ZVL

BROTHER,		1	Page
and other co-heirs succeed to a member of joint family	' in de	fault	_
of male issue,		154,	
managion of to a senarated brother	•••	•••	192
uterine, succeeds first,		•••	193
half, after him,	•••	•••	194
me united appareds in default of male issue		•••	205
re-united uterine, succeeds first, re-united half, and unassociated whole, succeed togethe unassociated half, succeeds in preference to wife, succession of uterine, to maiden's property, to sister's property,	•••	•••	206
re-united half, and unassociated whole, succeed togethe	r,	•••	ib.
unassociated half, succeeds in preference to wife,	•••	•••	214
succession of uterine, to maiden's property,		•••	240
to sister's property,	•••	. :••	242
marriage and investiture with sacred thread, of, charge	s on e	state,	81
BROTHER'S SON,			
if joint, succeeds in preference to wife,	•••	154,	164
succession of, to separated uncle,			192
uterine, preferred to half,	•••		193
if re-united, succeeds in preference to wife,			205
equal to son in conferring spiritual benefit,	•••	•••	157
•			
C.			
•			
CAPACITY for conferring spiritual benefit,			
does not determine succession to joint estate,	•••	•••	91
determines priority of succession to separate person,		•••	ib.
is equal, of son, grandson and great-grandson,	•••		155
also brother's son,		•••	157
CASTE,			
intermarriage of a man of superior, with a woman	of inf	erior,	
allowed,	_	95,	132
allowed, intermarriage of a man of inferior, with a woman of	f sup	erior,	
not invalid,	•••		255
adoption of a child of interior, allowed,			117
	•••	132,	152
CAUSE OF HERITABLE RIGHT,			
to unobstructed heritage, is birth,		•••	3
to obstructed heritage, is extinction of right,	•••	•••	4
CHARGES ON INHERITANCE,			
debt of deceased owner		•••	154
initiation of co-heir,	•••	•••	81
marriage of co-heir,			ib.
marriage of daughter,	•••	81,	219
sister,		•••	53
initiation of co-heir,	153	, 174,	219
CHASTITY,			
		153,	174,
not a condition of mother's succession,			191
condition of widow's right to maintenance against	husb	and's	
co-heirs,		153,	174
not a condition of wife's right to maintenance,	•••	•••	153

CHASTITY,—(continued).				Page
by subsequent want of, right to receive ma	intenance	from	hus-	_
band's co-beirs, fo widow's estate is not	rieitea, divested.			174 253
	,		•••	
COGNATES or BANDHUS,	e - 1:tt		. .	100
are sapindas, in the sense of blood relations, See Bandhu.	or a dim	erent ge	oiru,	199
CO-HEIR, nature of ——'s right in joint property,				49
cannot alienate his interest in joint property,	•••	•••	•••	42 87
can alienate joint property for legal necessity	····			ib.
is not liable for excess of consumption,			•••	247
can alienate his share after partition,	•••	•••	•••	257
mother is a,	•••			168
CONCEALED PROPERTY, distribution of,	•••		•••	245
CONCEALMENT OF EFFECTS, by a co-heir,	is theft,			ib.
CONFLICTING TEXTS,				
to be reconciled by referring them to distinct	cases,		•••	190
CONSANGUINITY,				
is the principle of inheritance.				1, 3
	18	5, 194,		
CONSENT,			_	
of sons necessary for alienation of immoveab	le properi	v.		87
CONSUMMATION,	FF	3,	•••	٠.
re-marriage of widow before,				107
CONTESTED PARTITION, determination of,	• •••	•••		260
by direct evidence,		•••	•••	ib.
by circumstantial evidence,	•••		•••	261
by ordeals and oaths,	•••	•••		262
re-partition,	•		•••	ib.
CO-PARCENER. See Co-heir.				
CO-SHARER. See Co-heir.				
COUSINS,				
may be re-united,			•••	169
COVERTURE,				
woman's power over her stridhan during,				224
CRITERION of order of succession,	•••	•••	•••	
is nearness of propinquity,	18	5, 194,	195.	200
also capacity for conferring spiritual benefit,	•••	•••		
CROWN.				
estate of deceased, in default of heirs escheat	s to,			201
a Bráhmana does not,	•••	•••		ib.
CUSTOM or USAGE,				
local, may be taken into consideration for c	determini	ng dou	btful	
questions,	•••		•••	127
has force of law,	•••	•••	•••	168

							-	Page
		D.						
DATTAKA, or son given.	See Ado	pted S	Son.					
DAUGHTER.	•	-						
maiden, entitled to qua	rter shar	e on r	artitio	n,	•••		•••	81
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	C	41	-		•••		176
order of succession succession of to stridh	amongs	t diffe	rent ki	inds o	of,		•••	181
succession of, to stridha	ın,	•••		•••	•	•••		228
order of succession	,		•••		•••		•••	231
marriage and maintenar	ice of m	aiden,	charge	on i	nherit	ance,	81,	219
DAUGHTER-IN-LAW,		•	_					
not hair to mother-in-le	w.	•••		•••			•••	244
entitled to maintenance	from m	other-	in-law	s est	ate.			ib.
DAUGHTER'S DAUGHT					•			
succession of, to stridhe								238
DAUGHTER'S MARRIA			•••		•••		•••	
charge on inheritance,	α ₁₂ ,						81	219
DAUGHTER'S SON,		•••		•••		•••	01,	210
	earn had	Afath.						183
succession of, to separat			er,		•••			238
per stirpe	8 <i>11 14 1441</i>	•		•••		•••		241
DAYADA,	æ,	•••		•••		•••	•••	271
								140
partaker of obla	ations d	habivi	or und	livide	ત્રું			155
means a co-heir, ————————————————————————————————————	e <i>aotra.</i>	- 1 1 4 0 4		-11140	,,	•••		126
DEAF.	· g,		•••		•••		•••	
excluded from inheritar	ace.					•••	•••	253
DEATH.	,	•••		•••			•••	
								4
extinguishes right, opens succession to obst	tructed I	heritae	76.		•••	•••	•••	ib.
DEBTS.	• •		,~,	•••		•••	•••	•••
moral liability of sons, g	randenne	and o	rest.o	randa	ons to	disch	arce	154
legal liability of heir to	dischar	ge.	,1000-B.		0113 00	CIBOL .		ib.
DEDUCTION specific,	dibona;	5~,		•••		•••	•••	•••
							52 <i>at</i>	0471
partition with,	•••		•••		•••		53 et	90Y
DEED OF PARTITION,							000	001
best evidence of partition	ш,	•••		•••		•••	260,	201
DEGRADATION,	b							05
extinguishes right in th	e absenc	e or p	enance	,	•••			37
excludes from inheritan	Ce in the	auser	ice or l	репап	ice,			
DESERTED SON,	•••		•••		•••		101,	119
DESERTION,		_	_					
by husband, of unchaste		hen al	lowed,		•••		•••	153
DIVESTING OF ESTATI								
is not caused by subseq	uent dis	ability	,	•••		•••		253
DISCIPLE or PUPIL,								
succession of,	•••		***		***		201,	202
							,	

INDEX.				2	271
				1	Page
DISEASE,					_
incurable, excludes from inheritance,	•••		•••		252
husband may use wife's property during,		•••		•••	227
DISQUALIFICATION,					
to inherit arises from physical or moral de	efect,		•••	•••	2 52
DISSIPATOR OF WEALTH,				•	
a woman who is, not entitled to stridhan,		•••		•••	
DISTRESS,					
in, husband may take wife's property,	•••				226
in extreme, theft allowed,	ı	•••			26
DISTRIBUTION,					
by father's choice of his property in two	modes on	ly,			58
equal, of father's property, by sons' choice	9,	•	•••	•••	60
of grandfather's property, must be equal,		•••		•••	65
equal, is preferable in all cases,	•••		•••	•••	70
DIVINE or sacred authority,					
is the authority of the Sastras,		•••		14	l, 25
DIVISION. See Distribution and Partition					
DOUBLE SHARE,				•	
of acquirer,	•••		(63 <i>et</i>	seq.
of father in self-acquired property,	ı	•••			iħ.
of acquirer who is re-united,	•••		•••	•••	205
DUBIOUS PARTITION,					
how ascertained,	ı	•••			260
DUMB, excluded from inheritance,	•••				258
DVYAMUSHYAYANA,					
or son of two fathers,	,				104
DWELLING,					
husband must provide wife with,	•••		•••	•••	226
77 * *	•				
E.					
EFFECTS, not liable to partition,		•••		•••	248
ELDEST SON,					
may be entitled to specific deduction,	•••				58
cannot be given away in adoption,				•••	117
ENEMY, to father, not entitled to inherit,					252
EUNUCH, not entitled to inherit,	•••		•••	•••	ib.
EVIDENCE OF PARTITION,	•	•••		•••	•0.
deed of partition,					260
direct,	•••		•••		ib.
circumstantial,)	•••		•••	26
oaths and ordeals,	···		•••	•••	26:
EXCLUSION, from inheritance,	-	•••			25
EXCOMMUNICATED,	•	•••		•••	40
excluded from inheritance,					954
	•••		•••	•••	250
EXPIATION,removes disqualification arising from degr	ndot:			97	25
1891 HOLL ALIGITIS HOUSEHAURA HAR A LOUI GENT	augululi.			07.	40

Page

F.				
FAMILY,				
maintenance of, is a legal necessity,	•••			87
for maintenance of, husband may take wife's proj			•••	227
FAMINE,	. •			
at a time of, husband may take wife's property,		•	•••	ib.
FATHER,				
may alienate ancestral moveable for certain purpo		•••	•••	16
cannot alienate immoveable ancestral or self-acqu			•••	17
can alienate immoveable with consent of sons or	for leg	gal n		07
sity,		•••	•••	87 49
may distribute his property at his desire, ————————————————————————————————————	•••		•••	49 53
may give a share to his wife out of his property,	•••	•••	•••	57
entitled to two shares of his property,	•••		•••	63
equal share of ancestral property,		•••	•••	~~
not entitled to two shares of son's acquisition,		•••	•••	69
succession of, to estate of separated son,	•••		•••	185
succeeds before unchaste mother,		•••		191
succession of, to estate of daughter,	•••		•••	240
FATHER and SON,				
respective rights of, in joint property,		•••	16, 74	l, 87
FATHER-IN-LAW,				
when succeeds to daughter-in-law,		•••	•••	244
FATHER'S CONCUBINES,				
not partible,	•••		•••	249
FATHER'S GIFTS,				
not partible, • •		•••	250,	251
FATHER'S FATHER'S SISTER'S SON,				
is a bandhu and heir,		•••	•••	200
FATHER'S MATERNAL UNCLE'S SON,				
is a bandhu and heir,	•••		•••	ib.
FATHER'S MOTHER'S SISTER'S SON,				
is a bandhu and heir,		•••	•••	ib.
FATHER'S SISTER'S SON,				
is a bandhu and heir,	•••			ib.
FATHER'S WIVES.				•
entitled, according to Mitákshar.í to shares on part	ition by	ster	sons.	80
sonless, entitled to maintenance only, according to	the a	ıthor		ib.
FEELINGS.			,	
what is repugnant to, though legal, should not be	practi	sed.	•••	61
preservation of good, of co-heirs after separation,				
ed to,	•••		•••	247
FELLOW STUDENT,				
succession of,		,,,	•••	201

FEMALES,						Pag
as a general rule, excluded from inhe	eritance	, but	may ir	aherit 174	when 198	. 244
are sapindas, in the sense of allied by	y funer	al obla	tions,	of hu	sband	
and of husband's sapindas,		•••		•••	195,	244
that get shares on partition are co-h	eirs and	i may	be re-	-unite	d,	168
See Wife and Woman's Proper	ty.					
G.						
GAINS OF SCIENCE,						
defined and when not partible,	•••		•••			248
GANDHARVA, a form of marriage,		•••		•••	•••	240
GENTILES. See Gotrajas.						
GIFT,						
relinquishment by donor not sufficien	it to co	mplet	е,		•••	32
acceptance by donee completes,		•••		•••	•••	33
may be revoked, of sons and daughters,	•••		•••			262 65
<u> </u>	_	•••		•••	•••	00
GIFT SUBSEQUENT. See Anvádheya	7.				_	
GOTRAJAS or GENTILES, are those that are descended in the m	solo lin	. fu		amaa	 	
ancestor,	ISTG IIII	3 TLOII	i a con	птоп		199
includes females admitted into the se	otra hv	marr	9.07A.	•••		196
	o gotra	by ac	loption	n.	•••	126
are divided into sapindas and samana	dakas,			•••	196,	
GRANDFATHER, paternal,	•				•	
succession of,	•••		,			199
GRANDFATHER'S descendants,						
succession of,		-:-		•••	•••	ib.
GRANDFATHER'S property. See An	cestral	Prope	erty.			
GRANDMOTHER, paternal,	• •	•	•			
succession of,	•••		•••		•••	196
entitled to a share on partition,		•••		•••	•••	79
GRANDSONS,						
acquire right by birth,	•••		•••		8,	
by different fathers, take per stirpes,	,	•••		•••	•••	72
succession of, to stridhan,	•••				•••	238
GREAT-GRANDFATHER,						
succession of,		•••		•••	•••	199
GREAT-GRANDFATHER'S descendan	ts,					.,
succession of,	•••		•••		•••	ib.
GREAT-GRANDMOTHER,	. •			, e.	1	
is silently introduced as heir, there be succession.	ing no	_	ss tex	t ior		100
succession, See <i>Females</i> .		•••		•••	•••	199
GREAT-GRANDSONS,						
acquire right by birth,			•••		Ω	, 90
by different grandfathers take per sti	irpes.	•••	•••			72
35	£ ,			•••	•••	. –

ATTA	RDIAN,		F	age
u o n	father has the preferable right to be,		•••	93
attt		•••		111
GUI	JINON, of Scores-born son, a substancy are,			
	. H.			
	•			
HE	IRS.			
	relatives are,		•••	1, 2
	to a separated person enumerated,			131
	order amongst, determined by nearness of propinquity, 1	.85, 1	94,	
		1	.95,	2 00
HEI	RITAGE,			
	J_C J	•••	•••	2
	is of two sorts, obstructed and unobstructed,	•••		3
	two sorts of, explained,		•••	ib.
HE	RMIT, or Vánaprastha,			
		•••		202
Territ	SBAND and WIFE,			
110,	relation of, arises on completion of ceremony of marriage)_		107
	unity of,	,		230
	as between, no partition,	•••		165

H U	SBAND, must provide wife with food, raiment and dwelling,			226
	permission of, for the disposal of property by wife,	•••	•••	224
	power of, over stridhan in distress,	•••	•••	226
	succession of,	•••		240
	must refund stridhan taken, when rich enough to pay,	•••		227
	2000 202022 007 000000			
	· ·			
	I.			
	▼ *			
	OT, excluded from inheritance,	•••	•••	252
ILI	EGITIMATE son by a female slave,			
	of a Sudra, entitled to half share, or to whole property,		•••	130
	of a twice-born, entitled to maintenance only,	•••	•••	ib.
TLI	LNESS.			
	during, husband may take wife's property,			227
TM	MOVEABLE PROPERTY,			
1111	right to, not absolute before birth of son,			17
	joint, not saleable by a co-sharer,		•••	87
	saleable by a co-sharer after partition,		•••	257
	given by husband, not alienable by wife,	•••	•••	225
	given by parents to daughter, goes to her brother in de	efaul	of	!
	issue,	•••	•••	~ 4 4
TM	POTENT,			
	excluded from inheritance,			2 52
	can marry,	•••	•••	255
TN	CURABLE DISEASE excludes from inheritance,	•••		252
TTA	COTHER TOTALISM ANAMARITAN INTRICTIONARS		•••	- 404

INFANT,				Page
co-sharer's being, no bar to partition,	•••	•••	•••	89
				90
conceived before partition, but born after,	entitled	to a sha	re by	
re-opening partition,	•••	•••	92	2, 93
conceived after partition, entitled to father's	share,	• • •	•••	92
re-opening partition, conceived after partition, entitled to father's INHERITANCE,			•	
vests in relations.				1-4
vests in relations, from an unseparated person, vests by survive from a separated person.	orship.		•••	165
from a separated person,	<u>r</u> ,	•••	131-	-201
from a separated person, from certain religious persons, from a re-united person	•••		202,	203
from a re-united person,			204	-219
from a re-united person, from a woman,	•••	•••	228-	-244
INITIATION,	•••	••••		
means, the performance of the Sanskáras or	gaeram	ente incl	nding	
			uung	81
marriage, of brothers and sisters, charge on inheritance	•••	•••	•••	ib.
	,	•••	•••	050
INSANE, excluded from inheritance,	•••	•••	•••	202
INTERMARRIAGE,		•		
of a man of superior class with a wom	an of	inferior	class	
allowed,	•••	•••	. 95 <i>et</i>	t seq
allowed, of a man of inferior class with a woman of s	uperior	class,	•••	255
INVESTITURE with the sacred thread, an init	iation,			
of brother, charge on inheritance,				81
of brother, charge on inheritance, impotent, &c., are not fit for,	•••	•••	•••	255
ISSUE, male,				
includes grandson and great-grandson,				154
	• `			
-				
J.				
TOTAM DARKIN	•			
JOINT FAMILY,				
law of succession, as in ch. iii., does not appl	y to est	ate of a	mem-	
ber of, succession by survivorship applies in, a person may be a member of, with his sugrandson, father, grandfather, great-s	•••	•••	•••	154
succession by survivorship applies in,	•	•••	•••	165
a person may be a member of, with his so	on, gra	nason, g	great-	
descendants, in the male line, of fa	tner, o	grancı	atner	
and of great-grandfather, also with the wives of these,	•••	•••	•••	72
also with the wives of these,	•	••	•••	165
К.				
				
KANINA, or maiden-born son, a subsidiary son,	•••	•••		111
KARSHAPANA = $4 \times 20 \times 16 = 1280$ cown (for the purpose of penance, taken to be equal KING.	·ie s .	••		224
(for the purpose of penance, taken to be equa	al to on	e rupee	,	
		Poo. /	•	
when entitled to take estate,	•••	•••	•••	
not entitled to take estate of Bráhmanas,	•	••	•••	ib.

KINSMAN,				1	Page
means a person of the same gotra,			•••		1 26
KRITA, or son bought, a subsidiary son,		•••			117
KRITRIMA, or son made, a subsidiary son,	•••				118
KSHETRAJA, or wife's son, a subsidiary son,	•	•••		•••	104
. L.					
LAME, excluded from inheritance,				•••	252
LAW, or Smriti,	•••		•••	•••	
consolidates what was observed by primeval	man.				19
positive, is deducible from reason,	 ,	•••	•••	•••	20
positive, is therefore superfluously treated in	ı Sást	rag.	•••	•••	20
Sástras on positive, prevent the unthinking	from c	omm	itting	mis-	
takes,					ib.
conflict of, to be reconciled by referring ther	n to d	listin	ct case	s	
LEGAL NECESSITY.				-,	
necessary religious ceremony, maintenance of	f fami	1 . &		rati_	
			16		141
tute, See Alienation.	•••		10	, .,	121
					050
LEPER, excluded from inheritance,	•••		•••	•••	252
LIMITED INTEREST,					
wife only has, in husband's estate,		•••	•		140
LUNATIC, excluded from inheritance,	•••		•••		252
W					
M.					
MADMAN, excluded from inheritance,	•••			•••	252
MADMAN, excluded from inheritance, MAIDEN, daughter,	•••			•••	252
MADMAN, excluded from inheritance, MAIDEN, daughter, succeeds first to separated father.	•••	•••		•••	181
MADMAN, excluded from inheritance, MAIDEN, daughter, succeeds first to separated father, mother,	•••	•••	•••	•••	181 231
MADMAN, excluded from inheritance, MAIDEN, daughter, succeeds first to separated father, mother, entitled to quarter share on partition,	•••	•••	•••	•••	181 231 81
MADMAN, excluded from inheritance, MAIDEN, daughter, succeeds first to separated father, mother, entitled to quarter share on partition, marriage of, charge on inheritance,	 			 81,	181 231 81 219
MADMAN, excluded from inheritance, MAIDEN, daughter, succeeds first to separated father, mother, entitled to quarter share on partition, marriage of, charge on inheritance, maintenance of,	•••		•••	 81,	181 231 81 219 219
MADMAN, excluded from inheritance, MAIDEN, daughter, succeeds first to separated father, mother, entitled to quarter share on partition, marriage of, charge on inheritance, maintenance of, succession to estate of,	•••			 81,	181 231 81 219
MADMAN, excluded from inheritance, MAIDEN, daughter, succeeds first to separated father, mother, entitled to quarter share on partition, marriage of, charge on inheritance, maintenance of,	•••			 81,	181 231 81 219 219
MADMAN, excluded from inheritance, MAIDEN, daughter, succeeds first to separated father, mother, entitled to quarter share on partition, marriage of, charge on inheritance, maintenance of, succession to estate of, MAIDEN-BORN SON. See Kánína. MAINTENANCE.				 81,	181 231 81 219 219
MADMAN, excluded from inheritance, MAIDEN, daughter, succeeds first to separated father, mother, entitled to quarter share on partition, marriage of, charge on inheritance, maintenance of, succession to estate of, MAIDEN-BORN SON. See Kánína. MAINTENANCE, of chaste widows, charge on inheritance.	•••	 	•••	81, 	181 231 81 219 219 240
MADMAN, excluded from inheritance, MAIDEN, daughter, succeeds first to separated father, mother, entitled to quarter share on partition, marriage of, charge on inheritance, maintenance of, succession to estate of, MAIDEN-BORN SON. See Kánína. MAINTENANCE, of chaste widows, charge on inheritance, of maiden daughters.				81,	181 231 81 219 219 240
MADMAN, excluded from inheritance, MAIDEN, daughter, succeeds first to separated father, mother, entitled to quarter share on partition, marriage of, charge on inheritance, maintenance of, succession to estate of, MAIDEN-BORN SON. See Kánína. MAINTENANCE, of chaste widows, charge on inheritance, of maiden daughters.				81, 174,	181 231 81 219 219 240 219 219
MADMAN, excluded from inheritance, MAIDEN, daughter, succeeds first to separated father, ————————————————————————————————————				81, 174,	181 231 81 219 219 240 219 219 130
MADMAN, excluded from inheritance, MAIDEN, daughter, succeeds first to separated father, mother, entitled to quarter share on partition, marriage of, charge on inheritance, maintenance of, succession to estate of, MAIDEN-BORN SON. See Kánína. MAINTENANCE, of chaste widows, charge on inheritance, of maiden daughters, of illegitimate sons, of daughter-in-law, from mother-in-law's est			 158, 	81, 174, 	181 231 81 219 219 240 219 219 130 244
MADMAN, excluded from inheritance, MAIDEN, daughter, succeeds first to separated father, mother, entitled to quarter share on partition, marriage of, charge on inheritance, maintenance of, succession to estate of, MAIDEN-BORN SON. See Kánína. MAINTENANCE, of chaste widows, charge on inheritance, of maiden daughters, of illegitimate sons, of daughter-in-law, from mother-in-law's est			 158, 	81, 174, 	181 231 81 219 219 240 219 130 244 226
MADMAN, excluded from inheritance, MAIDEN, daughter, succeeds first to separated father, mother, entitled to quarter share on partition, marriage of, charge on inheritance, maintenance of, succession to estate of, MAIDEN-BORN SON. See Kánína. MAINTENANCE, of chaste widows, charge on inheritance, of maiden daughters, of illegitimate sons, of daughter-in-law, from mother-in-law's est		 	 158, 	81, 174, 	181 231 81 219 219 240 219 219 130 244
MADMAN, excluded from inheritance, MAIDEN, daughter, succeeds first to separated father, ————————————————————————————————————	tate,	 le,	 153, 	81, 174, 	181 231 81 219 219 240 219 130 244 226 153
MADMAN, excluded from inheritance, MAIDEN, daughter, succeeds first to separated father, ————————————————————————————————————	tate,	 le,	 153, 	81, 174, 	181 231 81 219 240 219 240 219 130 244 226 153 224
MADMAN, excluded from inheritance, MAIDEN, daughter, succeeds first to separated father, ————————————————————————————————————	tate,	 le,	 153, 	81, 81, 174,	181 231 81 219 219 240 219 219 130 244 226 153 224 3, 81
MADMAN, excluded from inheritance, MAIDEN, daughter, succeeds first to separated father, ————————————————————————————————————	tate,	 le,	 153, 	174, 	181 231 81 219 240 219 240 219 130 244 226 153 224

MARRIAGE,—(continued).				1	Page
persons competent and bound to giv	e a girl i	in,			~~
completed on completion of ceremon	y of,			•••	107
involves the idea of gift of the girl,		•••	107,	113,	262
MARRIED DAUGHTER,					
succession of, to separated father's	estate.				181
to mother's estate,		-1-	•••		231
MATERNAL UNCLE,	•••			•••	
is a bandhu, and as such succeeds,					200
		•••	•••	•••	200
MATERNAL UNCLE'S SON,					ib.
succeeds as a bandhu,	•••	•••		•••	ш.
MINOR,	1.4.				00
a co-heir's being minor, no bar to pa		•••	•••	•••	89
share of, to be entrusted to guardia	n,	•••		•••	90
father is guardian of,		•••	•••	•••	93
MOTHER,					
life of, no bar to partition,				74 et	
entitled to a share on partition,		•••	•••	•••	
share of, becomes her <i>stridhan</i> ,	•••	•••			92
is a co-heir of sons,		•••	•••	79,	168
but cannot demand partition,	•••	•••			168
may be re-united with sons,	•	•••	***	168,	169
succeeds by survivorship,	•••	•••			164
succeeds to a separated son,		•••	•••		185
before father if chaste and	virtuous,	•••			191
arter rather, in unchaste,	•	•••	•••	•••	ib.
succeeds to a re-united son in prefer	ence to	wife,			216
succeeds to daughters,	_		•••		240
right by birth of sons to stridhan of		•••			228
no partion of property of, during he	r life,	• • •	•••	44,	22 8
MOTHER'S RELATIONS,		_			
succession of,	•	•		•••	200
MOVEABLES,					
ancestral, father's right to,		•••	•••	16.	17
MULTIPLICITY,			• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •		,
is a defect in a hypothesis when it i	nvolves	a greater	numb	er of	
		m Bromer			29
assumptions,	ľ	•••	•••	•••	
17					
N.					
NECESSITY. See Legal Necessity and	l Alienai	tion.			
NEPHEWS. See Brother's son and Si					
NISHADA.	0007 0 007	••			
is a son of a Bráhmana by a Súdra	mifa				97
most of		•••	•••	•••	98
right of,	•••	•••		•••	•0
NIYOGA or appointment to raise issue,				100	100
practice of, censured,	•	•••	•••	106,	108
may be made by husband or the ver	ierable p	rotectors,			111
theory that widow accepting, succeed	eds, is rej	jected,	•••	143,	148

NITTO TO A	77 . 1					^		Page
NUPTIAL presents or	Yautaka,	or pres	ents be	tore n	uptial	tire	222,	ൈ
described, succession to,	•••		•••		•••			230
auccession to,	•••	•••		•••		••	• ···	200
		0.						
OBSEQUIES,		0.						
performance of, oblig	zatory on	heirs.						256
OBSTRUCTED HERIT		 ,	•••		•••		•••	
		• •						Ω
described, succession to,	•••	•••		•••		•••	131-	-203
	•••		•••		•••		101	200
ONLY SON, cannot be given in a	dontion							115
		•••		•••		•••	•••	110
ORDER OF SUCCESS See Succession, Strice	dhan and	Pa unio						
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	snun anu .	<u> </u>	"					
ORNAMENTS,								OEA
not partible,	· ···		. ***		•••		•••	250
OUTCAST AND HIS	SON,				-			~=~
excluded from inheri			be not	perfo	rmed,	•••	•••	253
not entitled to main	tenance,		•••		•••		•••	254
		P.						
		. —						
PARASAVA or son of a	Bráhmana	by a 8	údra v	vife,		•••	97,	119
PARENTS,								
succession of,	•••							185
PARTITION.								
Johnad		•••					8	, 39
does not produce pro	prietary r	ight.		•••				
means also succession	n or devol	ution.			131.	204	, 228,	252
of joint family prope				•••	•	•••	44	-130
of father's property.	when and	by wh	om ma	de.			44	
mode of, by father o	f his prop	erty no	t arbit	rary,				53
on, father entitled to	o two shar	es of h	is prop	erty,		•••		63
on, father's wives ma	ay get sha	res of h	is prop	erty,	•••			57
of ancestral property	, may be	enforce	d by so	ons,			•••	49
on, of ancestral prop	erty fathe	r and s	ons equ	ual sha	rers,		•••	65
on, after father's des				share,		•••	•••	79
on, maiden daughter	s get quar	ter sha	re,		•••		•••	81
may take place at th				o-beir,		•••	•••	89
one born after, entit	led to a sh	are,	•••		•••		•••	
by sons of different	castes,	•••		•••		•••	95	
by true and subsidiar	ry sons,		•••		•••		12l-	
of the estate of a sep	parated pe	rson,		•••		•••	131—	203
See Succession.	•. •						004	
of the estate of a re-	united per	son,	•••		•••		204-	.219
See Re-union.							800	
of woman's property	,	•••		•••		•••	228-	211
See Stridhanam.	_						-	245
of concealed property	y,	1		1 4 . "	•••			
cannot be re-opened	by one the	at nas a	ssente	ı to it,		•••		259
may be revoked when	ο,							56

			•	P	age
PARTITION OF HERITAGE, means law of succession and inheritance,				1-	-
PARVA OCCASIONS,	•••		•••		
means days of new moon, half moon, fu	ill moon.	and t	ransi	t of	
the sun from one sign of the zodiac to				•••	90
PARVANA SRADDHA,	•			•	
means ancestor worship on parva occasions	3.				
PATNI,					
is a wife wedded in a lawful form of marri	age,	•••		•••	132
succeeds first to the estate of separated	l husband			nale	100
issue, See <i>Wife</i> .	•••		•••	•••	104
PAUNARBHAVA or son of twice married wor	man dagai	nhad			114
PINDA.	man desci	i i beu,		•••	LLT
means food, body and food offered to a	decease	d per	son a	at a	
Sraddha ceremony,		- P		110,	121
POSTHUMOUS SON,				•	
born after partition entitled to a share by	re-openin	g par	titio	n,	94
PRAJAPATYA, an approved form of marriage	е,	•••		•••	240
PRECEPTOR,					
succession of,	•••		•••	200,	202
PRESENTS,					
to a woman by relatives, become Stridhan,	,	•••			220
by strangers, not absolute Stridhan,	•••		•••	•••	222
PROFANE AUTHORITY, is, the authority of sensation, perception	n andrin	faran		dia.	
tinguished from the authority of the			e aus	uis-	25
PROPERTY	~u,	•••		•••	
is a distinct category of its own	٧.				24
notion of, is not of divine origin,	•	•••			-24
PROPINQUITY,					
nearness of, determines succession,	•••	185,	194,	195,	200
PUPIL,					
succession of,	_	•••		201,	202
PUTTRIKAPUTTRA, or appointed daughter	's son,				100
a subsidiary son, described, means either such daughter's son,	. •••		•••		102 <i>ib</i> .
or such daughter herself,		•••		•••	103
rights of,	•••	•••		21 et	
_					•
R.					
RECOVERED PROPERTY,					
in ancestral, by father, he has the same r	ights as i	n self	-acqı		
property,			•••		, 74
without detriment to paternal estate, is pa	artible,	•••		•••	249
RELIGIOUS DUTY, of heirs to perform Sráddha of deceased,				•	950
• or none to belief blancher of deceased,	•••		•••	•••	256

	Page
RELIGIOUS PRINCIPLE,	
	0, 91
determines priority to some extent, 155-	
according to, son, grandson and great-grandson equal, 90	, 155
RE-MARRIAGE,	
	. 114
of undefiled widows, explained to refer not to Kali age,	. 61
in the shape of appointment, of undefiled widows,	. 107
REPRESENTATION,	
rule of,	72
•	
RE-UNION,	
may be formed with one who was a member of the joint family,	
i. e., with one male or female who obtains a share or	
partition, 168	, 205
	204
on partition after, a co-heir entitled to two shares only of pro-	
perty self-acquired during,	205
sons re-united or not equally succeed in the first instance to	ı
father re-united with his brother &c., 205	. 217
representation obtains on partition after,	205
order of succession to the estate of one dying after, without	
male issue :	
(1) re-united whole brother, (2) re-united half brother and unas-	
sociated whole brother, (3) re-united mother, (4) re-united	
father, (5) any other re-united co-parcener, (6) unassociated	
half brother, (7) unassociated mother, (8) unassociated	
father, (9) wife, (10) sister, (11) sapindas, (12) samanodakas,	
	-207
maintenance of maiden daughter and wife, and marriage of	
daughter, charges on the estate of one dying after,	219
	210
RE-UNITED,	
does not include son of a re-united co-sharer,	216
REVERSION,	
allowed after widow alone, the interest of other female heirs	
	140
•	1.10
REVERSIONERS,	
after widow are dáyádas or those who would take joint estate,	140
RIGHT,	
	3, 4
to unobstructed heritage, by birth, to obstructed heritage, by extinction of previous owner's right,	ih
extinguished by death, degradation &c.,	37
	0,
RIVAL WIVES,	
may divide husband's property,	132
of, she that is married in a lawful form of marriage, succeeds	
first,	ib.
of, she that is of the same caste with husband succeeds in pre-	
	ib.

S.

SACRED AUTHORITY,	
is the authority of the Sastras, 1	4, 25
SAGOTRA,	• .
means a person descended from a common male ancestor, in the	е
male line, 105	5, 196
	. ib.
includes subsidiary sons,	. 126
divided into sapindas and samánodakas, relationship extends to)
fourteenth descendant of fourteenth ancestor, or so far a common descent is known,	s . 199
SAHODHHA, or son received with a pregnant bride, a subsidiary son	
SAKULYA,	,
means a sagotra, 142	2, 200
a sapinda in the sense of blood relation other than a sapinda	3
in the sense of allied by oblations,	156
SALE. See Alienation.	
SAMANODAKA,	
is a sagotra other than a sapinda, 199	, 200
relationship, extends to the fourteenth descendant in the male	ð
line of all the ascendants, in the male line, up to the	
fourteenth in ascent,—barring the sapindas,	ib.
or to all those that are recognised to be of common descen in the male line.	τ , <i>ib</i> ,
	. 10.
SANSKARAS, or initiatory rites, See Initiation.	
SAPINDAS OF A PERSON,	
in the sense of allied by oblations, are his son, grandson, great	-
grandson, father, grandfather, great-grandfather, and three	e
descendants in the male line of father, of grandfather and	d
	. 155
in the sense of blood relations are six descendants, six ascendant	
in the male line, and six descendants in the male line of each of the six ascendants in the male line, 199	1
of the six ascendants in the male line, 198 blood relations of a different gotra, though literally sapindas are	7, 400 a
	. 199
SASTRAS,	
proper subject of, is what is beyond the means of human	n
knowledge,	. 20
still, treat of things that are otherwise deducible from reason,	. ib.
SAUDAYIKA, or kind gift, a kind of Stridhan,	
	. 224
SELF-ACQUIRED PROPERTY,	
father entitled to two shares of his,	. 63
	. 205
•	. 248
36	

								I	Page
SEP	ARATED CO-SH	ARER,							
	rights of,	•••	•••		•••		•••	• • •	257
SIS'	TER,						•		
	uterine, succeeds to	o re-united bro	other,	•••		•••		•••	215
	maiden, entitled to	quarter share	on pa	rtitio	n,		•••		81
	marriage of, charge	e on inheritance	e, ¯	•••		•••		53	, 81
SIST	ER'S SON.								-
~_~.	succession of, to Si	tridhan.							243
SLA		,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,		•	•••		•••	•••	
ЮПИ	illegitimate son by	a famala							190
a03.		a lemaio,		•••		•••		•••	130
SON					1				
	right of, in proper	ty of father, &	c. arı	ses by	birth,	, 3 , 1	ra—17	, 66,	228
	not so, according t partition of father	o Dayannaga	ana ot	ners,		11.	. 1	13	, 81
	partition of father	s property by	choic	e or, y	vnen a	mo & e	×		49
	entitled to ancestra	n property equ	uany v	WILD I	atner,			;	65
	grandson and gre	at-grandson e	ntitle						
	father &c. in	the first instan	ice,	a				131,	
	•	- to re-united	tather	, &c. 1	n the	first i	instanc	e,	205
	between a re-unite	d, and one not	so, th	ere 18	no di	stinct	ion,	•••	217
	succeeds to certain		mothe	r's p	copert	y equ	ually v		
		iter,			••••		•••		228
	other	properties in	detaul	t of d	aught	er's i	ssue,	•••	2 38
SON	S, true and subsid	iary,	•••				1	.00-	130
	1, true legitimate	son, or <i>auras</i>	a desc	ribed,		•••			101
	superior to su		•••	-	•••		•••		120
	2, appointed daug	ghter's son or	puttri	ká-pu	ttra,	•••			102
	means eithe	er the appoint	d dau	ghter	herse	lf,	•••		103
		or her son,		·		•••			102
	3, wife's son or A		•••		•••		•••		104
	includa	s Dvyámyskyá	yana,						ib.
	4, secretly begot	ten in the hou	se or	Gúdhi	haja,		•••		111
	5, maiden-born o				•	•••			ib.
	6, son of twice n		or P	aunar	bhava,		•••		114
	7, son given or d	lattaka,			•				115
	8, son bought or		•••		•••		•••		117
	9, son made or k	ritrima,		• • •					118
	10 son self-given	or Snauandatt	a.		•••				ib.
	11, son received w	ith a pregnant	bride	or s a	hoddh	а,		`	119
	12, deserted son o	r Apaviddha,				•	•••		ib.
	partition by,	· ′		•••		•••		•••	9 21
	rights of subsidiar	v. in adopted	family	٧.			•••		126
SO	n's son,		•						
201	succeeds with son,	•				1	72, 90,	154	205
	per stirp			•••		•••	· 2, 00,	72,	205
	succession of, to &	tridhar	•••		•••		•••		243
801		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		•••		•••		•••	# EO
נטמ	n's son's son,					,	70 00	15/	90=
•	succeeds with son	and son's son,	•••		•••	7	72, 90,	104,	200
	per stirp	68 ,		•••		•••			72
	succession of, to &	stridhan.			•••			R.	243

INDEX.		28
		Pag
SON'S WIFE,		
is a <i>sapinda</i> ,		24
not entitled to inherit from mother-in-law,	•••	ib.
entitled to maintenance,	•	ib.
SPECIFIC DEDUCTIONS,		٠
partition with,		58
SPIRITUAL BENEFIT,		
not the principle of inheritance,	•••	90, 91
determines to a certain extent, priority,	90, 8	91, 15
SPIRITUAL BROTHER,		
succession of,	•••	202
SRADDHA, is a ceremony in honor of deceased,		
STEP-BROTHER,		
succession of,		194
STEP-BROTHER'S SON,		
succession of,	•••	195
STEP-DAUGHTER,		
succession of,		284
STEP-MOTHER,		
entitled to a share on partition, agreeably to Mitákshará	, .	80
to maintenance only according to author,		ib.
STEP-SON,		
is like an adopted son,		116
succeeds to step-mother,		248
son and son's son of, succeed,	•••	ib.
STRIDHAN, or woman's property,	00/	
described,)224
bears no technical meaning, no power of disposal of, without husband's permission,		221 224
excepting certain kinds,	•	ib.
immensation 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	••••	225
male members have no power over,		ib.
husband may take, in distress,		226
taken by husband, when recoverable,		227
Succession to,	228	3-244
to gift subsequent and affectionate gift by husband,		
daughter jointly succeed,	•••	228
to <i>yautaka</i> ,		
maiden daughter succeeds, in her default, husband succeeds,		230
in her default, husband succeeds,	23	5, 286
to other kinds of,	_	
(1) maiden daughter, (2) unprovided married d	aughter	r,
(3) provided married daughter, (4) widowed daug	nter,	231
(5) daughter's daughters in the same order as da	retagu	5, Q 041
(8) (0)	23	o, 241 243
(7) son, (8) son's son, (9) son's son's son,	• •	,. ==0

STRIDHAN,—(continued).	°ag6
(10) step-son, (11) his son, (12) his grandson,	243
(13) husband, 239—	239
other heirs, 239—	244
what is given by parents after marriage goes to brothers in	
default of issue,	242
sulka goes to brother,	ib.
gift by bandhu goes to bandhu in default of issue,	ib.
STUDENT,	
	202
SUCCESSION to estate of a re-united person, 204—	219
See Re-union.	
SUCCESSION to estate of certain religious persons,	202
SUCCESSION to estate of a separated person, 131—	
(1) son, grandson and great-grandson, 131,	
(2) chaste wife,	
2, of inferior caste,	
(3) daughters,	176
1, maiden, 2, married unprovided, 3, married provided,	181
	188
(4) daughter's son,	185
1, chaste mother, 2, father,	200
1 mond fother O mush and month and	191
(A) brothers	192
Tutama G balk	102
(7) brother's son,	104
(7) brother's son,	195
(0)	100
(9) grandfather, (10) paternal uncle, (11) paternal uncle's son,	100
(12) paternal great-grandmother, (13) great-grandfather,	
(14) grand uncle, (15) grand uncle's son, (16) nearest	
sapinda, (17) nearest samanodaka,	100
sapinda, (17) nearest samanodaka, (18) nearest bandhu, (19) preceptor,	200
(20) numil (21) fellow student (22) king or Rahhmanae	901
(18) nearest bandhu, (19) preceptor, (20) pupil, (21) fellow student, (22) king or Bráhmanas,	201
SUCCESSION TO BITTIDITAN, 226-	244
See Stridhan.	
SUDRAS.	
inferior position of, 121,	130
SULKA.	
	223
	242 242
goes to province	2¥2
SUPERCESSION,	~~ 4
and the state of t	224
SUPERFLUOUS PRECEPT, or injunction,	
is a text of Sástras, declaring what is deducible from profane	
authority, or from another text,	5
SURVIVORSHIP,	

INDEX.					Ä	600
					F	age
T.				•		
THEFT.						. •
concealment by co-heir of joint prope allowed, when,	rty is,		•••	•••	· ;···	245 26
THINGS not liable to partition,						248
in the second se	•••		•••		•••	
U.						
TINOTI A CONTON		•	•			
UNCHASTITY, excludes widow from inheritance,					133,	154
subsequent, does not divest,	•••	•••	•••			253
does not exclude mother,		•••		•••	•••	191
disentitles widow to maintenance,	. :**		. •••	. :		174
wife of one excluded from	inherit	ance,	to ma	unten	ance,	255
UNCLE,		,				100
paternal, succession of, maternal, ————,	•••		•••			199 200
UNDIVIDED FAMILY. See Joint Fa	mila	•••		•••	•••	200
UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION,	meery.				٠.	
of paternal property by father's choice	ce.				55	3, 63
UNINITIATED,			•••			, 00
initiation of, charge on inheritance,					444	81
UNMARRIED.		•	•••			
brother, sister and daughter, marriage	e of,			5	B, 81,	219
girl succession to property of,	•	•••		• • • •		240
UNOBSTRUCTED HERITAGE,		•				
defined,	•••					
devolution of,		. • • • •	•	•••	131-	-203
USAGE,						
overrides law,	•••		•••		•••	61
v.						
VANAPRASTHA or hermit,	•					
succession to property of,				•••		202
become to property or,		•••		•••	•••	
. W .				•		
WIDOW.						
chaste, succeeds to separated husband	,		•••		132,	153
re-marriage of,		•••		61,	107,	
chaste, entitled to maintenance,		•	•••	•		153
cannot adopt without consent of hus	band's	kinsm	ien,	•••	•••	116
See Wife.						

						Page
WIDOWED DAUGHTER without son,						
entitled to succeed to father,	•••		•••	•		178
as such, not entitled to preference,		•••		•••	181,	, 231
WIFE,						
status of, arises on completion of man			ny,		107,	, 132
husband has a sort of proprietory righ	t over	,	-	•••	105	, 113
husband's son by co-wife is like an add	opted	son to	,		•••	116
can adopt son with husband's permissi	ion,			•••	• • • •	ib.
for her own sake,	•••		•••			ib.
no partition between husband and,	•••				59,	165
acquires a sort of peculiar right over	r husba	nd's	prope	rty di	iring	
their joint life			_	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •		165
entitled to food, raiment and dwelling	from	husba	nd.		225,	226
entitled to share on partition,	•••					57
different castes of				95.	132,	
does not succeed to joint husband,		•••			153,	
succeeds to separated husband in defau		nale i	8811e.		132,	153
succeeds to re-united husband when,					214—	
chastity, condition of succession of,	•••		•••		152,	
adulterous, entitled to maintenance f	mom h	 zahan	a if a	ianos	d to	100
perform penance,	TOM III	TDO:	u 11 u	rebose		153
of joint co-heir, entitled to maintenance	og if a	hasta	•••		158,	
of re-united co-heir entitled to maintenant				•••		219
of excluded from inheritance, entitled	to m	ainta	•••	(f . a)	···	210
	и ш				TOPO NO.	255
and not perverse, power of, over stridhan during covertu		•••		•••	•••	224 224
power or, over striants during covertu	re, .:. J:-	.	• • •			
power of husband over's stridham	in aus	tress,		•••	•••	226
witness,						
best, of partition, are kinsmen,		•••		•••	260,	261
WOMAN'S PROPERTY,						
See Stridhan						
WORDS IN A PRECEPT.						
cannot signify two meanings, one prims	PV and	the	ther o	econd	0 22	79
	ary and	I UIIG C	OHOL :	50 00110	ary,	10
WRITING,						001
is better than parol evidence,		•••		•••	•••	261
Y .						
YATI or ASCETIC,						
succession to estate of,						202
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	•••		•••		•••	202
YAUTAKA,						000
described,		•••		٠2.	•••	230
maiden daughters alone succeed to,			•••		•••	ib.
in default of maiden daughter, husband	i Atc. s	nccee	d.		225.	226

JZS LMS SPm
The lew of inheritance as in t
Stanford Law Library
3 6105 043 865 463

